BEF 1914: Attrition of Officers' Experience

[Guest]

Excellent work Martin, fascinating and valuable.

I had very great difficulty when trying to work out officer reinforcements to 7th div. if I remember I tracked down a few commissioned from the Artists Rifles and a number commissioned from the ranks.

David

David - 7th Div was a real revelation, second only to properly understanding the annihilation of the August men.

Finding them was not too difficult as the Star roll proved to be reassuringly accurate. One can count the number of Officers 'missed' by the roll on one hand. Finding out what happened to them was trickier. If you are interested in seeing the detail on them please PM me. I am in your debt for info you have provided in the past. I am confident I have captured fatalities as every individual is double checked against ODGW. The real challenge is ensuring one has pinned down non-fatal casualties. The consistency in reporting this category varied considerably across Regiments. Some units simply made no record so I am confident these numbers are the minimum and may well increase with some further research.

Another eye-opener; some units with extremely thin diaries had excellent published histories, suggesting either the historian had weeded the diary or the historian had access to some rich material in the shape of personal diaries or both. The reverse was also true.

Off to complete the 8th Div. MG

[David Filsell]

Martin,

More than happy to see the material. I will check it against what I have on file from my uunfinished manuscript on the 7th Div at Ypres. (largely unfinished because of the dearth of contemporary material and accounts after October 30th.

Best regards

David.

Good luck with the 8th - it should be easier!

[charlesmessenger]

Excellent work Martin, fascinating and valuable.

I had very great difficulty when trying to work out officer reinforcements to 7th div. if I remember I tracked down a few commissioned from the Artists Rifles and a number commissioned from the ranks.

David

David

You are absolutely right. In mid November `1914 a number of Artists' were given immediate commissions. The first 50 went to 7th Division and Henry Rawlinson was most impressed by them.

Charles M

[Guest]

David

You are absolutely right. In mid November `1914 a number of Artists' were given immediate commissions. The first 50 went to 7th Division and Henry Rawlinson was most impressed by them.

Charles M

Gents, as I know you are aware, the diaries were generally very good at tracking Officer's comings and goings. The diaries (all BEF infantry) captured over 95% of the data if my recent exercise is anything to go by.

When I search the 1914 diaries for Artists Rifles, 12 diaries show results - all examples of probationary Officers being attached for instruction. A typical diary entry;

2nd Bn Gordon Highlanders (20th Inf Bde, 2nd Div)

13th Nov 1914. "Four privates of Artists' Rifles sent to each Battalion of the Brigade on a month's probation with a view to giving them commissions"

MG

[Guest]

Final data for the regular Infantry: 8th Div. - see table below.

I have traced data of sufficient quality for 97 of the 102 regular infantry battalions that disembarked within the dates of the 1914 Star (5th Aug-22nd Nov 1014) in the BEF; 2,662 individuals. For these 97 'First cohorts' - the Officers who disembarked when their battalions initially deployed - the stats;

Regular Infantry Officers 1914 Star - First Cohorts

Overall Casualties: 77%

Fatal Casualties: 40%

Please note the data is for the whole war. The skew towards 1914 is 75% for overall casualties and 65% for fatalities - i.e one in every four regular infantry Officers who disembarked with their battalions in 1914 would die before the end of the year*. A considerable number who were wounded in 1914 recovered, only to be killed in 1915. This data is only for the First Cohorts.

The tables do not include the 2nd, 3rd ,4th etc Reinforcements within this period. These additions would doubles the sample. I am working on these stats and early indications are that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th etc cohorts suffered a similar fate. The reason that casualty ratios for these later cohorts were as bad was mainly due to the disasters at Neuve Chapelle, Aubers, Festubert and later Loos. We might reasonably expect this but the concentration of losses around these dates are quite astonishing. As just one example, the 1st Bn Royal Irish Rifles (8th Div) lost 9 Officers killed and 9 wounded at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915 (all men who landed in Nov 1914). Their replacements were annihilated two months later; 23 Officers killed or wounded at Fromelles on 9-10th May 1915. This later group are of course in the 1914-15 Star data.

As mentioned before, the 'First Cohort' figures are light. The variance in the fatal data will be extremely low as every name was checked twice against ODGW. I would estimate an upwards variance of 0.2% for the fatalities as the record keeping in this area was good and we have multiple sources. Given parts of some diaries were lost, diarists failed to record some non-fatal casualties and some histories were purely based on the war diaries, it seems inevitable that scores of wounded are missing from the data. The numbers above should be taken as a minimum. There are battalions where there were 10 fatalities and one non-fatal casualty (see 8th Div data below). This seems to be so unlikely as to be virtually impossible. In cases where we see these distortions in the data, it is nearly always due to the lack of a decent published history or large chunks of a diary missing or both.

I strongly suspect the missing non-fatal casualties would push the data above 80%. I will revert with a more refined calculation in some months. For now I am confident that the figure above have integrity. The 1914-15 Star data is five times larger. I will be back in 6 months with this. If anyone knows of battalions that had exceptionally good record-keeping in 1915, any pointers would be gratefully received.. Any mistakes are mine. MG

* Calc: 40% x 60% = 26%

In table below the data highlighted in pale yellow indicates data is incomplete.

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Martin,

Just to thank you (and the others) for all your research and pulling it altogether in the spreadsheets. Although one would naturally expect a higher percentage of fatalities amongst those fighting for the longest period the figures for 1914 casualties alone make grim reading.

[phil andrade]

Martin,

Are we to understand that roughly two thirds of the 142 officer fatalities in your tabulation died beween date of disembarkation ( between 5th and 7th November ) and December 31st 1914 ?

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Martin,

Are we to understand that roughly two thirds of the 142 officer fatalities in your tabulation died beween date of disembarkation ( between 5th and 7th November ) and December 31st 1914 ?

Phil (PJA)

Not for 8th Div, as they landed in early Nov 1914, but if we take the First Cohorts of Aug (1st-5th Divs) , First Cohorts of Sep (6th Div) First Cohorts of Oct (7th Div) and First Cohorts of Dec (8th Div) combined, 65% died in 1914. I can get the stats on 8th Div as a sub-group [Edit: 18% for 1914 and 63% in 1914-15]. I suspect the ratio of 8th Div that died in 1914 will be very low [confirmed] as they largely missed First Ypres. Comparing 1914 data with 7th Div which landed only a month earlier is quite telling. ...however when we look at the disasters of early 1915, 8th Div took a severe hammering, so the 8th Div stats on a plus six months from landing look as horrendous as I and II Corps [Edit 65% (I and II Corps) v 63% 8th Div] We can see in the data how each wave of the BEF gets annihilated. There are some interesting charts in prep.

Basically it answers the question: "what happened to the first Officers off the boat for each regular battalion of the BEF?". The data varies a bit, with the August cohorts having a greater skew towards 1914. Without making this too complex it is now possible to select any subgroup of the 97 battalions; e.g 1st Div or II Corps or Irish Regiments and work out the attrition on any time scale: 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 6.78 months, by the end of 1914, within a year or by the end of the war (shown above). Within that it is also possible to select more narrowly defined sub-groups.

If one was inclined to know what happened to Irish Regiment adjutants, I can now provide the answer. Similarly if someone wanted to know if Majors had a higher risk of becoming a casualty than 2nd Lts, we can now know with a very high degree of certainty. If The Scotsman wanted to know what happened to Officers in Scottish battalions I could give it accurate stats. It takes the conjecture out of the equation. Having built the data, I am now trying to comprehend some of the outputs. For example why Battalion COs survivability was so much higher than Senior Majors, or why the Guards died in such higher proportions than the Line infantry, or why so many Officers died; many more than I would ever have guessed. Close to four times more than the fatality ratios of the British Army through the war. That is a simply staggering stat and something I would never have guessed.

I have started the 1914-15 rolls and it is more depressing than the 1914 rolls, simply because the Army appears to have lacked any imagination in tactics. As part of this process (cross checking the diaries and histories) the main impression I have had is that the BEF kept making the same mistakes again and again. The use of human flesh in the absence of materiel (guns and ammunition) in the early part of 1915 is quite apparent. Sadly Loos proved that the lack of materiel was not the only challenge. This is not a criticism, merely an observation anchored on the data.

The main impact this has had is that it has completely shattered any prior understanding I have had of the motives of these Officers, especially those of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th etc cohorts and especially the subalterns. A subaltern joining a battalion that had already seen the equivalent of two or three battalion's worth of Officers destroyed would almost certainly know what his chances were. Despite this stark reality, these 'children', 'ardent for some desperate glory' still managed to find enough strength of character to face the inevitable. Quite something.

Any mistakes are mine. MG

[phil andrade]

Martin,

" ...the BEF kept making the same mistakes again and again."

Do you think this is attibutable to the very destruction of the officer cadre that you have so meticulously and convincingly tabulated ?

If so, I would want to discuss whether this was uniquely pernicious for the British ; or whether an extreme loss of officers afflicted the performance of other armies to the same degree.

Phil (PJA)

[SteveMarsdin]

In his book "Tommy", Richard Holmes writes that "about half of the army's staff college graduates were killed or crippled in the first nine months of the war" which would seem to be backed up by your statistics.

[phil andrade]

It was surely a " no brainer" that officer casualties in the BEF's 1914 fighting were very heavy ; but I for one have to acknowledge that - but for the research and presentation provided by Martin - I would never have guessed that the fatality rate ( and I allude especially to fatality, rather than casualty rate) was as dreadful as has been revealed.

Phil (PJA)

[seaforth78]

"I have started the 1914-15 rolls and it is more depressing than the 1914 rolls, simply because the Army appears to have lacked any imagination in tactics. As part of this process (cross checking the diaries and histories) the main impression I have had is that the BEF kept making the same mistakes again and again. The use of human flesh in the absence of materiel (guns and ammunition) in the early part of 1915 is quite apparent. Sadly Loos proved that the lack of materiel was not the only challenge. This is not a criticism, merely an observation anchored on the data."

Martin,

Out of interest, would you agree that because the British and French had to do the attacking 95% of the time with the Germans content to hold what they gained, that the latter learned from the errors of their enemies their breakthrough tactics which they use to great effect in 1918? The French seemed to have learned quicker than the British and if we look at the 1st day of 1st July 1916 for example, the French took all of their 1st day objectives; indeed Maxse praised the French Army's tactics and said that as of 1916 the British still had a way to go. I would think that 1917 was the year that the BA was the most experienced and professional as they have become since 1914.

[phil andrade]

"I have started the 1914-15 rolls and it is more depressing than the 1914 rolls, simply because the Army appears to have lacked any imagination in tactics. As part of this process (cross checking the diaries and histories) the main impression I have had is that the BEF kept making the same mistakes again and again. The use of human flesh in the absence of materiel (guns and ammunition) in the early part of 1915 is quite apparent. Sadly Loos proved that the lack of materiel was not the only challenge. This is not a criticism, merely an observation anchored on the data."

Martin,

Out of interest, would you agree that because the British and French had to do the attacking 95% of the time with the Germans content to hold what they gained

There is scope for some revision of this widely held view. In broad strategic terms, of course, it is valid. But I think that the Germans were not just content to hold what they had gained ; they wanted to exploit their tenure by using every opportunity to inflict maximum harrassment and damage on the Franco British forces. A survey of the fighting in F&F 1914-1915 reveals a large number of German attacks. In much of this fighting , the Germans enjoyed advantages of terrain and were able to inflict disporoportionate damage, especially when the Allies felt themselves compelled to counter attack. Second Ypres will come to British minds, but the French suffered all too many such incursions. Anxious as I am not to appear adversarial, I think that it is a mistake to think that the Allies attacked 95% of the time.

As for the destruction of the British officer contingent in 1914, I wonder how far the British tactical inferiority to the French ( a contentious statement, I fear) which I reckon was eradicated by July 1918 ( a two year lag, I would suggest) - can be attributed to this. Surely the French - and the Germans too - were afflicted by similarly catastrophic losses among their officers ? Or was there something uniquely "British" in this phenomenon ?

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Martin,

Out of interest, would you agree that because the British and French had to do the attacking 95% of the time with the Germans content to hold what they gained, that the latter learned from the errors of their enemies their breakthrough tactics which they use to great effect in 1918? The French seemed to have learned quicker than the British and if we look at the 1st day of 1st July 1916 for example, the French took all of their 1st day objectives; indeed Maxse praised the French Army's tactics and said that as of 1916 the British still had a way to go. I would think that 1917 was the year that the BA was the most experienced and professional as they have become since 1914.

Seaforth78 - I don't know if the Allies were attacking 95% of the time. It certainly didn't feel that way at First Ypres. I know very little about the French in the Great War and only a bit about the British. I have not read beyond 1915 in any detail. I think to understand 1916,17 and 18 one probably needs to be well read in the earlier years to understand the context of tactical changes. It is very complex and currently way beyond my limited abilities. My sense is that the British learned some hard lessons in defence from the Germans when the British failed in their attacks at Festubert and Aubers for example, however my understanding of the 'learning' process is limited - how did these hard lessons force change?

I do not doubt that there were mechanisms in place to learn from mistakes, but it is difficult to see these being implemented in early 1915. In short I dont see that the BEF had changed its tactics between 1914 and the first half of 1915. If they did I woud be interested in some pointers. The the context of this tread (attrition of Officers' collective experience) I can only think of the introduction of the LOOB in 1915 as a tangible tactical change aimed at lowering the casualty rates. The earliest example I have seen was in an Operational Order in July 1915 - at Gallipoli, not the Western Front.

The supply of trained Officer material was of course limited. The attrition rates of 1914 were not sustainable. Something had to change. MG

[phil andrade]

Martin,

You mention " The use of human flesh in the absence of materiel ( guns and ammunition ) in the early part of 1915...".

One hundred years ago this very day the British were able to deploy a truly massive concentration of artillery at Neuve Chapelle.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

In his book "Tommy", Richard Holmes writes that "about half of the army's staff college graduates were killed or crippled in the first nine months of the war" which would seem to be backed up by your statistics.

I am adding this kind of data - commission dates, psc, etc, so sometime soon I should be able to tighten that figure up. His definitions are a bit loose though - I am not sure there is any data that records how many staff officers were 'crippled'. If he meant 'wounded' I can understand where he is going, but if that is the case his numbers are not very accurate if the 1914 star data is anything to go by. The Staff College at Camberley might have a roll of honour.

The Staff medal rolls are separate to the battalions, and it is something I intend on wading through soon. As one might imagine the attrition at this level was markedly lower and would support the counter-theory that 50% were killed or crippled. One only has to look at Infantry battalion COs compared to their Senior Majors to get an understanding of the relative attrition ratios against rank. - there is a marked decline in both fatality ratios and non-fatal casualty ratios. In fact it is the most pronounced step in the data. While rank and staff college graduates are not 100% correlated, there will be similarities. There are dozens of Brigade Staff in the data I have and their ratios are much lower.

To get the full picture one needs the 1914-15 Star data. In a few months I may be able to give a more accurate assessment. MG

[GGirl]

Very interesting reading Martin, one of the early Gordon casualties 23/8/1914 is my great uncle Leslie who is thought to be the first Australian born soldier to die and then in the Black Watch is his Brother George Richmond who travelled back to Scotland to join his regiment after war was declared and still managed to get to France on the 14/10/1914 , he was wounded and returned to the front and then serverely wounded, and could not return. I find it fascinating to try and understand their mind set. I have picked up the diary again, it has been a while ... I don't think the details will help this thread though.

[Guest]

BEF 1914 Cavalry. I have just finished transcribing the 1914 Star roll for Cavalry Officers. 1,191 individuals including Remounts. Brigade and Div Staff yet to be added. The record keeping was significantly worse that the Infantry for some unexplained reason. The disembarkation dates for 4% of the Cavalry Officers were simply not recorded.

There appeared to be greater fluidity between regiments perhaps reflecting the smaller base numbers; a regiment with high casualties would need officers from other regiments. The Indian Army (British) Officers provided a healthy number of replacements. The other notable characteristic is the loose alignment of regiments. Some regiments reinforcements predominantly came from specific regiments. It was not a free for all, so we see the 20th Hussars and 14th King's Hussars linkages and 13th Hussars with 11th Hussars. One might reasonably expect to see lancers reinforce lancers and hussars with hussars etc, but we see quite a mix; lancer Officers appearing in Dragoon Guards (for example) and vice versa.

Tracing the fate of these Officers is proving to be more difficult as I have proportionally fewer published histories. A number of cavalry regiments had their squadrons split between different formations which makes tracking down the diaries slightly more difficult. The process of reassembling the fragments is more challenging.

An example below: The 1st Life Guards sent a squadron with the Household Cavalry Regiment in Aug 1914. Fourteen Officers disembarked on 16th August 1914. 10 would become casualties. The Regiment reassembled after 8th October when another 32 officers arrived. Nineteen of these would become casualties. Of these two groups, close to two-thirds would become a casualty. The story of the cavalry in the trenches is one that is often overlooked.

1st Life Guards 1914 Star Officers' Medal Roll:

[Muerrisch]

Martin, thank you for these. The fact that the cavalry suffered very considerably in the trenches was, in my opinion, because they could indeed function as infantrymen. The decision [not universally popular] to arm them with the SMLE instead of a popgun carbine, and the decision to train them to the same standards of musketry as the infantry, was very important. I venture to suggest that neither allied nor enemy cavalry could have held the line in times of crisis.

[phil andrade]

Were these cavalrymen in Martin's tabulation actually fighting from trenches ; or were they dashing about from place to place to bolster up the line in time of crisis ? I'm trying to envisage the kind of battlefield that the men of First Ypres had to deal with, and wondering whether it had consolidated sufficiently to allow for trenches. I think I remember reading Haig's diary, and he does allude to trenches ; but I cannot remember if this was during - or after - the October/November battles. I imagine the cavalrymen digging " scrapes" and forming a line from them.

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

Phil, were you querying "trenches" per se, or "cavalrymen in trenches" please?

If the former, widespread use in WDs First Ypres.

If the latter, we need a cavalry expert I think. I am pretty sure that yes indeed, cavalry did spells in proper trenches. But then "I don't do donkey wallopers" so cannot quote chapter and verse.

[Guest]

Were these cavalrymen in Martin's tabulation actually fighting from trenches ; or were they dashing about from place to place to bolster up the line in time of crisis ? I'm trying to envisage the kind of battlefield that the men of First Ypres had to deal with, and wondering whether it had consolidated sufficiently to allow for trenches. I think I remember reading Haig's diary, and he does allude to trenches ; but I cannot remember if this was during - or after - the October/November battles. I imagine the cavalrymen digging " scrapes" and forming a line from them.

Phil (PJA)

They were in very basic trenches, but definitely in the front line alongside the infantry for weeks. If you can get a copy of R A Lloyd's A Trooper in the Tins (later renamed Troop Horse and Trench) it is a vivid account of the Life Guards in the Great War.

"At 8:30 am [25th Oct 1914] we moved up to Zanvoorde to relieve the 6th Cavalry Brigade in the trenches....our position was on the left of the Brigade next to the 2nd Gordon Highlanders who were right of the 7th Division.... There was no continuous line. The trenches were a series of holes, for all the world like large graves, not connected and running zig-zag across the hillside....the trench was about ten feet long, two feet wide and five feet deep"

[phil andrade]

Thanks for putting me in the picture, Grumpy and Martin.

My mind's eye had me seeing the cavalrymen of autumn 1914 as a mobile reserve of mounted infantry ; and since I always associated the fighting of later October to mid November of 1914 as a series of encounter battles, with their attendant dramatic crises, I'd assumed that the cavalrymen were being moved about more than most.

If Lee's infantrymen could construct trenches in the encounter battles at Spotsyvania in May 1864, then I suppose that the BEF solidiers fifty years later were more than happy to do the same.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

My mind's eye had me seeing the cavalrymen of autumn 1914 as a mobile reserve of mounted infantry ; and since I always associated the fighting of later October to mid November of 1914 as a series of encounter battles, with their attendant dramatic crises, I'd assumed that the cavalrymen were being moved about more than most.

Phil (PJA)

The unit war diaries are quite clear on this period - the Cavalry operated as infantry through first Ypres. They were very effective too. They held significant parts of the line, rotating through the trenches alongside the infantry Brigades. It is an interesting period and one that is often either glossed over or completely missed in many early histories including the OH which really does not do the Cavalry any justice in the infantry role. . Even the Marquess of Anglesey's monumental 'A History of the British Cavalry' doesn't really cover this in sufficient detail..

A 'must read' book on this subject is David Kenyon's "Horsemen in no-Man's Land: British Cavalry & Trench Warfare 1914-1918" which devotes a whole chapter to this period. A wonderful book. MG

Page 23: "The operations of the BEF and of the cavalry in August and September 1914 have been well described in any number of different accounts. ..... this work is mainly concerned with the more neglected activities of the cavalry in the trench warfare that characterised the Western Front"

[David Filsell]

The cavalry literally held the line on October 1914 from Zandvoorde to the Ypres Commines canal.