BEF 1914: Attrition of Officers' Experience

[phil andrade]

Martin,

You mention social conditioning.

These dreadful officer casualty rates in 1914 - which, I'm sure, were higher relative to those of other ranks than in any other year - suggest to my mind that a noblesse oblige syndrome was at work, reflecting the upper class provenance of so many of the regular army officers in that era.

Or could it be that these were engendered more by the nature of those early battles, with their close quarters infantry encounters which required officers- whatever their social background - to lead conspicuously ?

Perhaps the social conditioning of those officers imparted a special " dynamic" to the fighting.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

Following on from my thoughts above, this special " dynamic" that I mentioned could be the function of having to deal with reservists who were not fit.

The perils of being an officer are amplified if the men you're leading are close to collapse, physically and mentally.

The inordinately high death rate among Majors that you've discerned, Martin, could be pertinent here...relativley high ranking officers having to intervene and try and hold things together.

The very high proportion of POWS among the August casualties of the BEF is also remarkable, even allowing for the difficulties of an army in retreat.

This leads me to think that we've been persuaded to take a rather romanticised view of the Old Contemptibles, and that the shockingly high death rate among officers might indicate that things were not quite as we've been encouraged to believe.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Phil - It is extremely difficult - arguably impossible - to isolate any factor. Each factor impacts the others and vice versa. It is complex system. We know for example that Officers were ordered to dress less conspicuously in 1914 after the crossing of the Aisne. It is perhaps one small but tangible attempt to specifically reduce Officer casualties. Later in the War the mistakes made on the Western Front were being repeated with tragic consequences in the Dardanelles, where Officers were again ordered to dress in soldiers uniforms and carry rifles and an early form of the LOOB was introduced to further reduce the impact of any catastrophic action. In 1914 these men of course at the beginning of a very long period of tactical evolution. Preliminary research into K1 and K2 on the Western Front suggests similar levels of attrition in the Officer ranks. The British Army was slow to adapt in some aspects.

We know British Officer battle casualties were in higher proportions than OR battle casualties throughout the whole war. The data suggests this differential was even more pronounced in 1914 and might reflect a number of factors. The 1915 data appears to be in similar orders of magnitude. I dont think exhaustion of Reservists would have been significant factor. Men were exhausted or under-trained or unfit in subsequent phases of the war. It was common. It simply impacted a different cohort. It is worth remembering that we are looking at Infantry Officers rather than All Arms and the units that were first to disembark; the men at the tip of the 'sharp' end. We should expect the data to be worse than the aggregate data. It is the magnitude of that differential - 1914 compared to later periods - which intrigues me and the impact it had on the accumulated experience. In 1914 and early 1915 Officers and Men were becoming casualties faster that they could be replaced. It follows that there had to be a concomitant erosion in accumulated experience in the Officer ranks during this period.

The drivers behind the style of Officer leadership in the British Army and its sometimes negative consequences have been explored in a number of well researched books:

• The Old Lie: Great War and the Public Schools Ethos by Peter Parker
• Playing the Game: The British Junior Infantry Officer on the Western Front 1914-18 by Christopher Moore-Bick
• Six Weeks: The Short and Gallant Life of the British Officer in the First World War by John Lewis Stempel
• Public Schools and the Great War: A Generation Lost by Anthony Seldon and David Walsh
• Stemming the Tide: Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force 1914. Various Authors. Edited by Spencer Jones.
• British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the First World War by Peter E Hodgkinson

They are all very good reads and concur on many ideas of what drove this extraordinary group of men. The motivating forces are complex. In the first year of the war when young privileged middle class men from public schools dominated the Officer ranks the 'Public School 'ethos' alluded to by Peter Parker was a significant factor. More recent research by Peter Hodgkinson and others is demonstrating how the composition of the Officer ranks changed as the war progressed and how the Public School 'ethos' became less significant. Hodgkinson's work in particular is starting to dismantle some myths on the social backgrounds of British Officers.

That aside, the Officer class (for want of a better expression) in 1914 was fairly homogeneous and were selected from a very narrow section of British society. That they had a common ethos should not really be a surprise. There are a number of excellent first hand accounts by Officers who fought in the BEF in 1914. They put some life into the dry statistics and give some idea of the prevailing attitudes. The diaries of the younger officers are most illuminating. Hyndson's for example runs to 15,000 words, Hudson's to 9,000 words:

• Lt Hyndson - 1st Bn Loyal North Lancashire Regt
• Lt Wollocombe - 4th B Middleses Regt
• Capt Paterson - 1st Bn South Wales Borderers
• Capt Hudson - 1st Bn King's (Liverpool Regt)
• Lt Col Davies - 2nd Bn OBLI
• Lt Col Gibbs - 2nd Bn DOWR
• Maj MacLeod - 2nd Bn DOWR
• Lt Col Bond - 2nd Bn KOYLI
• Lt Wynne - 2nd Bn KOYLI
• Lt Col Forbes - 2nd Bn Wiltshire Regt
• Lt Col Churcher - 1st Bn Royal Irish Fus
• Brig Gen Burrowes - 1st Bn Royal Irish Fus
• Brig Gen Bird - 2nd Bn Bn Royal Irish Rifles

...and a dozen other anonymous narratives. All the above are embedded in the war diaries of the respective units.

A long winded way of saying I dont yet know. : )

I have crunched the data on 36 battalions so far. Rather than drip feed the data I will complete it and post in a few weeks time as I need to double check the data and populate it with details from the diaries. It will cover every Officer in every battalion of the BEF that qualified for the Mons Star. 77 Regiments and 120 battalions. Over 5,000 names. I think it will be quite interesting reading. MG

[phil andrade]

Good of you to post that reply to my rather ad hoc suggestions, thanks, Martin.

I want to make a coment : the exhaustion of reservists might well have been replicated in the ranks later on in the war ; but in the extreme circumstances of 1914, wouldn't that exhaustion have been more pernicious ?

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

"Public School Ethos" is a difficult concept for a Brit., and impossible I suggest for an outsider to understand.

My very narrow expertise is of one regiment, RWF. After the public school boys of 1914 fell dead, wounded, sick or moved on to the staffs, came the grammar school boys and the rankers promoted from the stalwart NCOs and WOs.

My impression is that the grammar school boys were imbued with the much the same ethos as the public school boys, and indeed these attitudes towards monarch, country, empire, duty and muscular Christianity survived into the 1950s.

I attended a good Grammar run on public school lines and, when I entered the world of work, my peers were a mix of public school and grammar. There appeared to be no systematic differences in outlook and work ethic, the most obvious differences were of accent and idiom.

I participate in my school forum and there is a clear fault line in ethos and outlook between, shall we say, 1940s intakes and 1970s

[Guest]

The Coldstream Guards 1914-18 Vol I page 273: Fourteen of the original 90 officers were still with their battalions on 23rd Nov 1914. An attrition of 84%.

Cross checking this data against the diaries, medal rolls and CWGC data, I have managed to trace 88 Coldstream Guards Officers who disembarked with their battalions in Aug 1914. Of these 74 became battle casualties (84%) and 38 died - a 41% fatality ratio of the original cohorts of the Coldstream Guards' Officers.

[paulgranger]

I'm missing the point, probably, but the table total of officers killed, wounded or captured is 89. The narrative remarks below the table imply that 14 officers remained with their units unhurt, out of 90 altogether, which leaves 76 killed wounded or captured, a difference of 13. No?

[Guest]

I'm missing the point, probably, but the table total of officers killed, wounded or captured is 89. The narrative remarks below the table imply that 14 officers remained with their units unhurt, out of 90 altogether, which leaves 76 killed wounded or captured, a difference of 13. No?

The difference is the Original battalion and the subsequent Reinforcements. The maths implies of the 89 casualties, 76 were 'originals' and 13 were subsequent reinforcements. MG

[paulgranger]

Ah, thanks for the clarification.

[Guest]

Some more grim reading:

130 Coldstream Guards Officers appear on the 1914 Star medal roll. 115 of them became battle casulaties at some stage during the war: 88%.

[Muerrisch]

I have been mulling over the "loss of officer experience" concept, as opposed to "loss of officers in the front line [by reason of death or incapacity or posting to the staff or whatever].

One reads frequently of the "learning curve", the "learning process" etc of the British army during the course of the war, culminating in the "all arms" concept, the "bite and hold" principal, the use of air assets, the ready availability of reserves, and indeed the improvement of staff work.

I do not wish to be misunderstood in saying that the early "losses" might in fact have cleared the way for fresh minds to rise rapidly to the levels where they could demonstrate adaptability and innovation. There were I believe expressions of hope about a "return to proper soldiering" by Christmas 1914. The peacetime constraints on the army had meant that there had been little practice of war skills at levels above brigade.

Appalling loss of life, yes. Truly appalling.

But much of the "experience" was of the piping times of peace and barrack life, and not necessarily relevant.

[phil andrade]

And here's a discordant note from me....the proportion of officers killed vis a vis ORs is actually lower than that for the BEF as a whole in 1914.

I state that from memory, without recourse to my cherished Med Stats, but I'm confident that my observation is valid.

Maybe that's because there were fewer officers in the Guards' Battalons than there were in other formations ; or it might reflect a more prominent leadership role played by NCOs...or it might be a distinctly assertive combat role played by the ORs, who were conscious of their legendary status as guardsmen and were keen to show that they were special. Then there's Lady Luck....

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

Mine was not meant to be discordant I hasten to add.

[phil andrade]

Now it seems that I have missed something ; the table states that 29 officers were killed or died from wounds, while Martin has found that 38 died. How do we account for the difference of nine ?

The 38 officer deaths would demolish the point I made about the lower than normal ratio of officer fatalities against the deaths among ORs.

Doh ! I failed to notice that the 38 applies to the whole war. The 29 apply to the end of First Ypres.

May I rehabilitate my earlier comment ?

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

I have been mulling over the "loss of officer experience" concept, as opposed to "loss of officers in the front line [by reason of death or incapacity or posting to the staff or whatever].

One reads frequently of the "learning curve", the "learning process" etc of the British army during the course of the war, culminating in the "all arms" concept, the "bite and hold" principal, the use of air assets, the ready availability of reserves, and indeed the improvement of staff work.

I do not wish to be misunderstood in saying that the early "losses" might in fact have cleared the way for fresh minds to rise rapidly to the levels where they could demonstrate adaptability and innovation. There were I believe expressions of hope about a "return to proper soldiering" by Christmas 1914. The peacetime constraints on the army had meant that there had been little practice of war skills at levels above brigade.

Appalling loss of life, yes. Truly appalling.

But much of the "experience" was of the piping times of peace and barrack life, and not necessarily relevant.

Measuring experience and its relevance for the Western Front in 1914 is of course subjective.

I take a rather simpler view. A Lt Col with 25 years' experience gets killed. He is replaced with a Major of 25 years' experience who severely wounded and is a permanent casualty. 50 years experience gone. There are no more Majors left as they are all killed wounded or promoted upwards . The replacement is a Captain with ten years experience. He is killed as is his replacement of seven years experience recently promoted from Lt. He in turn is replaced with an SR Captain of 6 years part-time experience and is left commanding his battalion at Ypres less than 3 months from disembarkation. Incidentally the SR Captain has only been in theatre for 3 weeks. This was not uncommon. While one might argue the learning curve of the SR Captain was steep and more relevant than fighting the Boers but I can't see how his short and gallant service can in any way replace the cumulative lost years. The organisational skills alone would be very difficult to replace.

The casualty ratios for Officers of the first cohorts was extremely high, but so too were the casualty ratios of their immediate replacements. MG

[seaforth78]

Martin G,

I have read carefully every post here and I had noticed that not one commentator had mentioned (or noticed?) that perhaps why the officer casualties were so high was because of the high density of officers in a typical British battalion. For example compared to a German or Japanese battalion a good deal of the platoons were led by SNCO's not 2nd Lts and due to the continental Regimental structure, the highest rank commanding a battalion was a Major. Companies by Lieutenants or Captains. The Germans and Japanese (who were trained by the former) noticed this and much remarked on the top heavy officer ratios compared to other European armies.

I had always wondered why there had to be 4 majors, 4-6 captains and twice as many subalterns in a BB. It does, even today, seems a bit bloated. I think this one factor would explain the high rates.

[phil andrade]

Seaforth,

Valid comment, yes...although I think that we have been aware of the huge disparity of ratio : I'm guessing here, but would I be right in saying that in the Franco German armies, there was one officer for every fifty men ; while the British deployed one for thirty ?

That said, we need to address the fact that the officer fatality rate vis a vis that of other ranks was conspicuously higher in 1914 for the British that it was to be in the following years. The nature of the 1914 fighting obviously impinged here.

I'm still wondering why the difference was so reduced in the Coldstream Guards example. No way am I suggesting that the officers held back...heck, one third of them were dead by the end of First Ypres. But what is clear is that the guardsmen they led were more likely to share their officers' fate than was the case in the general survey of the BEF casualties for 1914.

What might account for this difference ?

Editing : I must not subject pals to a blizzard of statistics, but allow me to draw attention here :

Med Stats, France and Flanders, 1914-18, one officer combat fatality for every eighteen other ranks ; 1914 alone, one officer for every fourteen. Coldstream Guards example, August to November 1914, one officer for every twenty one other ranks....a very marked disparity, in the order of fifty percentage points. It was every bit as lethal to be a guards' officer, but, for reasons I find intriguing, the men they led were singularly prone to dying with them. I need to mention this, because I noted the same phenomenon in the Guards when they fought one of their biggest battles on the Somme on 15 September 1916. Another thing about the Coldstream Guards example : note the relatively low number of POWs. Another testimony to high morale and unit pride ? This, of course, might be attributable to avoidance of the actions in the August retreat that yielded the Germans so many prisoners. But I cannot resist the temptation to suggest that elite units, conspicuous for high traditions of morale and professionalism, exhibit a lower disparity of deaths between officers and men than the general average.

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

Quote:

I had always wondered why there had to be 4 majors, 4-6 captains and twice as many subalterns in a BB. It does, even today, seems a bit bloated. I think this one factor would explain the high rates.

Not so. The War Establishment demanded only a single major as [variously] "senior major" or "second in command".

All the company commander posts were fluid complemented major/captain and it was not unknown for a battalion, even in August 1914, to have just the single major. If you SEARCH you should find extensive coverage of this topic herein.

[Guest]

Martin G,

I have read carefully every post here and I had noticed that not one commentator had mentioned (or noticed?) that perhaps why the officer casualties were so high was because of the high density of officers in a typical British battalion. For example compared to a German or Japanese battalion a good deal of the platoons were led by SNCO's not 2nd Lts and due to the continental Regimental structure, the highest rank commanding a battalion was a Major. Companies by Lieutenants or Captains. The Germans and Japanese (who were trained by the latter) noticed this and much remarked on the top heavy officer ratios compared to other European armies.

I had always wondered why there had to be 4 majors, 4-6 captains and twice as many subalterns in a BB. It does, even today, seems a bit bloated. I think this one factor would explain the high rates.

Seaforth78 - A very interesting point and certainly one I had not considered. The top heaviness of the British Army was I think rooted in its old 8 Companies-per- battalion structure (see below). One also has to bear in mind that the small professional British Army was structured for expansion and had disproportionately higher numbers of Officers. It takes longer to train an Officer that to train an infantryman. A corollary of this 'top heavy' argument might be that the British Infantry had more Officers (leaders) than it needed at battalion level. The obvious counter to this is that the BEF's extraordinary performance in 1914 might have had something to do with this top heavy command structure at Battalion level. Both ideas are difficult to prove (or disprove). Officer casualties - and the impact it had on lost experience (the subject of the thread) can be measured in a number of ways and each measure tells us something quite different.

• Absolute number of casualties - this is interesting when compared to the number of available trained Officers - how long can the attrition be sustained?. At the beginning of the war, official expectations were way short of the unfolding reality.
• Officer casualties relative to the number of Officers on the battlefield - this is interesting as it one measure of the intensity (and lethality) of a particular phase (1914 in the context of this thread)
• Officer casualties relative to Other Ranks casualties - relative to the respective numbers on the field. This measure is interesting as it might tell us something about the behaviour of one group relative to the other. When we get a large body of data, it becomes statistically relevant. This part is interesting (to me at least) as we have lots of large data and the differentials are huge, which prompts questions.
• All of the above compared to other Armies (your point)

If I understand this correctly, your suggestion is that there were high British Infantry Officer casualties simply because there were lots of British Infantry Officers on the Battlefield. This doubtless explains high absolute numbers (the first measure above), but not the proportion as a per cent of Officers on the battlefield.

Roughly speaking the British Infantry accounted for 60% of All Arms of the BEF in 1914. The 1914 Star was issued to 378,000 British personnel, implying by 22nd Nov 1914 some 227,000 Infantrymen had entered the theatre of war. With numbers this large, we can be fairly confident that the laws of large numbers will provide some meaningful stats. Within this mass of 227,0000 men (All Ranks) the 1914 Star was awarded to 5,700 Infantry Officers or 2.5% of the total. This is absolutely consistent with proportions in (revised) War Establishment, possibly suggesting that the ratio of Officers:Other ranks in theatre was fairy consistent with War Establishment during the period. Notably this was only achieved by cross-posting Officers between Regiments, something that was rarely done with ORs in 1914.

With such a large number of men, and the random nature of death and destruction, in theory the probability of becoming an Infantry casualty was fairly evenly distributed. In reality it wasn't. Infantry Officer casualty rates were significantly higher than those of Other Ranks by any measure. This is consistent across every battalion in the British Army in 1914. Something has to explain this. The obvious conclusion is that the role of the Officer was the causal factor rather than the absolute numbers. The Officer/Other Rank comparison is simply easier to measure as the data was collected based on this divide. I suspect that if we had data for the other leaders - NCOs - we would see higher casualty ratios than that of the Rank & File. The correlation between leadership and the propensity to become a casualty is high, although for the British Army we only have two main divisions: Officers and Other ranks.

I have collated the data for the 5,700 infantry Officers who were awarded the 1914 Star and it is interesting to see the casualty differentials between the various ranks. The data is not yet complete (I have to populate the names with non-fatal data from the diaries and histories) but the data on the 381 Guards Officers who served within the dates of the 1914 Star is complete. While it is a small sample and statistically less robust, there are some indications that fatalities were evenly distributed across the ranks of Lt, Capt and Major (37-38%) but higher among 2 Lts (43%) and lower for Lt Cols (9%).

Within these groups, roles such as Adjutant had higher fatality ratios (50%) which is particularly interesting. Why? I wonder. If we separate the Majors that were elevated to command Battalions the remaining Majors' fatality ratios jumps to over 50%. Battalion command was a relatively 'safer' role in 1914. This was fortunate as dead men cant make critical decisions that might save lives. Of greater interest is that the role rather than rank had a greater impact on the likelihood of becoming a casualty. I have often been struck by the number of ORs promoted in the Field to 2nd Lts who subsequently died within a very short period. There might be some evidence that outsanding junior leadership among ORs in 1914 was rewarded with an even riskier job of Platoon Commander - often with catastrophic consequences for the appointee.

We have to be extremely cautious with this data due to the small sample, but there seems to be a relationship between 'point' leadership (read 2 Lt Platoon Commander) and fatalities. This is well understood but the statistical confirmation is reassuring. One might expect the Officers leading the men at the very sharp end of the point would fall in greater numbers . What is interesting is to find out what happened one and two levels of command further up. When lines were wavering and all four Platoon Commanders were incapacitated, what happened next and what were the consequences? The data on Company Commander fatality ratios will take more time to compile as the necessary data needs to be rebuilt. A few weeks.

A few comments on the numbers of Officers in a British battalion. This is an area where a few authors have small blind spots. The BEF in Aug 1914 had its War Establishment of Officer reduced by three in early Aug 1914. This was to offset the 3 Officers required from each battalion to form the nucleus of the New Army battalions. Most of the first 54 battalions (4 Divs of 12 battalions each plus 6 battalions as Army Troops) deployed with 26-27 Officers.There were slight variations on this and the reduction by 3 Officer did not last beyond October. The typical structure was

• CO (Lt Col)
• 2IC (Maj)
• Adjt (Capt or Lt)
• MGO (Subaltern)
• QM
• Transport Officer
• MO (RAMC)
• Four Companies of five Officers each. (20)

Most companies were commanded by Captains, but in most battalions one Company was commanded by a Major. In addition there were four more Officers per battalion. i.e. five Officers per Coy (total 20). This meant that in many cases, assuming one Officer was Coy 2IC, one platoon per Coy was commanded by an NCO. The alternate structure was to drop the 2IC and have Officers as platoon commanders. The structure of the BEF in Aug 1914 was top heavy with Captains, so in most cases the second Captain was the Coy 2IC rather than functioning as a Platoon Commander. The reason for this was the legacy of the 8 Company Structure still used in India in 1914 and with the TF at the outbreak of the War. In 1914 some early dairies refer to the Companies as 'double companies' based on the old structure. The conversion from 8 to 4 companies happened after mobilisation for some overseas battalions and the TF. This meant that half of the Company Commanders were reduced to Company 2ICs in the 'new' structure. To take on the role of Platoon Commander might have been a step too far.

The other thing that falls out of the structure above is that it was very rare for battalions to deploy with more than two Majors. There are examples but it was not the norm.

I have done some research on the BEF in 1914. There are dozens of diaries and published histories that recorded in some detail the nominal rolls of the Officers that embarked for France in August. We probably have detailed records in 80% of the cases, so around 45 examples of the original troops that disembarked in Aug 1914 and over 70 for the BEF in 1914. The data is fairly robust.

MG

[Guest]

Seaforth,

Valid comment, yes...although I think that we have been aware of the huge disparity of ratio : I'm guessing here, but would I be right in saying that in the Franco German armies, there was one officer for every fifty men ; while the British deployed one for thirty ?

That said, we need to address the fact that the officer fatality rate vis a vis that of other ranks was conspicuously higher in 1914 for the British that it was to be in the following years. The nature of the 1914 fighting obviously impinged here.

I'm still wondering why the difference was so reduced in the Coldstream Guards example. No way am I suggesting that the officers held back...heck, one third of them were dead by the end of First Ypres. But what is clear is that the guardsmen they led were more likely to share their officers' fate than was the case in the general survey of the BEF casualties for 1914.

What might account for this difference ?

Phil. The stats in the history only show the casualties, not the total numbers sent out. The denominator of the OR figure is much larger and therefor the proprtions of OR casualties as a per cent of men sent out is lower. I will revert with the 1914 Star Coldstream Guards data. Edit: AT least 4,800 Coldstream Guards ORs were awarded the 1914 Star - 400 pages in the legers with 12 names per page.

The example shown in the book rather conveniently uses 22nd Nov as the cut-off date, so the 1914 Star medal rolls provide the denominators - 130 Officers and 4,800 ORs

Coldstream Guards

Ranks......................1914 Stars........Batt Cas........Ratio.....Fatal Cas.....Ratio

Officers.......................130.....................89..............68%........21.............16%

Other Ranks..............4,800................2331.............48%.......688.............14%

Note this cas stats are only up to 22nd Nov. Men still standing on this date continued to become casualties.

Edit 2: Importantly the ratio of Officers:

Other Ranks per Officer in Theatre: 38

OR Cas per Officer Cas....................26

OR Fatal Cas per Office Fatal cas.....33.

[seaforth78]

Good evening MG,

"If I understand this correctly, your suggestion is that there were high British Infantry Officer casualties simply because there were lots of British Infantry Officers on the Battlefield. This doubtless explains high absolute numbers (the first measure above), but not the proportion as a per cent of Officers on the battlefield."

Indeed I meant this exactly and thank you very much for your detailed analysis.

I have another question for you, and I ask this because the late Lt. Colonel Sir John Baynes Bt. who was a great friend of mine and helped me with my PhD thesis on a Cameronian officer wounded with the 2nd Scottish Rifles in 1915 who later became a Japanese post war apologist, discussed with me the typical structure of a British battalion and remarked how even as late as March 1915, how the 2nd SR went over the top very top heavy with 4 majors, 6 captains and about 9-10 subalterns all of whom he named. It was also around this time I believe that battalions started to leave 10% LOB so to be able to rebuild the battalion after their action, which they must have instituted after the losses of 1914, but said that the British really did not change the officer compliment of their battalions throughout the war and despite the high rates of attrition kept them in 'situ'

Why did they keep the old 8 officer Coy structure in the new 4 Coy one, knowing it imposed a great strain and did battalions in the field try to find a way out of this?

It seems to me that the British Army never intended to change its structure and indeed, if you look at the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards at Tumbeldown Mountain in 1982, you'll note the same ratio. Fascinating I think.

[Guest]

A very typical example: 2nd Seaforth Highlanders (see below).

Roll of Officers (by Companies etc) who landed in France 23rd Aug 1914.

Lt Col Sir E R BRADFORD Bt- Commanding (killed in action 14th Sep 1914)

Capt C I STOCKWELL - A/Senior Major

Lt Hon E O CAMPBELL - Adjutant

Capt J A DAVIDSON - Quartermaster

Lt P W K CARR - i/c Machine Guns

2 Lt N I MacWATT - Transport Officer

Lt E U RUSSELL - RAMC attached (transferred 2nd ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS 8th Sep 1914)

A Coy

Capt E CAMPION

Capt K D M MACLACHLAN (wounded 26th Aug 1914)

2 Lt G M MACKENZIE (3rd Bn SEAFORTH HLDRS SR)

2 Lt A HEPBURN (Sup List SR)

2 Lt B STEWART

B Coy

Capt P G ANSTRUTHER (wounded 14th Sep 1914)

Capt D G METHVAN

Lt A R BURNESS

Lt V M PRICE (3rd Bn SEAFORTH HLDRS SR)

2 Lt J F GLASS

C Coy

Capt H F BAILLIE

Capt H M SPENCER

Lt D B BURT-MARSHALL (Brigade Sig Off 10th Sep 1914)

2 Lt A J N WILLIAMSON (Sup List SR) (killed in action 14th Sep 1914)

2 Lt I N FYFE-JAMIESON

D Coy

Capt D A CARDEN (wounded 21st Sep 1914)

Capt E G HAY

Lt Hon D BRUCE

2 Lt A G COWIE (to hospital 31st Aug 1914)

2 Lt C E BAIRD

Source: 2nd Bn Seaforth Highlanders War Diary.

Edit:

The 2nd Bn RDF 1914 Star roll shows only one Major (Shewan DSO) disembarked during the period.

[phil andrade]

Am I right in stating that the burden of fatality was more equitably shared - in proportionate terms - between officers and men in the Coldstream Guards than in the BEF at large in 1914 ?

No flippancy intended here :

Good leaders need to be good bleeders ; but the best leaders get the other poor bleeders to bleed with them.

Colstream managed this well, it appears.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

I have another question for you, and I ask this because the late Lt. Colonel Sir John Baynes Bt. who was a great friend of mine and helped me with my PhD thesis on a Cameronian officer wounded with the 2nd Scottish Rifles in 1915 who later became a Japanese post war apologist, discussed with me the typical structure of a British battalion and remarked how even as late as March 1915, how the 2nd SR went over the top very top heavy with 4 majors, 6 captains and about 9-10 subalterns all of whom he named. It was also around this time I believe that battalions started to leave 10% LOB so to be able to rebuild the battalion after their action, which they must have instituted after the losses of 1914, but said that the British really did not change the officer compliment of their battalions throughout the war and despite the high rates of attrition kept them in 'situ'

Why did they keep the old 8 officer Coy structure in the new 4 Coy one, knowing it imposed a great strain and did battalions in the field try to find a way out of this?

It seems to me that the British Army never intended to change its structure and indeed, if you look at the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards at Tumbeldown Mountain in 1982, you'll note the same ratio. Fascinating I think.

Seaforth78

1. The high number of Majors in the 2nd Bn Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) in March 1915 is interesting, but this was far from typical in the British Infantry at the time. There are reasons that might be specific to the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) and the 1st and 2nd Battalions in particular. Forgive me if you already know what follows, but it might be of interest to others.

Starting in Aug 1914 the 1st Battalion were originally Line of Communication Troops and then formed part of 19th Inf Bde in Aug 1914. The 19th Inf Bde had the lowest casualties of any Brigade that landed in Aug 1914. Less than half the average. Within this Brigade the 1st Battalion fatal casualties were the lowest of any Regular Battalion on the western front in 1914 - 66 total, including 4 Officers. The average of the 88 battalions in the 1st-7th Div during this period was 237.

The 2nd Battalion arrived from Malta via Hursley park on 5th Nov 1914 with no less than four Majors*. According to the Army List one (Lloyd) was a 1st Bn man. There is a long memorial piece on Lloyd in the 2nd Bn war dairy. The high numbers of Majors was partly due to the fact that the 1st Bn had needed few reinforcements so the draw-down on the remaining Officers had been less demanding. By way of comparison the Black Watch history claims that every trained Officer was in France by mid Oct 1914. The 2nd Bn Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) suffered two Officer fatalities before the year end as well as 29 OR fatalities. The early part of 1915 (Jan Feb) was relatively quiet, although losses through sickness were high. By the start of March 1915 the regular battalions of the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) probably had the one of lowest levels of officer fatalities in the regular Army. Possible the lowest. They were very far from typical. (edited)

As you doubtless know, three of the four Majors that took part in the disastrous attack on 10-14th March at Neuve Chapelle died. (Hayes, Ellis and Lloyd) along with 10 other Officers. A further 9 were wounded. Officer casualties: 22. OR casualties 113 Killed, 304 wounded, 21 missing. The diary notes that only 7 of the Officers were 2nd Bn Scottish Rifles (including the CO), the other Officers were mainly from the 3rd Reserve Bn. Interestingly the losses of the 2nd Bn were listed by name in the 1st Bn diary as they had to send and Officer to the 2nd Bn due to their severe losses. French sent a personal letter to the survivors commending them on their performance. The diary does not record the number of Officers that started on 10th March 1915.

I don't think the 2nd Bn Scottish Rifles is a typical example. It is nonetheless interesting and perhaps a stark illustration of how much experience can be wasted in a single action. The CO and three majors alone represented 95 years of experience.

Edit: Interestingly the 4th Bn Middlesex Regt (same Brigade) disembarked with four Majors. Two had promoted in September having started the war as Captains.

2. The Eight-company structure was not maintained. The Army in the UK had converted some years before, but the British Army in India and the TF and the SR had not. On mobilisation they all converted to the Four-company structure. For some this was a mental step too far. In the same way some units managed to cling onto their old pre-Cardwell reform numbers - 5th Fusiliers, 60th Rifles etc - some commentators struggled with the 'new' structure.

3. The British Army has been a small professional Army for most of its history. Consequently it has mostly been structured in a way that allowed for expansion when necessary and therefore was (I think) generally 'top heavy' by continental standards.

MG

Edit2

* Of the other battalions in the same Brigade (23rd Inf Bde)

The 2nd Bn West Yorkshire Regt - left an embarkation roll showing two Majors. One a Company Commander and the other the Battalion 2IC.

The 2nd Bn Devonshire Regt history recorded three Majors (one curiously in the role of Adjutant) on embarkation

The 2nd Bn Middlesex Regt disembarked with four Majors. Two had started the war as Captains.

[Muerrisch]

It might be worth adding that "Morale", by John Baynes is an extremely fine and moving account of 2nd Scottish Rifles in those dark days.

Essential reading in my opinion.