Saxon, Prussian and Bavarian attitudes to the war

[josquin]

Ron,

That’s very amusing. I think your point is very relevant, as it definitely highlights another aspect of the ‘attitudes’ of the time. Thanks a lot.

I have read some similar stories where the Germans seemed to have got hold of information like that. In particular, when the authors seem to think that the Germans have the upper hand with some sort of advanced listening apparatus (and/or because of spies). For example, I think the QVR History refers to the Germans shouting out British passwords in order to taunt them- “Bully Biff, Bully Biff”.

Siege Gunner,

Thank you very much indeed for that. Another different aspect to consider, I had not heard of those incidents before. I will have to look out for those stories. I would love to hear more about them.

Seaforths,

Thanks again. I can just picture the Tommies up in trees having a look, and the Brigadier catching them at it. That’s hilarious. My friend who was in the Greenjackets, said that he and his comrades were just like school boys at times (Actually, I think he said it was most of the time!).

Many thanks everyone for all your help.

Chris

I thought this was interesting from Ludendorff’s My War Memories, 1914-1918 Pg. 261:

“The Ministries of War of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and Wurtemberg ranked equal to ourselves. They had their Representatives at G.H.Q., ...It must be clear that not even in the German Army was jealousy wholly non-existant. If any difficulties arose in any part of the field, one national contingent was at times disposed to lay the blame on another... it was only after a long period of nerve-racking toil that a certain spirit of hostility manifested itself between the Bavarians and the Prussians.”

The above is from a part of his ‘Memories’ where he is talking about events from mid to late 1916. Presumably he means these National tensions started to come out in 1917/1918, but there is obviously some evidence of it in early 1915. I don’t know if he is trying to gloss over previous tensions, or if there really was a marked deterioration towards the end of the war. It is entirely plausible of course. Which means that I just wonder how big it was early on. Whether joking with the British about shooting the Prussians counts as banter or not.

Chris,

What Ludendorff alludes to in the passage you quoted reflects the prewar reality of the German army rather than tensions emerging as the war progressed.

In the words of Robert T. Foley, in "German Strategy and the Path to Verdun" (Cambridge University Press, 2007):

"As Chapter 3 has shown, the Wilhelmine German army could best be characterized during peacetime as a 'polycracy,'

with many different centers of authority competing for power. The corps commanders, the Ministry of War, the Military Cabinet,

and the General Staff all possessed important, often overlapping, powers during peacetime, but none had clear authority

over the others. Additionally, the Kaiserheer was in fact made up of several armies, as the armies of Bavaria, Wuerttemberg,

and Saxony all existed as autonomous institutions during peacetime. [This structure] meant that the German army entered

the war with a command structure which was open to challenge from within." (pp. 84-85).

The divergences, then, were institutional and structural as well as regional--the latter having been documented with great interest and

specificity throughout this thread.

Trelawney

[Drew-1918]

Trelawney,

Thank you very much for that. I take the point that there were aspects other than simple regional difference, and that these factors pre-dated the war. I would ask though; weren’t the structural and institutional differences the result of regional differences? In other words, wasn’t the German Army set up in the way it was precisely because of the different national components? Which might therefore make it (the regional aspect) the main determining factor?

However, I think it is very important to bear in mind these structural and institutional aspects, that meant that later on, during the stress of war, the system was open to "challenge form within".

Just to say, I am not trying to argue or reject what you have said; I am just trying to clarify my understanding of what you meant. Perhaps I am missing your point, though.

I very much appreciate your input.

Joe,

Very interesting to have such a detailed background to what we are looking at here. Thank you very much.

The part where you mention the complications resulting from, for example, soldiers from Mecklenburg being integrated into the Prussian Army, and later being seen as being Prussian, is a crucial point. I think it really underlines the danger of simplistic labelling and the value of a deeper understanding.

I found an article: "Why can't a saxon be more like a Prussian?" Regional Identities and the Birth of a Modern Political Culture in Germany, 1866-67, by James Retallack in the Canadian Journal of History. It is not quite our period of study here, but the people he is studying would have been the fathers and grandfathers of some of the WWI soldiers. In this essay Retallack says that we should "...be skeptical in accepting characterizations of Saxony as either harmoniously happy or stifingly parochial..." and that the Saxon views of the time were often ambivalent. Perhaps therein lies a key to understanding some of the views we see expressed in the soldiers' memoirs and elsewhere. I don't know if you have read it, but I thought it might be of interest.

http://utpjournalsreview.com/index.php/CJOH/article/view/8901

Thanks very much to you both.

Regards,

Chris

[seaforths]

This is a contrast of two German prisoners from October 1916 and March 1917 respectively:

The first man came from 62 IR, and crossed to British lines voluntarily, waving a white hanky in one hand and carrying a small bundle in the other. He was interrogated by the Intelligence Officer and on the subject of moral, this is what he had to say:

'Prisoner stated that the moral of the regiment was fairly good, but the Germans and the (Polish speaking) Silesians kept apart from each other. It is obvious from the confusion of the relief the absence of instructions re defence etc, that the Coy. leaders shewed little control over the men in their charge.'

The second batch of men were captured by force and of the Bavarian 2nd RIR. 'A stout resistance was offered in every part of the area...' During this particular raid, 1 Officer and 20 ORs were eventually captured but many more were killed as they refused to give up. The diary records: 'The prisoners stated...Their Battalion had only come into the line for the first time at midnight...six hours before the raid took place, and the fine fight put up in these circumstances was a most creditable performance, and shows how well the line had been handed over and what a good system of defence existed...'

Both extracts from 152nd Bde. diaries.

[joerookery]

Chris I can go on forever. The structural differences were exacerbated by the Constitution itself. Each kingdom had a war ministry but they followed the lead of the Prussian war minister. The only real "German" office was that of Chancellor. So in every state there was a state parliament and then national representation in the national parliament. The popular one man one vote franchise came into play for the national Reichstag. By 1903 in Saxony twenty-two of the twenty-three Reichstag deputies from that kingdom were socialists. Even with these overwhelming numbers the socialists never got anywhere near control of the Saxon parliament as the voting law was changed in 1896 in a way similar to the Prussian three-tier voting system. So there are all sorts of divisions – economic, religious, ethnic and social. Again these are explained in the book but it is not an easy fit. The competition between the general staff, war ministry, and the military cabinet is also covered in its own chapter And it is absolutely key to understanding the lead up and the preparation for war. the corps commander thing is significantly different and needs to be understood as it had completely different boundaries and powers. It was pretty easy in Saxony as they had only two different Corps.

I do need to point out that the Hanoverians came from a region known as Lower Saxony but they were Hanoverians involved with the Geulphs not Saxon. There was a significant political pushback that existed on the national level with the intent of reestablishing the Kingdom of Hanover. Never got anywhere but made a lot of noise. The picture below is an artistic rendition of them breaking away from Prussia.

ps497 by joerookery, on Flickr

The references to Silesia's participation is complicated that it was not homogeneous. A Prussian province that had many Saxons and the heavily oppressed Polish minority. These guys really took it in the chops but that is another subject… Also covered in the book.

[Drew-1918]

Seaforths,

Those are two fantastic examples. Very interesting and pertinent. Thanks very much. They really highlight the fact that its not as simple as the stereotypes say.

Joe,

Many thanks again. I realised that the Hanoverians were not Saxon (I think ), I was more just trying to account for why the area of modern Hanover is known as Lower Saxony by pointing out that the Saxons inhabited this area in ancient times. I wondered if perhaps this was why JWK had heard references to them as Saxons. i.e. because of confusion. I thank you very much for clarifying this point. The picture is a really powerful expression of what you are saying. Thanks for that too.

Thanks very much for turning your expertise to my questions. Can I ask; what is your overall view of these accounts of Saxons. Prussians etc? Something in them? Propaganda? Pre-existing stereotypes? A mix of all?

This interesting topic is starting to cost me a bit! I'm gonna have to get the book you mention... (the others looked very interesting too).

Regards,

Chris

[joerookery]

Chris,

IMHO I vote for your mix of all option. I also think it is unit specific as opposed to nationality. As the war went on units tended to become more amalgamated and less pure. In 1914 there was certainly a Saxon army and a Bavarian army. It is instructive to look quickly at the relationship or the lack thereof between the commanders of the Bavarian sixth Army and the Prussian commander of the seventh Army. Even though the seventh Army was subordinate to the six, the commander of the seventh frequently would not talk to anybody in that headquarters. The good news is we have a rather detailed account of it from the Bavarian archives.

Yes the book is not cheap. I think the best price I have seen in England comes from naval and military press. If you're going to get it in Japan I would certainly get it from the publisher. It is a massive book that was skillfully printed. There is a review of it in Stand To! 101. This looks on life using German sources as opposed to the well-known British sources that were the foundation of my education. I think you'll enjoy it but I'm biased.

V/R

Joe

[Drew-1918]

Many thanks for your thoughts there, quite a few leads and things to think about. Thanks also for the advice about the book.

Cheers,

Chris

[seaforths]

The organisational skills of some of the Bavarians seems to have gone awry a little later in the war (April 1918), abandoning their taste for beer in favour of wine and other things...(PS in this instance = Prisoner Statement):

[Drew-1918]

That's funny. Some of the famed 'looted wine'?

[seaforths]

Oh I think there was wine looting occurring but it's the first I've seen a division withdrawn on account of it

Here's a little snippet from the WFA website:

Private Albert Conn provided a pithy summary of the day from the point of view of a private soldier:

‘They went out alright but it was another balls-up like Loos. Our blokes and the Gordons took Fricourt alright, but they lost about 700 men doing so.' He also had some interesting observations on both the opposition and also those who remained behind the lines: ‘They run up against the Prussian Guards. I saw some of these big ugly ******** going into the wire compounds near Meaulte. They would sooner spit at you than take a cigarette. Not like the Saxons, they were glad to be taken prisoner, decent blokes, I had a chat with several of them...'

[Drew-1918]

Oh yeah, I see your point. That is pretty full on. I wonder if there were any national differences where the wine was concerned. I doubt it!

Thanks for that and the Pte. Conn quote.

Chris

[joerookery]

A wonderful quoteand a clear example. What we have talked about Saxons the Prussian Guards offer the clear example. These guys were recruited from The entire German Empire. The primary requirement was the height of the individual. Not nationality. Yes they were considered Prussian but could easily have come from his Hesse. That's why I say unit specific.

[trajan]

The organisational skills of some of the Bavarians seems to have gone awry a little later in the war (April 1918), abandoning their taste for beer in favour of wine and other things...(PS in this instance = Prisoner Statement):

bav.JPG

Thank the gods it was just wine and women - if there was song involved, well... Mind you willing to bet it was a Prussian officer complaining about them not taking the war seriously and enjoying too much gemutlichkeit that got them moved out...

[Drew-1918]

These guys were recruited from The entire German Empire. The primary requirement was the height of the individual. Not nationality. Yes they were considered Prussian but could easily have come from his Hesse. That's why I say unit specific.

Joe,

Very interesting again. Thanks a lot, your point here really makes me wonder. If the different ‘nationalities’ of the German Army were recruited from all over Germany, then it raises serious questions about thinking of any one group as either ‘Saxon’ or ‘Prussian’ (Which is something I think you have hinted at). May I ask- Was this the case right from 1914 through to 1918? Or was it more a feature of the war as it progressed? I suspect that the different nationalities must, by necessity, have become more mixed as time went on, but the important point seems to be how mixed were they at the start? If the German Army was mixed from early on, then it would make it harder to understand the kind of stories we seem to be getting from late 1914 through to the start of 1915. If it was indeed very mixed, I wonder what ratios tended to be and how that would affect things.

I suppose I tend to think of it from a British perspective- i.e. I think of Highland Regiments maintaining their character throughout the war, though to be honest that is something I know very little about, and I will probably be corrected very soon. The only example I know a little bit about is the London Scottish, and I am pretty sure they never had any recruiting problems, though perhaps that is not a good example. I know there were problems keeping some Irish Regiments up to strength at certain points. But, what I mean to say is, that I think I am right in saying that overall British Regiments kept their different national characters. Was this not the case in the German Army?

Another issue is the Esprit de corps. Where British Regiments suffer horrendous losses, the Regimental Histories often talk about difficulties maintaining Esprit de Corps. Although they describe these difficulties, you do tend to get the impression that they did nonetheless manage to maintain it intact. So I wonder, even if a German Regiment from, say Saxony, got very mixed up with soldiers from all over Germany, would not the Esprit de Corps, or the Cadre of old soldiers, help to maintain their identity? And if this is so, could this possibly account for any continuing stories of differences between the German Regiments? As I'm sure you know, as the war progressed, the British started to put a certain number of soldiers on battle surplus. Was there nothing like this that might have helped to maintain the different Regiments when heavy losses occurred? Apologies, too many questions there, but it just makes me think.

Many thanks again for your points.

Chris

[roel22]

What we have talked about Saxons the Prussian Guards offer the clear example. These guys were recruited from The entire German Empire. The primary requirement was the height of the individual. Not nationality.

You're absolutely right. My great-grandfather (tall & quite an athlete) was in the Kaiser Alexander Garde Grenadier Regiment no. 1, stationed in Berlin. Yet he came from Nordhorn in Lower Saxony, close to the Dutch border.

Roel

[joerookery]

Chris,

My apologies if I give the wrong impression – I was talking about the Guards being recruited nationally. Not the rest of the Armies. It would generally like this though this is incredibly simplistic. There were a series of regions that Imperial German was split into for recruiting. Each of these recruiting regions were given quotas. After a medical examination that was easy to fail the region tried to fill its quotas.

In the prewar years these quotas changed annually. There was a real shift in population from rural to urban areas but the regimental structure did not change. So basically for forty years who got to go changed. In the case of some regiments they had to be filled with conscripts from other regions as the population no longer supported the quota requirement. There were also efforts to spread out certain minorities so that they didn't affect the esprit de corps of the regiment. The poor conscripts from Alsace-Lorraine were often sent all over the place.

In addition to this prewar training was an entirely Corps commander specific. So as the Kaiser went from inspection to inspection he found different methods entirely. Many people who got their German information from English-language sources have this wrong. Terrence Zuber in his books gives the impression of a homogeneous grouping that followed the "written doctrine". This is just patently untrue. It is also why I think certain studies of early engagements with the BEF should be analyzed with the lens of units from different Army Corps engaging the British. One size did not fit all.

All this changed as the war went on. My knowledge is mainly focused on 1914 and before.

[Drew-1918]

OK, I see. Apologies as I think it was I misunderstood you. Thanks very much for taking the time to explain all this to me. It is all really interesting and there are many different points to consider.

An impression I got from a BBC article recently on Germany's memory of WW1, was that it was quite a forgotten war (far too simplistic I'm sure). As such, I thought there would not be so much written in German, let only for an English readership. I was very pleased to come across such work as yours. What people like you and Jack Sheldon are doing looking at the German sources is absolutely fascinating, and essential.

Many Thanks,

Chris

[Drew-1918]

You're absolutely right. My (quite tall) great-grandfather was in the Kaiser Alexander Garde Grenadier Regiment no. 1, stationed in Berlin. Yet he came from Nordhorn in Lower Saxony, close to the Dutch border.

Roel

Thanks for this information Roel.

[seaforths]

...I suppose I tend to think of it from a British perspective- i.e. I think of Highland Regiments maintaining their character throughout the war, though to be honest that is something I know very little about, and I will probably be corrected very soon. The only example I know a little bit about is the London Scottish, and I am pretty sure they never had any recruiting problems, though perhaps that is not a good example. I know there were problems keeping some Irish Regiments up to strength at certain points. But, what I mean to say is, that I think I am right in saying that overall British Regiments kept their different national character...

Chris

The Highland Regiments had a spattering of non Highland men serving in them initially but they became very diluted as the war progressed. There was a lot of loyalty toward their home battalions and it caused some bitterness when men were wounded and returned to a different battalion or even regiment/unit altogether. I've seen discrepancies between a local war memorial and CWGC entry because a man was named on the former as belonging to his home battalion when he had actually been transferred and killed in another battalion. In-fighting also took place, the Argyll Hrs. with their Gaelic speaking and non Gaelic speaking battalions ended up having to be kept separated in rest billets when the fighting got out of hand. I've come across other incidents of in-fighting with other Scots regiments.

[Drew-1918]

Thanks Seaforths. I was hoping you might supply the necessary info . Many thanks for that.

I have seen one or two 9th London men who transferred into Scottish Regiments, but try as I might, I couldn't quite picture them whacking the cockneys into kilts, as it were. Excuse my naivety, but would the English have kept their battledress trousers? Apologies for the short digression. I'm hoping it will pass as a general and comparative investigation of Esprit de Corps as the war progressed.

Obviously, the Kilt is something that would mark them out in the eyes of the Germans, even if the actual make up of the Regiments had changed significantly.

Cheers,

Chris

[seaforths]

Nope - no trousers if they were in a kilted regiment. Not all of the Scots regiments were kilted. However, some English and Irish with Scottish connections or roots sought to join the Scots regiments and the TF regiments wasted no time recruiting south of the border quite early in the war.

[Drew-1918]

That's great. Thank you so much. Starting to look similar to what Joe was saying about it tending to be unit specific...

[seaforths]

I'm reading a very interesting book at the moment, McCarthy's 'The Prisoner of War in Germany' and the chapter 'The Army Corps and Prison Problem' in particular addresses the attitudes of the various Army Corps Commanders. In a discussion at the Reichstag, one of the delgates raised the following in discussion:

'...The attitude indeed of some of these commanders became so bumptious as to lead to a discussion in the Reichstag...one of the delegates to the Reichstag read a letter sent by one of the army corps commanders in reply to one of his constituents who protested to the injustice of the censorship in reference to business matters. The army corps commander replied that he and his delegate might protest as much as they liked but he had the power and would do as he pleased in the matter. In this letter he stated: "We (the army corps commanders) are the ministry. We are the Bundesrat. We are the imperial chancellor. We are the Reichstag." He only stopped short of saying: "We are the Kaiser". This delegate stated "I am not surprised at this sentence, for the Gottahnlichkeit which these commanding generals have assumed on the basis of the authority they have taken over, can scarcely be surpassed." This attitude of the army corps commanders found like expression in the attitude of the various State Ministries of War of Saxony, Bavaria and Wurtenberg towards the Central Prussian Ministry of War in Berlin. While in theory the Ministry of War in Berlin is in supreme control, as a matter of fact, it was often found that orders issued by it were not carried out by the Ministries of War of the individual states or the army corps commanders in their district...'

[trajan]

"... Gottahnlichkeit which these commanding generals have assumed on the basis of the authority they have taken over, can scarcely be surpassed."

What a wonderful word! Gottahnlichkeit! And it will fit as a suitable substitute for gemutlichkeit in that popular Bavarian drinking song!

[Drew-1918]

I'm reading a very interesting book at the moment, McCarthy's 'The Prisoner of War in Germany' and the chapter 'The Army Corps and Prison Problem' in particular addresses the attitudes of the various Army Corps Commanders. In a discussion at the Reichstag, one of the delgates raised the following in discussion:

'...The attitude indeed of some of these commanders became so bumptious as to lead to a discussion in the Reichstag...one of the delegates to the Reichstag read a letter sent by one of the army corps commanders in reply to one of his constituents who protested to the injustice of the censorship in reference to business matters. The army corps commander replied that he and his delegate might protest as much as they liked but he had the power and would do as he pleased in the matter. In this letter he stated: "We (the army corps commanders) are the ministry. We are the Bundesrat. We are the imperial chancellor. We are the Reichstag." He only stopped short of saying: "We are the Kaiser". This delegate stated "I am not surprised at this sentence, for the Gottahnlichkeit which these commanding generals have assumed on the basis of the authority they have taken over, can scarcely be surpassed." This attitude of the army corps commanders found like expression in the attitude of the various State Ministries of War of Saxony, Bavaria and Wurtenberg towards the Central Prussian Ministry of War in Berlin. While in theory the Ministry of War in Berlin is in supreme control, as a matter of fact, it was often found that orders issued by it were not carried out by the Ministries of War of the individual states or the army corps commanders in their district...'

Many thanks Seaforths,

Not the quite the harmonious picture Ludendorff paints! Though to be fair he does make an allusion to such things (albeit an understated one).

Just to carry the debate on, I was just looking through ‘Iron Kingdom’ by Christopher Clark, (as recommended by ‘Uncle George’). Clark discusses the tension between the Imperial Crown and, in particular, Bavaria. He puts this down in large part to the Kaiser’s unscripted and undiplomatic speeches. He also adds that militarism was associated with Prussia by people in the south, and furthermore, that there was no doubt that militarism was indeed more a part of Prussian life after 1871.

Interestingly though, Clark adds that we should be wary of thinking (as I suppose some of our accounts may do), that this kind of thinking represents all Prussians. He gives the example of many Prussian veterans clubs which were plebian and egalitarian in nature, and that these clubs “were highly critical of the conservative military elite…”. He also talks about a “chasm” between the civil and military authority structures; Prussian military commanders only being answerable to the Kaiser, and thus often at odds with any civil authority with which they dealt. Clark cites the example of the military's high-handedness in German South West Africa, and the Governor’s exasperation with what went on.

Chris