Special Reserve: necessary but not sufficient

[Guest]

Grumpy. An interesting sequence.

The experience of the 1st Bn King's Liverpool Regt was as clean as it gets as the Regiment was only supporting one Regular Battalion in the line rather than two. The 2nd Bn was stuck in India.

I am building a matrix of the Reinforcements - numbers and dates - so I can compare across unit formations and across Regiments. I shall revert if there are any interesting conclusions.

We have other factors at play of course; Regiments such as the RWF were supporting two battalions serving within two different formations, probably drawing down drafts on different demand cycles as a result if different consequences in the field. It seems that the reinforcements were at least synchronised within Brigade formations, all four battalions generally receiving drafts on the same dates.

When the 1st Bn RWF was effectively being rebuilt, it will be interesting to see if the 2nd Bn saw any dip in the numbers it received relative to numbers required. I can probably do the analysis myself given I have both diaries.

MG

[Guest]

FYI Grumpy's very excellent first article has just been published in the 100th Edition of "Stand To!" the journal of the WFA.

[Muerrisch]

My "very excellent" article totally impossible without huge input and encouragement from Martin G.

Very many thanks Martin.

[ss002d6252]

A very good read.

Craig

[Muerrisch]

I had a lot of help, thank you very much!

[Guest]

It looks the the man possibly enlisted under an earlier order, AO283 rather than AO341.

65,000 infantry enlisted under AO295 by 30 Sep 14.

Have you seen part IX - Special Reserve in the General Annual Report of 1913-19 ?. This gives some interesting figures. No enlistment is shown to the S.R. after year ending 30 Sep 1914.

Craig

Craig - can you held with the following:

1. AO 295. What is the source of the 65,000 figure by end Sep 1914? Is it the GAR 1913-1919?

2. AO 341: Who was this AO aimed at?

Regards MG

[ss002d6252]

1. AO 295. What is the source of the 65,000 figure by end Sep 1914? Is it the GAR 1913-1919?

The figure for line infantry was 64,223 - page 25 of the GAR 13-19.

2. AO 341: Who was this AO aimed at?

Grumpy posted some info on this here - http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=202940&p=1993830 . It seems to have directed experienced men to the SR rather than the New Army.

Craig

[Guest]

The figure for line infantry was 64,223 - page 25 of the GAR 14-18. The figure for line infantry was 64,223 - page 25 of the GAR 13-19.

Grumpy posted some info on this here - http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=202940&p=1993830 . It seems to have directed experienced men to the SR rather than the New Army.

Craig

Thanks Craig - I thought I had seen it somewhere but for the life of me couldn't find it...I guess an unknown number went to the formation of the Kitchener Battalions and an unknown number became feeders for the Regular Battalions.

I am wondering if time expired men who re-enlisted got a new Army number..... MG

[ss002d6252]

I am wondering if time expired men who re-enlisted got a new Army number..... MG

As far as I know they did.

This is a record for man who enlisted under AO 295 - using form B248.

http://interactive.ancestry.co.uk/1219/miuk1914e_123418-00808/34446?backurl=http%3a%2f%2fsearch.ancestry.co.uk%2fcgi-bin%2fsse.dll%3findiv%3d1%26db%3dBritishArmyService%26rank%3d1%26new%3d1%26MSAV%3d1%26gss%3dangs-d%26msydy%3d1914%26msydy_x%3d1%26gskw%3dspecial%2breserve%26dbOnly%3d_F8007873%257c_F8007873_x%252c_F0003CA3%257c_F0003CA3_x%26uidh%3d784%26pcat%3d39%26fh%3d1%26h%3d34446%26recoff%3d%26ml_rpos%3d2&ssrc=&backlabel=ReturnRecord

Craig

[Guest]

As far as I know they did.

Craig

That would be my assumption. .....which I guess would make them almost impossible to identify unless one had Service Records. Making a reasonable guesstimate of where these 65,000 men went would be rather difficult. Equivalent to the infantry in more than five Divisions. MG

[ss002d6252]

which I guess would make them almost impossible to identify unless one had Service Records. Making a reasonable guesstimate of where these 65,000 men went would be rather difficult. Equivalent to the infantry in more than five Divisions. MG

I would agree - likely the only way to track them would be on a case by case basis (65,000 records never sounded more fun) although all of the ones i have looked at for AO295 enlistments so far were re-enlisted to their old corps but after that...

Presumably many of the older hands went to the Service Bn's to help train them and the younger, fitter, men to the regulars but who knows in reality?.

Craig

[Guest]

I would agree - likely the only way to track them would be on a case by case basis (65,000 records never sounded more fun) although all of the ones i have looked at for AO295 enlistments so far were re-enlisted to their old corps but after that...

Presumably many of the older hands went to the Service Bn's to help train them and the younger, fitter, men to the regulars but who knows in reality?.

Craig

I have been doing some spot-checking of the Casualty data for battalions that ran out of men. We see late numbered SR men (recruited after the outbreak) with rather old ages - 38, 39, 40. The SR was notoriously 'young' in age profile and I suspect some of these older guys were in fact re-enlisted men with new SR numbers (3/ prefix to their numbers). Some disembarked as early as 10th Oct 1914. A forty year-old SR Private with a post 4th Aug 1914 number might suggest a re-enlisted man.

The men who enlisted under AO 295 would have to be at least 29-30 years old (enlisted at 17 and served 12 years incl Reservist obligations). These guys were a decade older. I have a few Suffolks who are 44-45....also a KOYLI SR man aged 22 18 with SR number 3/1222 and a KOYLI SR man aged 37 with SR number 3/6696 which seems to imply a 37 year-old enlisted 5,474 numbers later than the 18 year old. Incidentally also showing the under-19-year-olds were there.

Suffolk Regt and KOYLI - both got annihilated at Le Cateau which accelerated the draw-down of Reservists.

MG

[Muerrisch]

Which 18 year old is this please? The 22 year old?

[ss002d6252]

The men who enlisted under AO 295 would have to be at least 29-30 years old (enlisted at 17 and served 12 years incl Reservist obligations).

DId AO 295 only cover those who had passed from the regular reserves though ?, Would it have also covered those who had done the SR commitment and left the forces ? . If it did then these men would possibly be younger. (A quick scan through the Ancestry records does seem to tend towards older men though)

Craig

[Muerrisch]

6^th August. Ex-regular soldiers invited to enlist in SR for one year or the duration AO.295.

6^th August. Enlistments invited for New Armies, three years or the duration. AO.296.

6^th August. 100,000 regulars to be enlisted. Large influx at Depôts expected. WOI.32.

7^th August.^. Kitchener’s Appeal for 100,000 men. WOI.37.

AO 295 men were necessarily 12 years minimum total.

[ss002d6252]

Thanks Grumpy

Craig.

[Guest]

Which 18 year old is this please? The 22 year old?

the 18 year old in the KOYLI not the KOLYLI. Both corrected. **ahem** Obviously a deliberate error.

[Guest]

AO 295 men were necessarily 12 years minimum total.

Which means 65,000 men were at least 29 years old and on a time-weighted basis probably (on average) quite a few years older which might explain the plethora of 38-45 year-olds with post-war-declaration SR numbers.

Only 6.9% of Infantry SR men in 1913 were aged 35 and upwards. More importantly there were only 501 men aged 40 and above in the whole of the Infantry which works out at roughly 7 men per Regiment or 3-4 men pr battalion or just 1.07% of all Infantry SR men. Given fatal casualties were roughly speaking 10% we should expect 0.1% of SR casualties to be aged 40 or over.....so,....when we find large numbers of fatal casualties of men aged 40 and over in the SR, this might suggest older men were arriving from another source: i.e. AO 295...and the differentials over the whole infantry might provide clues to the proportions. There are glimmers of statistical evidence that 'older' SR appear in significantly disproportionately higher numbers than we might expect in the fatal casualty data. This again suggests the incidence of re-enlisted men with the SR who were accelerated through the reinforcement chain. I stress at this point it is just a glimmer. MG

[Muerrisch]

Agreed.

The RWF sent about 1000 men to the battle in 1914 WHO WERE NOT ON THE BOOKS IN ANY FORM on 4th August: not among those serving, those in Sections A. B. or D. or the SR.

These 1000 will be a mix of re-engaged regulars as SR, and also long-serving but time-expired men re-joining Section D and being rapidly deployed. Without them, the rather bountiful [comparatively] well of the regiment would have run dry.

If the 65000 figure is correct, these 1000 men are about average for an infantry regiment of course.

[Guest]

Agreed.

The RWF sent about 1000 men to the battle in 1914 WHO WERE NOT ON THE BOOKS IN ANY FORM on 4th August: not among those serving, those in Sections A. B. or D. or the SR.

These 1000 will be a mix of re-engaged regulars as SR, and also long-serving but time-expired men re-joining Section D and being rapidly deployed. Without them, the rather bountiful [comparatively] well of the regiment would have run dry.

If the 65000 figure is correct, these 1000 men are about average for an infantry regiment of course.

Indeed. A battalion's worth of old-timers per regiment. Which perhaps further illustrates that the line was held, in order by;

1. 40% Regulars

2. 60% Reservists from Sections A and B, some of who had not been with the colours for anything up to 9 years..

and when 1. and 2 were depleted..

3. SR men

4. Section D men

5. With an admixture of re-enlisted men

and ...

6. 19 Battalions of TF

7. The IAEF A

and..

8. Kitchener recruits accelerated through their 'training'.

A rather in-cohesive force cobbled together through necessity. Against all this it is still a wonder that the New Armies were still not deployed until May 1915. It suggests that 6 months training might have still be insufficient even in those desperate times. The more I understand this complex phase of the war the more I wonder if the British Govt would have been better to let the Europeans get on with it for 6 months and then enter with an Army of sufficient size and training rather than fritter away its core expertise in a matter of months. We will never know if the cost from losing so much experience was outweighed by the knowledge gained by the (original Regular) survivors.

It strikes me that strategic planning and preparedness was orders of magnitude adrift from the rapidly developing reality. Kitchener is often (incorrectly) cited as a lone visionary, expecting the war to last 3 years and needing at least another 500,000 men. His gamble that the Regular Army could hold the line for sufficient time fell rather short of his hopes. Despite his contempt for the TF he had nearly two Divisions' worth of TF infantry in the line by Jan 1915 - nearly one in 5 Infantrymen of the BEF. When we include the IAEF A, something in the order of one in three infantrymen were not British Regular Army at the end of 1914. Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Perhaps a subject for another thread. MG

[Muerrisch]

Broad agreement, minor quibble.

Your item 2. has to include some D men of necessity: a two-battalions-in-combat regiment did not not have enough A+B to make up the 60% in some cases.

Item 3 men were preferred to item 4 in the main.

Your point about sitting back for 6 months and then deciding what to do had occurred to me ......... taking a crude jingoistic balance of power stance, even if Germany had won it would have been hard-hit. We might then have done simply nothing. It would take years before we felt threatened.

Of course France/Russia might have won ................... and then we would feel immediately threatened!!!!

[Guest]

minor quibble. Your item 2. has to include some D men of necessity: a two-battalions-in-combat regiment did not not have enough A+B to make up the 60% in some cases.

A good point. If one also considers not all the A and B men would be fit enough. I have not yet worked out a way of identifying Section D men other than those with Army Numbers more than 12 years old but they will be indistinguishable from men who had re-engaged for 21 years. GAR 1913 data indicates that Home based Line Infantry battalions each had (on average) 112 ORs who had extended to serve 21 years. Interestingly (on average) 42 would still be Privates. Assume say 10% of the 112 were in the unfits, somewhere in the region of 100 ORs in each Battalion would be serving beyond 12 years

I have recently been trawling the 1914 Star medal roll of the 1st Bn East Rurrey Regt. 185 men disembarked with the Battalion on deployment with numbers that were issued before Aug 1902. This will of course include some who had re-engaged to complete 21 years who were still serving. Using the average numbers from the GAR 1913, the 1st Bn East Surrey Regt would theoretically have deployed with around 85 men Section D men (Calc: 185 less 100) or roughly 8.5% of War Establishment.

The War Diary and the history are vague on the actual nmbers of Reservists that were required. The Monthly Returns for July 1914 show the Battalion with only 717 ORs. Assuming WE of 1,100 (incl 1st reinforcements) that would imply at least 382 Reservists were needed. We also know from the War Diary that 694 reservists were sent to cover the unfits and under-age, but the narrative implies some of these replaced 'three year' Reservists as much as possible. So, the 1st Bn needed somewhere between 382 and 694 reservists to meet War Establishment.

We know from the Monthly Returns for the East Surrey Regt had the following Army Reservists in Ag 1914:

Section A...54

Section B...723

Subtotal.....777

Section D...331

In this case (in theory) there would have been enough Section A & B men to cover the 694 Reservists that were sent, so it seems some Section D men were chosen ahead of the Section A & B men. Clearly an unknown number of Section A and B Reservists would have been unfit. There is evidence from some diaries that some Section A and B men held were back for the Overseas battalions for their return, which might explain why Section D appear in the Home based battalion; i.e the Home based battalions did not always have first choice and the preferred Section A and B men were more evenly distributed between the battalions.

The Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regt) notes that the first Battalion, despite deploying first had second choice as it was initially designated as Corps Troops. Clearly external factors could play a part. MG

[ss002d6252]

An interesting quote I found today:

Commons Sitting of Thursday, 19th November, 1914.

[555]

46. Mr. MORRELL asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that a considerable number of veterans who, after serving their term with the Colours and completing their Reserve service, have re-enlisted for this War are being kept for long periods of training side by side with raw recruits who have seen no previous service; whether there is any reason why men who have fought in previous wars should now be kept in camps in England to learn the elements of drill which they know already; and whether, in view of the need for reinforcements at the front, he will take steps to see that men who have had previous service and are physically sound should be attached to some trained unit and sent abroad as soon as possible?

Mr. TENNANT: In each service battalion there is a certain proportion of old soldiers to perform certain regimental duties, such as those of police, cooking, etc. The number of these has been reduced to the minimum, and those allotted to these duties are, so far as possible, selected from men who, for various reasons, are not fit to send to the front with drafts. All demands for reinforcements at the front have been fully and promptly met.

Mr. MORRELL: Is it not the case that at the camp at Seaford there are scores of men who have been through previous expeditions, and are well equipped in military drill, and who are now being taught to slope arms and firing exercise?

Mr. TENNANT: I think there are very few, if any, such. They are nearly all used for these special duties.

Mr. MORRELL: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider a case if I bring it to his notice?

Mr. TENNANT: I shall be very glad to do so.

Craig

[Purbecksteve]

Would each regiment have kept separate lists of Special Reserve Soldiers prior to 1914 ,I am interested in the Dorset Regiment SR rosters 1908-1916

[Guest]

Would each regiment have kept separate lists of Special Reserve Soldiers prior to 1914 ,I am interested in the Dorset Regiment SR rosters 1908-1916

They certainly would have. The challenge is to find if they survived and where they are now. If they survive, I think they are most likely to be at the Keep. See here. MG