Special Reserve: necessary but not sufficient

[Guest]

Another clear example of a collapse in the number of available Reservists. This time from the Royal Irish Fusiliers which had the 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn and the 4th (Extra Reserve) battalion supporting only two Regular battalions in the field. The combined number of Reservists in the Reserve battalions peaked after mobilisation (and after drafts were sent to the Home based battalion) at 1,375 men. The chart below shows the steady draw-down on these Reserves to a low point on 1st March 1915 when there were just 82 fully trained Reservists left. This example is particularly interesting as the Reserve battalions were effective supporting just the 1st Bn in the field in 1914 as the 2nd Bn did not arrive in France until 19th Dec 1914.

Data from the Royal Irish Fusiliers reveals the 1st Bn received 977 Reservists* as reinforcement drafts up to 1st March 1915. Deducting this number from the peak 1,375 would leave 398 men. We know there were 82 left on 1st March which would leave 316 unaccounted for. The returns show 89 men temporarily medically unfit or under 19 years and another 61 sick, absent or in prison. This would still leave 227 men unaccounted for. The Drafts for March numbered 67 and if we assume these had already departed, that would still leave 160 unaccounted for. One might assume these men were deemed permanently unfit for overseas service but the returns show 147 in this category, which still leaves 13 men unaccounted for or just 0.9% of the original 1,375 Reservists. [Edited with correct calc]

The other noticeable feature is the sharp decline in Feb 1915 when a tighter definition of who qualified as "Fully Trained and Effective". The number of residual Fully trained Reservists drops from 476 to 215 men between the 8th and 15th Feb. To save you the calculation that equates to a -55% drop. The numbers (261) almost exactly match the numbers of men either medically unfit, under-age or permanently medically unfit - some 269 men. This is a very clear demonstration that the official returns for trained Reservists prior to 15th Feb were partly illusionary as they included hundreds of men who clearly could not be sent overseas. In this case it accounted for over half the men allegedly available on 8th Feb 1915. We see similar patterns in almost every other Regiment.

The margin of error with these returns appears to be quite low.

Here is the chart. Any mistakes are mine. MG

* Data source on Post 41 on this thread here

[Guest]

Another chart from the 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry showing the near collapse of the Regiment's ability to reinforce the 1st and 2nd Battalions. It is worth noting that the 1st Bn did not arrive in France until 16th Jan 1915 as it had been stationed in Singapore, so the vast majority of Reserves were dedicated to just one battalion until this date.

The returns reveal that on the eve of the Great War the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry had 572 Special Reservists of which 428 were fully trained. On mobilisation some 1,238 Army Reservists assembled, making a total of 1,666 fully trained men. Immediately 615 were sent to the 2nd Bn in Dublin to bring it up to War Establishment The returns for the 2nd Bn suggestwith a strength of 537 it should have only required 183 men to come to War Establishment plus a first reinforcement draft of 93 making total requirements of 276, That 339 additional Reservists were sent gives us an Idea of the number of serving soldiers who were swapped for Reservists due to young age or being unfit. A typical Home based battalion would likely have around 7% of its men under the age of 19 (the threshold for serving overseas on active service) which in this case would be around 38 men. The implication is that roughly 300 men were deemed unfit for active service.

The returns do not give us an detail on the breakdown of the Reservists until 1915 when suddenly we see 299 men Permanently unfit for active service (medically or on account of Age)". the returns from 15th Feb 1915 provide details on the numbers of ex BEF men who were recovering from wounds and sickness, a small fraction of them became "Now fit for Foreign Service" each month. In the case of the KOYLI it did not make a material difference as the numbers are so small. The nadir was on the 1st March 1915 when the Reserves were down to just 64 men of which 18 were recovered BEF men. Coincidentally this is the same date for the nadir of the Royal Irish Fusiliers (see post above).

To put this into context, the Regular battalions of the KOYLI used 1,602 of its 1,666 Reservists by 1st March 1915 - essentially in six months. By this date the 1st Bn and 2n Bn had lost 427 men KIA (mostly 2nd Bn) meaning 1,175 were non-fatal casualties. 371 of these men can be traced to the Reserve battalion where they were waiting to recover after hospital of which 18 were ready to go again.

Data and charts below. Any mistakes are mine.

[Muerrisch]

Martin, well done indeed.

One point worth emphasising. The Black Watch statement " "A syllabus of work was bought out by the War Office for a course of twelve weeks' training and for the average recruit this was found sufficient" is either disingenuous or economical with the truth.

The training period referred to was for the INDIVIDUAL, and the syllabus required a total of 6 months to complete [AO 324 Sept 1914]. These convenient 12 week men would be like lambs to the slaughter, having done no collective training, even at section level, never mind platoon or above. When they arrived at the unit they would find many of the senior ranks, and the exemplars among the old soldiers, dead and buried, or long gone.I wonder how many lads were sent out for other regiments, wet behind the ears?

Contrast this to the New Armies, held back until well into 1915.

[Guest]

One point worth emphasising. The Black Watch statement " "A syllabus of work was bought out by the War Office for a course of twelve weeks' training and for the average recruit this was found sufficient" is either disingenuous or economical with the truth.

The training period referred to was for the INDIVIDUAL, and the syllabus required a total of 6 months to complete [AO 324 Sept 1914]. These convenient 12 week men would be like lambs to the slaughter, having done no collective training, even at section level, never mind platoon or above. When they arrived at the unit they would find many of the senior ranks, and the exemplars among the old soldiers, dead and buried, or long gone.I wonder how many lads were sent out for other regiments, wet behind the ears?

Contrast this to the New Armies, held back until well into 1915.

I agree. ...but I think it is easy to demonstrate with the arithmetic that the Royal Highlanders had to accelerate the training of recruits in order to fill the gaps in their shattered ranks. My reading of this is that the author is effectively trying to justify why men were sent to the front with less than recommended training. Desperate times called for desperate measures.

I have finally trawled the data and there are 28 Line Infantry Regiments where the number of available trained men dipped below 100 and within these there are 12 Regiments whose reserved dipped below 50 men. Four went to zero. As we know, there were 74 paired battalions of line infantry of which five were four-battalion structures and another four had for some time been four-battalion structures - all of which would have disproportionally larger numbers of Army Reservists as their four-battalion structures exactly coincided with the period (Aug 1902-Aug 1907) that would generate Reservists mobilised for the Great War. These nine regiments generated large distortions in the Reservists data which masked a plethora of issues elsewhere. Stripping these nine Regiments out and looking at the Regiments with one pair of battalions it is clear (to me at least) that if 27* of the remaining 65 Regiments had less than 100 trained men in reserve, this was not an isolated issue.

Clearly there are tectonic forces playing on a number of large moving parts. The cratons are historical recruiting levels, attrition of those recruits, the attrition rate of the residual Army Reservists, numbers of trained Special Reservists on the eve of war, strength of regular battalions on the eve of war and casualty rates are all tangible and measurable dynamics (If one has the patience). The intangibles include the ability to retain men, the random impact of some categories of non-fatal casualties (wounded who recovered and sick who recover) and and non-permanent casualties - (missing who later re-emerge). I would also include the recycling (for want of a better word) of BEF invalids - men who recovered and were sent back through the machinery, and in some cases men who were recycled more than once. We get a tiny glimpse of the invalids in the returns post 15th Feb 1915 and I was quite extremely surprised about the low numbers being recycled and the high numbers or "Permanently Unfit" accumulating in the returns. Of course the last dynamic is the numbers discharged. These 'intangibles' are extremely difficult to quantify at a Regimental level simply because they were either not recorded or the records were not consistent in the way they were records. Edit. I would also add the fact that time-expired men were allowed to re-enlist. There is little doubt some (all?) of them would be classified as untrained. To my knowledge there is no data on this dynamic which distorts the Reserves data to the upside while not necessarily providing men considered fit enough to serve overseas.

I am certain of one thing; the aggregate figures masked a multitude of near-disastrous situations at Regimental and Battalion level.

* The biggest mystery is why the Northumberland Fusiliers ran out of trained men - it is one of the 28 despite being an old 'Large' Regiment. The Regiment had only two battalions being fed by a pool of Army Reserves men generated by five years of four battalions' worth of Army Reservists (four Bns between 1902 - 1907) - a staggering 1,793 trained men, plus 311 Special Reservists - over 2,000 men in total - yet by 12th April 1915 it ran out of trained men. Two thousand men in eight months. Simply mind-boggling. In rough terms this Regiment had an annualised destruction rate equivalent to three and a half battalions. I have yet to crunch the data to discover what happened but it will doubtless be an interesting tale and already demonstrates that the number of trained Reservists 'borne as supernumerary' was not the most important factor. Clearly other dynamics were (in this case) more powerful. I wonder if the drain on the reserves as a consequence of raising so many Kitchener battalions and Pals battalions was a dominant factor. Ditto the Welsh and the Welsh Div - possible a Division too far? More food for thought

My head hurts from thinking about this. Any mistakes are mine.

MG

P.S. Early indications are that the TF were in an even worse position. No strategic reserve of any size........and the impact of this lasted even longer viz 1/5th Royal Scots in the 19th Div. Another story. MG

[ss002d6252]

The biggest mystery is why the Northumberland Fusiliers ran out of trained men

A quick look through the CWGC shows that from August 1914 through to mid April 1915 that the N.Fus suffered at least 600 O.R's killed.

The N.Fus. were quite possibly hampered by virtue of the massive number of battalions raised on Tyneside during a relatively short period.

If they were required to supply a cadre of men to each of the 20 or so Kitchener battalions which formed during that the period then the number of men lost from the battalion would sharp add up once injuries and sickness are added in.

Craig

[Guest]

A quick look through the CWGC shows that from August 1914 through to mid April 1915 that the N.Fus suffered at least 600 O.R's killed.

The N.Fus. were quite possibly hampered by virtue of the massive number of battalions raised on Tyneside during a relatively short period.

If they were required to supply a cadre of men to each of the 20 or so Kitchener battalions which formed during that the period then the number of men lost from the battalion would sharp add up once injuries and sickness are added in.

Craig

Craig...600 fatal casualties is high but not unusual (I calculate 628 for the 1st and 2nd Bns) by the standards of the BEF. One battalion of the Cameraon Highlanders alone suffered 584 killed before Christmas. The main swing factor here is (I suspect the second point) if the Regiment had to send 15 NCOs to each new Northumberland Fusilier Service battalion being raised that would put an additional drain of 19 battalions x 15 men = 285 by the end of 1914, or 300 if you include the 27th Bn (4th Tyneside Irish) rased in Jan 1915.

Here is my preliminary Calc.;

4th Aug 1914: Reservists..................................................................................................1,783

4th Aug 1914: Special Reservists........................................................................................311

4th Aug 1914: Total Reservists......................................................................................................................2,094

4th Aug 1914: less SR recruits...........................................................................................-261

4th Aug 1914 subtotal....................................................................................................................................1,843

5th Aug 1914: less Reservists for 1st Bn.............................................................................-600

5th Aug 1914 subtotal....................................................................................................................................1,243

6th/7th Aug 1914. Returned unfit under-aged from 1st Bn................................................ +404 (includes retention of 93 for 1st Reinforcements)

6th/7th Aug subtotal ......................................................................................................................................1,647

7th Aug -Jan 1915 20 x 15 NCOs cadres for Service Bns...................................................-300

Subtotal.........................................................................................................................................................1,347

14th Aug 1914 -1st Apr 1915 Fatal casualties...................................................................- 628

Subtotal ...........................................................................................................................................................719

This is as far as we can go with static data. the rest is dynamic data that does not give cumulative totals, however on 29th March there were;

29th Mar 1915 Invalids from Exped Force - Temp unfit for Foreign Service........................-606

29th Mar 1915 Invalids from Exped Force - Now fit for Foreign Service..................................+2

29th Mar 1915 sub-total...................................................................................................................................115

Which would leave only 115 men for POWs and men still in hospital or men under-aged or men discharged. The above figure does not include any reservists allocated to the 2nd Bn which landed in France on 18th Jan 1915 or does it quantify the number of time-expired servicemen who re-enlisted.The returns for the 29th March also record:

Temporarily medically unfit for foreign service or under 19 years' of age..............................-474

Sick, Prisoners, Absentees....................................................................................................-173

Fully Trained and effective .....................................................................................................+18

Which suggest that the Northumberland Fusiliers had recruited over 550 'trained' men or had trained 550 men in the interim period. Either way with just 18 fully trained and fit men aged 19 or over on 29th March, this was a fairly big crisis that would not survive a another Ypres By the 12th April the figures were:

Temporarily medically unfit for foreign service or under 19 years' of age..............................-545

Sick, Prisoners, Absentees....................................................................................................-129

Fully Trained and effective ........................................................................................................0

Permanently unfit for overseas service (medically or on account of age)..............................-238

Invalids from Exped Force - Temp unfit for Foreign Service...................................................-699

Invalids from Exped Force - Now fit for Foreign Service.............................................................0

1,611 men and not one man fit enough to serve. This, the strongest Line Infantry Regiment in the British Army only 8 months earlier with 2,094 trained Reservists. If we go full circle and add back the known KIA of 628 that would make 2,239, again reinforcing (excuse the pun) the idea that not only did the Northumberland Fusiliers run out of men, it did so despite recruiting at least 145 ex-servicemen.

The OP asked "Special Reserve: Necessary but not Sufficient?"

QED. Again.

MG

[Muerrisch]

I have been crunching the fate of 1st RWF up to New year's Day 1915.

Bear in mind that they had been reduced by the end of October to "86 other ranks and no officers" according to the admittedly poorly maintained War Diary, written shortly after the event, author unknown, might be 2Lt Joe Cottrell who had been RQMS until commissioned in the field 10th October but who may well not have known of the fact until some dust settled.

Allowing for casualties from end October, and adding drafts as they arrive, the battalion had a ration strength of 995 men at midnight 31st Dec/1st jan.

My only cautionary note is that the diary fails to account for any sicknesses, of which there may well have been a lot.

[Muerrisch]

Further to the above, I have dug out the Other Ranks reinforcements sent to the 2nd battalion up to 31st December 1914, according to their well-kept War Diary.

They total AT LEAST 395, excluding the first reinforcement, allowed for in the mobilisation process.

The 1st battalion had 945 in the same period, again excluding the first reinforcement .......... a whole battalion more or less. They had been reduced to less than 100 men by end of October.

That makes 1340 men as reinforcements in total. Some might be recycled wounded but the time span makes that rather unlikely.

We know from Martin G's research that the regiment had 1351 regular reservists on the books, and 631 trained Special Reservists [RWF were exceptionally strong in this]. All but 2000 men theoretically available from Declaration.

The battalions consumed 342 [1st] and 489 [2nd], total 831, to complete to Establishment before sailing. That leaves 1151 men, rather short of the 1340 we know were sent to the front. So what sort of soldiers made up the shortfall? I suggest they were the 1914 recruits.

Difficult/impossible? to allow for non-effectives among the total of reserves in the period, but the Regular Reservists would include no under-age, no untrained, but a lot of unfit; the Special Reserve would include a lot of under-age.

No doubt the 1914 intake of Regular recruits was rushed through [the regiment did NOT send any post-Declaration enlistees to the front before May 1915], which was just as well, because 2nd RWF hoovered up another 217 men by the end of March 1915, and I have not yet extracted 1st RWF figures for 1915.

How the less-well recruited regiments hung on beggars belief, but they did.

[ss002d6252]

How the less-well recruited regiments hung on beggars belief, but they did.

I think it shows how critical the T.F. were to help bridge the gap until the New Army men were fully ready,

Craig

[Guest]

I think it shows how critical the T.F. were to help bridge the gap until the New Army men were fully ready,

Craig

And the Indian Army Corps who dwarfed the TF in 1914.....

[Muerrisch]

Here is an important query, to scratch a long-standing itch.

Did recruiting on the Special Reserve terms [6 months training, six years commitment] formally end, or did recruitment dry up when canny lads decided that the New Army terms "or the duration" were a better deal?

I do know of two twists in the tale:

AO 295 6th Aug 1914 invited ex-regulars to re-enlist as SR men, one year or the duration

AO 341 30th August extended the invitation to ex-Militia, SR, VF and TF men.

My belief is that was the last twitch of the SR as such. All the fit ones over 19 were about to fight for King and Country, and never be replaced as they died, were wounded, sick or PoWs.

Please does any one know better?

[ss002d6252]

AO 341 30th August extended the invitation to ex-Militia, SR, VF and TF men.

That answers a question I was just going to ask regarding a time expired T.F. R.F.A man who re-enlisted on 7 August 1914 and died on 16 December 1914.

EDIT:

It looks the the man possibly enlisted under an earlier order, AO283 rather than AO341.

AO 295 6th Aug 1914 invited ex-regulars to re-enlist as SR men, one year or the duration

65,000 infantry enlisted under AO295 by 30 Sep 14.

My belief is that was the last twitch of the SR as such. All the fit ones over 19 were about to fight for King and Country, and never be replaced as they died, were wounded, sick or PoWs

Have you seen part IX - Special Reserve in the General Annual Report of 1913-19 ?. This gives some interesting figures. No enlistment is shown to the S.R. after year ending 30 Sep 1914.

The Times Recruiting Supplement of Nov 1915 makes no reference to S.R. enlistments although it covers all the other options.

Craig

[Muerrisch]

Thank you. I will follow up the references.

I consulted THE GURU on regimental numbering sequences, Paul Nixon.

He has vast databases of numbers/ dates issued. He says that whereas recruiting on SR terms [strictly, the allocation of SR numbers] was withering away by November 1914, some regiments, notably the Duke Of Wellingtons and some Irish regiments recruited SR numbered men right into early 1916.

[Muerrisch]

readers will wish to see Paul Nixon's:

http://armyservicenu...-demise-of.html

[David_Underdown]

Of course in Ireland there was no TF to join.

[ss002d6252]

A bit late to the party but I stumbled across this



The Times (London, England), Friday, Sep 04, 1914; pg. 9

[Guest]

A bit late to the party but I stumbled across this

unfit.JPG

The Times (London, England), Friday, Sep 04, 1914; pg. 9

Thanks. Very interesting.

This is interesting as the date clearly indicates these are men who were returned before the retreat from Mons was finished (6th Sep 1914) and (I think) a few days before most 1st Reinforcement Drafts had joined their battalions. Dates vary but most battalions were receiving their first reinforcement drafts around 5th Sep i.e a few days after this newspaper article was written. Assuming there was at least a day or two time-lag between the gathering of the info and the publication, this strongly suggests the men being returned were in fact from the body of men who had deployed with the battalions rather than the reinforcement drafts.

On the 4th Sep there would have been five Infantry Divisions on the ground in F&F, or sixty battalions. These 2,682 unfit men would account for 45 man per battalion on average, which roughly equates to around 4.6% of War Establishment (assuming they were of course infantry). By the end of Aug 1914 the Infantry had lost 1,713 Killed and roughly four times that in wounded missing and POWs - around 8,600 men or around 14.3% of War Establishment. To have to shed another 4.6% would have been a fairly hard decision given I and II Corps were still in full retreat on the 2nd-3rd Sep.

When the battalions mobilised they had time in UK to weed out the least fit. There is plenty of evidence of COs returning unfit men to the Depots when in the UK and at least two examples of COs specifically asking for the Reservists who had most recently gone on to the Reserve. The COs had very large pools of men to choose from so one might reasonably assume there was plenty of opportunity to select the fittest of the Reservists. It is clear that even after disembarkation most battalions were seeing men (mostly Reservists) falling out of route marches. It was a systemic problem. Hard route marches were still insufficient preparation for the rigours that were ahead. We know from the diaries and the numerous records that the battalions were marching an average of 17 miles a day and anyting up to 30 miles in a single day during the retreat - and fighting a rearguard action most of the way.

This is a really valuable snippet as it provides tangible evidence of the magnitude of the problem.

Do you have the rest of the article? particularly the first part?

MG

[Muerrisch]

Readers please be aware that a three-part treatment of "Reserves and Reservists" up to the end of March 1915 has been accepted by the editor of the WFA Journal, Stand-To!, and the first part, covering the background to the situation on 4th August 1914, will be published this month.

The subsequent parts will also be approximately synchronous [100 year anniversary] with the developing manpower crisis.

The series is by me and Martin G.

[ss002d6252]

The rest of the article is a casualty return (third one I think) but can sort out a copy for you later today.

craig

[Guest]

ACI 118 - 1915 (Small).jpg

Just to add fuel to the fire and although not directly related to the Special Reserve, as early as 16th January 1915, This ACI came into being in an effort to get T.F. personnel to transfer to the Regular Reserve Bn's.

Just trawling back through this thread....

Does anyone have any evidence of TF men volunteering to transfer to the Regulars in early 1915 and making it to the front with a Regular battalion? To me this ACI is one of the few official documents that shows that the authorities acknowledged the urgent need for trained men. Dated 16th Jan 1915.

If they were being discharged from the TF and re-enlisted into the Regulars I assume they would be given new Army numbers and would on paper be indistinguishable from other recruits. I suspect a 'late' number and 'early' arrival in F&F would be the only clues.

MG.

[ss002d6252]

I have 2 men who have anomalous dates of entry who may have come under this regulation:

2707 Conway
2803 Hicks

Conway enlisted early Oct 14 and Hicks in late Sep 1914. Hicks had been a Volunteer pre 1908 but makes no mention of any service since that date.

Both men have a date of entry of 23/01/1915 and although both men later were given 6 digit 6th DLI T.F. numbers they certainly went off to France with another battalion and not the 6th DLI.

Only service record is for Hicks - joined 6th DLI and was then posted to another Bn on 23/01/1915 and then sent to France on 23/01/1915.

The Bn number is a either a 4 or a 14, it's difficult to read. The problem I have is that date of entry doesn't match the 14th DLI so I'm beginning to wonder if it was actually 4th DLI and he was posted off to France through them.

It may be a wild goose chase and a look at the Medal Rolls will probably be required to settle it one way or another but the date seems to be in the right ballpark.

Craig

[Guest]

I have 2 men who have anomalous dates of entry who may have come under this regulation:

2707 Conway

2803 Hicks

Conway enlisted early Oct 14 and Hicks in late Sep 1914. Hicks had been a Volunteer pre 1908 but makes no mention of any service since that date.

Both men have a date of entry of 23/01/1915 and although both men later were given 6 digit 6th DLI T.F. numbers they certainly went off to France with another battalion and not the 6th DLI.

Only service record is for Hicks - joined 6th DLI and was then posted to another Bn on 23/01/1915 and then sent to France on 23/01/1915.

The Bn number is a either a 4 or a 14, it's difficult to read. The problem I have is that date of entry doesn't match the 14th DLI so I'm beginning to wonder if it was actually 4th DLI and he was posted off to France through them.

It may be a wild goose chase and a look at the Medal Rolls will probably be required to settle it one way or another but the date seems to be in the right ballpark.

Craig

Thanks Craig

An interested conundrum. On the date Hicks disembarked the only DLI battalion in F&F was the 2nd Bn. The first DLI New Army battalion to disembark in France did not do so until 21st May 1915 (10th (Service) Bn DLI) and as you will of course know, the first DLI TF battalion did not land until 17th-18th April (1/5th Bn TF to 1/9th Bns).

This strongly suggests he was part of a reinforcement draft for the 2nd Bn.

The first reinforcements to arrive after his disembarkation date were the 13th and 14th Reinforcement Drafts (30 and 40 men respectively) which arrived on the 7th and 20th Feb. What is interesting is that the Reinforcement Drafts were not the normal 93 men of the early months,. We see from late 1914 through to early 1915 rather smaller groups of men in these drafts which might suggest propblems in the chain. That said, the DLI started the War with the largest pool of Reservists per paired battalion Regiment and given the 1st DLI were languishing in India, this massive pool of Reservists was effectively supplying only one active service battalion (2nd Bn).

MG

[Muerrisch]

Martin: draft/ reinforcement strengths:

From my narrow specialism, only First Reinforcements [as you know, part of the War Establishment] were of, or approximated to, 93 other ranks. After that, "anything goes", from massive 200 plus to dribbles of 20 or 30.

What I have noted is that drafts seem to have arrived AT BRIGADE from the relevant Divisional IBD, with parties of men for each or some of the brigade constituents.

[Guest]

Martin: draft/ reinforcement strengths:

From my narrow specialism, only First Reinforcements [as you know, part of the War Establishment] were of, or approximated to, 93 other ranks. After that, "anything goes", from massive 200 plus to dribbles of 20 or 30.

What I have noted is that drafts seem to have arrived AT BRIGADE from the relevant Divisional IBD, with parties of men for each or some of the brigade constituents.

Grumpy - the experiencs of the 2nd Bn RWF might not be typical. You may well be right that the multiples of 93 were completely abandoned, but there was certainly an attempt in the first months to adhere to this standard size for a single draft.

In the larger body of evidence we have, the first, second, and third Reinforcements for most Battalions in the BEF in Aug were based on multiples of 93 (or thereabouts due to small losses). We have nearly 100 battalions in the line by end 1914 and a huge body of evidence in the diaries to show this, further supported by 25 Brigade war diaries - so around 120 sources in total. It was not completely consistent but there is enough evidence to support the theory that this is how the process started and was maintained for a few months at least. An example from the 1st Bn King's (Liverpool Regt) - the battalion with the most complete set of Reinforcements records in their diaries.

1st Reinforcements..........1 + 87

2nd Reinforcements.........1 + 92

3rd Reinforcements..........1 + 93

4th Reinforcements..........2 + 29

5th Reinforcements..........2 + 210

6th Reinforcements..........2 + 21

7th Reinforcements..........1 + 70

8th Reinforcements..........1 + 110

It may be a coincidence that the combined 4th, 5th and 6th Reinforcements are very close to 3 standard drafts and it may be a coincidence that the 7th and 8th Reinforcements (combined) are 6 short of a double draft. Either way it seems clear that there was an attempt to send standard sized drafts in the first three - 4th, 7th and 22nd Sep 1914. The other three Battalions in the Brigade show similar returns. Interestingly the 1st Royal Berrkshire Regt's 8th Reinforcement Draft on 29th Dec 1914 was "60, about half of which were Kitchener's Army".

As the war progressed the 'standard' draft of 93 became more fragmented -as you note. My read of this is that the smaller drafts were likely cobbled together from recovered lightly wounded and sick - remember a very high proportion of sick recovered and a high percentage recovered within just a few weeks - indeed some of the diaries actually note some of these smaller drafts were mostly recovered wounded/sick.

As we know there is a rather large black hole of information between drafts leaving the Reserve Battalions in the UK and arriving at the Battalion in the line. There is considerable scope for leakage between the two and I have little doubt that in the chaos of war with mounting casualties and casualty numbers far in excess of the worst expectations the fragmentation of the drafts into smaller groups was inevitable. Almost without exception the battalions in the line were losing men faster than they could be replaced, and the only times we generally see Battalions being taken back above War Establishment is during times when they are taken out of the line and completely refitted as we see in many cases after 1st Ypres. If Battalions were constantly under strength it would seem that the Base would be sending as many men as they could as soon as they could. I can't imagine the Base being flush with Reservist Reinforcements or recovered wounded and injured when Battalions were at less than 50% strength for long periods. Losses of 200-330 a day during intense periods of fighting were not uncommon. I have seen examples of more than 400 losses in a single action. The the Adjt of the 1st Loyal North Lancs claims his battalion lost 1,000 men and 30 Officers in just 23 days (a quick cross-check with the CWGC and diaries does not quite substantiate this claim) Similar claims are made by the Cameron Highlanders and if memory serves the Black Watch. The Suffolks, Royal Munster Fusiliers, Cheshires, Warwickshires, Queen's, Scots Guards, KOYLI all had battalions that were essentially annihilated which put enormous strains on the logistic chain.

Often we see the standard drafts split and (roughly) the same numbers arriving over 2-3 days. Again my reading of this is simply that the drafts were bundled into any available transport - often crowded trains and horse trucks - which might not have enabled the full draft(s) to get there in one go.

MG

[Muerrisch]

Martin, herewith complete draft sequence for 1st RWF mid October to end March 1915 excluding odds and sods like a batman arriving with an officer: 1st RWF were sucking on the hind tit, a month later than 2nd RWF, and also the drafts in bold were to rebuild a battalion reduced to about 90 men late October. The diaries sometimes appear to agregate genuine drafts with returnees of sick, lightly wounded, stragglers and missing.

90 86 109 99 303 151 190 [12 Nov] 40 25 25 30 50 60 33 15 35 28 57 18

2nd RWF 94 93 93 52 [22nd Oct] 20 37 95 99 50 50 25 42 September to end March.

I think what was happening after 1st RWF landed 7th October was that the men arriving at Rouen or wherever were apportioned to the two respective Div. IBDs for use as required, a huge administrative and logistical task.