Special Reserve: necessary but not sufficient

[Guest]

Craig, a very good find. Excellent. The movement if these men will be seen in the Annual General Report tables, but only at the level of Line Infantry rather than single battalions. It will be interesting to see evidence in the monthly returns if any sharp decline in the numbers. MG.

[Guest]

Boot neck. Thanks for the data. Interesting and worth comparing with the return data. I will post the return data in a few days. Transcribing takes some time.... Very useful to get a full set of draft numbers. MG

[Muerrisch]

There are I think a number of ways the numbers get distorted, each of which should be quantifiable on an absolute or relative basis;

1. Historical Establishments. The establishments differed depending on where the overseas battalion was stationed other than India; Gibraltar, Malta, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mauritius, Bermuda, Egypt, Sudan, South Africa all required establishments of 840 compared to 940 for India. Some battalions went from one of these lower establishment stations to another in back-to-back postings, which means they could have spent half of the previous decade with 100 men fewer than battalions in India. If for example they had spent 1904-1909 in two of these places rather than India, it might have had a noticeable impact on the absolute numbers as the starting point each year is from a lower base. Easy to model. Additionally I would assume serving in India required higher turnover of personnel due to the climate compared with, say, Malta or Gibraltar.

2. Strength. The actual strength of each battalion is available on a monthly basis, so it should be possible with a bit of patience to calculate which battalions were consistently under strength. Assuming overseas stations were generally up to strength, this will be more pertinent to the Home station battalions in each Regiment which appear to be consistently short of men. It will be interesting to see if there is any relationship between regimental stregths and the service numbers used during the period.

3. Attrition of Line Infantrymen. As we know from the annual returns it is possible to model the attrition of the average line infantry battalion from the long list of causes; death, desertion, illness, discharge, prison, etc....

4. Attrition of Army Reservists. The second derivative; all the same factors as above, but applied to the Army Reservists

5. Emigration. Not covered in the above.

6. "Other". I am sure we will discover a few 'other' causes, but here is one example; I noticed when reading the "Edwardian Army" that in 1911 it was possible for men with Army Reservist commitments to join the Special Reserve. One Regiment boosted its Special Reserve battalion strength by 200. Robbing Peter to pay Paul. Clearly if these Army Reservists had come from the same Regiment there is a direct cost/benefit. The Army Reserve numbers fall by 200 and the SR numbers rise by 200. If however Army Reservists could sign up with a different Regiment than the one they originally served with, this might explain some shifts in numbers between Regiments. It is definitely worth exploring the rules and regs for 1911 on this specific issue.

MG

Edited with overseas establishments.

"Yes but", as a friend of mine begins every sentence.

Point 1 takes no cognisance of the fact that REGIMENTS could recruit to full REGIMENTAL ESTABKLISHMENT if they could. Therefore the overseas battalion size should not be looked at in vaccuo.

If total regulars in regiment at any one time = T

Then T = O + H + Depot or 3rd depending on date, where T is the number of men enlisted, which at any one time can be treated as a constant, so that as O, the overseas battalion, varies, so does/ do the H battalion to keep T the same.

The literature suggests that modest numbers of soldiers deteriorated before time up in India, but I think this is irrelevant: sending them home and replacing from H merely keeps totals the same.

Hope I make myself clear?

6. Regarding reservists joining SR that was specifically forbidden

Recruiting regs 1912 90 [ii] ......... under any circumstances

[bootneck]

Grumpy

Sorry I cannot help with 2RWF as I’ve been concentrating on 1^st ESR trying to put a nominal roll of Other Ranks together starting with annotating the 1914 Star Roll typescript held at Surrey History Centre. I am currently working on a 1915 nominal roll using the unit’s Battalion Part II Orders and have 900 names and just started the letter L.

According to the regimental history the 3^rd Bn, ESR, had 19040 men pass through its ranks throughout the war; 13029 were sent overseas and the other 6011 were transferred to other units serving in the United Kingdom. The breakdown of men sent overseas was as follows:

1^st ESR: 3695

2^nd ESR: 1268

7^th ESR: 1276

8^th ESR: 778

9^th ESR: 158

12^th ESR: 697

13^th ESR: 311

To Base (France) for posting as ordered: 4261

To Base (Mediterranean) for posting as ordered: 558

Sent overseas individually: 17

Similarly from the same source 4732 men were posted overseas from the 4^th Battalion and the breakdown is as follows:

1^st ESR: 178

2^nd ESR: 947

7^th ESR: 396

8^th ESR: 80

9^th ESR: 190

12^th ESR: 86

To units of the various Expeditionary Forces, inclusive of ESR battalions not specified: 2855

Just to muddy the waters, the same source states that the 4^th Battalion started sending drafts overseas, including 250 men to the 2^nd Battalion in February, in early 1915. By August 1915 they had sent 200 men to the 1^st Battalion and 931 men to the 2^nd Battalion.

Apologies again if slightly off topic.

Bootneck

[Guest]

"Yes but", as a friend of mine begins every sentence.

Point 1 takes no cognisance of the fact that REGIMENTS could recruit to full REGIMENTAL ESTABKLISHMENT if they could. Therefore the overseas battalion size should not be looked at in vaccuo.

If total regulars in regiment at any one time = T

Then T = O + H + Depot or 3rd depending on date, where T is the number of men enlisted, which at any one time can be treated as a constant, so that as O, the overseas battalion, varies, so does/ do the H battalion to keep T the same.

The literature suggests that modest numbers of soldiers deteriorated before time up in India, but I think this is irrelevant: sending them home and replacing from H merely keeps totals the same.

Hope I make myself clear?

6. Regarding reservists joining SR that was specifically forbidden

Recruiting regs 1912 90 [ii] ......... under any circumstances

Grumpy

1. Adding the numbers of a few sample battalions (O+H+D) for 1904-1913 does not give constant T in the few I have looked at so far. I think I need to simply crunch the numbers and post. Like many things in the Army theory, regulations and reality were sometimes slightly different. It may be the case that the experience of the RWF O+H+D was a constant, but we have to remember it was (in my analysis) the second best recruited two-battalion Regiment in the prev decade. If we look at the Regiments that struggled, O+H+D varies somewhat. I will revert with examples.

2.Ref my earlier point 6 I read recently that Army Reservists were allowed to join the SR...Staffordshires was the example from memory. .... I will revert with the reference. It may have been a window that was subsequently closed, but a window nevertheless. Found it: Page 121 of "The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, training and Deploying the British Army 1902-1914" by Bowman and Connelly:

"The Special Reserve was artificially boosted in 1911 by allowing the incorporation into its ranks of former regular soldiers, most of whom were under an obligation as army reservists to rejoin the army again in the event of national emeergency. Thus the 4 North Staffordshire gained 200 ex-regulars and was also allowed to reduce its annual camp to fourteen days...."

A footnote quote the Staffordshire Regimental Museum's "Digest of service 4th North Staffordshire Regiment 1853-1914". Note this occurred before your reference for 1912. The wording suggests the window was created in 1911 and may well have only lasted for a short time, but if it did indeed exist, it will explain why the North Staffs available Army Reservists might have dipped by 200. I will cross ref with the returns. It opens the possibility of other windows in prior years. MG

[Muerrisch]

Grumpy

1. Adding the numbers of a few sample battalions (O+H+D) for 1904-1913 does not give constant T in the few I have looked at so far. I think I need to simply crunch the numbers and post. Like many things in the Army theory, regulations and reality were sometimes slightly different. It may be the case that the experience of the RWF O+H+D was a constant, but we have to remember it was (in my analysis) the second best recruited two-battalion Regiment in the prev decade. If we look at the Regiments that struggled, O+H+D varies somewhat. I will revert with examples.

2.Ref my earlier point 6 I read recently that Army Reservists were allowed to join the SR...Staffordshires was the example from memory. .... I will revert with the reference. It may have been a window that was subsequently closed, but a window nevertheless. Found it: Page 121 of "The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, training and Deploying the British Army 1902-1914" by Bowman and Connelly:

"The Special Reserve was artificially boosted in 1911 by allowing the incorporation into its ranks of former regular soldiers, most of whom were under an obligation as army reservists to rejoin the army again in the event of national emeergency. Thus the 4 North Staffordshire gained 200 ex-regulars and was also allowed to reduce its annual camp to fourteen days...."

A footnote quote the Staffordshire Regimental Museum's "Digest of service 4th North Staffordshire Regiment 1853-1914". Note this occurred before your reference for 1912. The wording suggests the window was created in 1911 and may well have only lasted for a short time, but if it did indeed exist, it will explain why the North Staffs available Army Reservists might have dipped by 200. I will cross ref with the returns. It opens the possibility of other windows in prior years. MG

Didn't explain myself at all well, sorry.

Martin I said a constant AT ONE TIME.

O + H + D in year x gives the same total T for the regiment regardless of how large O is because H and D will [must] take up the slack. H was rarely if ever to establishment, was it? Hardly need add that O + H + D has a maximum value set by the three respective establishments.

T will vary month by month and year by year as recruits arrive and men pass to the reserve, and O and D will be close to the Establishment, but H will go up and down.

The 1911 window for the reservists to special reservists is indeed interesting [and pointless!]. I note that it did not exclude ex-regulars with no current reserve obligation though. Another dratted variable!

[Guest]

Not sure I quite understand the point, but here goes....

1. Regiments with a battalion in India would have a total establishment of 1,717

India establishment......940

Home establishment.....720

Depot establishment......57

2. Regiments with a battalion in Malta would have a total establishment of 1,617

India establishment......840

Home establishment.....720

Depot establishment......57

In theory, two Regiments with identical turnover of 20% of establishment per annum, one with a battalion in India for 10 years and one with a battalion in Malta all at full strength throughout would by the end of the decade have turned over 4,030 and 3,804 men respectively, a difference of 226 men. This is in perfect conditions: fully recruited.

In reality, most battalions were well short of Total establishment and the differentials are very wide. Interestingly while most regiments did strive to keep the overseas battalion at full strength, many were unable to as the returns show. Similarly the shortfalls at the home based battalions were wide and varied considerably between Regiments. I will crunch the data for the 74 paired battalions for Dec 1913 to illustrate the point. Keep an eye on this space.... I was very surprised at the range of the differences between the best and the worst recruited.

MG

[ss002d6252]

An interesting look at the recruitment via district (only of those men recruited locally for a regiment within their own district)

Again, it also reflects the lower recruitment for the Sottish and Irish districts.

Craig

[Muerrisch]

Quote from Martin G. In theory, two Regiments with identical turnover of 20% of establishment per annum, one with a battalion in India for 10 years and one with a battalion in Malta all at full strength throughout would by the end of the decade have turned over 4,030 and 3,804 men respectively, a difference of 226 men. This is in perfect conditions: fully recruited.

Exactly so: no regiment ever was at full establishment I believe, so the comparison [and the difference over 10 years is only 5% or so] is not very helpful, is it?

The regimental total intake over 10 years is best calculated by subtracting from the regimental number issued in year 10 the regimental number issued at year zero, and depends not at all on where the men were sent, or for how long.

[Muerrisch]

Paul Nixon’s Regimental Numbers as a guide to maximum number of reservists a 2-battalion regiment might have in 1914.

Enlistments before 1902 will have no reserve obligation in 1914 unless they enter Section D to extend obligation..

Enlistments 1902, 1903, 1904 for 3 years colour & 9 years reserve will go to reserve 1905 1906 1907 and are still reservists on outbreak of war

Enlistments 1904, 1905 for 9 years colour & 3 reserve go to reserve 1913 onwards

Enlistments 1906, 1907 for 7 years colours & 5 reserve go to reserve 1913, 1914

All enlistments after 1907 do not go to reserve by outbreak of war unless special provision made as in 1911 when about 100 per REGIMENT seem to have gone prematurely. Those due to pass to reserve in 1915 would be “held to serve” under their Terms of Engagement.

Nixon rarely has a regimental number conveniently issued in August so that interpolation is necessary, which is not satisfactory as rates changed rapidly. Likely error +/- 100 men.

This is a work in progress. I have omitted regiments with 4 battalions for all or part of the period, and also most Scottish and Irish.

It is interesting to compare these rankings with Martin G.’s tabulation of actual reservists available: there is some correlation but not very inspiring!

Red regiments high end, blue regiments low end.

Regiment

Total men

N & D

2850

E Lan

2300

RWK

2200

RWFus

2200

RSF

2200

R H

2200

King’s

2200

L N Lan

2150

DLI

2150

Welsh

2100

SWB

2100

KOYLI

2100

Yorks

2000

Wilts

2000

Lincs

2000

Glos

2000

S Lan

1950

Essex

1950

Y & L

1900

W Yorks

1900

R Irish

1900

R Berks

1900

KOSB

1900

Cam SR

1900

W Riding

1850

RS

1850

QRWS

1850

SLI

1800

R Sx

1800

R Inn Fus

1800

Northants

1800

N Staffs

1800

King’s Liverpool

1800

E Surrey

1800

Dorset

1800

DCLI

1800

Beds

1800

Leics

1700

Buffs

1650

Border

1650

E Yorks

1600

Chesh

1600

S Staffs

1500

KSLI

1500

Suffolk

1400

Hants

1400

Devons

1400

Ox Bucks LI

1300

Norfolk

1300

[Guest]

Quote from Martin G. In theory, two Regiments with identical turnover of 20% of establishment per annum, one with a battalion in India for 10 years and one with a battalion in Malta all at full strength throughout would by the end of the decade have turned over 4,030 and 3,804 men respectively, a difference of 226 men. This is in perfect conditions: fully recruited.

Exactly so: no regiment ever was at full establishment I believe, so the comparison [and the difference over 10 years is only 5% or so] is not very helpful, is it?

The regimental total intake over 10 years is best calculated by subtracting from the regimental number issued in year 10 the regimental number issued at year zero, and depends not at all on where the men were sent, or for how long.

That makes the assumption that every number was used. Were they? ....and if they were, they were presumably allocated to recruits.... what per cent made it through to a battalion. When I look at the number of men who allegedly served due to service number extremes (and therefore became eligible to be considered as a future reservists for the purposes of this debate) I often wonder. MG

[ss002d6252]

1.8% of men were discharged medically within 3 months of joining in the 1913 return data.

This does not include purchases out, discharged as not effective, deserters etc.

I would guess the overall army drop out rate was probably 2-3% per year but I need to have a better luck at the figure.

edit

drop out was 15% per annum for men who never entered the reserve commitment whereas only 13% entered the reserve.

For a 2 bn regiment at full strength only about 260 men per year would join the reserve at the best whereas some 560 men would be needed to keep the strength of the regiment up.

Craig

[Guest]

To illustrate an earlier point, the differences between Establishment and Strength with Overseas battalions and Home Battalions and Depots (and by extension Total Establishment) was very wide with some regiments. Below is a snapshot for just one month. In order to strengthen this argument more data runs need to be done for a continuous string of months and years.

Here are the stats. I had a look at the Line Infantry in Dec 1913 and have data for 64 paired battalions (there should be 74 but one page was blurred). Some general observations about manning of Overseas, Home and Depots

1. Establishments:

a. Overseas battalions

i. India .......................940

ii. Other .....................840

b. Home battalions : ............720

c. Depots:............... ..............57, occasionally 56 for the second depot supporting four-battalion Regiments.

2. Overall Summary. The Line Infantry was short by -4.3% or some 4,673 men on a Total Establishment base of 107,808 (64 paired battalions plus related depots). Only 9 of 64 paired battalions (plus related depot) were (in aggregate) at or above establishment.

a. Average (mean) Establishment for a paired battalion plus depot:...1,684

b. Average (mean) Strength for a paired battalion plus depot:............1,611

b. Average (mean) shortfall for a paired battalion plus depot:.................-74

b. Variance:

i. Largest surplus to Total Establishment (Overseas Bn + Home Bn + Depot):....... +63

ii. Largest shortfall to Total Establishment (Overseas Bn + Home Bn + Depot):.... -197

3. Overseas Battalions The battalions overseas were (in aggregate) overmanned by 4.5% or 2752 men on an Overseas Establishment base of 60,912. Of the 64 Overseas battalions, 14 were under establishment

a. Average Establishment:....909

b. Average Strength:.............952

c. Average Surplus:................43

d. Variance:

i. Largest surplus to Overseas Establishment:....+198

ii. Largest shortfall to Overseas Establishment....-108

4. Home Based Battalions The battalions based at Home were (in aggregate) under-manned by -25% or 9,252 men on an Establishment of 40,080. Of the 64 Overseas Home battalions only 2 were at or above Establishment

a. Average Establishment:....720

b. Average Strength:.............575

c. Average Shortfall:..............145

d. Variance:

i. Largest surplus to Home Establishment:........+62

ii. Largest shortfall to Home Establishment......-264

4. Depots The Depots were (in aggregate) over-manned by +51%% or 1,827 men in excess of Establishment of 3,568. All 64 Depots were at or above Establishment

a. Average Establishment:....56

b. Average Strength:............84

c. Average excess:.............28

d. Variance:

i. Largest surplus to Depot Establishment:........+81

ii. Smallest surplus to Depot Establishment........+7

I trust this at least demonstrates that across the Line Infantry there was a very wide spread in the ability of individual Regiments to meet Establishments. It also illustrates that Overseas battalions were not always up to establishment and that nearly 80% of the Home based battalions were under strength. Overall, 86% of Regiments were under Total Establishment.

MG

[Muerrisch]

That makes the assumption that every number was used. Were they? ....and if they were, they were presumably allocated to recruits.... what per cent made it through to a battalion. When I look at the number of men who allegedly served due to service number extremes (and therefore became eligible to be considered as a future reservists for the purposes of this debate) I often wonder. MG

Martin

There is every indication that every number was used in the relevant period after 1902 with one possible and rare exception.

This that, when a regiment neared 9999 it was required to seek permission to start a new series at #1. It is possible that some short-cutted from the big 99xx to 0001.

However, very very few reached 99xx in the relevant period for obtaining 1914 reservists, which I take to be 1902 to 1907.

I have left VSC numbering out of this consideration because that abberation was over by 1902.

Your

4. Home Based Battalions The battalions based at Home were (in aggregate) under-manned by -25% or 9,252 men on an Establishment of 40,080. Of the 64 Overseas battalions only 2 were at or above Establishment

a. Average Establishment:....720

b. Average Strength:.............575

c. Average Shortfall:..............145

d. Variance:

i. Largest surplus to Home Establishment:........+62

ii. Largest shortfall to Home Establishment......-264

I assume you mean "of the 64 Home battalions?"

These figures lead one to ask why the average top-up necessary was at least twice your shortfall figures! The halt and lame, under-age and untrained had to be legion ....... but we knew that of course!

I think much of your variation/shortfall/surplus in all categories O H and D reflects transients: men on way to India etc, men on way back, men at depot waiting discharge ...... and these transients will be omni-present, technically on somebody's books but "on their way" one way or the other. "Noise" in the equation!

[Guest]

Some better data from the eve of the Great War...

Line Infantry Regiments - battalion establishments and strengths (and differences) on 31st July 1914. Summary table at the bottom.

It is worth noting that the 74 Overseas battalions were (on average) at full strength, however at battalion level there were huge ranges with the 1st Bn Welsh Regt some -190 under-establishment. There may well be a simple explanation for this. Aside from this big out-lier, the other battalions that were under-establishment were only marginally under-establishment

The 74 Home based battalions were almost all under-establishment - on average by 130 Rank and file on an establishment of 740. That equates to -17.6% under peace-time establishment. The average Home based battalion was 590 strong. When under-aged men are taken into the equation it is easy to understand why the battalions needed somewhere in the region of 500 Reservists to come up to War Establishment. This is all consistent with the anecdotal evidence in the War Diaries and Histories,

The returns for the 74 Special Reserve battalions only tally the so-called permanent staff.They are only included for completeness. Most were carrying slightly more than the establishment 57 Rank & File. The Extra-Reserve battalion permanent staffs were negligible in size and have been excluded.

Any mistakes are mine. MG

[Guest]

Martin

Your

4. Home Based Battalions The battalions based at Home were (in aggregate) under-manned by -25% or 9,252 men on an Establishment of 40,080. Of the 64 Overseas battalions only 2 were at or above Establishment

a. Average Establishment:....720

b. Average Strength:.............575

c. Average Shortfall:..............145

d. Variance:

i. Largest surplus to Home Establishment:........+62

ii. Largest shortfall to Home Establishment......-264

I assume you mean "of the 64 Home battalions?"

These figures lead one to ask why the average top-up necessary was at least twice your shortfall figures! The halt and lame, under-age and untrained had to be legion ....... but we knew that of course!

I think much of your variation/shortfall/surplus in all categories O H and D reflects transients: men on way to India etc, men on way back, men at depot waiting discharge ...... and these transients will be omni-present, technically on somebody's books but "on their way" one way or the other. "Noise" in the equation!

In short - yes. The Overseas part was a residual from a cut-and-paste. Will amend for clarity.

"Home" means the home based part of the 74 paired battalions rather than an SR battalion. Anyway, the date is all rather irrelevant now as I have found the July 1914 data (reported in Aug 1914) which gives an accurate picture of the situation on the eve of the Great War (see post above).

On your suggestion that the variations are accounted for by movement, I would disagree. Men in transit are accounted for in the numbers. It is possible to add up the 1st and 2nd Bn Establishments and net off the 1st and 2nd Bn strengths (for two battalion Regiments). When doing this exercise it is clear that scores of Regiments were short of men. Even including the SR battalion staff doesn't move the dial much. A random example....

Battalion......................................................................................Establishment...............Strength...................Difference

1st Bn South Staffordshire Regiment (South Africa)............................840.........................816...........................-24

2nd Bn South Staffordshire Regiment (Aldershot)................................720.........................457.........................-263

3rd (Special Reserve) Bn South Staffordshire Regiment.(Staff).............57...........................84...........................+27

Total .................................................................................................1,617......................1,357..........................-260

...which equates to being 16% under peace-time establishment. Regardles, it is just putting more accurate figures on what we already knew - that the Home battalions needed over 500 Reservists and the Overseas battalions needed some men too. Clearly what this does not take into account are the ages of the men. I see the data as the best case and a base from which the under-aged, over-aged, untrained , unfit, malingerers etc are deducted. MG

[Muerrisch]

Martin thank you, very informative indeed.

As background:

The Trooping Season was from October outbound from UK, to March last homebound from India.

Depending on drop-offs/ pick-ups on the way [Gib, Malta, Cyprus, Aden, for example] the India trip took as little as three weeks and as long as six.

During that period after new draft arrived in India the unit might be in surplus unless some clever accounting "got rid of" the homeward bound. However, the Government of India was responsible for feeding and clothing the lot, wherever they were in the country.

The drafts were accounted for outside the regimental totals as "Drafts despatched to battalion abroad" in a shipboard limbo! We have, for example, drafts total 172 RWF bound for 2ndRWF sent in December 1912 still not taken on strength in the Feb 1913 returns.

Regarding:

The 74 Home based battalions were almost all under-establishment - on average by 130 Rank and file on an establishment of 740. That equates to -17.6% under peace-timeestablishment. The average Home based battalion was 590 strong. When under-aged men are taken into the equation it is easy to understand why the battalions needed somewhere in the region of 500 Reservists to come up to War Establishment. This is all consistent with the anecdotal evidence in the War Diaries and Histories,

I/we tend to pay little attention to the intake of recruits of 1914. Most regiments pulled in about 300 to 350 men per annum, 150 to 175 per 6 months. There was a tendency for Jack Frost to be a good recruiter [as opposed to the harvest season] so many Home battalions would have 150 or more men [of various ages] not fully trained by August 1914. As the rules [soon to be bent] stood, these could not be sent on active service until "fully trained". This is a major component, I believe, of the need for a huge top-up. It would have happened whichever year war began.

[Muerrisch]

Martin I think we may be at cross purposes or I have got hold of the wrong end of the stick. Probably the latter.

Taking the monthly return of Feb 1913 [it is the one in front of me, by your kindness] I find:

983 men on books 2nd RWF

621 on 1st

80 on 3rd

and 172 in transit to India

This gives a regimental total of 1856 men, whereas the establishments added give 1717.

By my reading, and I draw no conclusions or make inferences, that means that transients outbound were indeed [as you rightly say] not in O H or D/3rd, but were in fact on the regimental books. In the fullness of time a similar number would be on the way Home but there is no provision for enumerating them on the return that I can see. Beyond urging caution on myself .............. !

[Guest]

Martin I think we may be at cross purposes or I have got hold of the wrong end of the stick. Probably the latter.

Taking the monthly return of Feb 1913 [it is the one in front of me, by your kindness] I find:

983 men on books 2nd RWF

621 on 1st

80 on 3rd

and 172 in transit to India

This gives a regimental total of 1856 men, whereas the establishments added give 1717.

By my reading, and I draw no conclusions or make inferences, that means that transients outbound were indeed [as you rightly say] not in O H or D/3rd, but were in fact on the regimental books. In the fullness of time a similar number would be on the way Home but there is no provision for enumerating them on the return that I can see. Beyond urging caution on myself .............. !

Grumpy, You might be right, but that is not the way I am reading the data. If you look at the consecutive monthly returns the '172' number is under column heading "Drafts required for Abroad 1912-13". Edit: This is a ball-park figure that bears little relation to the actual numbers sent: 221

Separately in the next two columns are the draft(s) numbers and the date(s) they were sent. The draft at this time is in fact three separate drafts; one of 80 (sent in Oct 1912) and another 81 (sent in Dec 1912) an a later draft of 60. The former first appears in the Nov 1912 monthly return and continues to appear in the returns through to Jan 1913. The second of these two drafts first appears in the Jan 1912 Monthly return and both continue to appear in the monthly returns to Apr 1913 when the third draft of 60 appears dated Mar 1913.

My reading (and I may well be wrong) is that the margins are making notes of drafts and the drafts are included in the numbers when they arrive. There may well be 172 men on the high seas additional to the reported numbers, but the returns do not tell us the offset - i.e. ho many men are leaving on time expired, discharge etc. If you look at the total numbers (O+H+D) excluding the drafts mentioned in the margins, the total numbers sometimes have low correlation to the draft numbers. In this small example, taking the data back to April 1912 through to April the total numbers (O+H+D) actually fall,...and consistently fall...which suggests more men left than joined as drafts through the period in question.

Because the drafts are mentioned continuously for a few months, my assumption is that they are 'in the numbers'. If I am wrong, something has to explain why the total numbers dropped during the five months from Oct 1912 to Apr 1913 from 1,752 to 1,655 (a net decline of 97) despite drafts totalling 221 arriving. This would imply 318 men left the RWF during the period. Note that the previous draft arrived in April 1912. Edit: This of course is a typical annual requirement for a line Regiment, so it is possible that this is the case...BUT...the returns don't show the block outflows, so we have to deduce it from the totals less the drafts. Clear as mud?

Here is the data. Double checked against the original docs which you have. I have transcribed the whole run from Jan 1904 to Dec 1913. It is worth remembering that the RWF is not particularly representative as they were particularly well manned throughout, which doubtless explains their high levels of available Reservists on mobilisation.

To illustrate the point on the drafts here is the run of data. Any mistake are mine. MG

P.S. I will do the same for the Lincs and R Sussex to compare. Sadly I dont yet have the complete data run for 1904-1914 for either. MG

PPS. In case you are wondering, the data in 1913 stabilises around the 1650 mark. The point being it does not subsequently pick up.

[Muerrisch]

Martin, you [and I to a lesser extent] are " "going where no man has gone before"!

Your output is phenomenal, and marvellously presented. I am committed to other matters for a few days and will mull over the tables instead of counting sheep.

My Regimental Records RWF usually records coming and going in the trooping season so I will have a look and report back.

[Guest]

The Lincolnshires and the Ides of March.

The story of the Lincolnshire Regiment in 1914 and early 1915 exposes just how shallow the pools of Reserves were for some Regiments. At the outbreak of the War as a Home based battalion the 1st Bn Lincolnshire Regiment's, peace establishment was 750. The 1st Bn strength in July 1914 was only 617. The battalion had to be made up to War Establishment * but it also had to send back the men under the age of 19 who were not eligible to be sent overseas. They represented 6.5% of the Rank & File. In theory on a net basis mobilisation required 288 Reservists to come up to strength.

The 2nd battalion was overseas but still under peace-time Establishment of 940 with just 839 rank & file. It would need a further 66 Reservists to come up to War Establishment of 905 Rank and File. The number of under-aged men would be minimal. The theoretical combined requirements of the two Regular battalions would be 354 Reservists. In reality an extra 189 Reservists were sent out making a total of 543 Reservist.

Regardless of the actual numbers sent, both Regular battalions would have sent men back to the Reserve battalion (under-aged men, unfit men etc). For the purposes of this exercise the net requirements for the two Regular battalions to come up to War Establishment will be used: 354

On the eve of the Great War, official returns reveal that the Lincolnshire Regiment had 993 Army Reservists "borne as supernumeraries". Taking away the 354 Reservists that were required by the two Regular battalions would have left 639 Reservists who would join with the growing 3rd Special Reserve battalion. Official figures are slightly more elusive for the Special Reserve battalions but we have returns showing the number of men and the sub-set of 'Trained Men' for a number of dates in August-September 1914. The peak figure occurred on 5th September 1914 when the 3rd Bn reported 1,430 ORs of which only 830 were fully trained men. This number would include the remaining Army Reservists which implies there were 191 trained Special Reservists on the books. (Calc: 830-639=191). In summary, the two regular battalions were at full establishment leaving 830 fully trained Reservists made up of 639 Army Reservists and 191 Special Reservists.

According to the Regimental History, by 2nd November 1914, the 1st Bn Linconshire Regiment was down to 175 men. The CWGC data reveals 289 1st Bn men were KIA by this date, implying a further 536 men were either WIA, MIA, POW or had become non-battle casualties. Either way they would need to be replaced. By this date, the 1st Bn War Diary recorded four drafts totalling 378 ORs and a fifth draft specifically described as Special Reserves numbering 100 ORs. Total 478. Deducting this figure from the 830 Reserves at the 3rd Bn would leave only 352 trained Reservists (Army Reserves plus Special Reservists).

The battle casualty data reveals a non-fatal-battle-casualty: fatal battle-casualty ratio of 1.85 to one. We know from the CWGC and SDGW data that the Lincolnshire Regiment suffered 392 fatal battle casualties by the end of 1914. Applying the same ratio would suggest roughly 725 non-fatal battle casualties for 1914, so for the whole of 1914 there would be roughly 1,117 battle casualties in total. This in turn implies that between 2nd Nov (when the 1st Battalion was down to 175) and the end of 1914 a further 108 men were killed and another 189 became non-fatal battle casualties. The additional drain on the Reserves to replace these men would be 297.

On the 2nd Nov 1914 the number of available fully trained Reservists was 352. Netting off the 297 would leave just 55 men. So much for the theory.....A cross-check against the official returns reveals on 26th Dec 1914 the 3rd (Reserve) Bn Lincolnshire Regiment had just 59 'fully trained and effective' men. This of course would include at most of the 40 under-aged men originally sent back from the 1st Bn on mobilisation, leaving about 20 men of legitimate age to die for one's country overseas. Despite the paucity of available Reserves the 1st Bn records drafts as follows:

30th Jan 15:.....169 ORs (possibly already in the reinforcement pipeline when the 26th Dec return was made)

8th Feb 15........ 33 ORs - led by a 3rd SR Bn Dorset Officer

24th Feb 15.....165 ORs

13th Mar 15.......61 ORs

There is no explanation where the 428 men came from. One assumes recycled recovered wounded from the BEF and some other offsetting factors such as under-aged trained men turning 19 and men becoming trained.

The first category can be approximated assuming the 40 under-aged men had birth dates evenly spread across the year. It would add a tiny handful of men each month. We can also have a stab at the latter category. If the SR battalion originally had 191 fully trained SR men and an establishment of 550, it would imply the maximum number of SR recruits before the War started who were already partially trained was 359. This is a very generous assumption as most SR battalions were severely under-manned. Additionally the proportion of men under the age of 19 was extremely high in a typical SR battalion who would not be eligible for overseas service even if they were trained. The returns do not split these men out until early 1915. For argument's sake let us assume the best case scenario that it was fully manned and the trained men were all 19 or older. This is an extremely generous assumption. It would still leave the bottom of the barrel exposed after the first drafts of 1915.

All the above is a 'best case scenario' and yet the Regiment was still hundreds short of trained men. I think it is highly likely that Kitchener recruits were being sent forward as reinforcements to the Lincolnshires by the end of 1914, possibly as early as late November after 1st Ypres. Interestingly, the same returns show the Recruits held at the 3rd Special Reserve Bn peaking on 9th January 1915 and falling by 275 by the middle of March when the Fully Trained Reservists ran out. I suspect somewhere in the region of 250-300 Kitchener men will have made their way through the reinforcement pipeline in the first quarter of 1915. The Regimental History reveals that

"The 3rd Battalion sent to the 1st [battalion] to replace casualties in 1914 in less than five months' fighting, 1,336 men" **

Using this figure as a cross-reference, it is clear that the Lincolnshire Regiment would have run out of trained reservists well before Dec 1914 if they had not resorted to other sources of trained men. On the Ides of March, the 3rd Bn Linconshire Regt returns records 424 Invalids from the BEF who were categorised as "temporarily unfit for foreign service". More soberingly, the returns for "Fully trained and Effective: Medically fit for foreign service and over 19 years of age" were zero.

The OP asked 'Special Reserve: necessary but not sufficient?' QED.

All data sourced from

1. The National Archives Ref WO 114

2. 1st Bn Lincolnshire Regiment War Diary August 1914-Jun 1915, courtesy of the National Archives Ref WO 95/1429

3. The History of the Lincolnshire Regiment 1914-18 by Maj Gen C R Simpson CB

4. CWGC data courtesy of Geoff's Excellent Search Engine.

Any mistakes are mine.

MG

Edited: Substituted War Establishment at 905

* I have assume War Establishment of 905 Rank & File. Note this is different from the War Establishment (All Ranks) of 1,000. (1914). The Regimental History and the War Diary do not record the exact numbers who embarked for overseas.

** It is worth remembering that there were 20 Regiments with higher fatal casualties than the Lincolnshire Regiment. The Regiment was slightly worse off than the average Regiment in 1914 in terms of fatal casualties.

The tables below provide the supporting data on the number of trained Reservists at the 3rd Bn. It is interesting to note how the War Office changed the sub-categories over time.

[Muerrisch]

Bravo. Fortissimo!

[ss002d6252]

So far I can see S.R. wartime enlistments who were sent out to the 1st Bn in Oct and Nov 1914 (they all have prior service) but the service battalion enlistments are elusive (I've quickly scanned through about 30 records so not a huge sample).

Craig

[ss002d6252]

Arrival on 22 Oct 1914

8292 Ainger - 1907/08 enlistment so presumably a reservist

Arrival on 01 Nov 1914

9907 Westly - date of entry 01/11/1914 (a wartime enlistment by Paul Nixon's site)

Presumably the 30 Jan 1915 draft arrival:

10011 Hayman - date of entry 26/01/1915

10014 Waight - date of entry 27/01/1915

Craig

[Guest]

The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) provides another example of a Regiment that ran out of Reservists.

On the eve of the Great War the situation was as follows:

1st Bn Black Watch based in Aldershot had 561 Rank & File. It would require a net addition of 344 Reservists to come up to War Establishment*

2nd Bn Black Watch based in Bareilly, Bengal had 935 Rank & File and would need no Reservists to come up to War Establishment*

The number of available Army Reservists 'borne as supernumerary' was 979.

In reality, the 1st and 2nd Bns took in more Reservist. The History of the Black Watch records 500 and 118 for the 1st and 2nd Bns respectively, but the 1st Bn War Diary records a total of 628 by 11th August. The under-age men etc would be swapped out and would return although exact numbers are not recorded. For the purposes of this exercise let us assume they were all fit enough to serve and would be sent to the pool of Reserves at the 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn Black Watch. On a net basis the pool of 979 Army Reservists would have been reduced by 344 - the net requirements of the 1st and 2nd Bns - leaving 635 Army Reservists who would join the Special Reservists. The returns for the number of trained men at the 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn after consolidating all classes of Reserves peaked at 783 trained men on 5th Sep 1914. The implication is that there were 148 trained Special Reservist (=783-635).

The War Diary for the 1st Bn Black Watch records a numbers of drafts, however the history rather conveniently has a small chapter on the 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn that records the drafts:

26th Aug 14: 1st Reinforcement Draft.....93.....recorded arriving on Sep 5th in the War Diary

30th Aug 14: 2nd Reinforcement Draft....93.....recorded arriving on Sep 8th in the War Diary

19th Sep 14: 3rd Reinforcement Draft...186....(War Diary from 14th Sep to 1st Nov missing...this draft probably arrived around 26th Sep 1914)

The three drafts above would account for 372 men alone. When deducted from the 783 Reservists (AR and SR combined) would leave 411 Reservists on 20th Sep. We know from the CWGC data that by the 26th Sep 14 the Black Watch had suffered 83 men KIA. Using a rough non-fatal : fatal battle casualty ratio of two-to-one, would imply 166 non-battle casualties or 249 battle casualties (approximately), so the battalion would probably be at close to full strength. Between 26th Sep and the end of the year the Black Watch suffered another 356 fatal casualties. Applying the same rough assumptions would imply an additional 712 non-fatal battle casualties. The total for 1914 would be 439 killed** and (theoretically) approximately 878 non-fatal casualties (WIA, MIA, POW) or a rough total of 1,317. With only 411 available trained Reservists to cover these losses, it is clear that the Black Watch history was not exaggerating when it records on page 347 that;

"by the middle of October almost every trained Officer below the rank of Major , and all trained men had left for France"

The emphasis is in the original. So we know that the supply of trained Reservists was exhausted by mid October.It is worth remembering that the Black Watch had yet to fight through 1st Ypres and the 2nd Bn was about to arrive on 26th October from India yet the Regiment had no trained men left if the history is to be believed. Interestingly the official returns still show 377 trained Reservists on 17th October. It is important to remember that this will include under-aged men and recovering wounded etc as the returns did not at this stage provide the splits in the sub-categories. The War Diary from 15th Sep to the end of October is missing, but there are drafts totalling 690 men for Nov through to 8th Jan including a draft of 80 originally destined for the 2nd Bn but diverted to the 1st Bn after its losses of 1st Ypres. It is interesting to see how the Black Watch responded to this Crisis. Again the History provides a hint on where to look. On page 349 it records:

"A syllabus of work was bought out by the War Office for a course of twelve weeks' training and for the average recruit this was found sufficient"

No date for this is given, however the returns again provide some evidence. As the crisis hit, there is a rapid decline in the number of men under training from a peak on 17th October of 1,428 to 390 by the the end of 1914. To save you the calculation that is a decline of 1,038. One might reasonably assume this was due to the formation of a Kitchener battalion, but yet again the returns show this would not fully explain the draw-down of over 1,000 recruits from the reserve battalion as the Kitchener battalions were already largely formed by mid October;

Black Watch Kitchener Srevice battalions (Rank & File)...........17th Oct 14........26th Dec 14.........Change

K1: 8th Bn Black Watch (Royal Highlanders).................................850.................994......................144

K2: 9th Bn Black Watch (Royal Highlanders).................................966...............1,062.......................96

K3: 10th Bn Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)............................1,015................1046...................... 31

K4: 11th Bn Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)...............................- .....................197......................197

Total............................................................................................2,831...............3,299......................468

It is worth remembering that throughout this period recruits would still have been coming through the doors, especially as standards such as height restrictions were once again dropped on 5th Nov, spurring another up-tick in recruiting across the country The reduction in the 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn recruits by 1,038 is only partially explained by the rise in the numbers at the Kitchener battalions. Deducting the 468 at the Kitchener units would still leave 570 men. During this period we see the numbers of trained men rise from 377 on 17th Oct to a peak of 992 on 7th Nov, an increase of 615. It seems a distinct possibility that the Black Watch started to shift Recruits across into the Trained column as fast as humanly possible.

If this theory is correct we should expect to see War enlisted men appear in the casualty data before the end of 1914, particularly in the ranks of the 1st Bn Back Watch.

Sources:

1. Weekly returns: Recruiting, Depots, Reserve battalions, New Armies - all WO 114 courtesy of the National Archives

2. War Diary 1st Bn Black Watch August 1914-March 1915. - courtesy of the National Archives. Ref WO 95/1263 volumes I and II

3. History of the Black Watch in the great War 1914-1918 Vol I: Regular Army.by Maj Gen A G Wauchope CB

4. CWGC data courtesy of Geoff's Excellent Search Engine.

Any mistakes are mine. Data and chart showing the Reservists and the Recruits graphically illustrates the inverse correlation between the sharp decline in the recruits and the sharp rise in the Reserves after the mid October crisis. MG

* Edited: I have used 905 Rank and File as War Establishment.

**With 439 KIA in 1914 the Black Watch was not unusual. There were 17 Regiments that suffered greater losses during the period.