Special Reserve: necessary but not sufficient

[Muerrisch]

The Special Reserve Infantry: necessary but not sufficient.

A recent article on the Special Reserve [sR] in the journal of the WFA set me thinking, in that it seemed not to address the inevitable crisis of manpower that the SR just about met. This short note looks at the vital role played by the SR men battalions in the first months of the Great War.

The South African [or Boer] War had demonstrated that anything more than a minor conflict would soon find the regular army short of men, because the numbers of regular reservists serving their period of reserve service as civilians on half-pay was inadequate, and the Militia and the Volunteer Force were under no obligation to serve overseas.

The creation of the Special Reserve in 1907/8 from the rump of the Militia was intended to supply men as drafts [not formed fighting units] when required, these men trained initially for about half a year and then released to pursue civil occupations. It had been intended that Extra Reserve battalions might deploy as formed units, but they were so weak in numbers this seems to have been abandoned.

Some estimate of the need for reinforcements needs to be made. Only two-battalion Line infantry regiments will be considered. Since 1881 when a new series of regimental numbers had been introduced, most regiments had reached a number between 9000 and 11000 so that, for the purpose of this note, it will be assumed that 10,000 men enlisted in the 33 years to 1914, that is about 330 men per annum on average, divided between the two battalions. Thus about 300 men would go to half pay on Section B of the reserve each year having completed their seven or so years with the colours, and each of these would be a first class reservist for the balance of twelve years, with a further obligation of one year if a state of war existed. Some soldiers opted for further obligation in Section D.

.

It will readily be seen that the reserve for a typical regiment in Section B was about five times 300 men, less those deceased, deserted and those found to be unfit. Section D men, being by definition older, might be expected to have a poorer fitness and state of training when called upon.

The War Office assumption was that 80 to 85% of replacements would be needed in the first year of a major war, that is, 80 to 85% of about two battalions at War Establishment of about 1000 men. Taking the lesser figure, that is some 1600 men, this is rather more than the entire regular reserve, even making the best assumptions about fitness and availability. The situation was much worse than this, in that under-manning of Home battalions was such that the average necessary augmentation of a Home unit [nominally 800 all ranks in Peace] has been calculated elsewhere as 50% of the war establishment; in other words, a Home battalion used 500 reservists before a shot was fired. The sister unit was probably stronger, coming from India or the Colonies with official establishments of about 1000 and 900 men respectively, but these needed further substantial augmentation in most cases as the sick and sorry were weeded out.

The Special Reserve was not to full strength in 1914. A regiment was lucky indeed to have its establishment of 500 special reservists available. Very soon the SR

was all there was: as an example even as early as October 1914 the 1^st battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, arriving Home post-haste from Malta, had to use some SR men because the 2nd battalion, being at Home, had gobbled up the pick of the regular reservists [over 400] on mobilisation and many more were in drafts under subalterns making their way forward along the lines of communication. Regimental records state that 2429 men were sent forward to the two regular battalion by the end of 1914; these included both sorts of reservists, pre-war recruits finishing training, soldiers achieving 19 years, and recycled sick and wounded. Such a figure necessarily used all of Section B, all of D, and all of the SR. There was no more, other than the TF and the Kitchener men.

None of the above takes any account of the need to employ regular soldiers as depot staff, unit regular staff of the SR battalion [100 men], of the many Territorial Force battalions, and the rapidly forming Service battalions.

No wonder the TF had to come to rescue: the bottom of the barrel was visible by Christmas 1914, and the first Kitchener men were a long way from being ready.

[clive_hughes]

For the benefit of those who (like me) have no access to the WFA journals, I'll just add that the establishment of the SR on 1st August 1914 should have been 2,882 officers and 77,238 Other Ranks (80,120 total). The strength was actually 2,557 officers and 61,376 Other Ranks (63,933 total). This doesn't include the Channel Islands Militia.

I think you have pointed out elsewhere that once Kitchener began offering competitive "Duration" service terms as opposed to 6 years, the number of SR enlistments declined catastrophically. This just reinforces what you say at the end.

Clive

[ss002d6252]

I'll just add that the establishment of the SR on 1st August 1914 should have been 2,882 officers and 77,238 Other Ranks (80,120 total). The strength was actually 2,557 officers and 61,376 Other Ranks (63,933 tot

Somewhere around the equivalent of 15 infantry battalions short of men.

As much as Kitchener disliked the T.F. you can certainly see why they were needed abroad to prevent a collapse in manpower for the army.

I don't have any figures to hand but I would suspect that the number of men hitting the regulars, before Kitchener's men were ready, was being outstripped by the casualties.

Craig

[ss002d6252]

From a (very quick) look around 'Statistics of the Military Effort' it would appears that there was an 850,000 man enlistment to the regular army by the end of 1914 - this figure appears to include Kitchener men, who amounted to something in excess of 750,000 men - this would leave at most 100,000 men to join the regulars between Aug 1914 and Dec 1914.

Considering that many men would not have reached the front, being retained in training etc by the end of 1914 and allowing for the 30,000 + dead and wounded in addition to the expansion of the army itself it does look rather thin on the ground.

In my experience the T.F sent men overseas in 1915 with circa 3 months of training so at a push they were ready from August 1914 with 3 months notice to have men trained and available to go to France (Many battalions in August 1914 could not have deployed without the extra men who enlisted so the end of 1914 would seem to be reasonable before they they could deploy) .

This would leave the army in a bit of a hole regarding manpower as the S.R. and Army reserve were depleted and the Kitchener men weren't ready so without the T.F the army would have in a serious crisis. Eyes had to look at the T.F and their (net) increase of 350,000 men during 1914.

Craig,

[Guest]

Grumpy - the General Annual Report on The British Army for the Year Ending 1911 has some very useful tables which might shed some light on the numbers.I don't have the 1913 edition (yet) but it is possible with some analysis to get a picture of the declines in numbers and some of the underlying trends in place that were causing the driving the long and steady post Boer War decline in the Militia and (after 1908) the Special Reserve.

A quick rough analysis shows some indications of very high turnover due to the natural cycle for engagements ending, a high dependence on under 19 year old recruits (not eligible for overseas service) and a chronic structural shortage with strengths consistently being way below establishment.

Section II Part XI Special Reserve and Militia

Table 1 - Numbers of Special Reserve and Militia of the United Kingdom PRESENT at TRAINING on the day of inspection in each year from 190 (exclusive of Regular Establishment and Permanent Staff)

Table 2 - Establishment and Strength of the Militia ....on 1st Oct in each year from 1903 and the Special Reserve (exclusive of Regular Establishment) since its formation in 1908.

Table 3 - Increase and Decrease of the Special Reserve Category (a) (exclusive of Officers and Regular Establishment) for the year ending 30th Sep 1911

Table 4 - Increase and Decrease of the Militia and Special Reserve Category (a) (exclusive of Officers and Regular Establishment etc) during each year from 1902 to 1908 for the Militia and from 16th Jan 1908 for the Special Reserve.

Table 5 - Ages of the Recruits who joined the Special Reserve Category (a) during the twelve months ending 30th Sep 1911

Table 6 - Services of the Men who were struck off as Deserters or Absentees from the Special Reserve Category (a) during the twelve months ending 30th Sep 1911

Table 9 - Year in which engagements will expire etc...

Table 10 - Ages of the NCOs and Men of the Special Reserve and Militia on 1st Oct 1911

Table 12 - Nationalities of the NCOs and Men of the Special Reserve Category (a)

Table 13 - Religion (ditto)

Table 14 - Past Services of the NCOs and Men (ditto)

If you would like to see any of the Tables, let me know and I will post them. (I also have the Annual Reports for 1904, 1905, 1906 and 1907 and I am still hunting for 1910, 1912 and 1913)

Some snippets - note all stats are for Infantry and ORs only

Table 1 shows 41,690 Infantry Special Reservists ORs in Category (a) and 3,928 in category ( b )

Table 2 shows and establishment of 63,178 against a strength of 48,522 Special Reservists plus 1,275 remaining Militiamen

Table 3. shows;

Increase of 20,145 split as follows:

Joined as Recruits ...............................18,487

Re-enlisted.............................................1,142

Rejoined from desertion or absence.........498

Other Causes............................................18

Decrease of 21,830

Died..........................................................179

Disch. On termination of engagement....5,473

Disch as Invalids.....................................1,244

Disch. by purchase.................................1,493

Disch. Not likely to become efficient...........471

Disch..Misstatement of age........................227

Disch . Miscondiuct....................................264

Dish. Miscellaneous...................................245

Total Discharged.....................................9,614

Struck off as deserters............................2,029

Joined Regular Army...............................9,572

Joined RN or RM........................................436

Total Decrease.......................................21,830

Net Decrease ...........................................1,685

Strength on 1st Oct 1911.........................48,522*

*Note this is just the Special Reserve. The Army Reserve - sections A and B - for line Infantry was 61,894 and Foot Guards 7,502 plus a further 15,029 in Section D - grand total of 69,396 implying the SR Category (a) represented 69.9% of all Infantry Reserves (including Foot Guards) in 1911.

Table 5 reveals that 14,743 of the 18,487 recruits in the previous 12 months in Category (a) were under 19 years of age. This represents 79.7% of all SR infantry recruits during the year. This might suggest 1. High turnover an 2. a significant proportion of all SR men under the age of 19 and therefore not eligible to serve overseas - see Table 10 below. The historical data shows similar proportions and (my conjecture) would indicate the situation in 1914 was no different. The large proportion of men in this age category would have put further constraints on the numbers available to make up losses.

Table 9 shows the following numbers would be struck off the Infantry SR in the subsequent years:

1911-12.....9,915

1912-13.....4,663

1913-14.....7,004

1914-15.....9,458

[Note: Sub total for the years pre-conscription: 31,040 or 64% of the strength on 1st Oct 1911. ]

Table 10 shows 9,664 men in Category (a) were under the age of 19...representing 19.9% of the strength on 1st Oct 1911

Table 12 interestingly shows 9,802 of the 48,522 infantry SR were Irish by birth (20.2%). I am not certain if this reflects the lack of TF in Ireland or the (alleged) high proportion of Irishmen in non-Irish regiments in previous years who were then in the SR .....or both. It needs some analysis of the battalion returns. I will revert. [Edit. Analysis of the 1908 data (the only complete SR Battalion data I have shows Irish SR battalions on average had 4.3% more men]

Any mistakes are mine. Edited for typos. MG

[Guest]

Some simple maths for mobilisation:

148 Regular Line Infantry battalions pre war.

50% (=74) serving overseas at full strength*

50% (=74) serving at home requiring on average 500 men from the Reserves to mobilise**........... 74 x 500 = 37,000

* There is evidence in the regimental histories that some battalions returning from overseas did require some reservists. Eight battalions stayed in India, leaving 66 to return. If each required on average 100 to make up numbers, that would imply another 6,600 SR men. I would guesstimate somewhere in the region of 40,000 SR men were required just for mobilisation of the Regular Line Infantry. Essentially the Category (a) men were probably all used by the end of the first week in August if we assume roughly 20% were ineligible to serve overseas with the BEF due to age. This does not take into consideration the numbers who would be weeded out as unfit etc. It is very easy to construct a scenario where there is a big shortfall.

** Peace home establishment was 25 Officers and 777 ORs, War Establishment was 29 Officers and 971 ORs, implying at least 194 ORs were required just to come up from Peace to War establishment even if the Bn was full strength. I have seen higher numbers for War Establishments.

The dates of TF units deploying overseas in 1914 might also indicate how the initial gaps were plugged.... between the 14th Sep 1914 and 9th Nov 1914 21 TF Infantry battalions embarked for the Continent - the equivalent of nearly 2 division's worth of Infantry.

Any mistakes are mine. I am sure these assumptions can be challenged. MG

Edit. Reviewing a sample of 20 battalions' histories, the average number of reservists required for mobilising a home based battalion was 576. In a much smaller sample of 3 overseas battalions the average number of reservists required to make up numbers on returning to the UK was 264. Applying these numbers to the structure above would imply the following requirements just for the Line Infantry;

148 Regular Line Infantry battalions pre war.

50% (=74) serving overseas. 66 returned to UK requiring on average 264 men..............................66 x 264 = 17,424

50% (=74) serving at home requiring on average 576 men from the Reserves to mobilise............. 74 x 576 = 42,624

Total...............................................................................................................................................................= 60,048

MG.

[clive_hughes]

A couple of 1914 Special Reserve vignettes:

The 3rd Battalion South Wales Borderers (SR) on mobilisation were stationed at Pembroke Dock as part of the Severn Defences. The establishment of the battalion was increased to 2,500 as recruits for both the SR and new Duration men came in. A 3 November 1914 Duration recruit I researched was posted from the Brecon Depot to the 3rd Battalion on 4 December 1914. The 2nd Battalion arrived from China on 12 January 1915 and was moved to join other regular units forming the 29th Division in the Coventry area. After the weeding-out which Grumpy has described, and probably being under-strength anyway it required reinforcements. On 2 February my man was one of a draft of 234 which the 3rd sent to the 2nd to help complete their war establishment. In March they set out for Gallipoli.

An Anglesey farm labourer enlisted in the RWF in September 1914 having been picked up by a proper recruiting sergeant complete in scarlet finery at Llangefni, and found himself at the Depot in Wrexham. He later claimed not to have understood the nature of his engagement, his English being poor. He had in fact signed a 6-year SR engagement and had a SR number allocated. After various mishaps and adventures at the Depot and with 3rd Battalion, he finally got to France on 28 July 1915, and to the 2nd Battalion RWF. He didn't last long, being wounded at or even before the Loos battle that September. He was hospitalised in the UK, and seems to have stayed there, later being transferred to the 23rd Battalion (TF) complete with a 6-figure TF number from that battalion's block. He returned to France and served with 1/4th RWF by ?mid-1918, but wasn't demobbed because he says the original 6-year engagement was held to be binding. He ended up in an RWF ?Garrison battalion in Egypt c1919-20 and rose to Sergeant before being released presumably about Sept. 1920. This information from his autobiography and what can be gathered from the Medal Rolls and Absent Voters lists.

Clive

[Guest]

From the History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War 1914 - 1918

"The 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn mobilized at Perth on 8th Aug 1914 and entrained over 1200 strong....In view of an early call for reinforcements, training of reservists was started at once. Orders were received for the first draft of 1 Officer and 93 men who left for France on 26th August.... The second draft [departed] on 30th August and...the third on 11th September, both drafts being 1 Officer and 93 men. On the 19th Sep [two Officers] left with 186 men.....by the middle of October almost every trained Officer below the rank of Major and all the trained men had left for France".

Also the history records;

"The Bn was formed on the basis of nine companies. The ranks of six of these were filled with recruits; two others were filled with Expeditionary Force men, who only remained a few weeks with the battalion and one company was maintained for employed and Home Service men. Recruits undergoing the last three weeks of their training and all fit Expeditionary Force men were formed into a Training Company and given a special course of instruction"

It is worth noting that the three drafts of 1 Officer and 93 men (3 Officers and 279 men) and the 2 Officers and 186 men were additional to the 500 Reservists sent to the 1st Bn on mobilisation and a further 118 men were needed for the 2nd Bn returning from India. The 2nd Bn managed to find 20 Reservists who had taken their discharge in India and obtained employment there. Interestingly the History records that "the normal mobilisation strength in India was 816 other ranks. A few days after mobilisation this figure was increased by 37 to allow replacement of the native servants and syces...."

On the above figures, a total of 1,123 Reservists were required for mobilisation and reinforcements up to 19th Sep 1914. Given the fact that the 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn started with 1,200 reservists (plus 20 in India) this would leave only 97 Reservists after 19th Sep 1914. This flow of men seems to substantiate the claim that by the middle of October almost all the trained men had left for France.

MG

[Muerrisch]

Martin, many thanks for the above, shedding more light on a little-understood subject. However I don't understand your:

From the History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War 1914 - 1918

"The 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn mobilizer at Perth on 8th Aug 1914 and entrained over 1200 strong....In view of an early call for reinforcements, training of reservists was started at once. Orders were received for the first draft of 1 Officer and 93 men who left for France on 26th August....

A SR battalion at full strength was 606 men, of whom 98 were regulars. Where on earth did the other 600 come from, do you think? "Establishments" were rarely reached, and were NOT to be exceeded, so I don't understand the quotation at all.

[ulsterlad2]

Here's something I'd seen before about 3rd Bns becoming rapidly inflated at the start of the war. Just couldn't remember where I'd seen it. I don't know if it would account for an extra 600 men though.

LLT Link

(Sorry I can't copy and paste the actual paragraph.It's the last one of section 1.)

[Muerrisch]

Yes, the permitted numbers were raised progressively to 2500 with an extra RSM and an extra RQMS ................. but not on/by 8 August of course.

Mystery!

[Guest]

Martin, many thanks for the above, shedding more light on a little-understood subject. However I don't understand your:

From the History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War 1914 - 1918

"The 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn mobilizer at Perth on 8th Aug 1914 and entrained over 1200 strong....In view of an early call for reinforcements, training of reservists was started at once. Orders were received for the first draft of 1 Officer and 93 men who left for France on 26th August....

A SR battalion at full strength was 606 men, of whom 98 were regulars. Where on earth did the other 600 come from, do you think? "Establishments" were rarely reached, and were NOT to be exceeded, so I don't understand the quotation at all.

Grumpy - From what I have read, in the first weeks of the War the SR absorbed the excess recruits and Army Reservists. Edit. According to 'Statistics of the Great War' at the outbreak the numbers of Army Reservists and Special Reservists were as follows:

............................Establishment.......Strength on 1st Aug 1914

Army Reserve........145,000.......................145,347

Special Reserve.......77,238.........................66,933

So for every Special Reservist there were 2.2 Army Reservists. In 1914 I would imagine that the Infantry represented a very large proportion of the Army Reserves. When they were called up they had to go somewhere and as the Depots filled to bursting, I believe the Special Reserve battalions absorbed the excess until the K1 was started. There are a few anecdotes supporting this scenario on this thread here.

The quote is a composition of direct quotes from the History of the Black Watch (leaving out the parts irrelevant to this subject) from pages 345 to 347. On page 347 it goes on to record "Although large numbers had left as reinforcements in the first few weeks the strength of the Battalion had increased both in Officers and men. Large drafts of ex-soldiers and untrained men arrived daily from Perth..." Note that 'Perth' means the regimental depot....and on page 349 "...as the strength of the Battalion increased to over 2000..."

The 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn has a whole chapter (pages 345 to 355) dedicated to its contribution. It is clear that the Battalion had two roles in the early days, one (official role) as part of a Home defence Brigade based at Nigg in Ross-shire. The other three battalions being the 3rd Scottish Rifles (also at Nigg), 3rd Seaforth Hilghlanders (Cromarty) and 3rd Cameron Highlanders (Invergordon). At the same time it appears to have taken in hundreds of surplus recruits Reservists and structured itself into a training battalion and the primary vehicle to provide drafts for the 1st and 2nd battalions. From the structure, six companies were recruits (presumably men flocking to the colours) and two companies of 'Expeditionary Force men' who (presumably) were existing Army (?) Reservists and one Company of Home Service men (page 348).

Recruits were arriving so fast that the Depots could not handle the numbers and the War Office decreed on 30th August that recruits would be sent out directly to their battalions directly. Only four days before the recruits had been held at the depot for 2 days before being sent on. I wonder if this incident merely illustrates the very small window between mobilisation, the calling up of the Reserves and the announcement in the press on 12th August the details of the New Armies. Maybe the 3rd (Special reserve) Bn of the Black Watch was unofficially recognising that the depot was bursting at the seams, even as early as 8th August 1914?

Separately I see that according to Peter Simkins in his excellent "Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916" that the SR was 13,699 below establishment of 74,166 at the outbreak of the War with 29% not eligible to serve overseas. Simkins also states that the decision to expand the SR battalions up to 2,000 was made around the 27th August 1914 and the second 100,00 were to be used to bring all the SR battalions up to strength and the balance to be kept at the regimental depots for training. He indicates that K2 was not formed until K1 and the SR were at 2,000 per Bn on or around 1st Sep 1914. ... Later he highlights that K4 was to "be formed in due course from the surplus recruits who had been sent to the Special Reserve battalions from 27 August onwards"

MG

Edited. Any mistakes are mine.

[Muerrisch]

Martin, thank you, I think I can see what was happening, in that the 1200 men on 8th August were probably not SR in the main.

The Royal Highlanders were the third-best recruiting battalion of the entire line, averaging 461 men per annum [Paul Nixon figures]. Thus the regular reserve may well have been as big as 5 x 461 less sick and sorry, say at least as big as 2000 men, on 8th August. The 1st battalion were in the Guards Brigade at Aldershot and were in France by 14th August. The most pessimistic estimate of their necessary augmentation for war establishment is about 600 men [the History may know better]. That leaves about 1400 men standing on the Home shore waving goodbye!

Reductio ad absurdem the 3rd battalion [whose official role was exactly to absorb regular reservists not needed to augment, under age, not fully trained [these latter around 200 men because training was 6 months, half a year's intake], sick etc. not taken on active service] might have had minus 200 SR members! If the SR was at full strength I reckon the 3rd should have needed twice as many railway carriages.

HoHo!

Edit: the second battalion was not competing, being in India at the time.

[Guest]

Martin, thank you, I think I can see what was happening, in that the 1200 men on 8th August were probably not SR in the main.

The Royal Highlanders were the third-best recruiting battalion of the entire line, averaging 461 men per annum [Paul Nixon figures]. Thus the regular reserve may well have been as big as 5 x 461 less sick and sorry, say at least as big as 2000 men, on 8th August. The 1st battalion were in the Guards Brigade at Aldershot and were in France by 14th August. The most pessimistic estimate of their necessary augmentation for war establishment is about 600 men [the History may know better]. That leaves about 1400 men standing on the Home shore waving goodbye!

Edit: the second battalion was not competing, being in India at the time.

The stats for the Black Watch from the History are:

1st Bn The Black Watch.................................500 Reservists "almost all of whom had served seven years..."

2nd Bn The Black Watch................................118 Reservists taken in of which 20 were sourced in India from men who had taken their discharge in India to work (mainly) in the Jute industry.

On these numbers, the two battalions needed 598 Reservists and using your assumptions of 2,000 that would leave 1,402. Stripping out sick and sorry and men left at the depot, the 1,200 is a feasible number.

The stats would also bear out the view that the Black Watch were the third-best recruiting regiment *.The average requirements for 24 Home based battalions was 591 Reservists and the average requirements for 6 overseas based battalions was 232 Reservists ** . Combined, that makes an average requirement for a paired-battalion Regiment of 823 against the Black Watch's requirements of 618. To save you the calculation, the average paired battalion Regiment needed a 33% more Reservists than the Black Watch.

* Footnote 3 on page 163 of the History: "The Black Watch have always been nearly wholly Scottish. The actual percentage of nationalities in the ranks in October 1913, the last date before the outbreak of war for which the figures are available was: Scotsmen 88.5%, English 8.5%, Others 3%. If the Band, which is recruited from Kneller Hall boys and is entirely English, be excluded, the percentage of Scotsmen was over 95. The percentage was similar in the mobilisation for the Boer War" Note: This suggests that the Black Watch had little difficulty not only in recruiting, but also in recruiting Scotsmen.

** My calculations mainly sourced from published histories. 24 Home based battalions represents a sample size of 32% of the 74 Home based battalions at the time.

MG

Any mistakes are mine.

[Guest]

"The Edwardian Army: Recruiting and Deploying the British Army 1902-1914" by Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly is a very meticulously researched work with some relevant material.

They state that the Home Service battalions used up such a large proportion of the Army Reserve and Special reserve to come up to War Establishment that there were few trained reservists left. They also comment that the SR battalions were "stripped of their best men...to bring the original battalions of the BEF up to strength an to provide trained NCOs for the New Armies" and also note that not a single SR battalion served overseas as a unit during the Great War. This is all consistent with the comments on this thread.

For a detailed assessment of the Edwardian Army it is essential reading.

MG

[Guest]

I'm not certain what I am looking for here, but for those who are, there is quite a bit in Hansard that might be of interest?

Mike

[Muerrisch]

Martin,

the exceptions to those who had served seven years would be those enlisted under

1902 May

3 years colours and 9 on reserve.

Army Orders (AO) 117/02

which lasted two years only.

Then there were those

1904 Nov

Terms of service 9 years with colours and 3 years reserve

AO 189/04

again two years before these changed to seven and five.

A regular reservist in summer 1914 might therefore have been:

a civilian since 1905 up to 1907 [first case]

a civilian since 1913 or later [second case]

a civilian since 1913 or later [third case]

all of the above ignores the possibility of being held to serve in foreign climes well into the extra year mandated.

We should remind ourselves that SR battalions were never expected to serve overseas, apart from the roles discussed above, they were to deploy to ports and vulnerable points as Home defence.

I will follow up Mike's Hansard reference at what leisure I can scrape!

Thank you both.

[Muerrisch]

I have dug up a few more examples from regimental histories of how the Special Reserve battalion numbers fluctuated in the early days immediately after mobilisation.

Starting with the The Regimental Records of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, according to its author Dudley Ward;

Within thirty-six hours 1,300 reservists had reported at the depot in Wrexham of which 359 were sent to the 2nd Bn on the first day of mobilisation. On the 19th Sep 1914 a draft of 342 ORs were sent to the 1st Battalion, so the total number of SR men sent to the two regular battalions by this date was at least 701. In theory that would still leave 599 or the original reservists on 19th Sep 1914.

Whilst at Wrexham the strength of the 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn varied from 1,500 to 2,000. The history relates that orders were received to raise the strength of the SR battalion to 2,600 but gives no date for this order. Implicitly this was between 1st Sep and the end of October 1914. ..... and at the end of October the strength was reduced to 1,500 and recruits in excess of this number were used to form the 12th (Service) Bn RWF. Clearly there were big fluctuations as directives changed through this period. It goes on to say that by the end of 1914 some 35 Officers and 2,429 ORs had been sent out as reinforcements from the 3rd (SR) Bn to the two regular battalions.

On these numbers, assuming the vast majority all the RWF Resrevists had reported on time on mobilisation, the difference between the number of Reservists reporting for duty (1,300) and the number of reinforcements sent out by end of Dec 1914 (2,429) was 1,129. These men would have to come from somewhere. It is unclear from the text if the establishment of 605 were included in the 1,300 reporting on the first day.

Either way, the demands for reinforcementsin 1914 would have exceeded the number of reservists reporting on mobilisation. Doubtless other men with reservist commitments trickled in over subsequent days, but in the great scheme of things I suspect the numbers would have been relatively small. The shortfall had to come from somewhere.

MG

P.S. I will post some other examples to broaden the picture. I suspect each of the 74 Special Reserve battalions supporting paired regular battalions will all have slightly different experiences during this chaotic period.

Martin your "so the total number of SR men sent to the two regular battalions by this date was at least 701". is an underestimate ..... the regimental history did not do the hard yards like I did.

My analyisis of the personal regimental numbers of the reservists who reported and were among those who went to France on 11th August 1914 shows beyond doubt that they were almost to a man unequivocally REGULAR reservists. I published the results of my analysis in the journal of the WFA and nobody has refuted it.

You should also note that a total of 130 more REGULAR reservists were sent to the 2nd RWF from the depot by 7th August.

Long before the reservists [mixed regular and SR for certain, again my analysis] were sent to 1st RWF on 19th September [1st RWF had just arrived from Malta] the depot had despatched a further premeditated batch of drafts to the 2nd battalion in the field. Remember that the army expected 80% casualties among infantry in the first year of a European war. These drafts landed in France as follows:

28 Aug 93 ORs

1 Sep 87

6 Sep 95

7 Sep 93

11 Sep 182 [of whom some were held in France awaiting 1st RWF]

12 Sep 103 all of whom went to 1st RWF

13 Sep 65

So the 3rd battalion at the depot had sent forward as a matter of routine, long before significant casualties other than sickness, an extra 718 men of whom the great majority were regular reservists. This excludes the first reinforcement, included in the WE total, and excludes the 130 men who arrived at Wrexham by 7th August and not in your account. That is 848 men, mostly regular reservists in addition to the 701 that your analysis recounted. I make that 1566 reservists consumed one way or another by 19th September, a far cry from your 701 you will agree. There were NO trained, fit, over-age regular reservists or regular soldiers in the regiment by that date not committed to the fray or siphoned off to train the new cadres. These figures come from the roll of the 1914 star.

Another thing I should say: there is a blur between "depot" and "Special Reserve battalion" and "3rd battalion" and "Reserve battalion", which existed in the minds of the army at the time [as well as now on this thread].

In essence, the 3rd SR battalion was based at the depot, and in peace trained SR reservists. The depot depended in peace on the officers and men of the SR battalion, regulars and SR. The depot held stores, kit, colours and the regiment's sacred history. As far as I can trace the depot establishment was one regular major plus a few caretakers etc.

In war [here I quote from SR Regs 1911]

28. Infantry reserve battalions will on mobilisation take over the surplus reservists and men left behind by the regular battalion. Depots [note the distinction] will continue to receive recruits and after clothing them will despatch them to special reserve battalions to be trained.

Whereas some 3rd battalions were indeed sent to guard ports etc they all became "just like that" the holding/ training/ recuperating vast units as described, with extra officers and WOs and sergeants to cope.

Any man sent Home injured, wounded or sick was POSTED to the strength of third battalions, and subsequently reposted. There was also the influx of men enlisting in the SR on SR terms, this process being soon swept away in the far more attractive terms of the New Armies [why sign your life away for six years in the SR versus three in the New Armies?].

I am left with the thought that there was not a Plan for what happened to SR enlistment in war .......... there certainly was not a plan New Armies!

[David_Underdown]

I've looked at the Royal Scots Fusiliers (1st Battalion) war diary recently as I'm researching a regular reservist of theirs. This suggests that as of 9 August 1914 they had 750 reservists with them at Gosport!

[Guest]

Martin your "so the total number of SR men sent to the two regular battalions by this date was at least 701". is an underestimate ..... the regimental history did not do the hard yards like I did.

My analyisis of the personal regimental numbers of the reservists who reported and were among those who went to France on 11th August 1914 shows beyond doubt that they were almost to a man unequivocally REGULAR reservists. I published the results of my analysis in the journal of the WFA and nobody has refuted it.

You should also note that a total of 130 more REGULAR reservists were sent to the 2nd RWF from the depot by 7th August.

Long before the reservists [mixed regular and SR for certain, again my analysis] were sent to 1st RWF on 19th September [1st RWF had just arrived from Malta] the depot had despatched a further premeditated batch of drafts to the 2nd battalion in the field. Remember that the army expected 80% casualties among infantry in the first year of a European war. These drafts landed in France as follows:

28 Aug 93 ORs

1 Sep 87

6 Sep 95

7 Sep 93

11 Sep 182 [of whom some were held in France awaiting 1st RWF]

12 Sep 103 all of whom went to 1st RWF

13 Sep 65

So the 3rd battalion at the depot had sent forward as a matter of routine, long before significant casualties other than sickness, an extra 718 men of whom the great majority were regular reservists. This excludes the first reinforcement, included in the WE total, and excludes the 130 men who arrived at Wrexham by 7th August and not in your account. That is 848 men, mostly regular reservists in addition to the 701 that your analysis recounted. I make that 1566 reservists consumed one way or another by 19th September, a far cry from your 701 you will agree. There were NO trained, fit, over-age regular reservists or regular soldiers in the regiment by that date not committed to the fray or siphoned off to train the new cadres. These figures come from the roll of the 1914 star.

Another thing I should say: there is a blur between "depot" and "Special Reserve battalion" and "3rd battalion" and "Reserve battalion", which existed in the minds of the army at the time [as well as now on this thread].

In essence, the 3rd SR battalion was based at the depot, and in peace trained SR reservists. The depot depended in peace on the officers and men of the SR battalion, regulars and SR. The depot held stores, kit, colours and the regiment's sacred history. As far as I can trace the depot establishment was one regular major plus a few caretakers etc.

In war [here I quote from SR Regs 1911]

28. Infantry reserve battalions will on mobilisation take over the surplus reservists and men left behind by the regular battalion. Depots [note the distinction] will continue to receive recruits and after clothing them will despatch them to special reserve battalions to be trained.

Whereas some 3rd battalions were indeed sent to guard ports etc they all became "just like that" the holding/ training/ recuperating vast units as described, with extra officers and WOs and sergeants to cope.

Any man sent Home injured, wounded or sick was POSTED to the strength of third battalions, and subsequently reposted. There was also the influx of men enlisting in the SR on SR terms, this process being soon swept away in the far more attractive terms of the New Armies [why sign your life away for six years in the SR versus three in the New Armies?].

I am left with the thought that there was not a Plan for what happened to SR enlistment in war .......... there certainly was not a plan New Armies!

Grumpy - I am not surprised at all...as I said, "at least".... and to be clear, it is not my analysis (other than adding two numbers), I was highlighting what the regimental history recorded as one of a few examples where the activities of the 3rd (Special Reserve) Battalions were concerned. I am becoming confused with some of the terminology.

I assume by REGULAR Reservists you mean Army Reservists rather than Special Reservists - the definitions in the training returns etc - I would be interested to know if you have a breakdown of the 2,429 men the 3rd Special Reserve battalion sent out before the end of Dec 1914? Were you able to break this down into Army Reservists and Special Reservists? If I read your post correctly you say the 'majority' were 'Regular Reservists'. I assume all were processed by the Depot and then the 3rd (Special Reserve) battalion despite being Army Reservists, which is where (for me at least) the source of any confusion is... The SR Regs 1911 are clear that the original plan was to use the SR battalions to administer the Army Reservists.

My question is: did Regiments differentiate between Army Reservist and Special Reservists when sending out the first reinforcements?

My understanding of the first few months is as very roughly follows:

1. War Breaks out and all Reservists - Army Reservists and Special Reservists - report to the depot and the Special Reserve battalions respectively. These might be located in the same place i.e the depot. In most cases they were co-located.

2. The Army Reservists are provided clothing and equipment at the depot and sent to the Special Reserve battalions.

3. The regular battalions require hundreds of reservists to make up their numbers and these are sent to them from the Special Reserve battalions from the pool of Reservists. The implication is that the vast majority of the men sent to the 1st and 2nd regular battalions are Army Reservists, not Special Reservists (although the unit processing them is usually the 3rd (Special Reserve) battalion).

4. Shortly after the War breaks out, Kitchener appeals for 100,000 and gets more than he bargained for. The flood of recruits were a mixture of civilians and men with prior service but without reserve commitments and were used to form K1.

5. As recruits continued to arrive, Special Reserve battalions' establishments were initially expanded to 2,000. The Special Reserve separated trained men from recruits. At the same time it continued to supply the regular battalions with Army Reservists from the initial pool of Army Reservists. Numbers would vary across different Regiments.

7. Recruits surplus to the above would be sent to form K2, K3 etc but not before the Special Reserve was kept up to 2,000 (or any number subsequently decided on by the authorities).

8. Some Reservists were used as NCOs for the formation of Kitchener battalions.

I would be grateful if you could highlight which parts of the above are off mark....

Where I am definitely confused is what constituted a 'trained man'. The Army Reserve would have men who would be regarded as 'trained'. Ditto the Special Reserve, although the SR would also have recruits undergoing training as it had large annual turnover. The Returns clearly split these two apart. Recruits volunteering as a result of Kitchener's appeal would doubtless have men with prior service who had previous 'training' but whose reserve obligations had expired (the Army Returns up to 1913 will show how many from previous years with a breakdown by age). I wonder how these were split out. I have seen on the other thread that by Dec 1914 the authorities were asking for the numbers of recruits with previous military experience, which suggests they were attuned to this and saw different sub-sections within the pool of volunteers. I wonder if in the months of Sep, Oct, Nov the Regimental depots were effectively filtering the recruits and the Dec directive was essentially formalising and obvious practical response to the challenges of training men fast enough. Is there any evidence that volunteers with prior military experience were separated?

Any clarification would be gratefully received.

MG

[Graham Stewart]

Martin - I've reposted this here to give you some idea of how reinforcements were categorised in December 1914. Regular Reservists would always take priority, due to their years of training and once re-equipped would be sent to the S.R. for refreshment in musketry training and physical training to enable them to take their place at the front.

Those S.R.'s who had enlisted prior to the war and who had, had both training at the 'Regimental' Depot and continuous 'monthly' training, with the S.R. Battalion on a yearly basis, would again be sent out as soon as deemed capable.

Those S.R. men recruited after the outbreak of war were merely recruits and would have to undergo complete recruit training - these would only be sent out as and when deemed capable. The ex-service personnel, which could be R.N., R.M.L.I., R.M.A., ex-Vols, ex-S.R., who were still elligible for service abroad, but whom required extensive training to bring them up to the required standard of fitness.

The Regimental Depot in the main functioned as a reception centre - from here you were sent to the S.R. Battalion at it's War Station - if not despatched to the New Armies. The S.R. Battalion's were subsequently expanded to the point where I believe an 'eight' Company Battalion was most common, as some of the Companies were infact 'young soldiers' Companies.

[Muerrisch]

Martin, to deal with your numbered summary: I fully agree with your 1,2,3,4,8.

I more or less agree 5 and 7, but the numbers need refining, I can let you have these from my notes and some of the info. is above in this thread.

There is not a 6!

Regarding active service battalions differentiating between regular reservists and SReservists, I am sure they did ....... who wouldn't in that situation? Better the Devil you know.

There was another aspect, which was "time out". Using my estimate, of the roughly 1500 regular reservists available, about 300 had been civilians for less than a year, and about 300 for almost five years [using the 7 &5 Terms of Engagement]. The recent "Devil's Carnival" described NF being very picky, making great efforts to obtain the younger men most recently civilianised..

Regarding a breakdown of the 2429 men, no, partly because my study was of the 2nd battalion unless the 1st crossed my sights; but I think we can get close to the truth.

The figure of 1500 regular reservists is not far off the mark, and could be refined by looking at the number of enlistments in each year [using regimental numbers issued] and adjusting for changes in terms of engagement and also the infantry percentage of men signing on to 12 years colours and even 21 years, then subtracting infantry averages for invaliding and death before and after leaving the colours. And desertion. 1500 is on the low side and probably accounts for the error bars above fairly well.

The next consideration is to estimate regular soldiers under training/ under age/ unfit on 4th August and estimate how many would become available in the 5 months to 1915. Fewer than 300 of course, probably only 100. Which would give 1600 "non-SR reservists" in the period, thus about 600 SReservists, the entire establishment of the 3rd battalion.

As we have said before, the bottom of the barrel was clearly visble by Christmas, the Kitchener men were not ready, and all that remained was the Old Contemptibles [battered but not as destroyed as myth relates] and the TF battalions comprising the Imperial Service men. Desperate days.

At a guess, this thread has probably blown away all the cobwebs from a much-neglected aspect of the early days, and shows the forum at its best.

Enough here for an article in a relevant journal.

[Guest]

Gents... I am abandoning the other thread as the title will not encourage the debate and it is just too confusing running near parallel threads on close subjects. ..... I would prefer to post here.....

I discover on my return from Rhosneigr... (yes, managed to get to the Castle at Caernarfon and the RWF Museum and came back laden with books)....that I have the printed returns for the depots for the other dates with their misleading 'establishments' etc. The important part is that it will be possible to rebuild the returns of all the depots for the 29th Aug, 5th Sep and 12th Sep as well as the Special Reserve battalions which I have already done.

In the meantime I thought this was interesting....especially the part regarding the shift of recruits from one area to another at such an early date which I think establishes provenance for Graham's point on the other thread that the source of men was also fluid.

I note the use of 'Reserve' battalion rather than 'Special Reserve' battalion in para. 1.

MG

[Guest]

A couple of 1914 Special Reserve vignettes:

The 3rd Battalion South Wales Borderers (SR) on mobilisation were stationed at Pembroke Dock as part of the Severn Defences. The establishment of the battalion was increased to 2,500 as recruits for both the SR and new Duration men came in. A 3 November 1914 Duration recruit I researched was posted from the Brecon Depot to the 3rd Battalion on 4 December 1914. The 2nd Battalion arrived from China on 12 January 1915 and was moved to join other regular units forming the 29th Division in the Coventry area. After the weeding-out which Grumpy has described, and probably being under-strength anyway it required reinforcements. On 2 February my man was one of a draft of 234 which the 3rd sent to the 2nd to help complete their war establishment. In March they set out for Gallipoli.

An Anglesey farm labourer enlisted in the RWF in September 1914 having been picked up by a proper recruiting sergeant complete in scarlet finery at Llangefni, and found himself at the Depot in Wrexham. He later claimed not to have understood the nature of his engagement, his English being poor. He had in fact signed a 6-year SR engagement and had a SR number allocated. After various mishaps and adventures at the Depot and with 3rd Battalion, he finally got to France on 28 July 1915, and to the 2nd Battalion RWF. He didn't last long, being wounded at or even before the Loos battle that September. He was hospitalised in the UK, and seems to have stayed there, later being transferred to the 23rd Battalion (TF) complete with a 6-figure TF number from that battalion's block. He returned to France and served with 1/4th RWF by ?mid-1918, but wasn't demobbed because he says the original 6-year engagement was held to be binding. He ended up in an RWF ?Garrison battalion in Egypt c1919-20 and rose to Sergeant before being released presumably about Sept. 1920. This information from his autobiography and what can be gathered from the Medal Rolls and Absent Voters lists.

Clive

I see also that the history records

"To allow the officers of the Regular establishment of the 3rd battalion to proceed with it to Pembroke Dock officers on retired pay were given charge of the depot, Col F C Hunter being appointed to command it with Major C E Fitz G Walker as Adjutant and Capatin T Murray as Quartermaster"

Which goes some way to explain how the Depots managed during mobilisation in the few examples where the Special Reserve battalion was located apart from the depot. MG

[Guest]

Some more evidence of the lone Major, this time from the History of the Lincolnshire Regiment 1914 -1918:

"The 3rd (Special Reserve) Battalion (Lieut Colonel W V R Fane Commanding) had its headquarters in Lincoln. The depot of the regiment also at Lincoln was commanded by Major L Edwards who handed over to Captain R H Johnston. Colonel Ivatt took command from 11th August. ......By the 12th August mobilisation was finally completed and all insufficiently trained men with those earmarked as reinforcements or as cadres of new battalions were dispatched to join the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion. One officer and one hundred other ranks ...were to remain in barracks at Portsmouth after the departure of the [1st] battalion until further orders"

The History of the Suffolk Regiment 1914-1927 devotes 10 pages to the history of the 3rd (Special Reserve) battalion

" By the end of 1914 in spite of the outflow of drafts the strength of the 3rd battalion had jumped to 116 Officers and 2,600 men and eventually reached the remarkable figure of 201 officers and 4,285 men ....... in the meantime many retired officers and local gentlemen came to the depot offering their services in any capacity whatever, either as officers or otherwise. Old soldiers and recruits poured in......"

The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment by C T Atkinson has few pages on "A record of the Work at the Depot"

"Orders for mobilisation reached the Depot on the 4th August and within a short time nearly all the Regular officers and staff joined their battalions. On the first day of mobilisation, 5th August, Col G W Maunsell took over command from Major P M Robinson CMG and his first duty was to improvise a new staff from retired officers and ex-NCOs who rejoined on declaration of war...."

And Chapter IV covers the Special Reserve:

" To the 3rd Battalion the mobilisation scheme assigned the double duty of manning an important section of the Thames defences and of keeping the battalions on active service up to strength....to those serving on the Special Reserve engagement were soon added the surplus Reservists and the "details" left behind by the 1st Battalion, the recruits and the young soldiers. Then as the wave of recruiting brought men in hundreds to the Depot they were passed on to the 3rd Battalion as quickly as they could be clothed and equipped. Many of them were anything but new recruits; any number of old soldiers who had finished their time with the Reserve came flocking back to the colours. These included many experienced NCO's whose usefulness in dealing with the great influx of raw recruits can hardly be over estimated. .....another element had begun to replenish the 3rd Battalion, the recovered sick and wounded from the 1st [battalion]. By the beginning of December [1914] 130 of these were already with the 3rd Battalion...The wastage of October and November was far in excess of anything that had been estimated...........

[on Officers] Owing to the formation of the Service battalions the 3rd lost the advantage of having with it Regular officers from the Depot who according to "pre-war" plan were to have become 3rd Battalion officers on Mobilisation. However there was an immediate influx of its old members..."

The History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War 1914-1918 provides some indication of just how quickly the trained men were used up....

"In view of an early call for reinforcements, training of reservists was started at once. Orders were received for the first draft of 1 officer and 93 men who left for France on the 26th of August.....[this is followed by a list of drafts]...and by the middle of October almost every trained officer below the rank of major and all trained men available had left for France" Emphasis in the original.

The history later records "two [Companies] were filled with Expeditionary Force men who only remained a few weeks with the Battalion" and later it implies that the training period was shortened to just 12 weeks: "As the fighting developed into trench warfare the training became more intensive. A syllabus of work was brought out by the War Office for a course of twelve weeks' training, and for the average recruit this was found sufficient"

The official Returns for the Black Watch showed on 5th Sep 1914 the 3rd (Special Reserve) Bn The Black Watch had 783 trained men with only 69 more at the Depot. This is perhaps a good example of how quickly the trained reserves were depleted in the early days. Doubtless more ex-soldiers volunteered after 5th Sep but the history does not relate as to how it managed to find trained men after mid October.

Any mistakes are mine. MG