Easterners vs Westerners; who was right?

[George Armstrong Custer]

I confess, Krithia, that your post has rendered me speechless. So it's just as well that virtually everything you say is totally self contradictory, as epitomised by this gem: "I am not saying that Gallipoli was the salvation, it was not, but it offered an alternative, and it doesn’t matter how ill-conceived and poorly executed it may have been, in its madness it did offer a glimmer of hope."

PJA, you now offer us a man of straw, with your claim that "There doesn't seem to be enough acknowledgement about what the Turks went through in the course of winning their victory", and "Under estimation of the enemy is something that might pertain here." But these points are not revelations, and are glaringly self-evident in the arguments of most working Great War historians today, who overwhelmingly lay out the evidence for what a lunacy the campaign was. Peter Hart, whom you think has missed so many of the vital points which only you can see, wrote in his book:

"But this book seeks to tell the story from all sides and Turkish sources have been incorporated into the narrative of battle whenever possible to give a more rounded picture of events than has hitherto been presented. They were, after all, the victors in 1915; the story they tell is one of equal heroism and superior military competence."

If you've read Pete's book, perhaps you missed this, and other relevant passages, and a re-read might repay you. If you haven't read his book, perhaps you ought to, if only out of courtesy before suggesting here anything else which you imagine to be of vital importance which you think he might have missed.

This thread gets more surreal by the day. I have long since said all I usefully can in answer to the question posed by its title, 'Easterners vs Westerners; who was right?' It's a question that ought not to need to be asked in 2012 amongst those professing an interest in, and some knowledge of, the Great War. I've nothing more to add.

[Krithia]

GAC, maybe that sentence was poorly phrased. I was trying to make the point that Gallipoli was a viable alternative to the stalemate on the Western Front, promoted due to the lack of any workable strategy in France and Flanders. Gallipoli's operational execution and overall plan could have been better, but from the armchair that is easy to say. I firmly believe the operation could have worked.

I am also speechless in your relentless persecution of the campaign, and your persistence that the Western Front was the only way. Due to lack of imagination it took the allies another THREE bloody years hammering away on this front before the Germans gave in. If Gallipoli resource was diverted to the Western Front in 1915, would it make any difference, I doubt it very much, but turn that argument around, and yes, Gallipoli most definitely had hope.

[Guest]

In order avoid any confusion, I should say in answer to the original post that I believe the War was 'won' on the Western Front. I am interested in Gallipoli and the other 'Side Shows' for personal reasons.

I wonder if the war would have been shortened (not 'won') had Gallipoli been successful? I understand that many think it had no chance from the outset - and I would include myself in that group - but as a hypothetical question, had it been properly planned, and resourced and had it succeeded what would have happened. There were 13 Divisions at Gallipoli and I wonder if they would have made a blind bit of difference if,say, in mid 1915 they had been re-deployed. Some seem to argue that due to the stalemate it would not have had any impact. I am not certain how many Divisions were on the Western front in mid 1915 - I am sure someone will enlighten me immediately.

I am also very curious to understand if it was so doomed to failure why the decision makers went ahead with it. If it is so clear to us now, why wasn't it so clear to those who implemented it? I have studied the campaign in detail and it is clear that the part of the MEF that was deployed was woefully under-resourced for the job, with (some) poorly trained troops, appalling staff-work and abysmal General leadership. It seems to me at least (with hindsight) that it was doomed from the outset, yet that was not recognised by the decision makers. Who actually made the decision? I am aware of the earlier dissenting voices as highlighted above but it intrigues me why such a venture was undertaken if it was obvious that it was doomed from the start. I can only conclude that the consensus view among the decision makers in early 1915 was that the venture was seen as viable.

I have read masses of correspondence between survivors of the campaign and Aspinall Oglander - most written during the preparation of the OH in the early 1930s and is is very clear that many survivors thought it was doomed from the outset. In fact some actually say this in their correspondence. It is not clear to me that their views expressed in the 1930s are also with the benefit of hindsight. There is lengthy correspondence from the GSO1 (Malcom) of the 11th Div for example who gives a very long list of the reasons for failure. Some single out Churchill for the blame and imply in their letters that this was a very commonly held view during the campaign. [sources CAB 45 papers at the National Archives]. I have seen none speculate on 'what if' it had succeeded. Their focus seemed to be on the many reasons why it failed rather than what could have been.

Hope, perhaps, but purely based on ignorance of what they were up against.

[Alan Tucker]

1915 was a pre-condition for the final 100 Days. It would have been remarkable if we could have gone from our understanding of warfare on the Western Front in 1915 to 1918 in any less time. GIven the circumstances of the time there had to be a long hard learning road with cul-de-sacs along the way. It took the Somme after all to get to SS135 for example. In 1915 there was an understandable, if wrong with hindsight, belief that at Neuve Chapelle, Loos etc we could achieve the breakthrough. We did learn, however, that with adequate use of artillery the break-in could be achieved. It was better to learn lessons where it really mattered against the main enemy on the main battlefield rather than in a misguided sideshow. Those who think Gallipoli was a good thing strategically or tactically are the modern equivalent of 'lions led by donkeys' which most learned opinion buried a long time ago.

[Krithia]

Those who think Gallipoli was a good thing strategically or tactically are the modern equivalent of 'lions led by donkeys'.

I think you will find many of these people are accurately informed, and do not accept the one sided, one front arguments given, which is a long way removed from the popular and ill-informed beliefs of WW1 you may be referring to. Actually by default you are in danger of placing yourself in this very same camp by accepting, without thought, some of these modernist views.

[Khaki]

The Western Front could be seen as an area of allied operations where all the necessary developmental stages required for the prosecution of the war took place in (friendly) territory (good idea).

The Eastern Front (Dardenelles) was the opposite, apart from conceptual development in the UK where the strategic goals were outligned, the whole invasion deteriorated almost immediately into a scenario of throwing men and supplies into locally developed limited objectives. (bad idea)

khaki

[Crunchy]

The casualty statistics of the Great War interest me. I can't help it : I'm made that way.

Gallipoli in particular engages my interest, because the invading force, for all the inadequacies it suffered, managed to deploy and engage in a manner which ensured that the Turks did most of the bleeding and dying.

Phil,

While I accept your interest in the casualty statistics of the Great War, IMO the focus on casualties has done more to completely distort the public's perceptions and understanding of the Great War than anything else.

Without meaning to be rude, I think that even the most simple reading of Gallipoli would reveal the view that the invading force managed to deploy and engage in a manner which ensured that the Turks did most of the bleeding and dying is naive. I say this not only from extensive reading of many wars, but also as a long serving soldier who fought on active service.

Indeed, I can understand the frustration George and Peter have with your comments. Perhaps it might be useful if you could expand and explain the point that you have been trying to make. Could you give us a well reasoned argument to answer three questions:

How did the greater Turkish casualties affect the outcome of the campaign and what benefit did the British and French accrue from inflicting such heavy casualties on the Turks?

What impact did the fewer British and French casualties have on the campaign and how did the allies capitalise on having fewer casualties?

What were the specific British and French deployments and ways they engaged the Turks such that they were able to inflict more casualties on the Turks?

Again, without meaning to be rude, unless you can answer these questions with well reasoned argument, then the whole issue of who lost more casualties in the campaign is rather meaningless.

As I have said before casualty figures are no measure of competence or incompetence by one side or another. There are too many variables that contribute to casualties in battle and on campaigns - some are won cheaply and some are won dearly. The reasons are varied and depend on the existing particulars in each situation. All that casualty figures do is remind us of how bloody battles and wars are. IMO only in an attritional strategy is the matter of casualties and the wearing down of an enemy a valid issue - the whole aim of that strategy being to grind the enemy down until he loses the capacity and will to fight on. It is a strategy that has been used in more wars than many people think, and is a valid strategy. In the American Civil War, after three years of strategies employing manouevre for a decisive battlefield victory had failed, the North (Grant) finally resorted to an attrition strategy which brought the war to end in less than twelve months. Gallipoli was not fought as an attritional strategy, and could not have been a valid strategy for the Allies in that theatre of the war - to have done so would have dangerously weakened the Western Front. And that is the fallacy of the Easterners argument, that somehow the war could have been won in the east with fewer resources and casualties - without giving a rationale case of how that could actually be achieved - except for the throw away line of knocking the props out from under Germany - as if Germany was being propped up by smaller nations with infinitely fewer military resources and capabilities. Wars are not won on glimmers of hope - and hope is not a method. Where those who should have known better fell down, is that they grasped at straws rather than undertaking a pragmatic assessment of what was realistically achievable. To suggest that the same strategy in the Second World War succeeded ignores the very differences between the two situations.

Regards

Chris

[phil andrade]

Perhaps it might be useful if you could expand and explain the point that you have been trying to make. Could you give us a well reasoned argument to answer three questions:

How did the greater Turkish casualties affect the outcome of the campaign and what benefit did the British and French accrue from inflicting such heavy casualties on the Turks?

What impact did the fewer British and French casualties have on the campaign and how did the allies capitalise on having fewer casualties?

What were the specific British and French deployments and ways they engaged the Turks such that they were able to inflict more casualties on the Turks?

Again, without meaning to be rude, unless you can answer these questions with well reasoned argument, then the whole issue of who lost more casualties in the campaign is rather meaningless.

Regards

Chris

Chris,

You are not rude, and I thank you for that !

What point am I trying to make ? First and foremost, that any appraisal of the campaign must take into account the enormous damage that the Turks suffered. I do get the impression that this is sometimes overlooked . When I state that the death rate among Turkish soldiers at Gallipoli was higher than that suffered by the French at Verdun, that is not hyperbole ; I hope that I gave a reasonably valid tabulation that was convincing enough .

How did the greater Turkish casualties effect the outcome of the campaign ? The fact that the defeated side was able to withdraw its troops with negligible loss is testimony to the effect of those casualties.

What benefit accrued to the side that inflicted the heavier casualties ? I struggle to cope with that, because I would have thought that the answer would be self evident. The superior survival rate of your soldiers in a kill or be killed confrontation must count for something. I hope that doesn't sound facetious.

I appreciate and acknowledge the implication : the strategic defeat of the Allies was so momentous and unequivocal that the massive Turkish casualties count for nothing ; the body count was irrelevant ; the intention of the campaign was to knock Turkey out of the war, and the strategy was not predicated on the attritional exigencies of a prolonged killing match. Even if they'd killed a million Turks, they still lost, didn't they ? Point taken. To a degree, that must stand as an answer for the second question you posed.

As for the third question, I wish I knew the answer. By all the advantages conferred by terrain, the Turks held the upper hand. As Jim and others emphasise, just to stand on the site is to see how awful the task of the MEF soldiers was. My supposition is that Allied artillery had a lot to do with this ; that, and an excessively prodigal series of Turkish counter attacks. But I am genuinely astonished at how much heavier those Turkish casualties were, and would be grateful for any suggestions from the more knowledgeable as to the whys and wherefores. I put it rather simply when I commented that the Turks combatted firepower with the blood and guts of their soldiers, but that might be a fair summation. I hope Pete will forgive me for repeating this. I know that he has alluded to it.

The most contentious point I have to make, in the context of this debate, is the contrast between the casualty exchange rate at Gallipoli, and that of Second Ypres, which was raging at the same time. I'm almost frightened of saying this, but doesn't that suggest that British soldiers were fighting to better tactical effect against the Turks than they were against the Germans ?

I'm sure that I haven't done justice to your questions, Chris, and I do find it difficult to articulate some of the arguments I'm trying to make here. I hope that I don't get any more hostile responses.

In the meantime, I've found an old second hand book on my shelves, MEMORIES OF FOUR FRONTS, written by Lt. General Sir William Marshall. He served as a very high ranking officer under Hunter - Weston, and spent several months at Gallipoli. I've selected a couple of passages which might be of interest :

As a fact the shortage of shells, especially H.E. , was almost entirely the cause of the failure of the Gallipoli expedition ; the most heroic infantry in the world cannot go on attacking an unbroken enemy time after time; the losses in man-power, let alone morale, forbid this. It is perhaps presumptuous to say so, but I cannot help feeling that, had I been in Sir Ian Hamilton's place, I should have issued an ultimatum to the Secretary of State for War and said : " Unless you can send me such- and - such guns, and such- and- such an amount of H.E. and shrapnel, I see no hope of a successful issue to the present stalemate in the Gallipoli Peninsula ; as I cannot ask my infantry to attack again unless that attack can be adequately prepared for, and supported by a preponderating artillery fire."

pages 84-85.

A pithy summary comes on page 129 :

Given the troops and the guns, above all unlimited H.E. shells, and I am confident that, under Sir Ian's leadership, Constantinople would have been in our hands. But none of these things were supplied. There were no doubt influential officials and members of the War Cabinet who believed that knocking Turkey out of the war was the easiest and quickest way of shortening it, but I fancy they were in a decided minority. Most of the foremost soldiers were oposed to any deviation from the Western Front, and Lord K., who really believed in the world -wide effect which would be produced by a successful issue to the Gallipoli campaign, was forced to starve the expedition of most of the essential necessary to success.

Here's another one that might provide me with a little more confidence, and addresses your questions, Chris :

The campaign will presumably be counted as a failure because its main objective was never achieved, but it had its use in the world - war. It destroyed the flower of the Turkish Army, and kept that army pinned to the Peninsula, thus averting pressure from Egypt and Mesopotamia ; anyhow, it taught us all many lessons about combined sea and land operations. Our own losses were heavy indeed, but not nearly so high as those of the enemy, and, as it seems that war nowadays has developed into one of attrition, that point must count as a moral ( or should one say immoral ?) victory.

page 144.

Phil (PJA)

[Steven Broomfield]

The problem I have with this is my usual one: reducing the war to a sort of cricket score - we killed more of them than they did of us - sems a little pointless in determining the outcome. I suspect the Russians in WW2 lost far more men than the Germans, yet the outcome isn't reflected in that score. Simply, the Russians had more men to squander.

The Turks "won" Gallipoli, biut "lost" the war, so I'm not sure what point that makes - is that the numbers lost in Gallipoli affected the numbers available to fight in Palestine, ot lessened the will to win?

For myself, I can see no possible merit in Gallipoli, and apart from defence of the Suez Canal route to India, little value in the sideshows. As discussed elsewhere, the two Indian cavalry divisions removed to Palestine in 1918 would have come in very useful in France, and the large-scale withdrawal of British units to France later that year seems to indicate to me that the powers that be were seeing that way, too by mid-year.

I've said this before, I know, but I find the concentration on death-rates as a final arbiter on the war rather maudlin and mawkish. War is horrible, we all know, and the GW was a particularly ghastly affair, but if all we do is count the piles of bodies we lose sight of the outcome, I believe.

[aiwac]

I agree with the majority here that in the strict terms of 'winning the war', most British and French operations outside the Western Front were unnecessary and wasteful (as opposed to Russian and Italian efforts). However, Britain had post-war interests in the Middle East and the carving up of the Ottoman Empire that went beyond simply beating Germany and it was primarily to that end that the Palestine Campaign was waged (or so I remember). I seem to recall that Russia was even promised the Straits at one point, though I can't remember when and in what context.

[squirrel]

For myself, I can see no possible merit in Gallipoli, and apart from defence of the Suez Canal route to India, little value in the sideshows. As discussed elsewhere, the two Indian cavalry divisions removed to Palestine in 1918 would have come in very useful in France, and the large-scale withdrawal of British units to France later that year seems to indicate to me that the powers that be were seeing that way, too by mid-year.

Have to agree with you here Mr B although Mesopotamia was a necessary deployment to protect the oilfields.

Knocking the Turkish Army out of the war would have had no effect on the Germans on the Western Front in 1915 and had very little effect in 1918.

[Crunchy]

Phil,

To be perfectly honest I am having trouble understanding the logic of your argument, and your claims of the effect the Turkish casualties had on the campaign.

I think you are drawing an awfully long bow when you attribute the fact that the defeated side was able to withdraw its troops with negligible loss is testimony to the effect of those casualties. I would have thought the withdrawal plan and the deception ploys used by the Allies had a fair bit to do with them withdrawing from Gallipoli with negligible losses. While there is a view that the Turks knew about the withdrawal, there is sufficient evidence from senior Turkish officers who claim the withdrawal took them by surprise. Furthermore, even if they had an inkling the Allies were going to withdraw, they certainly didn’t know the exact date of the withdrawal, which had they known may have resulted in a different result. I think it is fair to say the Turks still had more than sufficient strength to counter another Allied offensive, so I am not sure what the point is that the Turkish casualties allowed the Allies to get away unmolested.

Then you go on to admit that the Turkish casualties were irrelevant to the outcomes of the campaign and that you are unable to provide an answer on the specifics of how the invading force managed to deploy and engage in a manner which ensured that the Turks did most of the bleeding and dying which was the thrust of your initial argument relating to casualties. So I am confused as to what your actual argument is.

Accurate casualty figures are always difficult to pin down and those at Gallipoli are no different. Some estimates give the Ottoman losses as high as 300,000 and the Allies as 265,000 (John Keegan The First World War) The generally accepted figures, however, from all causes are about 251,000 Ottoman casualties and about 252,000 Allied casualties. Based on these figures the losses are about equal, so I don’t see why you can say the Turks suffered significantly more casualties than the Allies. Nor do I see the relevance of the comparison with Verdun, other than both the Turks and the Allies lost more than the French at Verdun. So what?

Ed Erickson in Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign (p 199) provides a table of casualties for the Ottoman forces from Turkish sources broken down by Officers and Other Ranks under categories of Dead, Wounded, Missing, Died in hospital and Died as a result of weather. This gives the total dead from all causes, missing and wounded as 190,463, of which 165,050 were killed, wounded or missing as battle casualties (compared to Peter Hart’s 186,869 Ottoman dead, wounded and missing). Peter Hart lists Allied dead, wounded and wounded at 142,000, while the Australian Department of Veterans Affairs, lists 142,000 Allied dead and wounded. Whether the DVA figures are from all causes is not known. So in terms of battle casualties the Turks lost more than the Allies, but not to such a devastating extent as you are claiming.

I am sorry, but I still can’t see the logic or the relevance of the case you are trying to make.

Regards

Chris

[phil andrade]

Chris,

The huge Turkish casualty list indicates the vulnerability of the Ottomans. They enjoyed such enormous positional advantages ; this suggests that they were doing something wrong, or that the Allies were doing something right, or that the Turks laboured under some deficiency of weaponry, or a combination of all three.

I would like to investigate the reasons for such a mortality disparity in favour of the attackers, especially in view of the very clear adavantage in terrain that the Turks possessed.. Please refer to the breakdown of those casualties that we're discussing. This is important. Why on earth, dug in as they were, in superior terrain, dealing with an enemy that deployed in direct frontal assaults uphill, did they lose fifty per cent more men killed in action ? I allude here only to battle casualties. The costly counter attacks are obviously a factor, and poorer field hospital facilities must have caused high death rates among the wounded, but even if you allow for those, the failure of the Turks to inflict more fatal damage than they suffered is surprising, and certainly contrasts strongly with the Western Front experience at that time. Incidentally, at Gallipoli the Turks suffered a higher death rate than the French at Verdun, but not the Allies. I did not make that mistake.

I conclude, tentatively, that these distorted casualty ratios indicate that the fighting done by the Allies, deprived as they were of sufficient guns and munitions, and aflicted by muddled leadership and ineptitude at various levels, was still sufficiently effective to expose the Ottomans to a deadly threat. Given more H.E., and more guns to deliver it, the prospects for success were bound to be enhanced.

General Marshall bears me out.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

I've said this before, I know, but I find the concentration on death-rates as a final arbiter on the war rather maudlin and mawkish. War is horrible, we all know, and the GW was a particularly ghastly affair, but if all we do is count the piles of bodies we lose sight of the outcome,

Even I - maudlin, mawkish, number crunching nerd that I am - would be mortified at the suggestion that death rates are a final arbiter on the war.

Nathan Bedford Forrest got it right, though, when he said that

War means fighting, and fighting means killing

Gallipoli was a killing ground, and the Turks got the worst of it.

I am very unwilling to endorse the view that the Dardanelles operation represented sound strategic vision, but if any aspect of the fighting suggests that the Allies enjoyed some prospect of success, it would have to be the evidence of those statistics.

Phil (PJA)

[aiwac]

PJA,

But the killing must serve a real purpose. I am in agreement here that 'winning' the attritional war in Galipolli means nothing because the Allies lost over 200,000 troops that could have been used to good effect in the main theater of war. Turkey could have been left to stew in its own juice for much the same result. The Union made much the same mistake in losing thousands of soldiers in pointless diversionary campaigns in the American Civil War (Red River, anyone?).

[phil andrade]

What I'm driving at here is the potential of that operation. Given the terrible ground the Allies had to deal with, the shortage of shells and guns, and the sheer ineptitude that was extant throughout much of the execution, the ability of those soldiers to inflict such casualties begs the question as to how much might have been achieved with better resources and more competent management. I've gone on the record now as supporting the westerners, but I have to confess that I start to feel uncomfortable when I survey the scale of the Turkish caasualties and reflect on the vulnerability that they suggest.

Banks in Louisiana, April May 1864 - a dog's breakfast if ever there was one.

Phil (PJA)

[aiwac]

PJA,

But let's say it somehow does go swimmingly - the Dardanelles falls and Turkey capitulates. Then what? How would Turkey's fall help beat Germany? Remember - German didn't get much out of the alliance with Turkey other than diverting British efforts - no troops, oil or other material goods. So the net result is that all British troops are now focused on the Western Front...which is what they should have done in the first place?

The only justification I can think of here is supplying Russia, which was tying down hundreds of thousands of German and A-H troops. Which makes one wonder whether more supply really would have helped the Russian war effort, assuming this was available.

[Ian Robertson]

I think that some people earlier in this topic stated the obvious fact that as the allies were having trouble supplying themselves at the time there wouldn't have been much to send to Russia supposing that they had been able to defeat Turkey and then secure the supply route

[phil andrade]

Yes, that does strike me as the unanswered aspect. I don't believe that supplying Russia was valid as an argument. I note that by 1917, the Russian armies were well supplied and equipped and that even in early 1916 they were able to expend massive amounts of munitions - albeit to little avail - against the Germans at Lake Naroch. The Russians lost heart and voted against the war with their feet. I wonder, though, if the reversion of Constantinople to Russian control might have worked some magic : Stalin shrewdly deployed the appeal of the Church in 1941.

Phil (PJA)

[Khaki]

I really don't see how anyone then or now could imagine a succesful outcome to that campaign when there wasn't even a decent supply of fresh drinking water.

khaki

[aiwac]

khaki,

Did the Turks suffer from the same problems? (ie, lack of drinking water and disease problems)

[phil andrade]

khaki,

Did the Turks suffer from the same problems? (ie, lack of drinking water and disease problems)

Twenty one thousand Turks died from disease in that campaign : five times the Allied total. Whether it was in the firing line or the hospitals, the Turks took the bigger beating. I'm banging on a bit, sorry.

Tomorrow I fly to Germany, so the Forum will be deprived of my company for a few days.

One thing I promise : I will not try to enter the country through the Back Door !

Phil (PJA)

[squirrel]

What I'm driving at here is the potential of that operation.... ..begs the question as to how much might have been achieved with better resources and more competent management...

Phil (PJA)

There were no better resources, either in quality or quantity, available. As for more competent management, it is endlessly debateable who might have been chosen.

They were still learning the hard way on the Western Front but perhaps it did make those in authority look further than a man's seniority on the Army List and more on his proven capabilities.

[Crunchy]

General Marshall bears me out.

Phil,

There are a good many other generals who would disagree with General Marshall. Just because it is his opinion, it doesn't mean he is correct. In fact if he thinks it would have only taken more HE to win Constantinople then I have wonder what he was smoking when he wrote those words. Anyway enough from me. I think we will agree to disagree Phil. A rationale analysis of the campaign would show it had no hope of success - a view put put forward by Brigadier General 'Hooky' Walker, Birdwood's Chief of Staff, before the campaign started. Hooker was an astute and very able general, a no-nonsense British regular who went on to become one of the best divisional commanders in the AIF.

Regards

Chris

[phil andrade]

Thanks for your forebearance, Chris.

I realise that I've been " pushing against the pricks" on this one. I really wanted to put my head over the parapet, and venture debate.

A quixotic approach, with a sense that the easterners were in a minority, and a too silent one at that.

The attritional aspect of the campaign had a degree of efficacy. This is ironic, in a sense, because it did not set out to be attritional in its aspiration : the Western Front srtategy - which did have an attritional goal - proved rather more equivocal in this respect.

Enough from me. I go to Germany this morning, through the Front Door.

Phil (PJA)