Easterners vs Westerners; who was right?

[George Armstrong Custer]

I have already mentioned his position on a naval demonstration, but as George has pointed out Churchill’s 19 February press announcement committed the Government to continuing with a naval venture that, without military support, Fisher had opposed. Yet Churchill had ignored Fisher’s advice that a purely naval attack would not succeed and relentlessly pursued it. When the navy failed to get through alone the military were drawn into the campaign.

Thus, the root of the problem in pressing for a campaign was Churchill. The rest caved in and they are also culpable.

Absolutely, Chris, to which I'd only add that as the prime mover and most eloquent advocate, Churchill must shoulder the lion's share of that culpability - which is the main reason why he had to go as First Lord of the Admiralty, regardless of the fact that his already established political enemies rejoiced and joined in calling for his fall. Nor should we forget that Churchill was lobbying Kitchener for a military force several days before the naval attempt began on 19 February.* Despite this fundamental shift Churchill failed to request either a revision to the original plan or a postponement of naval action until military forces could be readied for deployment. Yet in his re-write of history in his 'The World Crisis' he untruthfully claimed that he would never have planned for a purely naval operation had he known that troops would be available shortly - something K of K had already acceded to making available before the bombardment started. It was Churchill's actions which prompted the following incredulous exchange between the Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey and Douglas Haig, then commanding First Army on the Western Front - from Haig's diary, 3 April 1915:

"As to the Dardanelles operations I asked why the naval bombardment had taken place before the military part of the expedition was on the spot to take advantage of it and co-operate. He [Hankey] quite agreed with my view, and said the 'operation had been run like an American Cinema Show' - meaning the wide advertisement which had been given to every step long before anything had actually been done."

And, as we have seen, it was Churchill's triumphal public misrepresentation of the success of the opening day's naval bombardment which the War Council perceived as having robbed them of the option of quietly abandoning operations should the naval attempt fail. No wonder that clear-sighted Westerner Haig was writing by June 27 1915 that:

"I still think it is fatal to pour more troops and ammunition down the Dardanelles sink. The whole British Expeditionary Force here if added to the Force now there cannot clear the two sides of the Dardanelles so as to make the Straits passage safe for ships and ensure the fall of Constantinople......"

And the prime mover of all of this folly had been Churchill; the culpability of Kitchener and other members of the Council was in allowing themselves to be persuaded by the glib-tongued wannabe strategist out to repair a bruised reputation.

* George Cassar, 'Kitchener's War, British Strategy from 1914 to 1916', p. 134, and Martin Gilbert (!), 'Churchill', vol. III, pp. 286 - 287

[Crunchy]

George,

We are in complete agreement.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

Those inordinately heavy Turkish casualties indicate that they ( the Turks) were fighting under some sort of tactical disadvantage.

Should that consideration be eradicated from our assessment of the campaign's prospects ?

Phil,

I am not sure how the casualties incurred led to them fighting under a tactical disadvantage. I would have thought relative strengths in the firing line was the issue when it comes to a tactical disadvantage. Can you expand on the point you are trying to make? As for the campaign's prospects from the Allied point of view, I would have thought it was pretty evident that it was a busted flush.

Regards

Chris

[Jim_Grundy]

Anyone who has ever visited the Peninsula is perfectly aware what "operating under a tactical disadvantage" truly means. And no-one who has seen the ground could possibly believe the allied forces had the tactical or strategic advantage! To maintain that line goes way, way beyond obtuse.

And, for the last time (?), whatever Compton MacKenzie said about the possible effect on Russian morale capturing Constantinople might have had, the fact remains that the allied forces got no further than about five miles from the beaches at the very most (at Helles). For the avoidance of doubt, Constantinople - Istanbul - is a little further away than that. And if Scimitar Hill at Suvla was beyond allied reach, and that's not even two miles from the sea, how is possible to blithely ignore that fact and casually speak of capturing Istanbul as if it wasn't a problem really?!?!

[Guest]

Some articles that should be of interest from PapersPast

Click

Many more Here

Mike

[George Armstrong Custer]

Some articles that should be of interest from PapersPast

Click

That one's a nice find, Mike, providing as it does an excellent example of Churchill in action in 1931 attempting to establish as received wisdom the self-serving version of the Great War which he'd produced a few years earlier in The World Crisis. As I've said many times before, the distortions peculiar to Britain's historiography of the Great War can in large part be traced back to the efforts of three individuals - Churchill, Lloyd George, and the latter's collaborator on his history, Liddell Hart. As this thread has shown, the disproportionately influential historiographical shadow cast by these men, and its impact on uninformed public perceptions, still holds some in its thrall to this day, despite the body of work which has comprehensively demolished it.

[keithmroberts]

I'm getting bemused. It was probably worth airing the question - and we should cheerfully accept that some topics will recur regularly in the GWF over the years and that no harm is done by re-working them intelligently.

But here we are - quite a lot of evidence one way, well supported, and sadly just a few shifting sands the other way. The campaign was mad. The British and French forces and their supporting resources could clearly have been much more effectively and productively employed in the main theatre of the war, while had we not launched this campaign, there has been no suggestion that the Germans would have had significant benefit from redeployment of Turkish troops.

George and Crunchy have spelled out the arguments, and they are surely right. I too have had the chance to visit Gallipoli and can see no serious advantage that might have been gained by the allies without multiplying the resources committed to invade and hold the other side of the Bosphorus for its entire length in addition to seizing at whatever price the Gallipoli peninsula. It would have been lunacy to try. What was attempted was lunacy, and brave men on both sides paid a heavy price for it.

The arguments in favour of the campaign really are incapable of serious development, and they haven't been developed since the attempts to re-write history referred to above. Churchill with all his brilliance was a loose cannon, carried away by his own wit to propose and later defend the indefensible.

Keith

[phil andrade]

Phil

What on earth are you talking about!? What inordinately heavy Turkish casualties! The reason people abandon forums is in reaction to such wilful obtuseness! I have already pointed out the casualties were about equal, mostly from disease and the circumstances in which heavy Turkish casualties occurred! In response you have not deigned to answer but simply plough on regardless!!!! How jolly rude! Please observe the elementary rules of debate or is this just another donkey shouting match!

If you don't oncentrate then this whole so-called debate is rendered a total waste if time!

Affronted Pete

Pete,

You've forgotten more about Gallipoli than I'll ever know, so forgive my presumption in challenging you.

The battle casualties were not equal. Look at the breakdown of the figures. Of the Allied total of a quarter of a million, forty seven thousand were killed or died from wounds and about one hundred thousand wounded ; of the Turkish quarter million, sixty five thousand were killed in battle and one hundred thousand wounded. Just over one hundred thousand allied soldiers were evacuated sick, of whom fewer than four thousand died ; of the Turks, twenty one thousand actually died from disease. The battle casualties, then, were significantly heavier on the Turkish side and included a much higher total of deaths. The slaughter was preponderantly of Turks. And this despite the awful predicament of the allies in terms of terrain, confinement and observation, and having to attack uphill. That this was so indicates that the Turks were labouring under some significant disadvantage : put bluntly, it resulted in the Turks having to contest the allied advantage in firepower with the blood and guts of their soldiers. And if that's not a tactical disadvantage, then what in God's name is ? But then what would I know ? You're the World's leading expert on Gallipoli, and I'm just a number crunching nerd.

Chris : I hope that I've clarified the point I've been trying to make.

Phil (PJA)

[keithmroberts]

Phil

I don't think your statistics actually prove anything about the "allied advantage in fire power".

Both sides had some machine guns as the fighting developed, and both sides had some artillery. I am not sufficiently knowledgeable to assess the impact or the balance of artillery resources. To demonstrate an advantage in fire power you actually need to address not the results of the fighting, or a breakdown in casualties, but the breakdown of lethal resources in a conflict surely dominated by infantry.

In addition you then have to consider tactical decisions before assuming that any imbalance of resources was more significant that the specific battle tactics employed at different times. It is never as simple as just statistics and even less so unless all the relevant data is considered.

Until you produce a rounded assessment based on the resources deployed, - how many rifles, machine guns, artillery pieces, and what ammunition supplies you are surely drawing conclusions that are not supported by evidence. Even then differential losses in combat could just as easily be explained by tactical decisions that were not based on resources.

You have a long way to go to make a case.

Keith

[phil andrade]

Keith,

At the moment, I feel uniquely well qualified to understand the ramifications of firepower, since I'm under fire from all sides !

But I do take your point. And thank you - and Chris - for the gracious manner of your criticism.

The view I take is rather simplistic, but I believe it has some merit.

If a defending force enjoys advantage in terrain and observation, occupies strong positions, and is confronted by an attacker that makes direct frontal assaults, and yet, despite those advantages, manages to lose significantly more men killed in the ensuing fighting than the force that attacks, then I deem that to indicate some form of tactical disadvantage. This, of course, might reflect an excessively prodigal series of counter attacks, which Pete has pointed out : but that reflects imprudent deployment and leadership which is - in itself - a tactical disadvantage. I suspect - and I admit that I don't know this, and certainly don't have the means of proving it - that the Turkish artillery was relatively deficient in both quantity of guns and quality of munitions. Please tell me if I'm wrong about that. I know next to nothing about the relative machine gun strength and effectiveness of the two sides. But I remain adamant that the respective battle casualties indicate that, without doubt, the Turks were taking the heavier punishment, and that their troops were more exposed to massacre. And that's shocking, bearing in mind the extreme casualties suffered by the British and Dominion ( and French ) contingents.

And now please indulge my crie de coeur. I have never argued that the Easterners were right. Refer to the opening words in my first post on this thread . I am convinced that Haig was right about the necessity of beating the main enemy in the decisive theatre. There are one or two "wannabe Achilles" on the forum, anxious to drag a Hector through the dust. Not nice, not at all ! Gallipoli certainly brings Troy to mind. Discussion and debate is enjoyable : I would like to try and appreciate, and evaluate, the allure of the Dardanelles. It must have been compelling.

Phil (PJA)

[salesie]

I would like to ask Phil (PJA) a question - if the Allies "won" 2-1, how come they didn't get through to the next round in the Gallipoli tournament?

A flippant question? Not at all, I simply use metaphor to try and get to the nub of your premise, Phil i.e. why focus on such a narrow yardstick when it clearly does not give anything close to the truth of the Gallipoli campaign (or any other campaign/battle for that matter)?

Cheers-salesie.

[Crunchy]

Phil,

Thank you for your further explanation. I think we will have to agree to disagree on this point. Heavy casualties are not an indication of poor (or imprudent) deployment or leadership, as has become fashionable in the last 50 years. It simply reminds us that battles and campaigns are very bloody affairs. IMO there is just no correlation between heavy casualties and tactical disadvantage in the case you have presented.The Turks were well trained and well led under competent commanders at Gallipoli.

Regards

Chris

[JimSmithson]

Jim,

That’s not quite what he said. We have to put Kitchener’s comment about the 150,000 men in context. It was mentioned in response to Fisher’s ill-considered plan to take the Indian Corps and 75,000 men out of France - men Kitchener couldn’t spare, and he stated such an operation would need a minimum 150,000, an estimate that needed further study.. His point was the venture would need many more men than Fisher proposed, not that he supported a military campaign. Indeed, he said he couldn’t spare any troops.

Regards

Chris

I did put the comment in context.. It was said at the end of a piece in Council by Kitchener in which he outlined why certain options were not acceptable and that the Dardanelles was the only possible. "An attack here could be made in cooperation with the fleet" were his words. Hankey then went on to say that it would give us the Danube to which Kitchener replied it would need 150000 men to take the Dardanelles (but he reserved final judgement until further study.) It was not made in reply to Fisher at all, I am not sure where you got that from. War Council January 8th 1915.

Other than that I am with you Chris in that you do lay some collective blame on those present at Council which is the point I am making.

Jim

[Crunchy]

Thank you Jim.

Clearly I was wrong. Thank you also for the source. Mine were two secondary sources, including the OH, and they must bow to a primary source. They related it to a War Council meeting of 13 January where they say Kitchener made the comment, and that there were no troops available, but that a naval demonstration was worthwhile.

Regards

Chris

[George Armstrong Custer]

Other than that I am with you Chris in that you do lay some collective blame on those present at Council which is the point I am making.

Hello Jim. Your previously stated position on the concurrent Churchill and the Dardanelles thread goes rather further than that, so allow me to assist in your laudable quest to keep the record accurate:

This is what happens in the meetings in 1915. I am not in any way trying to put up a defence for Churchill (I am not going for silk!), merely pointing out that there were others just as culpable when it came to Gallipoli and Kitchener was one of them.

It is your contention that the War Cabinet were just as culpable as Churchill, rather than sharing some collective blame (a subtle but significant difference) that I have consistently taken issue with. Apart from that I have seen no-one claim that Churchill was solely culpable - so it is rather more than just Chris who you are now with on that.

[Jim_Grundy]

The words 'flogging', 'dead' and 'horse' come to mind.

By the 'logic' on display here, it appears that if the planners of Operation Overlord had only realised that they would've defeated Nazi Germany simply by occupying the a fraction of the Cherbourg peninsula then they would've averted all the nastiness that followed.

[Crunchy]

That's quite clear Pete. Very eloquently put. That's why you are an acclaimed historian and I am a mere hack.

Regards

Chris

[Rockdoc]

and even in the event of a Turkish defeat would merely have rushed reinforcements to the Austrians to make the Balkan mountain ranges all but impregnable.

There's a question here, Peter, that you seem to have ignored. I don't dispute that the Germans would not have trusted the KuK army to hold the line for any length of time and would have needed to put her own troops in to stiffen the resistance but where was she to have taken those troops from? She was already fighting on two major fronts and it would have been difficult to move troops from either the Western or Eastern fronts without jeopardising them. Could Germany have maintained troop numbers on these two fronts and managed to mobilise enough new troops allow them to man a third?

I don't deny that the Western Front would be the place to kill off Germany's ambitions but the Westerners' arguments, valid as they may be overall, never seem to address the possibilities for the Central Powers if the Entente Powers had done nothing in that area. Italy would probably have entered the War on the side of her treaty partners and Greece would have been, at best, neutral. France would have had to man her SE border, pulling more of her manpower away from the main parts of the Western Front. The Med would have been a good deal hairier than it was, putting pressure on our North African campaign and the Suez Canal - our route to India and beyond. I accept the thrust of your argument but not that going nowhere other than the Western Front was a zero checksum game.

Keith

[phil andrade]

Phil,

The Turks were well trained and well led under competent commanders at Gallipoli.

Regards

Chris

You're certainly right about that, Chris, and the story of how a company of Turkish riflemen caused such havoc at the British beaches on April 25th speaks volumes. The Turks were skillful, resolute and dogged, stubborn in defence and frenzied in attack. Sometimes I'm tempted to draw an analogy with the Japanese in WWII. Most depictions of Gallipoli - especially those on screen - offer the image of British and Australian soldiers being mown down as they struggled uphill. It's too easily forgotten - I still maintain - that the Turks suffered such huge losses : nearly fifty per cent more, in terms of the number killed in action, than the Allies. Whether this indicated some tactical ineptitiude on the part of the Turks, or some technical advantage enjoyed by the Allies, is something I would like to discuss. The repulse of Turkish counter attacks must account for some of the disparity, but, surely, not all of it. The troops that attacked at Gallipoli must have enjoyed some form of advantage over the Turks that allowed for this difference ; whatever that advantage was, it was not enjoyed by British soldiers fighting the Germans on the Western Front. And Germans, too, were persistent in the counter attack.

I wonder if the way we concentrate on the flaws in the planning and execution of the campaign tends to overshadow the proper credit that should be given to the Turks. They were fighting for homeland, race and religion against the invaders ; more of a Turkish achievement than a display of Allied lunacy, perhaps.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

I would like to ask Phil (PJA) a question - if the Allies "won" 2-1, how come they didn't get through to the next round in the Gallipoli tournament?

A flippant question? Not at all, I simply use metaphor to try and get to the nub of your premise, Phil i.e. why focus on such a narrow yardstick when it clearly does not give anything close to the truth of the Gallipoli campaign (or any other campaign/battle for that matter)?

Cheers-salesie.

How right you are. Perhaps I'd better reconsider.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

The words 'flogging', 'dead' and 'horse' come to mind.

By the 'logic' on display here, it appears that if the planners of Operation Overlord had only realised that they would've defeated Nazi Germany simply by occupying the a fraction of the Cherbourg peninsula then they would've averted all the nastiness that followed.

A huge number of German soldiers ( 400,000?) were left inactive in Norway in the Second World War, because Hitler was frightened of an Allied invasion there. I'm sure there were lots more in the Balkans, too, awaiting an attack that did not materialise. Falkenhayn was alarmed when he learned about the proposed Dardanelles plan in early 1915. He was Germany's principal Westerner, yet he was quick to perceive the advantage of turning South and East if circumstances allowed. Serbia put to the sword ( aplogies to Jack Sheldon) .

Phil (PJA)

[Steven Broomfield]

Hi,

. In my recent book

Pete

Crikey. You kept that quiet. No-one tells me anything.

[phil andrade]

Tell me more about the Gallipoli casualty statistics and how they prove this, that and the other. I still remember with joy how you proved conclusively that Verdun wasn't that bad a battle for the French!!!! Silly old French!

Pete

The death rate among the Turkish soldiers who endured Gallipoli was higher than that suffered by the French at Verdun. Maybe that's worth a mention.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

[keithmroberts]

Maybe this thread is coming to a natural limit.

Keith in Arras