Easterners vs Westerners; who was right?

[Robert Dunlop]

'Containment' of the German Army on the Western Front was not an option. This is akin to an invasion of England where a significant proportion of the industrial heartland is occupied, with deportations and other deprivations imposed on the citizens in the occupied territory, then saying 'we will just wait it out by keeping the invader contained'. The war on the Western Front was a war of liberation, with attrition being being the only military option because, as Chris pointed out, the German Army as a whole was too good to be defeated in battle.

Robert

[Khaki]

Was the Gallipoli campaign a realistic concept, I doubt that even if the heights had been taken and reinforced that there ever was any chance of success. The Turks would not have capitulated but fought harder. Time,weather, disease, and logistical problems would have just created another 'Kut' siege except on a larger scale.

khaki

[Crunchy]

Khaki.

Spot on.

Regards

Chris

[Alan Tucker]

Enough brave men got off the boats at Gallipoli to show that they thought it a risk worth taking.

Harry

This is nonsense. Like all the rest they were obeying orders and had no influence on strategy whatsoever. However, of course it was brave to disembark under fire.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Was the Gallipoli campaign a realistic concept, I doubt that even if the heights had been taken and reinforced that there ever was any chance of success.

Anyone who visits the Gallipoli Peninsula will immediately grasp the reality of that statement.

[PMHart]

Sadly Harry has retired to play with his pointy things in the modest seclusion of his own bedroom but I would point out that we do not have to 'think' what soldiers of the Great War thought. We can read their letters and diaries, listen to their recordings - no need for imagination and fantasy....

As we used to say in the 1970s. 'Keep it real, man!'

Pete

[Jim_Grundy]

I do think there's a real danger that, in the minds of some, questioning the purpose of the Gallipoli campaign equates to denigrating the bravery and character of those who took part in it. Whilst I am most certainly of the opinion that the whole concept was a mistake from the beginning, having visited the battlefields myself, I can only wonder that such small bridgeheads were maintained under the eyes of their opponents for so long. But, equally, that human achievement cannot blind us to the reality that those bridgeheads were militarily useless - worse than useless, actually, they represented a significant diversion of resources away from the decisive theatre of operations.

[Jack Sheldon]

I agree, Jim and, as I have argued elsewhere, Gallipoli had one immediate and damaging consequence for the Western Front. The earmarking of 29th Div for Gallipoli and thus the inability of the British army to relieve elements of the French Tenth Army and so release them to attack in Artois in March 1915, simultaneously with a major effort in Champagne, eased the defensive task of the German army considerably. The resulting sequencing of these offensives, with the blow in Artois not falling until May, enabled the German army to rush reinforcements, especially of its limited stocks of heavy artillery, up and down the front to counter first one then the other attack.

It is difficult to quantify how much difference the consequent loss of Allied synergy made, but I am convinced personally from study of the German sources, that the presence of significant numbers of the Grober Gottlieb 210 mm heavy howitzers was of critical importance for the defence in Artois. If a large proportion had necessarily been deployed elsewhere, who knows what the outcome might have been?

Jack

[phil andrade]

which renders ludicrous any talk of 'risks worth taking' at under resourced, tactically impossible, and strategically pointless follies such as Gallipoli.

For such a monumental piece of folly, it's astonishing to contemplate how many people must have believed in it. Who were the principal culprits, apart from Churchill ? What fools !

What is even more surprising is the fact that the French - themselves fighting for their lives and suffering the presence of the invader on their soil - were proponents of near eastern follies, too.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

Indeed. But there were more who called it folly at the time than you seem to think.

[hazelclark]

What is even more surprising is the fact that the French - themselves fighting for their lives and suffering the presence of the invader on their soil - were proponents of near eastern follies, too.

Phil (PJA)

Not surprising at all, as the French could not allow the British the possibility of influence in that area should they actually be successful. Everyone involved had their own agendas.

H.C

[phil andrade]

Indeed. But there were more who called it folly at the time than you seem to think.

How, then, are we to account for the allure of such a flawed - some might say lunatic - enterprise ? What made it so tantalising ?

Phil (PJA)

[Crunchy]

Phil,

IMO the War Council was clutching at straws without any idea of the difficulties of the enterprise. In this Kitchener and Fisher should have known better. The oft quoted "war is too serious a business to be left to the generals" could just as well be applied to politicians, most of whom in my experience aren't even interested in naval, military and air operations, and have little or no idea of war or strategy. Frightening, isn't it?

Regards

Chris

[phil andrade]

Chris,

Now might be a good time to assess how the German High Command perceived the Dardanelles operation. Was there alarm ? Or a big sigh of relief ?

I'll take a quick browse through some of my books.

Phil (PJA)

[aiwac]

It caused great consternation among the Turks, though I doubt THAT's much consolation...

[salesie]

Phil,

IMO the War Council was clutching at straws without any idea of the difficulties of the enterprise. In this Kitchener and Fisher should have known better. The oft quoted "war is too serious a business to be left to the generals" could just as well be applied to politicians, most of whom in my experience aren't even interested in naval, military and air operations, and have little or no idea of war or strategy. Frightening, isn't it?

Regards

Chris

Not as frightening, Chris, as descent into de facto military dictatorship - a la Wilhelmine Germany (or post civil war England for that matter).

Cheers-salesie.

[JimSmithson]

Phil,

IMO the War Council was clutching at straws without any idea of the difficulties of the enterprise. In this Kitchener and Fisher should have known better. The oft quoted "war is too serious a business to be left to the generals" could just as well be applied to politicians, most of whom in my experience aren't even interested in naval, military and air operations, and have little or no idea of war or strategy. Frightening, isn't it?

Regards

Chris

Chris

Of course the War Council saw no real difficulties of the enterprise, that is why they were relying on the likes of Kitchener to guide them. Look through the War Council notes and you do not see him putting up any opposition; on the contrary he sights the Dardanelles as the best option for operations in the east and says we could take them with 150,000 men. Then he goes on to suggest an attack on Alexandretta, a minor but useful operation requiring 30,000 to 50,000 men! We have the enormous benefits of hindsight here and must remember that these men's decisions were based upon what they knew of old and what they were advised. Britain had so far sailed happily around the world, landing men here and there and taken vast areas of most continents. Many of the discussions at the time centred around other nations, most especially Italy, Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria. How they would react to events in the near east were crucial to many of the thoughts around at the time. Recent conflicts such as those in South Africa had done little to dent the arrogance of the Victorian and Edwardian politician (or senior military advisor), to which era, in effect, these men belonged. Similarly, the war in France had not, as yet, shown to one and all that this was to be a war of attrition and that the focus simply had to be in France. On these grounds I cut these men some slack. It is just a pity that post war they couldn't have held their collective hands up and say 'We got it wrong', instead of throwing blame around to deflect from their own shortcomings. But hey, are today's politicians any different.

Jim

[George Armstrong Custer]

Of course the War Council saw no real difficulties of the enterprise, that is why they were relying on the likes of Kitchener to guide them.

Interesting that you zero in on only Kitchener's name again, Jim, when the overwhelming evidence is that the most influential voice which they were listening to in respect of the Dardanelles was Churchill's. It has already been agreed elsewhere that K of K's fault was failing to subject Churchill to sufficient scrutiny and, with other members of the War Cabinet, entertaining unrealistic expectations about the benefits that would accrue from a successful action there. Churchill, of course, pulled it off because he was First Lord of the Admiralty with the rhetorical skills to successfully promote himself as a man au fait with military affairs. Not for the first or last time, events proved that his ego was writing cheques which were impossible to redeem. Trying to set up K of K as the scapegoat for the ensuing failure - a process begun by Churchill and Ian Hamilton in 1916 - will not exonerate Churchill in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

George

[phil andrade]

Following my previous post, I'll throw these passages into the pot. These are based on cursory reading of secondary sources, but they might serve to encourage discussion :

Falkenhayn became alarmed in the spring of 1915 when British leaders such as Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, opted for an amphibious assault on the Turkish Straits.

Holger H. Herwig, THE FIRST WORLD WAR, Germany and Austria Hungary 1914-1918, page 154.

Robert E. Asprey, in his GERMAN HIGH COMMAND AT WAR, emphasises how Falkenhayn was a confirmed Westerner...

" Victories in the east that are won only at the cost of our position in the west are worthless," he warned the German chancellor.

page 177.

Now look at this, from page 196

The Gallipoli landing, however, had changed Falkenhayn's antipathy toward a Serbian campaign ....[ he ] approached the new offensive with the avidity of any convert to a cause.

That's interesting. Here we have an avowed westerner changing his mind.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

The Gallipoli landing, however, had changed Falkenhayn's antipathy toward a Serbian campaign ....[ he ] approached the new offensive with the avidity of any convert to a cause.

That's interesting. Here we have an avowed westerner changing his mind.

Except that the quote is not Falkenhayn's, it is Asprey's, imputing things to Falkenhayn - though he doesn't go so far as to claim that Falkenhayn ceased to be a Westerner simply because he evinced enthusiasm for a Serbian project, which is what you seem to be extrapolating from this tenuous evidence. But even if Falkenhayn had written it himself and, as you imply, ceased to be a Westerner, the short answer would be that he was wrong to take his eye off the ball of the Western Front, where Germany would win or lose the war.

[phil andrade]

Was the Gallipoli campaign a realistic concept, I doubt that even if the heights had been taken and reinforced that there ever was any chance of success. The Turks would not have capitulated but fought harder. Time,weather, disease, and logistical problems would have just created another 'Kut' siege except on a larger scale.

khaki

A brief look at the casualty statistics provided by Martin in another thread on this sector of the Forum will serve to illustrate the terrible intensity and bloodiness of the fighting at Gallipoli. The loss sustained by the 29th Division and the Kiwis was incredible. But the number of Turks killed was huge, wasn't it ? Indeed, significantly more Turks than Allies were killed or wounded in this fighting, depite the terrific disadvantages of terrain encountered by the invaders. I am bound to suggest that, in terms of the exchange rate, this was a more effective venture for the Entente than the fighting on the Western Front.

Phil (PJA)

[aiwac]

PJA,

Yes, but the Westerners would argue that Turks shouldn't have been given priority at all, and that the losses at Gallipoli were completely pointless. Even losing those men at a 2:1 ratio at the Western Front (to take the argument to an extreme) would have been preferable to the waste at Gallipoli.

[David Filsell]

The key question remains - which off the Western Front campaign made a significant material difference to the allied war effort?

[Jim_Grundy]

Isn't the key question simply this: who was the main enemy during 1914-1918? Unquestionably, it was Germany. Germany, in pursuing its war against Britain and France brought in the Ottoman Empire and, later, Bulgaria, to divert allied resources away from the main theatre of operations, i.e., France & Flanders.

In the war against Ottoman Turkey the British had two key strategic objectives: a) to secure the Suez Canal; and to protect the oilfields in the Persian Gulf. Both of those objectives objectives had been achieved by February 1915, before the landings at Gallipoli had even taken place (if not the ludicrous bombardments undertaken without any means of following them up). So, with the key objectives attained, whose war aims were to be served by an extension of activity outside of the Western Front by the British & French - only those of Germany.

If a thousand Ottoman soldiers were killed for every allied soldier it isn't clear to me, at least, how that would have helped win a war against a Germany army that occupied almost all of Belgium and a large swathe of northern France.

[George Armstrong Custer]

If France fell and the German navy had access to the Channel and French Atlantic seaboard ports, then it didn't matter a hoot in hell how many Turks had been shot while we lost the Gallipoli debacle or in any other sideshow campaign. Period. End of story. And by the way, if more Turks than Allies were killed at Gallipoli it just goes to show what a thoroughly useless measure a comparative body count is as a sole measure of deciding who achieved their objective.