Easterners vs Westerners; who was right?

[aiwac]

Why is no-one bringing up the importance of the Russian army in tying down millions of German and A-H troops for the better part of four years?

The idea of opening a supply route to Russia makes sense, even if the operation itself had no chance.

[George Armstrong Custer]

An idea which makes sense but has no chance of success in practice is no idea at all, and indeed is a nonsense, wouldn't you say? And if it were, for the sake of argument, possible to have opened a supply route to Russia, where would you find meaningful amounts of materiel to supply Russia with without compromising our efforts in the West? We were stretched as it was.

[phil andrade]

And by the way, if more Turks than Allies were killed at Gallipoli it just goes to show what a thoroughly useless measure a comparative body count is as a sole measure of deciding who achieved their objective.

Who mentioned that it was " a sole measure" ? It's certainly worth mentioning , although it would be absurd to predicate the argument for success or failure of that campaign on a body count basis. It's more pertinent to the Western Front, which is why I allude so much to Churchill's August 1916 memorandum.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

It's certainly worth mentioning ,

To what purpose? What argument does it make?

[phil andrade]

It demonstrates that, even in a theatre in which terrain bestowed great advantage to the defender, the Allies were able to develop their firepower to lethal effect and inflict disproportionate damage. I would be interested to find out why this was the case at Gallipoli, whereas in France and Flanders the ratio was so very much more in favour of the defence. As Haig remarked, fighting the Germans was very different from fighting the Turks. Perhaps life was just more cheap in the Ottoman Empire ; the stubborn Turkish stand entailed very profligate counter attacks.. " I do not order you to attack : I order you to die ! " Did Kemal really say that ? Judging by the Turkish casualties, he did - and he meant it.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

I'm not going to waste much more time on this - life's too short. You need to make your mind up what it is you're saying. On the one hand you say that your claim that Turkish casualties were higher was because "the Allies were able to develop their firepower to lethal effect and inflict disproportionate damage", something you claim they failed to do on the Western Front. Yet, on the other hand you say that Turkish tactics, radically different from those of the Germans on the Western Front both in practice and ethos, were the cause of them supposedly incurring higher casualties. If the latter is the case, then it's hardly relevant to what the BEF did or didn't do on the Western Front, is it? I'm not going to get drawn into another rehash of your number-crunching about casualty ratios on the Western Front, beyond pointing out that if, as you concede about Gallipoli, "it would be absurd to predicate the argument for success or failure of that campaign on a body count basis", why do you think it less absurd to argue against or, like Churchill, seek to diminish the undoubted Allied success on the Western Front on such a basis?

By the way - I saw what you did there. Your original post which I queried had nothing to do with the Western Front, but was a clear argument for the British having achieved a success at Gallipoli solely on the basis of a comparative body count. Let me remind you of what you said:

But the number of Turks killed was huge, wasn't it ? Indeed, significantly more Turks than Allies were killed or wounded in this fighting, depite the terrific disadvantages of terrain encountered by the invaders. I am bound to suggest that, in terms of the exchange rate, this was a more effective venture for the Entente than the fighting on the Western Front.

My point remains that if more Turks than Allies were killed at Gallipoli it just goes to show what a thoroughly useless measure a comparative body count is as a sole measure of deciding who achieved their objective.

[Khaki]

The Gallipoli campaign was doomed from the very beginning, the only fortunate thing was that they were not more successful, had they achieved more local territorial gains and subsequently reinforced them, their success would have been a pyrrhic victory as the further expansion of the campaign would have made the secret evacuation they achieved 'impossible', resultant in the surrender of huge numbers of men and stores,

khaki

[phil andrade]

I'm not going to waste much more time on this - life's too short. You need to make your mind up what it is you're saying.

This is unpleasant ; downright rude, actually.

A little civility, please.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

You're a big boy now, PLJ, and If you're going to voluntarily post clearly contradictory nonsense then you can't play the 'I'm being bullied' card when someone points that out, in the hope that moderator intervention will bail you out of the corner you've painted yourself into.

[phil andrade]

Big boy or not, right or wrong, I ask you to consider the tone you use.

Those casualty figures are a surprising feature of that campaign, especially given the ground that the Allies had to contend with. A comparison between, say, Krithia and Aubers Ridge is striking. The odds - judging by the casualty exchange rate - were obviously far more fatally stacked against the attacker at Aubers than they were at Krithia. And that's something .

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

You forgot the "I am bound to suggest that, in terms of the exchange rate, this was a more effective venture for the Entente than the fighting on the Western Front" bit, which loses you all credibility as far as I'm concerned. I will take on board your request to consider the tone I use, if you will consider the possibility of thinking before you post such nonsense.

[JimSmithson]

"what a thoroughly useless measure a comparative body count is as a sole measure of deciding who achieved their objective."

Careful George as that is precisely the argument put forward by many for the methods used on the Western Front. The Germans are nearly beat (said by those 'in the know' in 1915, 1916 and 1917) so we keep attacking to keep the body count high because attrition will win the war. Yes it did and yes it was the method that had to be used but are we not in the realms of comparative body counts when we say that.

Yes George, I do, in both threads, allude to Kitchener as he was Secretary of State for War and therefore the senior military man on the War Council. Who else was in a better position to have put the breaks on foolish ideas by outlining the military nonsense involved?

Jim

[George Armstrong Custer]

Yes George, I do, in both threads, allude to Kitchener as he was Secretary of State for War and therefore the senior military man on the War Council. Who else was in a better position to have put the breaks on foolish ideas by outlining the military nonsense involved?

Yes, Jim, and I have concurred with you on that particular point twice. But it was Churchill whose rhetoric persuaded him over the prowess of the 'Queen Elizabeth' at knocking out forts, and whose premature and inaccurate press announcement made a discreet withdrawal from the theatre an untenable proposition for the War Cabinet.

On the body count - and I am not going to get drawn into another interminable round of statistics here - the rub is in whether you believe some of the figures being bandied about today which claim a huge British - German casualty ratio disparity in favour of the Germans, without explaining why the Germans were at the end of their manpower pool by November 1918.

George

[PMHart]

The casualties sufered at Gallipoli were about equal at about 250,000 a side. Most were caused by the rampant disease. In the actual fighting the Turks suffered severe casualties when attacking (or counter-attacking) well-defended positions with inadequate artillery support. To sum it up: the Turks were excellent in defence, pretty dreadful in attack; the Allies much the same!

This whole thread is utterly redundant from start to finish. To be an 'Easterner' now is wilfully obtuse in the face of the amassed published evidence over the last twenty years. Still you can always go back 50 years to the naive tosh peddled by the likes of Churchill 'fluffer' Robert Rhodes James. But if you're serious about your history don't read rubbish on the internet; read books!

Self-Interested Pete

[George Armstrong Custer]

This whole thread is utterly redundant from start to finish. To be an 'Eastener' now is wilfully obtuse in the face of the amassed published evidence over the last twenty years.

Self-Interested Pete

Amen to that, Brother Self-Interested!

[Jim_Grundy]

This is getting a tad silly. I might be guilty of adding to that by the following observations, i.e., we could've supplied Russia if:

1.) we had the guns and shells to send to Russia in the first place - we didn't, hence the well documented 'Shell Scandal';

2.) we had the ships to transport the material we didn't have - but we didn't have the ships either;

3.) had we captured the entire Gallipoli peninsula, got the Turks to agree to kindly not shell the shipping we didn't have, carrying the munitions we didn't have from the Asian side of the straits; or

4.) if the combination of u-boats and the Turkish navy also agreed not to intervene either.

Apart from those objections, I can see no reason why Russia couldn't have been supplied - except we couldn't capture an orchard in Krithia, let alone Constantinople.

[bill24chev]

Surley a further factor in the decision making concerning Gallipoli was the safety of the Suez Canal.

If Turkey had to be fought with limited resources, when the new armies were not ready for operations, it was better to have that fight away from such a strategic site as Suez?

I know that the forces "squandered" at Gallipoli could have been used in less expensive defence of Suez, but even a small breakthrough to the canal by the Turks could close this artery of Empire for many months at least.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Surley a further factor in the decision making concerning Gallipoli was the safety of the Suez Canal.

If Turkey had to be fought with limited resources, when the new armies were not ready for operations, it was better to have that fight away from such a strategic site as Suez?

I know that the forces "squandered" at Gallipoli could have been used in less expensive defence of Suez, but even a small breakthrough to the canal by the Turks could close this artery of Empire for many months at least.

Perhaps you should write a book about it, setting out these vital facts which Self-Interested Pete's book so clearly overlooked.

[Lt Colonel Gerald Smyth]

To expand on my initial question I see it like this. The various other war fronts Britain was committed to drained soldiers away from the Western Front. But eventually those other fronts succeeded in knocking out Germany's allies which must have been a series of nails in their coffin in 1918. Question is would the additional British forces applied to the Western Front have made a difference? And conversely if Austria, Turkey etc hadn't had to fight on their own doorsteps would they have been free to reinforce Germany with their forces?

I remember reading that on the eve of D-day Alanbrooke recieved a proposal from Churchill that rather than attack France directly they should attack via Spain instead, seeking the 'soft underbelly' of Hitler's Atlantic wall. Needless to say Alanbrooke promptly put him right but I always think that this was ghost of Gallipoli in more ways than one, Churchill once again seeking an alternative to a bloody frontal assault yet haunted by the prospect of another potentially disasterous opposed amphibious landing

[Jim_Grundy]

Err.., the Turks had already attacked the Suez Canal before Gallipoli and had been rather easily repulsed. I don't see how attacking, in the words of one local man (to me), the strongest defended waters in the world - with consequent heavy loss - made the Suez Canal any safer.

[phil andrade]

How much of a boost to Russia's war was bound to follow on from the reversion of Constantinople to the Orthodox Church ? A very significant one, I daresay.

Edit : Here's a goodnight kiss from Compton Mackenzie :

There is no doubt that with more guns or even with more ammunition for the guns we had, we should have swept up the Peninsula, and there is equally no doubt that, if we had achieved such a sweeping advance, the war could have been and probably would have been over by the end of 1915.

page 127, Gallipoli Memories.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Just a minor correction. With the greatest of respect to some of the authors quoted earlier, Eric Erikson's books are the most pertinent works in English about the preparedness of the Ottoman Army. 'Fear' of the Allied landings is not an emotion that receives mention. There was concern, rightly. This prompted significant efforts to strengthen defences and practice defensive routines.

Robert

[Crunchy]

Of course the War Council saw no real difficulties of the enterprise, that is why they were relying on the likes of Kitchener to guide them. Look through the War Council notes and you do not see him putting up any opposition; on the contrary he sights the Dardanelles as the best option for operations in the east and says we could take them with 150,000 men.

Jim,

That’s not quite what he said. We have to put Kitchener’s comment about the 150,000 men in context. It was mentioned in response to Fisher’s ill-considered plan to take the Indian Corps and 75,000 men out of France - men Kitchener couldn’t spare, and he stated such an operation would need a minimum 150,000, an estimate that needed further study.. His point was the venture would need many more men than Fisher proposed, not that he supported a military campaign. Indeed, he said he couldn’t spare any troops.

I have already said Kitchener was culpable, not for supporting the proposal but for not providing a sound appraisal to the War Council, and arguing against it committing any troops. Where he lost credibility was in saying he could provide the 29th Division for the equally spurious Salonkia venture. I have already mentioned his position on a naval demonstration, but as George has pointed out Churchill’s 19 February press announcement committed the Government to continuing with a naval venture that, without military support, Fisher had opposed. Yet Churchill had ignored Fisher’s advice that a purely naval attack would not succeed and relentlessly pursued it. When the navy failed to get through alone the military were drawn into the campaign.

Thus, the root of the problem in pressing for a campaign was Churchill. The rest caved in and they are also culpable. I don't believe Kitchener supported a military operation on Gallipoli. He did, however, support a naval demonstration as opposed to a full blown naval operation to proceed up the Dardanelles - there is a big difference between the two.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

"what a thoroughly useless measure a comparative body count is as a sole measure of deciding who achieved their objective."

Careful George as that is precisely the argument put forward by many for the methods used on the Western Front. The Germans are nearly beat (said by those 'in the know' in 1915, 1916 and 1917) so we keep attacking to keep the body count high because attrition will win the war. Yes it did and yes it was the method that had to be used but are we not in the realms of comparative body counts when we say that.

Jim,

There is a difference between the Western Front and Gallipoli when discussing the issue of the impact of casualties.

On the Western Front the only strategy left open to both sides was a strategy of attrition, and in this case the impact of casualties and the wearing down of the enemy’s capacity to resist is a central platform of the strategy.

On Gallipoli, a strategy of attrition was not contemplated, nor do I believe it was a realistic option in that theatre for the Allies. So any discussion on the impact of casualties on the Turks is fruitless, and adds nothing to the debate.

Regards

Chris

[phil andrade]

Those inordinately heavy Turkish casualties indicate that they ( the Turks) were fighting under some sort of tactical disadvantage.

Should that consideration be eradicated from our assessment of the campaign's prospects ?

Phil (PJA)