Attempting to gain perspective on Churchill

[salesie]

Hi Salesie,

Once again you have evaded answering my perfectly reasonable questions but I think we'll let it pass as I can sense you're at the end of your tether and I don't want to embarrass you further.

Have you bothered to read what I posted and referenced about the use of oral history in the other thread - any disrespect for veterans there? I don't think so! Just a look at how we treat different forms of evidence including oral history. You may revere Mountbatten's speech as you quoted it and that's entirely up to you but I think you'll find he wasn't at Gallipoli and several of his fact are demonstrably wrong including the quoted amount of shells left on 19 March 1915. Classic 'tosh' taken straight from Roger Keyes and of course 'World Crisis.

Cheers chum,

Ollie Pete

PS When I was in a punk band I always found it best to channel my then inarticulacy into song writing - my best rage song was 'I'm so Pure and Innocent!' So perhaps its time for a poem after all?

You say, Atlee was at Gallipoli but too low a rank to have a strategic opinion that's valid, Mountbatten was of very senior rank indeed but wasn't at Gallipoli so his strategic opinion isn't valid either. You were never at Gallipoli during the action, Pete, and never achieved any rank let alone a high one, but you say that your strategic opinion is definitely valid because the majority of historians, who mostly were never at Gallipoli or achieved high rank, agree with you? I think everyone should stop and ponder that little bit of blather for a while.

I don't revere Mountbatten's speech per se, I posted it out of interest to demonstrate the points mentioned in the post - but it has served a definitive purpose. It has shown quite clearly that your delusional arrogance knows no bounds; as I suspected, you're now strongly implying that if Mountbatten had your experience with the books and documents you've read and the tape recorders you've handled then he wouldn't be so dumb as to agree as with that lowly-ranked Atlee's assertion that "the Dardanelles was the only imaginative concept of the First World War but it went wrong because the Fleet was used by itself."

The number of shells is irrelevant, as the operational assessment of the fleet on its own is, the crux of the matter is the strategic assessment not the tactical/operational one - that's what really gets your goat, isn't it? They've actually had the audacity to proffer a different strategic view other than your own (please don't go on about resources, we're talking about pure strategic concepts), they've actually had the audacity, in your eyes, to endorse Churchill's strategic vision even though Mountbatten actually criticises him for going ahead without adequate resources.

I can just see the poll question:

Who's opinion are you going to take - the opinion a man who was of low rank when actually serving at Gallipoli but rose to become Prime Minister, and backed up by an Admiral of the Fleet no less, who rose to be Supreme Allied Commander in South East Asia in WW2 - or a man who's read a lot, taped a lot, visited the old battlefields a lot (now that they're all a lot prettier and safer), and written a bit? Place tick in one box only please.

For the first time in my life I'm going to quit, as I said earlier, it's impossible to argue with such delusional arrogance as yours – I think you actually believe that you have what it takes to be a high ranking commander, the same delusion you accuse Churchill of having (and that accusation has more than an element of truth in it)

Cheers-salesie.

[truthergw]

Can't fundamentally disagree with this, Tom, but that wasn't my point. Are we to assume that Atlee gained no appreciation at all of the "bigger picture" when ascending to the highest public office in the land? And, much more to the point, Mountbatten's shared view with Atlee is simply brushed aside with equal aplomb - and don't try to tell me that Mountbatten didn't get to the top rung of his ladder when painting his house!

Cheers-salesie.

Come, come, Salesie old chap. The suggestion was that although Clem did not reach high level of command, he had some sort of insight from being there. Now you are presumably implying that when he got into the cabinet in the war years, he was let into all the secrets of the Great War and all was revealed. I don't know what Mountbatten did in the Great War but I suspect he got a better idea of what was going on by listening in on his dad's conversations than he did peering out from the bridge of one of His Majesty's Ships.

[kenneth505]

They've actually had the audacity to proffer a different strategic view other than your own (please don't go on about resources, we're talking about pure strategic concepts).

Isn't strategy without the tactics to deliver a sort of fantasy? Wouldn't real leadership have the wisdom to know the limits of their reach?

Reading thru there seems to be an argument that no one at the highest levels had the necessary management and leadership skills or the necessary political clout to carry their point persuasively. As such many actions suffered due to a lack of focus. Could one of the culprits be the difficulties a society under a democratic form of government faces trying to wage war compounded by the newness of the magnitude of the war they were engaged in?

[salesie]

Come, come, Salesie old chap. The suggestion was that although Clem did not reach high level of command, he had some sort of insight from being there. Now you are presumably implying that when he got into the cabinet in the war years, he was let into all the secrets of the Great War and all was revealed. I don't know what Mountbatten did in the Great War but I suspect he got a better idea of what was going on by listening in on his dad's conversations than he did peering out from the bridge of one of His Majesty's Ships.

Not what I was saying at all, Tom, of course Atlee should not be considered a strategic authority just because he served in Gallipoli in his youth; the appreciation of the “bigger picture” I referred to was the understanding that usually comes when climbing to, and eventually attaining, high office. It is not a specific appreciation of Gallipoli per se, but the ability to see the "bigger picture" in almost all situations - I'd call it the accumulation of strategic nous through experience, or as it used to be called, when out-and-out revisionists felt they had to defend certain generals harder than they have to today, a "learning-curve".

Atlee would almost certainly not have “seen” the “bigger picture” when a junior officer, same for Mountbatten, whatever action they were in, Gallipoli or otherwise. What I'm saying, is that there is a strong possibility that men such as Atlee and Mountbatten would have acquired such nous from their own high-achieving "learning-curves"; Mountbatten given his eventual high military rank, and Atlee given his eventual high political office, and, thus, both men would probably possess the ability to look back and cast a knowing eye over certain events; when, in their youth, they would have been mere spectators of, and/or small contributors to, the "bigger picture". They may be wrong of course, their views may be partisan of course, but should we discount them just because they would not have appreciated the “bigger picture” when young, especially when knowing that their views were given after they eventually achieved very high office indeed?

Cheers-salesie.

[PMHart]

Still not able to answer the questons I posed to you me earlier chum? Still never mind me old mucker we still love you! You will never be a quitter to me - just someone who can't answer a perfectly reasonable set of question? And now - as so often promised in your last few posts - this is gooodbye forever!

Adieu mon petite ami,

Ollie Pete

[salesie]

Still not able to answer the questons I posed to you me earlier chum? Still never mind me old mucker we still love you! You will never be a quitter to me - just someone who can't answer a perfectly reasonable set of question? And now - as so often promised in your last few posts - this is gooodbye forever!

Adieu mon petite ami,

Ollie Pete

Not so fast, Pete, before we both go I need to apologise for, in effect, calling you a "chinless-wonder" - that was uncalled for and I apologise.

Also to George, and the wider forum community, I apologise for allowing emotion to rule my head and for entering into a "fight" that it looks like I could never win - George is right, the evidence presented so far shows that Churchill was in fact dismissed over Gallipoli per se. I was certain that I had documentary evidence to the contrary, but after a fruitless search over past day or so I am unable to present it. That said, I still see a lack of balance in the Hankey diary entries posted by George, and I still see his original post, which drew me into this thread, as being an attempted character assassination of one man and the beatification of another - but it would be churlish of me not to accept the evidence as it stands.

I should have played with a straight bat and stuck to my usual perspective of Churchill i.e. he was a scrapper, who wasn't going to allow the Gallipoli fiasco to ruin his career - he came back "fighting" and again rose to high office, was cast into the wilderness once more, but came back even stronger than before. His tenacity and flawed genius has always attracted harsh critics (even to this day), but in my opinion that went with his job and he readily accepted it as such - he didn't give a damn what others thought, and thank God he didn't.

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

Could one of the culprits be the difficulties a society under a democratic form of government faces trying to wage war compounded by the newness of the magnitude of the war they were engaged in?

Yes, indeed ! And, what's more, we must countenance the bewildering array of events that confronted people at that very early stage of the war. The mighty convulsions of 1914 had hardly subsided, and people must have been trying to devise coherent strategy from a situation of chaos.

Suggestions that Asquith was in declining health, and more alarming depictions of Fisher suffering initial stages of Alzheimer's, should persuade us that the vigorous and compelling personality of a young Winston was bound to hold sway.

In situations of flux and fear, strong men come forward and storm the breach. For an assertive man like Churchill, this was the hour.

Phil (PJA)

[salesie]

Isn't strategy without the tactics to deliver a sort of fantasy? Wouldn't real leadership have the wisdom to know the limits of their reach?

Reading thru there seems to be an argument that no one at the highest levels had the necessary management and leadership skills or the necessary political clout to carry their point persuasively. As such many actions suffered due to a lack of focus. Could one of the culprits be the difficulties a society under a democratic form of government faces trying to wage war compounded by the newness of the magnitude of the war they were engaged in?

We're talking about WW1 here, Ken - strategy without the resources to deliver, leadership not having the wisdom to know the limits of their reach? These are the very reasons the bloody thing kicked-off in the first place, and, come to think of it, not too much different from the way it ended (hence the re-run a couple of decades later). The two great conflicts in Europe, in the first half of the 20th century, could easily be renamed the Fantasists' Wars.

Now, I'm definitely making a strategic withdrawal (with my tail between my legs).

Cheers-salesie.

[PMHart]

Hi Salesie,

I am a bit of a 'chinless wonder' so no harm done chum! Believe it or not I think that going in to bat for Churchill is not a bad thing at all. I do not share Corrigan's negative view of the great man. It was just the Gallipoli 'blame' thing that raised hackles. And I can thoroughly endorse the last statements from you and Phil - they were indeed stumbling in the dark and the only reason we can appear 'clever' is that we have 20-20 hindsight!

Pete

PS You'll be pleased to know I have the most appalling hangover!!!

[salesie]

Hi Salesie,

I am a bit of a 'chinless wonder' so no harm done chum! Believe it or not I think that going in to bat for Churchill is not a bad thing at all. I do not share Corrigan's negative view of the great man. It was just the Gallipoli 'blame' thing that raised hackles. And I can thoroughly endorse your last statement - they were indeed stumbling in the dark and the only reason we can appear 'clever' is that we have 20-20 hindsight!

Pete

PS You'll be pleased to know I have the most appalling hangover!!!

Hangover? That's a self-inflicted wound - if you miss muster you'll be on a 252!

Cheers- a sober(ish), salesie.

[PMHart]

I think that's the first time i've posted at 02.28 in the morning when fully 'refrreshed' and not attracted the attention of the moderators. To me it shows what a good spirit this whole debate has been conducted in - a true joy also to cheerfully bite chunks out of people and not having the 'report' button pressed at every harmless exchange of insults - good on yer Salesie! We'll enjoy that drink in sunny Rotherham all the more!

Maudlin Pete

[jlang]

Pete,

Where is your water carrier in your hour of need? Or is he too hung over?

Jim

[PMHart]

I fear George is past his prime these days. Much akin to Fisher he is yesterday's man - a lot of shouting and fury all signifying little or nothing of any substance!

Pete

[George Armstrong Custer]

Unlike ageing Pete I am here fresh as a daisy, thanks to the wonders of ibuprofen! Salesie, old mate, no apology necessary - the line you were pursuing is a perfectly understandable one, based on much of the literature - Churchill's included - which misleadingly maintains that the Gallipoli idea was a near run thing which could have won the war had it not been let down by men of lesser vision. Couple that with the deservedly large shadow cast over his failures by what he achieved in 1940, and your passionate defence of Churchill is perfectly understandable. But it was the Dardanelles and Fisher's resignation which brought him down in 1915. I've enjoyed the sparring, good robust stuff with give and take and no whining from either side! Hopefully we'll all meet up for a pint of three sometime!

I think, though, that chinless wonder Pete has not engaged his alcohol-befuddled brain this morning, and has clearly not twigged that now that you and I are no longer engaged in combat I am free to turn my full attention to him - otherwise he would not have been foolhardy enough to make his last post.......

George

[PMHart]

Gulp!

Pete

[phil andrade]

Later on today I'll be opening a couple of bottles of Valpollicella Ripasso : a big Sunday Lunch beckons.

While still sober, I'd ask about the views of other notable participants in the Gallipoli campaign.

Did Bill Slim attempt to pass judgement ?

Another junior officer at the time, of course, but, like Attlee, destined for great things ( both men conspicuously modest, although Slim did not suffer the Churchillian comment directed at Attlee " he has a lot to be modest about!".

What was the great flaw ? The idea itself, or the determination to pursue the idea against advice and without adequate resources or preparation ? Or was it more a case of ineptitude in execution ?

Was Churchill, by dint of his political career, a confirmed maverick who saw his strategy as an expression of "thinking and acting outside the box" ?

He might have been keen to espouse radical ideas, whether in the realm of social reform or military strategy.

I find it significant that he stood by Edward VIII and Wallace in the Abdication Crisis. Perhaps Gallipoli nurtured within him a passion for lost causes.

I'll open up that powerful Italian red now and let it breathe.

Ciao !

Phil (PJA)

[kenneth505]

Suggestions that Asquith was in declining health, and more alarming depictions of Fisher suffering initial stages of Alzheimer's, should persuade us that the vigorous and compelling personality of a young Winston was bound to hold sway.

In situations of flux and fear, strong men come forward and storm the breach. For an assertive man like Churchill, this was the hour.

So here perhaps is some more of the vaunted 'perspective' I asked for at the beginning. WSC perceived by all to be highly self-confident and certain in the correctness and validity of his opinions was still in need of additional tempering in the fire and perhaps the acquisition of compassion. One wonders if WSC considered Fisher's advanced age and probable short tenure as FSL to be an asset to his ambitions at the time of his appointment.

Politics abhors a vacuum (sorry to trot out tired adages.) What would the cabinet and war effort have been like if another, equally self-assured younger politician had been available as a suitable foil for WSC?

[kenneth505]

We're talking about WW1 here, Ken - strategy without the resources to deliver, leadership not having the wisdom to know the limits of their reach? These are the very reasons the bloody thing kicked-off in the first place, and, come to think of it, not too much different from the way it ended (hence the re-run a couple of decades later). The two great conflicts in Europe, in the first half of the 20th century, could easily be renamed the Fantasists' Wars.

Being relatively new to adding comments to threads this bit above makes me realize that posting to a thread is 'like' having a conversation but one can't quickly recognize that what a moment ago had seemed useful is in actuality somewhat obvious. I appreciate your gentle reminder of the difference.

[kenneth505]

I'll open up that powerful Italian red now and let it breathe.

Phil (PJA)

I too am about to uncork a strategy aimed at the reduction of a bottle of red. I toast all the participants in this thread for the assistance given and the fun it is. I would not have thought in scarcely more then a week we'd have covered so much territory.

[phil andrade]

On reflection, the words diabolically persausive come to mind regarding WSC.

Phil (PJA)

[PMHart]

On reflection, the words diabolically persausive come to mind regarding WSC.

Phil (PJA)

Hi Phil,

I do see what you mean but I prefer to keep non-existent supernatural beings out of it! I think Churchill, with his formidable intellect, driving personality and wonderful eloquence could argue a compelling case for almost any old tosh - and that's exactly what he did over the Dardanelles. He was largely responsible for the initial strategic blunder, but then others share the responsibility for failing to stand up to him! You can't excuse them entirely just because Churchill was remarkably good at what he did! Lots of politicians (and lawyers!!!) are difficult to argue with, but many of the politicians involved in the decision were smply looking for the easy option to the Western Front and did not make any attempt to understand the real situation. And neither of the two men who should really have known better - Fisher or Kitchener - could maintain a consistent line under pressure from WSC!

Pete

[phil andrade]

Kittchener and Fisher - in their mid sixties and seventies respectively - both unable to cope with the personality of a man forty years old.

Perhaps Churchill liked bullying old men ! No wonder George takes exception to him....

Maybe this explains why people weren't so keen to listen to him twenty years later....once bitten, twice shy.

Phil (PJA)

[squirrel]

FWIW - WSC always thought that there was a better way to do things - his way. As if no one else, regardless of their experience, service or knowledge, had a clue.

"‎'Success consists of going from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm" is, I believe, one of WSC's statements.

Sums up his WW1 record IMHO.

Also, IIRC, did he not offer Haig 1,000 tanks in early 1918?

Haig, although not replying directly to WSC, wondered where the men to man them were to come from!

[phil andrade]

Last night we saw that play Three Days in May.

Thoroughly excellent.

There was one allusion to Gallipoli.

Clement Attlee ( " that modest little man with plenty to be modest about") reminds Churchill - who is agonising about the prospects of how many might be rescued from Dunkirk - that he recalls how successfully hundreds of thousands had been evacuated from Gallipoli.

Churchill glares at him furiously and says nothng. The most thunderous silence in the play.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

As another viewpoint from which to gain a perspective of WSC, one might like to recall that Churchill was firmly of the belief that there was a ruling class and that he was a member of it. Some of what we might see as high handed or even arrogant behaviour would stem from his belief that he was exercising an inborn facility. The likes of him were there to tell the likes of me what to do. Democracy was still viewed with some suspicion and in Churchill's circle, labelling someone a democrat had, in recent times, been a criticism bordering on insult. Ruling the country in time of peace quite naturally led to leading the army in time of war, which encouraged Winston to no sooner have an idea than to set the wheels in motion to enact it. He was born to lead, at least in his own estimation. He had the Marlborough blood in him.