Attempting to gain perspective on Churchill

[PMHart]

Not a death-knell Salesie. I said it was one of the reasons that Churchill was in deep trouble in May 1915 - a reason that you had forgotten and then seemed to be evading. Fisher was popular with the great British public. Fisher was an inceasingly incompetent lunatic, who by this time bore the imprint of the last person who had sat on him (Jellicoe/Churchill). As such Fisher was not universally popular with his Admiralty colleagues or indeed in the Royal Navy at large.

Churchill was very vulnerable in May 1915 due to the perfect storm of the shells crisis, his own terrible mistakes over the Dardanelles, the loss of Fisher and of course as you have pointed out - almost as if you had read my book after all - by the ramification of his earlier base political treachery to the Conservative Party. All these factors had an effect. But I am still entertained that you think the full ramifications of Churchill's Dardanelles/Gallipoli venture had borne fruit by May 1915 a couple of weeks into the land campaign. It would get a lot worse before his banal incompetence and criminal hubris were fully exposed by the worsening series of disaster that followed throughout the rest of May, then June, July, August finally culminating in the utterly humiliating withdrawal in January 1916. By then Churchill had already been booted out though!

And Phil I think you'll find that Clement Atlee was a politician as well and had no grasp of military strategy! Being present as a junior officer during the campaign in no way makes him a credible expert on what was going on, or of the bigger picture.

Olly Pete

[simonharley]

There was deep-seated opposition to Fisher's appointment as 2nd Sea Lord, Tom, let alone as 1st Sea Lord the first and second time around. And indeed, Fisher resigned the first time around as 1st Sea Lord after picking a "fight" he couldn't win with the incumbent First Lord. Yet his public persona was unblemished in 1914.

Not making excuses for Churchill, just pointing out that even in this debate it has been hinted at that Fisher's reputation and expertise automatically made his resignation a "death knell" for Churchill - when, in fact, Fisher was far from being universally liked, and that his "tantrum" in May 1915 was nothing unusual.

Cheers-salesie.

I think it's fair to say that however disliked and mistrusted Fisher was by the Navy, Churchill was just as unpopular.

And you're right, there was opposition to him as Second Sea Lord, then First Sea Lord. Most of it from people who knew from experience that he was a ruthless s*d and quite aware that his reforms, however much needed, would cause untold amounts of grief because he was the one pushing them through.

He resigned in 1910 (decided in 1909) because he hadn't been given the level of support from Asquith's government that he thought acceptable (i.e. unqualified) during the Beresford Inquiry conducted by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence chaired by Asquith. He knew he was approaching retirment and he wanted Sir A. K. Wilson to hold the reins for a couple of years at least. No First Lord (in this case McKenna) brought him down.

Now, if he'd shown the same force of character when Churchill brought him back, then who knows what might have happened. Instead, as Pete says, he "bore the imprint of the last person who had sat on him," and was relatively mute during the War Councils, despite years of speaking his mind at the C.I.D., and in the press, and to anyone who would listen.

Simon

[salesie]

Not a death-knell Salesie. I said it was one of the reasons that Churchill was in deep trouble in May 1915 - a reason that you had forgotten and then seemed to be evading. Fisher was popular with the great British public. Fisher was an inceasingly incompetent lunatic, who by this time bore the imprint of the last person who had sat on him (Jellicoe/Churchill). As such Fisher was not universally popular with his Admiralty colleagues or indeed in the Royal Navy at large.

Churchill was very vulnerable in May 1915 due to the perfect storm of the shells crisis, his own terrible mistakes over the Dardanelles, the loss of Fisher and of course as you have pointed out - almost as if you had read my book after all - by the ramification of his earlier base political treachery to the Conservative Party. All these factors had an effect. But I am still entertained that you think the full ramifications of Churchill's Dardanelles/Gallipoli venture had borne fruit by May 1915 a couple of weeks into the land campaign. It would get a lot worse before his banal incompetence and criminal hubris were fully exposed by the worsening series of disaster that followed throughout the rest of May, then June, July, August finally culminating in the utterly humiliating withdrawal in January 1916. By then Churchill had already been booted out though!

And Phil I think you'll find that Clement Atlee was a politician as well and had no grasp of military strategy! Being present as a junior officer during the campaign in no way makes him a credible expert on what was going on, or of the bigger picture.

Olly Pete

For the life of me, Pete, I can't see at all how you can say that I "think the full ramifications of Churchill's Dardanelles/Gallipoli venture had borne fruit by May 1915 a couple of weeks into the land campaign."

Firstly, because as you rightly say, chronology alone would make such an assertion absurd. And Secondly, and more importantly, such an assertion, or even an implication, by me would be totally counter to my wholly consistent stance on this matter i.e. Churchill was not "dismissed" in May 1915 because of Gallipoli per se. My whole stance has been consistent throughout so your "entertainment" is wholly misplaced, and just a quick glance at my previous posts will show it to be - in fact, I'm wondering if you've actually read anything I've said in this thread?

You also highlight the chronology of long standing disaster at Gallipoli even after Churchill had been removed from office; obviously the men who followed Churchill performed no better - again, this fits completely with my stance in this thread i.e. Churchill, at the time, for the most part was no better nor worse than his contemporaries (whether political or military). Now, I'm sure you're not intellectually dishonest enough to suggest that Churchill be damned when in office and damned when out and having passed control to other men, so I can only assume that your biggest gripe on this is akin to George's i.e. Churchill continued to refuse to accept that this venture was strategically unsound?

As for your comments about Atlee's view of the strategic aims of Gallipoli, it seems me that you brush this off much too easily on the grounds of Atlee not being qualified to seriously comment because of his low military rank. Firstly, Atlee did become Prime Minister after being Churchill's wartime deputy, so hardly an also-ran. Secondly, Atlee was Labour party leader and thus diametrically opposed to Churchill politically, which, in my opinion, adds weight to his comment. Thirdly, and much more importantly, Lord Mountbatten no less must have agreed with Atlee's comment otherwise he would not have given it specific mention in his speech - so, by definition, you are also blithely dismissing Mountbatten's view.

I know we'll now get a slagging-off session for Mountbatten over Dieppe and one or two other things - but his view cannot be as arrogantly dismissed as you did with Atlee's, especially on the grounds of being unqualified to comment because of lowly military rank.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

I think it's fair to say that however disliked and mistrusted Fisher was by the Navy, Churchill was just as unpopular.

And you're right, there was opposition to him as Second Sea Lord, then First Sea Lord. Most of it from people who knew from experience that he was a ruthless s*d and quite aware that his reforms, however much needed, would cause untold amounts of grief because he was the one pushing them through.

He resigned in 1910 (decided in 1909) because he hadn't been given the level of support from Asquith's government that he thought acceptable (i.e. unqualified) during the Beresford Inquiry conducted by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence chaired by Asquith. He knew he was approaching retirment and he wanted Sir A. K. Wilson to hold the reins for a couple of years at least. No First Lord (in this case McKenna) brought him down.

Now, if he'd shown the same force of character when Churchill brought him back, then who knows what might have happened. Instead, as Pete says, he "bore the imprint of the last person who had sat on him," and was relatively mute during the War Councils, despite years of speaking his mind at the C.I.D., and in the press, and to anyone who would listen.

Simon

You're probably right, Simon, I'm relying on memory on this; whatever the "fight", or whoever he picked it with, I formed the conclusion that this time it was fight he couldn't win - maybe with Beresford? But I'm not going to search it out, I'm happy to accept your correction - it's not really germane to this thread which is about putting Churchill into perspective not Fisher.

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Not making excuses for Churchill, just pointing out that even in this debate it has been hinted at that Fisher's reputation and expertise automatically made his resignation a "death knell" for Churchill - when, in fact, Fisher was far from being universally liked, and that his "tantrum" in May 1915 was nothing unusual.

Hang on there, Compañero, I thought you said we were moving on from the jokes!

Let me spell out the facts, in very simple terms, so that perhaps even you will grasp them. Then I'll give you the contemporary evidence to read through.

The death knell for Churchill at the Admiralty in May 1915 was indeed the Dardanelles. It happened because Churchill's venture lost the support of the First Sea Lord, Fisher, and the subsequent clash between the two men, ending in Fisher's resignation, is the central event which brought Churchill down. The contemporary evidence comes in the form of the man at the very centre of things, Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey. That Churchill himself knew damned well that Fisher's departure would mean his own fall is attested to by his desperate eleventh hour gambit on the evening of the 19th May, when he offered Fisher any terms he wanted, including a seat in the Cabinet, if he would rescind his resignation and stay with him at the Admiralty. Fisher told Churchill to go to hell, and the next day Hankey found the consensus at the Admiralty was that both Churchill and Fisher had to go. This ought not to be surprising, given the unpopularity of both alluded to earlier by Simon Harley.

Whilst the clash between Churchill and Fisher over the Dardanelles undoubtedly caused the fall from office of both men, it's worth noting the bigger repercussion of these events in the part they played in the fall of the Liberal administration. Writing in The Supreme Command of the fall of the Liberal Government which had come into existence in December 1905, and the formation of the first Coalition Cabinet, Hankey opined that "two circumstances helped to precipiate the change - the munitions crisis and, even more immediately, Fisher's resignation."

Before setting out Hankey's contemporary account of the fall of Churchill and Fisher in May 1915, I'll note that I don't intend coming back to argue semantics in ever decreasing circles over this - the facts are so self evident that only the most obtuse would try to argue around them. By the way, Hankey's account gives a brilliant example of the 'Sir Humphrey-like' role played by Hankey as Cabinet Secretary which Tom Rutherford alluded to in an earlier post. An unelected civil servant he was at the very heart of the wartime governments and, as the following account demonstrates, nudged things in the direction he thought they ought to go. One can even see a precursor of an Alastair Campbell-like spin doctor in Hankey taking it upon himself to ensure that Fisher is packed off to Scotland where he could do no damage by talking to the press. That other eminence grise who I mentioned earlier, Lord Esher, also makes a brief appearance in these entries. So, to the evidence from Hankey's 1915 diary:

May 15th. – Shortly after my arrival at office Fisher came to show me letters to Churchill and the Prime Minister resigning position as First Sea Lord owing to incompatibility of views with Churchill. It appears that on previous evening Churchill had asked his assent to an order for a mass of naval material for Dardanelles to which he could not agree. I saw it was impossible to shake him and advised him to see McKenna before resigning. McKenna fully supported his view. He left a note at 10 Downing Street, and then disappeared. The Prime Minister believed he had gone to Scotland – ‘levanted’ was the term he used – and London was scoured for him. The Prime Minister gave him a written order in the name of the King to remain at his post. I saw him again in the evening at the Athenaeum Club by appointment. He told me the whole story and said he was remaining at the club to escape from Winston. He had promised the Prime Minister to remain in office until Monday….During the day I saw Callwell re the possibility of bringing in Greeks and Bulgarians, in his opinion the only way to secure success at the Dardanelles….Have formed plan for the Prime Minister to use the Fisher incident to get a much closer grip on the war, and to insist that the Admiralty and War Office shall tell him everything.

May 17th. – Fisher turned up early at the office to say that his resignation was accepted; that Arthur Wilson was to succeed him; that Churchill was to remain; and that Oliver would probably resign. I sent him off to see Kitchener. He also showed me a Memo, by the other Sea Lords, sent to Churchill and the Prime Minister, taking Fisher’s side in the controversy, but saying that in this great national crisis they felt it their duty to remain at their posts. Then Esher came in to tell me that ‘coalition’ was in the air; that Kitchener talked of resigning and was ill. Crease told me Fisher meant ‘to let the cat out of the bag’ before Parliament rose on the 19th. In the afternoon Balfour came in and told me that there was to be a coalition Ministry, and that the Prime Minister had asked him to be First Lord. Kitchener to be Commander-in-Chief, and Lloyd George Secretary of State for War.

May 18th. – Fisher was at the office when I arrived. He said that forty per cent to sixty per cent of his energy has to be devoted to managing his First Lord [Churchill], and he wants this for the Germans; so he wants to be First Lord. I pointed out to him how troublesome all the deputations and other ‘blatherumskites’ would be. “Oh! I know all about receiving deputations,” he said, “the first rule is to put them in a draught.” He then kept on telling me humorous stories for about twenty minutes, till the tears came into my eyes with laughing.

May 19th. – Cabinet crisis now in full swing and a coalition Ministry is to be formed….This morning Fisher arrived early at office with a most preposterous letter of ‘terms’ on which he would return, eg Churchill not to be a member of the Cabinet; Balfour not to be First Lord; the First Lord to be reduced practically to the position of an Under-Secretary; Fisher to have control of strategy, all appointments, new construction. He showed me his list of appointments – clearly he would indulge in ‘head hunting’. I remonstrated, and told him his terms were impossible, and no self-respecting Minister would look at them. I saw him again in the evening and persuaded him to abate his terms – but it was too late, they had been sent to the Prime Minister, and greatly incensed him….I made up my mind that, whatever happened, he could not go back to the Admiralty. I had a long talk with Balfour, who is to go to the Admiralty most likely. There are also fearful intrigues against Kitchener. I am doing my utmost to tell everyone that he is absolutely indispensable at the War Office. In the evening Churchill offered Fisher any terms he liked, including a seat in the Cabinet, if he would stay with him at the Admiralty. The message was brought verbally by Lambert, the Civil Lord, while I was with Fisher at his house in the evening, but Fisher’s reply was to tell Churchill to go to hell. I dined with Bonham Carter and Masterton Smith. We had a very long discussion, and finally agreed that the best combination would be Balfour and Arthur Wilson, though it is only faute de mieux.

May 20th.- Usual visitation Fisher, who is a bit repentant. Bonham Carter sent Memo to the Prime Minister as the result of our talk last night, but I suggested, and induced him to suggest Henry Jackson for a seat on the Board of Admiralty, as understudy to Arthur Wilson, and to take some of the detail off his shoulders. I had seen Oliver, who is at the present time the linchpin of the Admiralty system, as well as Henry Jackson, and had found a consensus of opinion that Churchill and Fisher must go. Also saw Balfour to try and reassure him about Wilson, in whom he has not much confidence. Jellicoe is the only alternative to Wilson and Jackson, but everyone agrees that Jellicoe is indispensable in the Grand Fleet…..

May 22nd. – In morning I saw Balfour for a short time, but spent most of morning in getting pressure put upon Fisher from various quarters to go right away to Scotland, away from journalistic influences, as he may do himself and the nation great harm by an indiscretion in his present excited state. I saw him, and took the line that he ought to adopt the role of the ‘strong, silent man’, injured, but keeping silent. I reminded him that he had given this advice to Kitchener with excellent results, and told him it was his one chance of getting back to the Admiralty. It was 12.30 before he agreed, and his train was at 2 pm. ………Churchill said goodbye to the officials at the Admiralty today. I went round, but he had gone, so I wrote him a letter. I wanted to tell him that I had worked with Fisher for peace as long as there was any chance of it. Had long talk with Masterton Smith about future arrangements, and was able to tell him that Balfour intended to take him on as Private Secretary. This week-end, in the middle of this desperate war, there is neither a First Lord nor First Sea Lord at the Admiralty.

George

[phil andrade]

Being present as a junior officer during the campaign in no way makes him a credible expert on what was going on, or of the bigger picture.

Olly Pete

Yes, of course.

But you , of all people, must have conducted interviews with the Gallipoli veterans in their final years.

What proportion of them believed that the thing was worth trying ?

My guess is - judging by the tone of your book - that most of them were not impressed.

All the same, I'd like to know what opinions they voiced.

A Gallipoli veteran listening to Churchill on the wireless in 1940 might have taken a view about the allusion to fighting on the beaches !

Phil (PJA)

[PMHart]

For the life of me, Pete, I can't see at all how you can say that I "think the full ramifications of Churchill's Dardanelles/Gallipoli venture had borne fruit by May 1915 a couple of weeks into the land campaign."

Becuase old chum you go on and on and on and on and on and on about it as if somehow has some magic significance to your argument that Churchill was not to blame for the Dardanelles/Gallipoli fiasco! Despite the fact that you seem mainly to be arguing with yourself as all the rest of us were already well aware of the complexities of the situation that led to his departure in May 1915.

But more seriously you betray a dangerous inability to understand military operations. It isn't all magic-markers sweeping across maps and armchair generals! In the real world once the Allies were ashore in Gallipoli then they were immediately in deep deep trouble. You should see the ground - the word overlooked is the very least of it and the logisitcal situation was a nightmare. It was either 'victory' - which meant a massive amount of resources that the Allies simply didn't have given the primacy of the Western Front - or evacuation. Kitchener feared a terrible reaction to evacuation in the Muslim world - which mainly meant India and Egypt as far as he was concerned. Evacuation was also a terribly dangerous operation - it was only carried out in desperation in January 1915 when all hope of survival never mind success had gone.

I know you have to have the last word and that you have demonstrated 'victory' to your own satisfaction over us comic turns on the forum, but the fact that remains that to most historians Churchill was the most (not only) guilty figure involved/implicated in the Gallipoli affair, he was widely seen to be so at the time and has retained that reputation ever since.

Ollie Pete

P.S. I have of course added on your instruction Clement Attlee and Louis Mountbatten to my shortlist of those with military genius as evinced by their support for the Gallipoli operations! We live and learn!

[PMHart]

Hi Phil,

Interesting point and I posted a piece in less humorously inclined thread on the GWF about the use and value of oral history. In it I point out its benefits but also the severe limitations - and one of the most serious is that just because you were there does not mean you can pontificate about the 'whys and wherefores' of a campaign situation. That is just hearsay picked up in the long years afterwards. Even a regimental officer would have little or no clue as to what was really going on - except to them!

Ollie Pete

Just looked it up and the thread was:-

Great War Forum> The soldiers and armies of the Great War> Units and formations> Published oral records and recollections How much are they to be relied upon?

[truthergw]

For the life of me, Pete, I can't see at all how you can say that I "think the full ramifications of Churchill's Dardanelles/Gallipoli venture had borne fruit by May 1915 a couple of weeks into the land campaign."

............................

I know we'll now get a slagging-off session for Mountbatten over Dieppe and one or two other things - but his view cannot be as arrogantly dismissed as you did with Atlee's, especially on the grounds of being unqualified to comment because of lowly military rank.

Cheers-salesie.

Atlee is off topic but it is generally true that the further down the ladder you are, the less you can see. That is true whether you are a soldier or a house painter.

[salesie]

Hang on there, Compañero, I thought you said we were moving on from the jokes!

Let me spell out the facts, in very simple terms, so that perhaps even you will grasp them. Then I'll give you the contemporary evidence to read through.

George

Pretty compelling on the face of it, George - just a few initial observations though:

1) In a few months we've gone from deep-seated opposition in October 1914 to Fisher's appointment, then, in May 1915, Hankey makes a case for deep-seated support for him to stay. Given Fisher's performance (or more to the point, not much of) in those few months are Hankey's diary entries truly representative of such a dramatic turnaround in support for Fisher?

2) Churchill offered Fisher a seat in the cabinet to stay? Either Churchill had completely lost his marbles and become deluded that he was now the Prime Minister, or in making such an offer he actually carried Asquith's authority, or Hankey's assertion is somehow wrong at best or deliberately misleading at worse, or perhaps Hankey was not, as you believe, privy to everything?

3) No mention of Bonar Law's part in all of this at all, nor is there any mention of Lloyd George's negotiations with Bonar Law on Asquith's behalf - are we to take it that Bonar Law played no part at all, that Bonar Law made no ultimatum to Asquith about Churchill which brought about Asquith's rapid change of mind?

Not much I know, George, but this is from only a cursory glance at your post; perhaps Hankey had Alastair Campbellesqe tendencies for spin even in his own diary? Or perhaps he wasn't as central to certain events as you believe him to be? Or perhaps these things were so trivial he thought them not worth a mention?

You tell me, these posted diary entries throw up more questions than they answer.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Atlee is off topic but it is generally true that the further down the ladder you are, the less you can see. That is true whether you are a soldier or a house painter.

Can't fundamentally disagree with this, Tom, but that wasn't my point. Are we to assume that Atlee gained no appreciation at all of the "bigger picture” when ascending to the highest public office in the land? And, much more to the point, Mountbatten's shared view with Atlee is simply brushed aside with equal aplomb - and don't try to tell me that Mountbatten didn't get to the top rung of his ladder when painting his house!

Cheers-salesie.

[kenneth505]

"I [Louis Battenberg] suppose now I've gone you will go ahead with the Dardanelles operation with the Fleet only." Winston replied: "Yes." My father went on: "I believe the Dardanelles is a fine concept, don't spoil it by alerting the land defences with the Fleet only. Wait until you can launch a combined operation with the Army!" But Churchill wouldn't wait. He couldn't get Kitchener to produce the soldiers, so he sent the Fleet by itself to bombard the forts.

Early on Tom mentioned that KofK withheld troops because he was opposed.

Another post, Bob Lembke maybe? mentions a luck factor in the placement of mines.

Yet again Tom, in a later post begins to mention political decisions, or lack of, made by Asquith.

I'm starting to suspect the Asquith needs some examination. Perhaps we're seeing failures in management and leadership.

[George Armstrong Custer]

You tell me, these posted diary entries throw up more questions than they answer.

Discrediting an inconvenient source by saying it throws up more questions than it answers is often an attractive option, mon ami mate, but it only works if the questions you say it throws up are credible ones. In this case you yourself say of what passes for your 'questions', "Not much I know, George.." So which is it to be - does Hankey's diary throw up more questions than it answers, or is there actually not much to question? But let me help you by doing the joiny-up bits for you:

1/ On 15th May Fisher tells Hankey that he is resigning because Churchill had asked his assent to an order for a mass of naval material for the Dardanelles to which he could not agree.

2/ On 17th May Fisher shows Hankey a Memo from the other Sea Lords, sent to Churchill and the Prime Minister, taking Fisher’s side in the controversy, but saying that in this great national crisis they felt it their duty to remain at their posts.

3/ On 20th May Hankey meets Oliver and Jackson, who inform him of a consensus of opinion at the Admiralty that Churchill and Fisher must go.

If you want to argue the ludicrous position that the Dardanelles and Fisher were not central to Churchill's fall from the Admiralty, then you'll have to refute the above with some hard primary evidence of your own. Your smokescreen of 'more questions than it answers' is totally inadequate so far as negating a primary source is concerned. As to Churchill having completely lost his marbles with his last minute offer to cut a deal with Fisher, I think a more simple and obvious explanation is that it shows the lengths to which he was prepared to go to save his own political skin and reputation.

perhaps Hankey had Alastair Campbellesqe tendencies for spin even in his own diary? Or perhaps he wasn't as central to certain events as you believe him to be? Or perhaps these things were so trivial he thought them not worth a mention?

And if my auntie had balls perhaps she'd be my uncle. You are getting truly desperate, old sport!

George

PS - If you want to argue a case that Hankey wasn't as central to certain events as he thought, then amongst the many eyewitnesses you'lll be arguing against is Churchill himself, who as I've already quoted, said of Hankey: "He knew everything; he could put his hand on anything; he said nothing; he gained the confidence of all."

[salesie]

Ollie Pete

P.S. I have of course added on your instruction Clement Attlee and Louis Mountbatten to my shortlist of those with military genius as evinced by their support for the Gallipoli operations! We live and learn!

Perhaps it's time I did quit? An out-and-out academic has the audacity to preach about dangerous inabilities to understand military operations at the highest level as if he's done it, been there and wore the teashirt - when all he's actually done is read loads of books and papers and looked at the ground after the sh*ts gone away, and talked to many veterans, then wrote a few books himself. Thus he feels qualified to just arrogantly sweep aside any and all comment that is opposite to his own even from men who have achieved more than he ever has, men who have achieved high office in doing their bit at the sharp-end of both the political and military spheres.

It'll be easy next the time the sh*t hits the fan, boys, we'll just send for the military academics to "quote" them to death. It's time I did quit, I don't mind a bit of an academic debate myself, but who can argue against such deluded arrogance?

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Discrediting an inconvenient source by saying it throws up more questions than it answers is often an attractive option, mon ami mate, but it only works if the questions you say it throws up are credible ones. In this case you yourself say of what passes for your 'questions', "Not much I know, George.." So which is it to be - does Hankey's diary throw up more questions than it answers, or is there actually not much to question? But let me help you by doing the joiny-up bits for you:

1/ On 15th May Fisher tells Hankey that he is resigning because Churchill had asked his assent to an order for a mass of naval material for the Dardanelles to which he could not agree.

2/ On 17th May Fisher shows Hankey a Memo from the other Sea Lords, sent to Churchill and the Prime Minister, taking Fisher’s side in the controversy, but saying that in this great national crisis they felt it their duty to remain at their posts.

3/ On 20th May Hankey meets Oliver and Jackson, who inform him of a consensus of opinion at the Admiralty that Churchill and Fisher must go.

If you want to argue that the Dardanelles and Fisher were not central to Churchill's fall from the Admiralty, then you'll have to refute the above with some hard primary evidence of your own. Your smokescreen of 'more questions than it answers' is totally inadequate so far as negating a primary source is concerned. As to Churchill having completely lost his marbles with his last minute offer to cut a deal with Fisher, I think a more simple and obvious explanation is that it shows the lengths to which he was prepared to go to save his own political skin and reputation.

And if my auntie had balls perhaps she'd be my uncle. You are getting truly desperate, old sport!

George

This is not an answer, George, and you know it.

At the time, Asquith and Bonar Law were calling the shots (Bonar Law more than Asquith in reality), not their Lordships at the Admiralty nor Hankey, and, consequently, there are serious omissions from the posted diary entries that won't just go away with bluster. Tomorrow, I'll dig out documentary evidence of Bonar Law's ultimatum and Asquith's desperation to hold on to power in a coalition - I just assumed that seeing as no one has challenged this assertion then it was accepted as common knowledge - obviously not.

Cheers-salesie.

[PMHart]

Hi Salesie,

Blimey my dear old mum would have been proud to hear me called 'an academic' - I think you're barking up the wrong tree there chum. And of course I have every respect for your own military service but that does not give you the automatic position of knowing everything about everything military as you seem to imagine. It really does take all sorts chum!

In all honesty we both know this is an to divert attention from your total inability to answer any of the points I raised above. For the record could you explain how after Churchill's fall in May 1915 his successors could have rescued the disastrous situation Churchill had been responsible for (with others to a lesser degree) at Gallipoli. Divert the forces equivalent to the entire BEF in 1915 from the Western Front to acheive success? Or evacuate with the dreadful danger of a complete disaster and the unknown ramifications to the Muslim parts of the British Empire?

Ollie Pete

[PMHart]

Hi Salesie,

And as to your revalations about the fall of Churchill in May 1915 how exactly do you differ from the standard interpretation as reflected in my Gallipoli book (written over a year ago) and by many other historians - or let's be honest I wouldn't have known!

The Liberal government had never been strong. Now in May 1915 it was crippled by two serious crises that eventually brought it down. The first was the crisis caused by the lack of sufficient munitions on the Western Front. The terrible casualties there were at least partially attributable to the paucity of the artillery bombardments and the grieving British population was no longer prepared to listen to excuses. The problem was augmented by the resignation of Admiral Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord. This was an accident waiting to happen: Fisher was too old for the pressures of the job, ground down by the responsibility for resisting Churchill’s plans and repeatedly frustrated in his own mad schemes. Fisher was yesterday’s man but his reputation was still sky high from an adoring public. On 15 May he finally really did resign, citing the drip drip of new naval reinforcements to the Dardanelles, accompanying it with leaks to opposition politicians and the press to try and whip up a scandal that would help overwhelm Asquith’s government.

Although the government fell, Asquith was able to continue as Prime Minister by negotiating an agreement with his Conservative partners in the First Coalition Government which was formed on 25 May 1915. Many of the key figures survived but Churchill was doomed. The aftermath of Fisher’s departure, the failures in the Dardanelles and the general opprobrium felt by the Conservatives from whom he had defected to join the Liberals in 1904, meant that Churchill’s tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty was terminated. He was reduced to Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster a nominal position, leaving him in effect a Minister without Portfolio and with a much reduced Cabinet status. He was replaced at his beloved Admiralty by the veteran Conservative and former Prime Minister Arthur Balfour. Asquith would have liked to dispense with Kitchener’s services as Secretary of State for War, but it would have been politically impossible in view of his continuing popularity with the public.

I really don't know what you're arguing about, I really don't.

Ollie Pete

[George Armstrong Custer]

This is not an answer, George, and you know it.

No, old chum, but it wasn't meant to be. It's a reiteration of the evidence I'd posted already. You're just shooting from the hip now. You're the one posting specious questions in place of evidence based rebuttal. Not surprising - as I've already noted, the central reasons for Churchill's fall in 1915 are so plain from the evidence that arguing otherwise is Quixotically ludicrous. You've no evidence of your own to refute that which I've posted from Hankey, despite trying everything, including the fantastical suggestion that Hankey wasn't central and privy to events. You are now nimbly changing the subject to Bonar Law in the hope that nobody'll notice and think instead that you're making a credible counter argument. You're not, but since you've raised the subject, let's look at Bonar Law in the context of those Seven Days in May (good movie title there!) which I quoted earlier from Hankey's diary. Here's Hankey's diary from October 6th, 1920:

I had a long talk with Bonar Law this morning, who asked me about this diary, and subsequently became reminiscent. As regards the first coalition in May 1915, he told me that the real cause was Fisher's resignation and not the 'shells' controversy. It was true he had been very uncomfortable about the munitions controversy. Then one day he received a letter addressed in Fisher's handwriting, without anything inside except a newspaper cutting stating that Fisher had packed up and left for Scotland. He then rang up Lloyd George, and said that, if this were true, it showed a very bad rift between Fisher and Churchill, and he would be bound to raise the matter in Parliament, and impeach the Government. The only solution he could see was a coalition. Lloyd George replied at once that he agreed and suggested they should go to Asquith together there and then, which they did. Asquith agreed to a coalition without a word, and they started there and then to discuss the distibution of offices. Bonar told me that at the time he rather distrusted and feared Lloyd George, and had none of his present intimacy with him. His (Bonar's) friends insisted that he must be Chancellor of the Exchequer or Minister of Munitions. The Liberals didn't like this as they thought it would give the Unionists too much influence, and there was something like an impasse. At last Asquith said to Bonar "Do go and talk it over with Lloyd George and get something fixed up." Bonar went to Lloyd George, told him that he could "bust the whole show" if he didn't get it, and Lloyd George consented at once."

So, as already noted on this thread, the Churchill - Fisher bust up over the Dardanelles had much wider repercussions than just the fall of both men from the Admiralty. Hankey quoted the above 1920 diary entry of Bonar Law's account in his The Supreme Command of 1961, and meticulously noted it in the context of other available accounts, demonstrating that his account of Bonar Law's reminiscing in 1920 was not 'spun': "The last words are cryptic and probably I omitted something in memorizing the conversation. Bonar Law did not become either Chancellor of the Exchequer or Minister of Munitions, but Secretary of State for the Colonies in the first Coalition Government. The statement that Bonar Law and Lloyd George 'there and then' went to Asquith also lacks confirmation. In other respects this account tallies generally with other published versions."

With the best will in the world however, Salesie, I fear that you're now beginning to take us into the realm of evidence-free questioning of the evidence for Churchill and Fisher's clash over the Dardanelles and the consequences, both for the individuals and the country which flowed from it, which I cautioned of earlier. If you've anything of substance, not including your own opinion, to refute the evidence I've presented I'll be interested to see it.

George

[salesie]

Hi Salesie,

Blimey my dear old mum would have been proud to hear me called 'an academic' - I think you're barking up the wrong tree there chum. And of course I have every respect for your own military service but that does not give you the automatic position of knowing everything about everything military as you seem to imagine. It really does take all sorts chum!

In all honesty we both know this is an to divert attention from your total inability to answer any of the point I raised above. For the record could you explain how after Churchill's fall in May 1915 his successors could have rescued the disastrous situation Churchill had been responsible for (with others to a lesser degree) at Gallipoli. Divert the forces equivalent to the entire BEF in 1915 from the Western Front to acheive success? Or evacuate with the dreadful danger of a complete disaster and the unknown ramifications to the Muslim parts of the British Empire?

Ollie Pete

Where I come from, Pete, anyone with an O level is an academic.

As for my own military service. I've made no secret about that, I was an Aircraft Technician in the REME, and never once claimed to be an expert on military matters, more expert on airframe insertion repairs and/or timing unmarked engines. And I certainly don't arrogantly brush aside the comments of men who have more claim, in reality, than I do to pass comment about such matters - sure, I will say I disagree with their views if I feel that's appropriate but also give my reasons for disagreeing; I don't simply brush their views aside with sardonic humour as if they must be out-and-out numpties for not agreeing with my own opinion.

The point is, I've read your bio on your web-page and I see nothing outside the academic world - nothing wrong with that per se, I've even allowed the odd academic to be my friend, but when you start to display delusional arrogance and start preaching about inabilities to understand military operations at the highest level, and you apply sardonic humour to the views of men such as Mountbatten (and Atlee to a lesser degree) as if they are lesser men than you in understanding military strategies/operations and that their views are unworthy of your time then I start to get angry, very angry. They've been there, done it and truly wore the T-shirt, they earned their right to comment at the sharp-end, you earned your equal right to comment in dusty libraries and document archives where the biggest danger is gobbling your lunch too quickly when studying, or maybe a badly stacked pile of books will fall dangerously close, or you may stub your toe when visiting the old battlefields etc. I think you get my drift, so I won’t go on.

Now, as I said, you have an equal right to comment but you don't have a right in my opinion to treat men who earned their right in a much tougher environment than you did with so little respect that you feel their views don't deserve any serious comment from you. I said earlier, that I'm almost impossible to offend, but you're getting pretty close to achieving the nigh-on impossible. What next from you - if only Mountbatten had read the same books as me then he wouldn't be so dumb?

As I said earlier - it’s time I did quit, before my anger boils over.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Hi Salesie,

And as to your revalations about the fall of Churchill in May 1915 how exactly do you differ from the standard interpretation as reflected in my Gallipoli book (written over a year ago) and by many other historians - or let's be honest I wouldn't have known!

I really don't know what you're arguing about, I really don't.

Ollie Pete

No substantial disagreement there, Pete, which means, of course, you've been playing a silly game for the last god knows how many posts. Either that or your memory's so piss-poor that you've only just found your own summation.

Cheers-salesie.

[PMHart]

Hi Salesie,

Once again you have evaded answering my perfectly reasonable questions but I think we'll let it pass as I can sense you're at the end of your tether and I don't want to embarrass you further.

Have you bothered to read what I posted and referenced about the use of oral history in the other thread - any disrespect for veterans there? I don't think so! Just a look at how we treat different forms of evidence including oral history. You may revere Mountbatten's speech as you quoted it and that's entirely up to you but I think you'll find he wasn't at Gallipoli and several of his fact are demonstrably wrong including the quoted amount of shells left on 19 March 1915. Classic 'tosh' taken straight from Roger Keyes and of course 'World Crisis.

Cheers chum,

Ollie Pete

PS When I was in a punk band I always found it best to channel my then inarticulacy into song writing - my best rage song was 'I'm so Pure and Innocent!' So perhaps its time for a poem after all?

[PMHart]

No substantial disagreement there, Pete, which means, of course, you've been playing a silly game for the last god knows how many posts. Either that or your memory's so piss-poor that you've only just found your own summation.

Cheers-salesie.

No chum, you told me what I thought and I've been trying to correct you ever since! Still glad you made it in the end! Now all is peace and harmony and you can answer our real points about Churchill's culpability rather than your own smokescreen of his fall in May 1915. You raised it and you banged on, and on, and on about it!

Cheers,

Ollie Pete

[salesie]

With the best will in the world however, Salesie, I fear that you're now beginning to take us into the realm of evidence-free questioning of the evidence for Churchill and Fisher's clash over the Dardanelles and the consequences, both for the individuals and the country which flowed from it, which I cautioned of earlier. If you've anything of substance, not including your own opinion, to refute the evidence I've presented I'll be interested to see it.

George

Blimey, George, diary entries from 1915 now one from 1920 - it took Hankey five years to find out a little bit about Bonar Law's involvement, and from Bonar Law himself? Surely, this just proves my earlier point i.e. there were serious gaps about the ongoing factual events in the 1915 entries. And the 1920 entry proves that Hankey wasn't fully in the know in 1915 - no Alastair Campbellesque spin then, Hankey just wasn't as deep into the loop as you believe he was in 1915, and not even in 1920 by the look of it; Bonar Law wasn't totally forthcoming with him even then.

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

Food for thought....the junior officer who was invalided out of action at Gallipoli in early August 1915 would, almost excaclty 30 years to the day thence, be a principal agent in the dropping of the first atomic bomb.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

Blimey, George, diary entries from 1915 now one from 1920 - it took Hankey five years to find out a little bit about Bonar Law's involvement, and from Bonar Law himself? Surely, this just proves my earlier point i.e. there were serious gaps about the ongoing factual events in the 1915 entries. And the 1920 entry proves that Hankey wasn't fully in the know in 1915 - no Alastair Campbellesque spin then, Hankey just wasn't as deep into the loop as you believe he was in 1915, and not even in 1920 by the look of it; Bonar Law wasn't totally forthcoming with him even then.

Cheers-salesie.

Nice try Salesie, but no. Hankey's 1920 diary is simply quoting Bonar Law's off the cuff reminiscence confirming that the Dardanelles/Churchill/Fisher affair was more germane to precipitating the fall of the Liberal government and the establishment of the first Coalition government than the shells crisis. Hankey, of course, had already made this fact clear from his own observations in his 1915 diary. I'm afraid your idea that it took Hankey until his 1920 chat with Bonar Law to be aware of the latter's involvement in the events of May 1915 reveals a gaping ignorance of Hankey's central role within all of the wartime governments. And, of course, goes totally against Churchill's own assessment of Hankey - I'll quote it a third time, as you don't seem to have taken in its import from the first two: "He knew everything; he could put his hand on anything; he said nothing; he gained the confidence of all." This I certainly agree with Churchill on. Nobody, Salesie, was 'deeper in the loop' of government 1914 - 1918 than Hankey. What's up for debate is how much he drove rather than administered policy, but so far as knowledge of what was happening is concerned, his was second to none.

I note you've done a neat volte face and now concur with Pete's summary in his book, 'Gallipoli 1915', of Churchill's fall from the Admiralty. Which, as any fule kno, makes the Dardanelles, and the Fisher dispute/resignation over that campaign, the central reason for Churchill's demise. I always figured you were smart enough to know that when you're in a hole, stop digging! Well, no one can ever accuse you of not being prepared to change your mind when confronted with irrefutable evidence, as the long, long course of this thread demonstrates. I'm glad we've finally got there, though - I can get back to some proper work!

George