Attempting to gain perspective on Churchill

[PMHart]

Yes and as such he was unwilling to grasp how serious the war really was! I'm glad you're beginning to understand what I meant oh so long ago!

Patient Pete

[salesie]

Ok, ok - the bit about Churchill's age, sharks etc. was a bit of florid literary licence that came over badly.

What I was hinting at is Churchill's "learning-curve", a much used phrase when it comes to modern works on WW1, especially when rightly used to deflect criticism of certain generals - are we to take it that George and Pete find it an amusing notion when applied to politicians, but a deadly serious one when it comes to military men? Generals have "learning-curves" when faced with new experiences in their field but politicians don't?

It seems to me that in May 1915 Churchill must have realised that he wasn't as slick a political operator as he believed he was, hence his "blackdog" episode that lasted for a few months (he even went into the trenches in France for a while). But he came back "fighting" on the political front, his "learning-curve" was far from finished.

Pete tells us that his argument is not a complex one - and I agree with him, not least because he almost completely ignores the political context created by the great political storm of May 1915, a political storm so great that it prevented the incumbent political party from ever again holding office on its own in this country. A political storm not confined to Gallipoli alone. Why deflect attention away from your own "pet" sphere of interest, Gallipoli, and complicate one's argument by introducing the even greater turmoil happening alongside the Gallipoli fiasco? Just ignore the shell crisis, and ignore Asquith's desperation to hold on to office, and ignore Bonar Law's insistence that Churchill has to go before he'll do a deal, and ignore the true meaning of collective responsibility, and ignore the notion "learning-curves" (they're only to be used when defending the conduct of generals, but never to be mentioned when slagging-off politicians who had the sheer audacity to taint the historiography) - never mind the fact that all these things were happening together in May 1915, let's just stick with Gallipoli and keep it simple!

Unfortunately, I'm busy for the next couple of days so won't be around much - hopefully, by the time I return a proper answer to this question will be forthcoming: how on earth do we imagine that "Many of those responsible (for failure at Gallipoli) managed to evade the consequences of their culpability during their lifetimes..." by being much nicer, more honourable guys than Churchill at the time or not?

Cheers-salesie.

[PMHart]

Because chum in searching for who is to blame for Gallipoli I am not interested in political events that follow it! Gallipoli started with the naval assault in Feb 1915, while the landings were in April 1915! May 1915 is after that unless I have muddled my calendar again!

Patient Pete

[PMHart]

By the way it may interest Salesie that the learning curve he loves so much is a long outdated metaphor - keep up at the back there! In any event it refers to the BEF not an individual! But feel free to keep on twisting in the breeze!

Pete

[salesie]

Because chum in searching for who is to blame for Gallipoli I am not interested in political events that follow it! Gallipoli started with the naval assault in Feb 1915, while the landings were in April 1915! May 1915 is after that unless I have muddled my calendar again!

Patient Pete

There's me thinking this thread was about putting Churchill into perspective not Gallipoli per se.

Nothing wrong with your calendar, Pete, just your context i.e. Churchill wasn't dismissed until May 1915, after the shell crisis hit, after Asquith became desperate to form a coalition in order to save his and his party's collective necks, after Bonar Law's insistence that no deal unless Churchill went (which had sod all to do with the shell crisis or Gallipoli, but everything to do with Tory venom).

As for "learning-curve" being a cliche - Read all about it, Churchill blamed for Gallipoli fiasco! Pot, frying-pan, black springs to mind.

Now I really must dash.

Cheers-a not so patient, in a hurry, salesie.

[phil andrade]

The strategic diliemnas of late 1914 and early 1915 bore heavily on all the major belligerents. The Germans were at loggerheads about whether to look East or West, and even the French, fighting for their lives on their own soil, were coutenancing a foray into the Balkans. The Russians were screaming out for help, and the closure of the Dardanelles rendered their situation quite perilous.

Given all this bewildering and overwhelming pressure to do something, somewhere, it's not surprising that an energetic and ambitious youngster was able to prevail. Asquith was losing grip, and Fisher was exhibiting traits of Alzheimer's....

We look back on it now and see how misguided it all was, and yet I sometimes feel that the tirade against Churchill is as harsh as Lloyd George's against Haig.

I'll duck now.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

Since none of us are able to peer into the minds of the participants, we can only tender our opinion as to whether any one of them was unable or unwilling to accept a particular idea. I believe that Churchill, Lloyd George et al desperately wanted to reduce casualties. Like some of the members of this forum, they measured the success or failure of a battle or a campaign rather simplistically, by the casualties incurred. Theirs was a genuine concern and one which we can all share. These men were politicians. Wedded to the idea that there is always another way. If one solution is too difficult, try another. Theirs was the high art of compromise. It was natural for them to believe that high casualties on the Western Front could be avoided somehow. This was combined with a marked propensity to dabble in strategy. I think they were capable of making hard choices but only when their hand was forced.

To return to the original topic and try to gain a perspective on Churchill, we should always bear in mind that although his peers viewed him with attitudes varying from contempt through amusement to reluctant admiration, Churchill saw himself as a man whose destiny was to take an important part in the ruling of the country and he firmly believed that the nation would be the poorer if he did not occupy a place of some power and influence.

[Guest exuser1]

Though this reply will concern WSC in WW2 in someways to me it awnsers the measure of the man himself ? in the 1970s TV series The World at War ,an interview is shown with Anthony Eden ,who comments on Freybergs defence of Crete and his unprepearedness ,he states that at a meeting with WSC Freyberg is severly critised by Churchill for his inept defense of the island ,and says why were the airfields not defended and other landing grounds ,and sums it up with what a incomptent general Freyberg was at Crete ,this interview was recorded and broadcast nearly 30 years after Crete

It is well documented that Freyberg requested troops armour ect and he would defend the airfields as a basic military stragtey ,he was told on no uncertin circumstances this could happen ,the concern was that this may be seen by the Gemans of a leak in inteligence and that Enigma was broken , Crete was seen as a wasted cause indefensable and of no stragtic use as the naval ancorages were to open to air attack .

As an honerable man Freyberg never told of his request being refused and that he belived it came direct from Churchill ,this he only told soon befor his death and as been recorded else where .

The point is Churchill had many years to aplogise to Freyberg ,still in the 70s poiticians were seen to be protecting WSC repution not only as a Stragitest but as countrys leader ,and he himself was loath to take any critesim of his understanding of stragety or how he would be seen to future generations .

[PMHart]

Hi Salesie,

I just don't have you awe-inspiring ability to randomly twist and turn history purely to win an endless silly internet argument. Every half-baked concept is grist to the mill! As you well know I was answering points made on this thread that Galipoli was not Churchill's fault! It was! Other people were responsible to a lesser degree - of course they were! It was me that you and others have been sodding well quoting! But Churchill rightly carried the can then and still does now accordng to most historians. It is of course not the only reason he fell from the Admiralty in 1915 - I didn't say it was! There were many, many reason he fell then - most of them originating from his own political conduct over the previous years and triggered when the shell crisis gave his enemies a chance! Believe it or not this is not some obscure fact you have discovered that evaded every other historian over the last ninety years! Just to add a further clue: I can't see mention of the resignation of Fisher! What was his job I wonder? I wonder why he resigned! Probably just fancied a bit of a rest, eh? Nothing to do with the Dardanelles, I'm sure!

All this, not to put too fine a point on it, is the 'bleeding obvious' and as such I do make clear reference to it in my 'Gallipoli' book available from all dodgey booksellers! But I'm not going to retype the whole thing for you - if you really want to know what was going on I should ask a policeman!

Pete

[phil andrade]

This is a bit eye catching.

A letter from Churchill to Asquith, December 29th, 1914 :

I think it is quite possible that neither side will have the strength to penetrate the other's lines in the Western theatre.....although no doubt several hundred thousand men will be spent to satisfy the military mind on that point.

Note the allusion to "the military mind". Does this imply that he sees the soldiers as obdurate, even then ? This is not a post war attempt to vindicate the Dardanelles operation, but a reflection from the time when strategy was being formulated. There is consistency with the opinions he was to express many years later in The World Crisis.

Phil (PJA)

[PMHart]

Yes our favourite genius wrote this just before he was personally responsible for launching the Gallipoli campaign which led to the deaths of more than 50,000 Allied soldiers - lives thrown away in an utterly futile campaign that could never have succeeded and which was instigated against all professional military advice. There was no easy way to defeat the German Empire but Churchill and his fellow deluded Easterners never stopped throwing lives away in an effort to discover one! As a general Churchill truly was a consumate politician!

Pete

[simonharley]

Churchill might not have had such a fractious fall from grace had he not prevailed upon Asquith to recall Fisher to the Admiralty over the strong protests of no less a personage than the King himself. The need for a change in First Sea Lord in 1914 might have been avoided had Churchill heeded the warnings that Prince Louis of Battenberg might prove a liability in time of war. Battenberg had been appointed in 1912 because Churchill sacked Sir Francis C. B. Bridgeman. Bridgeman, who was nearing retirement anyway, had been appointed First Sea Lord in 1911 after Churchill sacked Sir Arthur K. Wilson because he couldn't work with him. Wilson, whom he invited in 1914 to become Chief of the War Staff (which he declined), and would act as an unofficial adviser to Churchill at the Admiralty!

One cannot deny that Churchill was a clever man, but I also can't help but think that in 1915 his cleverness caught up with him. That he survived and prospered seem to me to be nothing short of a miracle.

Simon

[phil andrade]

Yes our favourite genius wrote this just before he was personally responsible for launching the Gallipoli campaign which led to the deaths of more than 50,000 Allied soldiers - lives thrown away in an utterly futile campaign that could never have succeeded and which was instigated against all professional military advice. There was no easy way to defeat the German Empire but Churchill and his fellow deluded Easterners never stopped throwing lives away in an effort to discover one! As a general Churchill truly was a consumate politician!

Pete

Stupid boy that I am, it came as a revelation to me that Churchill nurtured this view of the military mind right from the off.

I had always imagined that he wrote the World Crisis and promulgated that view in a retrospective attempt to whitewash his strategy.

For a man who prided himself on his martial exploits, his implied disdain for the "military mind" is rather striking.

But the important thing is - from my point of view - that his reproachful assessment of the military mind did not develop as a result of the Somme and Passchendaele....it was already extant at the start of the war. I wonder why he thought that way so early on.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

I wonder why he thought that way so early on.

Because he thought he knew better, dear boy.

George

[PMHart]

And he was wrong! But as other contributors have explored:- Churchill had a good deal of contempt for all minds not safely housed within the Churchillian cranium!

Pete

[truthergw]

This is a bit eye catching.

A letter from Churchill to Asquith, December 29th, 1914 :

I think it is quite possible that neither side will have the strength to penetrate the other's lines in the Western theatre.....although no doubt several hundred thousand men will be spent to satisfy the military mind on that point.

Note the allusion to "the military mind". Does this imply that he sees the soldiers as obdurate, even then ? This is not a post war attempt to vindicate the Dardanelles operation, but a reflection from the time when strategy was being formulated. There is consistency with the opinions he was to express many years later in The World Crisis.

Phil (PJA)

This may well be a bit of snobbery as one politician to another. On the other hand, the previous war had been a series of fiascos and demonstrated just how badly prepared the army was for anything like a modern war against a reasonably well armed enemy. Soldiers were not chosen solely nor even mainly on their intellectual ability. I see this as a typical Churchillian sneer stemming from his delusions of strategic ability. He was quite happy to throw away the crews of obsolete battleships in order to force the Dardanelles.

[phil andrade]

Because he thought he knew better, dear boy.

George

As so many of us do, old man.

Phil (PJA)

[PMHart]

I've always thought of George more as an old woman! A gnarled old crone, but wise in the ways of man and casting forth the fruits of his vast experience as pearls before swine!

Pete

[phil andrade]

I've always thought of George more as an old woman!

But more at home in a brasshat than in a frock, surely.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

I've always thought of George more as an old woman!

Nobody likes you, Peter.

G A Crone

[SteveMarsdin]

Good evening,

Watching this from the sidelines and reading both the incisive commentary with reasoned arguments and puerile humour (with equal appreciation !); in simplistic terms, Churchill is primarily remembered as a politician and world statesman, a superb orator and writer but not for his dabbling in military affairs.

Whilst I would agree with the GAC/PMH viewpoint that he must carry primary responsibility for pushing the Gallipoli campaign, his role on the world stage still allows him to carry an aura of greatness today, where most, if not all others' reputations would have floundered; so I end up agreeing with Salesie's overall "flawed greatness" assessment.

It's getting too cold for sitting on the fence, I'm going inside..........

[kenneth505]

CHURCHILL: "He knew everything; he could put his hand on anything; he said nothing; he gained the confidence of all."

Perspective may be starting to develop for me.

One image of WSC emerging seems to be of a man who when he wasn't talking (about himself?) was writing (also about himself?).

Thus his words about Hankey quoted above gain extra impact.

WSC was clearly looking for the grand political prize of winning quickly but seemingly everyone was. It is probably an indication of his self opinion and still not fully formed political acumen that his perspective carried the day and he was suddenly in a position where failure would brand him so thoroughly. More astute politicians, KofK perhaps would have known not to be such an obvious torch bearer.

Jim Smithson in post #61 citing minutes from 13/1/15

Lord Kitchener said that, as far as he knew, General Joffre had no big conception for terminating the campaign.

Perhaps there is something in this. Early in 1915 money and energy would have been spent more wisely recognizing the home front industry and munitions needed the most effort, not trying to expand a new front. Imagine any politician espousing such a perspective. It seems impossible to even imagine a person who could both hold the position that 'we really need to pay attention to the fundamentals before we try and mastermind strategy in exotic locals' who also becomes a world leader.

Questions are occurring to me now. First GAC has several times mentioned the confiscation of the Turkish Battleships. Good move or bad? Again to read Churchill Turkish leaders were moving decidedly to the German side with or without the ships. Second - what about tanks and the air corps, doesn't WSC get some credit on both of those? Truthergw also mentioned a credible performance by WSC in munitions later in the war. Is he so indelibly tarred by Gallipoli that all other accomplishments or failures even pale in comparison?

This thread is working out better for me then I possibly hoped. In all truth I had found myself waking in the middle of the night trying to suss these thoughts out myself. (Yes in my neck of the woods people think I'm strange.)

Also I've Peter Hart's Gallipoli 1915 to track down and read if only I can find a dodgy bookseller.

[Jim_Grundy]

A 1919 take on Churchill.....

Hucknall man Pte. Peter Walters, 2nd Leicesters, returned home after being kept in Mesopotamia long after the end of the war. He finally returned home on 9th September 1919 after an absence of more than nine years. The local newspaper report went as follows:

"He and other Hucknall men have been unfairly treated by being kept away from wife and family for so long. If Mr. and Mrs. Churchill had to go through the same experience the Secretary of State for War would not be so eager to embark on his wild schemes" ('Hucknall Dispatch', 11th September 1919).

".. wild schemes" - a fair summary of Churchill's strategic vision unaffected by the Battle of Britain (forgetting Norway, North Africa, Greece, Crete, Singapore, Burma, the Dodecanese.....)?

[phil andrade]

What do we feel about Churchill's comment of December 29th 1914 :

"...no doubt several hundred thousand men will be expended to satisfy the military mind on that point" ?

He is making a portentious statement, almost a blueprint for what he writes in the World Crisis.

Our condemnation of his prodigal and futile sideshow is all very well, but I am haunted by the impact of his comment, and his prediction as to how things are going to develop in Artois and Champagne over the next year.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

Churchill wasn't alone in predicting that the war on the Western Front would be long and costly - no-one understood that better than the senior military advocates of the 'Westerner' strategy. The difference was that what Churchill predicted in 1914 was that the high cost would be expended simply to prove to an obtuse military that the war couldn't be won on the Western Front. But it was those military men who argued that the Western Front was the only place where it could be won who were proved right, whilst in contrast Churchill's Dardanelles strategy was a wasteful and unmitigated distaster. Yet his postwar writings sought to pretend that it might have been otherwise and that what was a very real victory on the Western Front was indistiguishable from defeat by virtue of its cost. He got the prediction you keep harping on about wrong, but in The World Crisis sought to disguise that at the cost of the reputation of the Westerners whose strategy actually won the war.

George