Attempting to gain perspective on Churchill

[phil andrade]

Yes, all right then, I will stop banging on about that comment he made on December 29th 1914.

And I hope that you appreciate that I do understand that the main enemy needed to be engaged and beaten on the Western Front.

Furthermore, we agree that Churchill's attempt to exculpate himself in the World Crisis is worthy of repudiation.

I will raise a delicate point here.....in our attempt to gain perspective on Churchill's role in the Great War, has anyone sought the opinion of Armenians ?

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

Perspective may be starting to develop for me.

One image of WSC emerging seems to be of a man who when he wasn't talking (about himself?) was writing (also about himself?).

Thus his words about Hankey quoted above gain extra impact.

WSC was clearly looking for the grand political prize of winning quickly but seemingly everyone was. It is probably an indication of his self opinion and still not fully formed political acumen that his perspective carried the day and he was suddenly in a position where failure would brand him so thoroughly. More astute politicians, KofK perhaps would have known not to be such an obvious torch bearer.

Perhaps there is something in this. Early in 1915 money and energy would have been spent more wisely recognizing the home front industry and munitions needed the most effort, not trying to expand a new front. Imagine any politician espousing such a perspective. It seems impossible to even imagine a person who could both hold the position that 'we really need to pay attention to the fundamentals before we try and mastermind strategy in exotic locals' who also becomes a world leader.

Questions are occurring to me now. First GAC has several times mentioned the confiscation of the Turkish Battleships. Good move or bad? Again to read Churchill Turkish leaders were moving decidedly to the German side with or without the ships. Second - what about tanks and the air corps, doesn't WSC get some credit on both of those? Truthergw also mentioned a credible performance by WSC in munitions later in the war. Is he so indelibly tarred by Gallipoli that all other accomplishments or failures even pale in comparison?

This thread is working out better for me then I possibly hoped. In all truth I had found myself waking in the middle of the night trying to suss these thoughts out myself. (Yes in my neck of the woods people think I'm strange.)

Also I've Peter Hart's Gallipoli 1915 to track down and read if only I can find a dodgy bookseller.

As far as the battleships are concerned, confiscation was the only move. No government would dare send two battleships abroad at the start of a war unless they were going to an ally. Germany had spent a lot of time, effort and money forging and strengthening commercial and military ties with Turkey. The odds were very heavy that Turkey would ally herself to the Central Powers or at least maintain a friendly neutrality to them.

I have no knowledge of any special relationship between Churchill and the air corps. Churchill was involved in the early trials and development of the tank. He made sure that he got at least his share of the kudos for that and any and all work performed by him in the course of the war. Documentary evidence points in the direction of the ubiquitous Hankey as the first to suggest trials for what was to become the tank. Pete's Gallipoli is readily available from Amazon.

KoK was and remains very much an enigma. He was not a politician in the accepted sense of the word. He was the least communicative of men and would appear to have been autocratic in the extreme. Exactly the opposite of the type that could work in a cabinet. He had spent many years abroad, ruling rather than commanding. He was contemptuous of politicians because their manner of arriving at a decision, debating and discussing until a common consensus was reached, was exactly the opposite of his accustomed manner. He weighed up the situation, arrived at an analysis then gave orders as to what was to be done. A mixture of military commander and oriental potentate, i.e. what he actually had been for years. The cabinet could not work with him and could not ignore him. They very soon turned against him and tried to work around him. He saw that as backstabbing. It is my opinion that Asquith made a very bad error in appointing Lord Kitchener and it is one I would like to see explored more fully by some competent historian. This was not Asquith's usual style and I have wondered if the relatively sudden onset of war upset his usual equanimity.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Is he so indelibly tarred by Gallipoli that all other accomplishments or failures even pale in comparison?

I can't see where you get that impression from on this thread. What is being debated is Churchill's central role in the Dardanelles fiasco and his later efforts to pretend that it could have been other than a disaster. But I think if you go back and re-read this thread you will find that no-one seeks to take away from Churchill's undoubted achievements in other matters and at other times. I have referred to him as a 'towering figure' in British history, and noted how fortunate it was for these islands and the wider world that he was where he was in 1940. I have also noted that, despite the fact that his strategic ideas were fundamentally at odds with that which Haig pursued to victory, both Churchill and Haig otherwise admired and respected one another. And when you eventually find a bookshop disreputable enough to stock Peter Hart's Gallipoli 1915, you will find that he too says that Winston Churchill was one "of the most significant individuals in the twentieth century. [....] Churchill was rightly pilloried in the aftermath of the failure at Gallipoli and his rebirth as a war leader during the Second World War is a testament to [...] his amazing political skills....."

You mention tanks as an example of Churchill's genius. Whilst no one would detract from his ministerial role in commissioning the proposal for the production of tanks, his subsequent ideas as to how these limited performance weapons which required large numbers of trained crew might win the war are typically unrealistic and betrays the military dilettante who was a would-be genius in that sphere - as I note on another thread here: Churchill & Tanks

George

[phil andrade]

Is he so indelibly tarred by Gallipoli that all other accomplishments or failures even pale in comparison?

Some might contend that the reverse is the case : his reputation is so exalted on account of the Finest Hour that his culpability for Gallipoli is too readily forgiven.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

That's right - you're beginning to get the fundamentals of it, son.

George

[PMHart]

Phil,

Is George really your Dad?

Pete

[George Armstrong Custer]

Given the amount of times I have to repeat things to him I might as bleedin' well be!

George

[PMHart]

Oh

Pete

[armourersergeant]

[truthergw]

Please do not encourage them!

[phil andrade]

Phil,

Is George really your Dad?

Pete

Only if Lloyd George knew him !

Phil (PJA)

[salesie]

A couple of hours to spare, so here goes.

I find this notion of "forgiveness" (or lack of) for Churchill over Gallipoli to be rather wet to be honest - it's almost as pathetic as the notion that drew me to this thread in the first place i.e. Churchill was an out-and-out ne'er do well schemer who, in comic opera fashion, was so devoid of morals that he danced on the grave of a thoroughly honest man even as he sunk below cold Orkney waters, but thank God he was where he was in 1940. Character assassination of the first order, followed by faint grudging praise - then we have the notion of whether we should "forgive" him over Gallipoli or not; that's nothing more than a condescending platitude, which ignores the fact that it was, when all's said and done, a "side-show", (given the momentous events that were contemporary to, and followed, the Gallipoli fiasco).

I've shown, to my satisfaction at least, that Churchill was far from being the only political schemer (shown that such things were common amongst generals and admirals as well as politicians), that he was not the only guilty party over Gallipoli, and that his dismissal in 1915 had very little to do with Gallipoli per se but a hell of a lot to do with political expediency. So forgive him for what? The deaths of thousands of men was mentioned earlier; on that footing do we also need to forgive Kitchener for presiding over stalemate in the west (not to mention in the east as well), do we need to forgive Kitchener for almost complete mis-management of munitions, forgive Sir John French because of Aubers and Loos, forgive Haig over the Somme, Ypres and Cambrai - forgive them all, and others, for making mistakes in planning and execution (because they all did, even Haig at times) that cost the lives of many thousands of men? No, of course we don't, that would be ludicrous - they were fighting a war after all, and being mere mortals they were not perfect and going through a "learning-curve", and not least because the Germans and Turks etc. were hell bent on stopping them.

It seems to me that only real reason we need to forgive Churchill, according to some, is that he was a champion of the "Easterners", that he refused, post-war, to change his strategic thinking on this, and thus he tainted the historiography for decades and in doing so cast serious doubt on the "Holy Grail" of "Westerner" strategy because of his Nobel-prize winning level of literary skills.

Now, I stated earlier that I believe the Easterner strategic thinking was fundamentally flawed, and I meant it. But I don't believe it to be flawed at all at the geo-political strategic level. It was flawed militarily simply because operationally and resource-wise it was doomed to fail; poor and hurried planning, poor command structures and a distinct lack of resources (even the BEF in France was desperately short of munitions) made the Gallipoli expedition in 1915 a disaster waiting to happen.

But at the geo-political level, the strategic aim was fundamentally sound. The Dardanelles was of vital strategic importance to effective Russian participation in the war i.e. for all practical intents and purposes it was the only ice-free waterway that Russia had through which to trade with the outside world, it's almost complete vitality to Russia is demonstrated by the fact that some 90% of its pre-war trade was shipped through the Dardanelles. Once closed by Turkey, Germany had. in effect, blockaded Russia with only two ships of its own, Goeben and Breslau (flying Turkish flags), the relatively small Turkish Navy, and the Turkish forts along the Dardanelles. In one stroke, and with the use of very few resources, Germany in its two-front fight was able to negate much of Russia's advantage in manpower; no good having all those men in the army if it becomes almost impossible to arm and equip them effectively, and becomes very difficult to feed them properly.

Of course, as I said earlier, the problem was, operationally and resource-wise, insoluble and the western theatre was the only practical solution. But don't get the idea that the strategic aim wasn't valid per se; if the Dardanelles could have been forced and opened up then common-sense says that the strategic pressure on the Germans would have been even greater, and that increased pressure would have certainly been felt on the Western Front. I once read somewhere (in Ludendorff's even more self-serving memoirs I think?) that the Dardanelles passage being closed enabled Germany to fight-on for two years longer than it would have done if it had remained open, but I'm not so sure that Ludendorff is someone we should take seriously on geo-political strategic matters.

But such things should just have been on the wish-list in 1915 - I mean, I want to lease a Ferrari for Christmas but my Mrs says NO CHANCE!

Cheers-still in a hurry, salesie.

PS. As for the two nearly finished battleships destined for Turkey in 1914, I think it's pretty clear that if anyone had allowed them to be delivered, we'd be needing to forgive them as well by now.

[truthergw]

The great attraction of the Gallipoli adventure was the sparkling rewards that would have flown from its success. Of that, there was no doubt as long as we assume that the Russians were going to play our game. That was by no means certain. More to the point, for a strategic aim to be adopted, one must have some sort of assurance that the aim is attainable with the available means. That was certainly not the case with the first plan. The Dardanelles could not be forced by ships alone and that was recognised almost immediately. In those circumstances, Gallipoli was not so much a strategic aim as a pious wish.

[PMHart]

And round we go again! Did a policeman tell you all that Salesie - have to say my admiration for the humble bobby grows greater every day as I get older!

Well thank goodness you've explained it all to us - thanks chum! Well all know better next time! Why do people bother with these endless pointless Internet squabbles? Let's all go to the pub and try and erase the memories of this utter tedium from what remains of our brains!

Pete

[salesie]

And round we go again! Did a policeman tell you all that Salesie - have to say my admiration for the humble bobby grows greater every day as i get older!

Well thank goodness you've explained it all to us - thanks chum! Well all know better next time! Why do people bother with these endless pointless Internet squabbles? Let's all go to the pub and try and erase the memories of this utter tedium from what remains of our brains!

Pete

"...endless pointless Internet squabbles...utter tedium..." Yet you still tune-in and feel compelled to comment? Pot, frying-pan, black again, Pete?

Cheers-salesie.

[PMHart]

You are too clever for me chum! I bow to your superior knowledge, debating skills, logic, tolerance, loveableness, intelligence, looks, charm, poetic skills and anything else you want! You are a god amongst men! Is that enough! Or will there have to be one more outpouring of your genius? I truly do abase myself before your majesty....

Pete

[salesie]

The great attraction of the Gallipoli adventure was the sparkling rewards that would have flown from its success. Of that, there was no doubt as long as we assume that the Russians were going to play our game. That was by no means certain. More to the point, for a strategic aim to be adopted, one must have some sort of assurance that the aim is attainable with the available means. That was certainly not the case with the first plan. The Dardanelles could not be forced by ships alone and that was recognised almost immediately. In those circumstances, Gallipoli was not so much a strategic aim as a pious wish.

As I said, Tom, Gallipoli should have been on the wish-list, not the to do list, in 1915 - but, surely, the particular strategic aim doesn't change, only the availability of resources has that possibility (until Russia is knocked out, of course - then that particular strategic aim disappears)?

Cheers-salesie.

[PMHart]

Hooray!

[salesie]

You are too clever for me chum! I bow to your superior knowledge, debating skills, logic, tolerance, loveableness, intelligence, looks, charm, poetic skills and anything else you want! You are a god amongst men! Is that enough! Or will there have to be one more outpouring of your genius? I truly do abase myself before your majesty....

Pete

I can't stand ar*se lickers, Pete.

Don't worry, I'm only joking - the irony in your post is clear, but the problem is I just love it; just love jerking the knees of my "betters". My philosophy is simple, if I hadn't touched the proverbial nerve, they wouldn't bother to attack.

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

the notion that drew me to this thread in the first place i.e. Churchill was an out-and-out ne'er do well schemer who, in comic opera fashion, was so devoid of morals that he danced on the grave of a thoroughly honest man even as he sunk below cold Orkney waters, but thank God he was where he was in 1940. Character assassination of the first order,

You seem to be in a perpetual hurry these days, old chum - you ought to slow down, then perhaps you'll be less prone to crass misrepresentations like the above. The only bit you get right is that there was indeed a comic opera quality to the situation of Churchill and Hamilton plotting the scapegoating of K of K until the cries of the news vendor outside their window alerted them to the latter's demise. At no point has it been suggested that they were dancing on anyone's grave - in fact their disappointment that their fall guy had escaped beneath cold Orcadian waters is palpable. And although no-one here has suggested that K of K was a thoroughly honest man in the way you mean, Hamilton's wife certainly thought that he was perhaps not the guilty party which her husband and Churchill were planning to make him appear. So - verifiable facts from Hamilton and Churchill: As respectively the political instigator and military executor of the Gallipoli campaign, they were indeed plotting how best to present K of K as the chief architect of the Gallipoli fiasco's failure at the very moment the latter sank beneath cold Orkney waters. The first they knew of K of K's death was during mid-plot the next day, and the news did not bring them deep joy. If you have any evidence to disprove any of this - ie to refute the accounts of the Hamiltons and Churchill themselves - then bring it on. If not, where's your beef?

As to those criticising Churchill in 1915 whilst also acknowledging his subsequent rise to greatness as a national figure in 1940, where's your problem with that? Both were documented episodes in the long life of a highly intelligent but mercurial man. Churchill did fail to grasp, or chose to ignore in favour of hitching his star to speciously attractive sideshows, the strategic imperatives of the Great War. And he did later refuse to acknowledge that - rather enormous - mistake. There again, he united the nation during its lonely stand between the fall of France in 1940 and the involvement of Russia and America in the Second World War in 1941, and he did this in a bravura way that probably no-one else could have equalled. But one only has to read Alanbrooke's WWII diaries to understand that the political originator of the Dardanelles had not been entirely supplanted by the statesman around which the country rallied in 1940. Geoffrey Perret's words on Douglas MacArthur might perhaps be adapted to an appreciation of Churchill 66 years after the end of the Second World War which made his reputation as a great man:

"[He] cared deeply about his reputation, so it is probably as well that he is dead. He has in recent years been excoriated by some scholars and journalists as a military blunderer and a grade A charlatan. Yet he also continues to be revered as a great [statesman] and patriot....The strong contradictions of [Churchill's] character make it inevitable that he will be both reviled and revered. But to paraphrase Max Beerbohm, only mediocrity is consistent. Genius contains the latitude for failures proportionate to its triumphs."

Well, Churchill's strategic view and its outcome in the Dardanelles was his great failure, whilst his triumph and greatness came in the way he rose to the role which fell to him in 1940.

As to the rest of your post, I cannot believe that a man in such a hurry as you are these days took two hours to knock up that rehash of your previous posts in this thread! Nothing new is added and it's no more convincing a defence of Churchill and the Dardanelles than your previous posts. Your defence of Churchill and the Dardanelles boils down to a plea that he had accomplices who were also guilty of allowing this Churchillian lunacy to proceed - but it's not much of a defence of your man simply to say "he wasn't the only one!", is it? Churchill is guilty as charged over Gallipoli, and the verdict of history ought to include extra time in its sentence for his attempt to pervert the course of justice with The World Crisis!

George

[PMHart]

That's right Salesie - your genius has overturned everything we thought we knew about Gallipoli, Churchill, Fisher, the shells crisis and 1915! I think you should publish these radical insights to a wider audience! I admit you have not so much touched a nerve as jerked it right out of my dodgy knee! Ouch! George has a poorly knee as well - rest assured we will always think of you when they are hurty!

Pete

[George Armstrong Custer]

I admit you have not so much touched a nerve as jerked it right out of my dodgy knee! Ouch! George has a poorly knee as well - rest assured we will always think of you when they are hurty!

So what are you trying to say then - that we should forget that idea of pitching up unannounced at Jack Sheldon's for a spot of skiing? Oh well, I suppose it was a lunacy that never could have succeeded, an idiocy generated by muddled thinking.....

George

[truthergw]

As I said, Tom, Gallipoli should have been on the wish-list, not the to do list, in 1915 - but, surely, the particular strategic aim doesn't change, only the availability of resources has that possibility (until Russia is knocked out, of course - then that particular strategic aim disappears)?

Cheers-salesie.

Once again, mon ami, I repeat that I am not pursuing some sort of personal vendetta against you. My musings are simply general contributions to the debate. Since you ask, however . Russia had coveted Constantinople for a long time. It was intimated to her allies in no uncertain fashion, that she expected to occupy that city as her part of the spoils. There was a strong pro-German party in the Tsar's Russia. That being so, it is not too far fetched that Russia might simply have occupied Turkey and come to an arrangement with Germany as to the division of the Middle East and the sub-continent. That would have given her victory in The Great Game. A contest that had been fought since the Crimean War. Two very ripe plums to fall into her basket. For such a prize, perhaps Willie and Nickie could patch up their differences after all. Perhaps Nickie could have been replaced by a regent who was even more Pro German. So the strategic aim is not even a simple wish. It is simply one possible outcome of a military action. So we have a naval action which was considered and rejected some ten years beforehand being undertaken in a badly planned, slipshod manner in the hope that one of the possible results might be obtained. That is one perspective from which, as requested, we might choose to view Churchill. Ex cabinet minister, ex Home Secretary, ex conservative who had crossed the floor and political babe in arms according to you.

[salesie]

That's right Salesie - your genius has overturned everything we thought we knew about Gallipoli, Churchill, Fisher, the shells crisis and 1915! I think you should publish these radical insights to a wider audience! I admit you have not so much touched a nerve as jerked it right out of my dodgy knee! Ouch! George has a poorly knee as well - rest assured we will always think of you when they are hurty!

Pete

It seems like I've stepped on the toes of the forum's version of Laurel and Hardy - and it's difficult to know which one is the stooge and which one the straight guy, because the roles seem to regularly swap around, but the humour is not too bad despite this.

We have Pete, sometimes Stan sometimes Ollie, Hart, accusing me of trying to supplant his knowledge of his "pet" topic; but I'm not, I'm simply challenging his conclusions about Churchill in order to put said statesman into perspective. It is clear that, despite his strong condemnation of the worth of Internet forums, he struggles to accept such challenges even online, and can't resist responding online with an attempt at highly sardonic humour, when the proverbial nerve is touched. He must be Ollie in this particular instance.

Then we have George, sometimes Ollie sometimes Stan, Custer, repeatedly accusing me of misinterpreting his intentions and missing his point about the tainted historiography; but I'm not, I'm simply challenging his conclusions about Churchill in order to put said statesman into perspective, and to let him know that not everyone shares his passion for, and his acute shock at the so-called tainting of, the historiography of the Great War. He, of course, does not condemn the worth of Internet forums, because he uses them extensively himself and understands the meaning of the old adage of Pot, Frying-pan, and Black. He must be Stan in this particular instance.

They should take this as a compliment, because I do regard Laurel and Hardy as being a class-act - but there again, I regard Churchill as being a class-act himself, so my judgement must be automatically suspect.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Once again, mon ami, I repeat that I am not pursuing some sort of personal vendetta against you. My musings are simply general contributions to the debate. Since you ask, however . Russia had coveted Constantinople for a long time. It was intimated to her allies in no uncertain fashion, that she expected to occupy that city as her part of the spoils. There was a strong pro-German party in the Tsar's Russia. That being so, it is not too far fetched that Russia might simply have occupied Turkey and come to an arrangement with Germany as to the division of the Middle East and the sub-continent. That would have given her victory in The Great Game. A contest that had been fought since the Crimean War. Two very ripe plums to fall into her basket. For such a prize, perhaps Willie and Nickie could patch up their differences after all. Perhaps Nickie could have been replaced by a regent who was even more Pro German. So the strategic aim is not even a simple wish. It is simply one possible outcome of a military action. So we have a naval action which was considered and rejected some ten years beforehand being undertaken in a badly planned, slipshod manner in the hope that one of the possible results might be obtained. That is one perspective from which, as requested, we might choose to view Churchill. Ex cabinet minister, ex Home Secretary, ex conservative who had crossed the floor and political babe in arms according to you.

Don't worry, Tom, I'm almost impossible to offend.

Of course, any combination of events can stem from Whatifs, the possibilities are endless. In this particular instance though, the priority in the war was the defeat of Germany, and to that end almost all other geo-political threats were secondary. Not least because, just like Whatifs, once total-war is joined the list of possible geo-political outcomes becomes endless, but you need to beat the enemy in front of you otherwise your geo-political options become non-existent. The geo-political strategic eastern aim I mentioned earlier was valid in 1915 right up until Russia was taken-out - it's a pity that the available resources were never going to be.

Cheers-salesie.

PS. I've already accepted that my metaphor about Churchill swimming with sharks came over badly - and explained that he was no babe-in-arms as such, but a man who, in May 1915, had to confront the stark fact that he was not as slick a political operator he believed he was, but came back "fighting" on the political front as part of his "learning-curve" (if the BEF, and certain Generals have 'em then I'm damn sure that politicians do as well).