Ineffective British Artillery

[Robert Dunlop]

My point is that, relative to the French, there seemed to be a lag in development and a difference in philosophy. ...senior artillery officers admitting that CB was not an area that had received the attention it deserved and hard lessons were learnt as a result.

Bill, there is no need to find the quotes. I agree with your summary of some senior artillery officers' retrospective conclusions. These conclusions, however, cannot be taken to mean that the British had not learned before the Somme offensive began. The classic example of a difference of opinion around Somme artillery tactics lay, as you know, between Haig and Rawlinson. Haig favoured a hurricane bombardment on the day of the attack. Rawlinson favoured the prolonged preparatory bombardment. Haig, having raised the alternative, allowed Rawlinson to proceed with Rawlinson's recommended approach. Both approaches could be argued on the basis of prior British experience. Prior British experience had not included anything as big as the Somme.

I also agree, FWIIW, that there seemed to a lag in development and difference in philosophy. Where I respectfully disagree is that the lag and difference was somehow due to the British being slow learners. Fayolle had a particular approach to CB fire that was not shared uniformly across the French army. In the same way, there were differences in the British approach to CB fire. Fayolle was, as you know, an artillerist by background and training. Furthermore, French CB fire programmes were not uniformly effective for other reasons. General Nivelle (another artillerist by profession) oversaw the CB programme for the Chemin des Dames offensive, which had a minimal effect. This despite Nivelle's excellent use of artillery in the later stages of the Battle of Verdun.

The danger, IMHO, of starting with the assumption that the British were slow to learn is that you will read the evidence in this light. The differences in CB approach across the British Somme front reflect a range of issues. Not least, as I pointed to earlier, is the fact that duration of preparatory CB fire cannot be considered as a crucial factor in determining success when the infantry attack goes in.

As to Fayolle's success, it is important to remember that this was facilitated in no small part by the British preparations north of the Somme. Instead of the Germans deploying assets from the British sector to reinforce the French sector, the converse happened. This reflected, in large part, the huge strategic significance of the high ground around the Ancre.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

This is Sanders Marble's view:

Bill, I have great respect for Sanders' work. It provides a helpful background but his views cannot be considered as support for the idea that the British had not learned. What he touches on is the fact that different conclusions were drawn.

As a matter of interest, I have studied the artillery programmes and their effectiveness in Third Ypres. This is by way of contrast to the Somme. I have touched on the problems created by prolonged CB fire in an earlier post. Even more interesting, however, is the study of German SOS defensive fire and its effects. The Germans focused their defensive artillery efforts on the area of strategic defensive importance, just as they did on the Somme. The British mounted an aggressive and prolonged CB effort, which was predicated on the German artillery being focused on Gheluvelt ridge. This information was gleaned from aerial reconnaissance and prisoner interrogations. The weather on July 31st, along with German counter-CB tactics, made it difficult to stop the German defensive barrages in this area. These barrages did not prevent the British attacks, which were much more successful than July 1st 1916. Even on the Gheluvelt ridge, significant gains were made (though not to the final objective line as happened on either side of the ridge). This reflected the fundamental importance of an excellent creeping barrage, coupled with good wire-cutting. More so than the CB programme. Please do not regard this comment as diminishing the importance of CB fire in any way. I am merely challenging the perceptions around CB fire.

Robert

[nigelfe]

In the British Army the commander can basically do what he likes, based on his experience, advice to and influences on him and his opinion.

In the end it is always the combined army commander who runs the show and makes the decisions, the great strength of the British Army in WW1 and later was that Gunners did't run the battle, they can advise about the best use of artillery but if the all arms commander ignores in any part, that advice that is his prerogative.

GHQ guidance had been issued in early 1916 (Arty Notes No 3). At least some artillery commanders had developed basically sound ideas during 1915, ie destroy before Z, neutralise after, very simple.

It's totally irrelevant to compare the situation in the second half of 1917 (and a bit earlier) to 1916. The key point being that map shooting just wasn't up to a predicted fire plan to destroy CB targets, and probably many others, while the RGA were developing well the RFA were behind them in this area.

To destroy hostile batteries pre Z was mathamatactics, number of targets, number of seige batteries, number of RFC aircraft and number good weather days, ammo & not forgetting you had to know where the targets where to tell the pilot. QED. You could probably in 1916 just about get away with map shooting for neutralization, but you had to be able to identify the hostile btys you needed to neutralize. The problem was the numbers meant you had no prospect of neutralsing all HBs at the critical time of the assault, even when using gas.

[JimSmithson]

Robert

I am interested in what you call 'German counter-CB tactics'. 3rd Ypres is not my time or place but I am intrigued as to how they may have learned from what must have been a salutary lesson in what the British could do in the run up to the 1st Scarpe battles in April. Whatever the artillery had learned in the months on the Somme, they certainly put to good effect in early April 1917 so how did the Germans counter this? it may be that they were already practising countering CB by 3rd Scarpe in May.

Jim

[Pete1052]

It may not be applicable to the Great War, but during my U.S. Army Field Artillery experience in 1977-84 U.S. doctrine turned into "shoot and scoot," batteries moving to another position after firing. By that time radar had vastly increased the ability of military forces to accurately locate the geographic sources of enemy Artillery fire. There was some debate in U.S. Army-Europe circles circa 1980 about whether batteries should be moving around all the time; there was also concern about traffic jams on major roads during retrograde operations when many units were trying to reposition themselves at the same time. Many units could have become mingled on those roads going nowhere because something had stopped traffic from moving along them.

In a dire situation in which 72 hours of fighting might have determined which side owned Western Europe some said firing batteries should remain in their positions and die there fighting in place and firing as necessary. That was for worst-case Fulda Gap scenarios involving a massive Soviet armored invasion. By the way, Jim, in 1979 I trained with a Bundeswehr Feld Artillerie battalion at Munster Lager.

[Pete1052]

During my time in the Field Artillery in '77-'84 there were also pyrotechnic devices that could be detonated at night to simulate the flash of a firing battery. The idea was to fool the enemy into targetting counter-battery fire into vacant spaces.

[Robert Dunlop]

'Shoot and scoot' became very common. Guns would move forward at night, fire harassing missions and then retire. False flashes and false gun reports were both used. Multiple gun pits were created, with some occupied by mock guns. Guns were rotated around the different sites on a frequent basis. Many guns were camoflagued and then left quiet. I have seen one description of a significant smoke screen being generated to mask a concentration of guns.

Robert

[nigelfe]

Shoot and scoot wasn't an option in WW1 (and isn't in any sustained operations). That said concealment and deception measures were used extensively, including pistol/roving guns. In many times and areas the real estate available for artillery deployment was limited especially when there were lots of batteries. Gun positions were often reused and part of the arty int problem was knowing which known positins were occuppied or not (with single gun deception.

All this greatly complicated gt acquisition.

[Robert Dunlop]

'Shoot and scoot' was observed by the British Second Army in the build-up to Third Ypres. It is mentioned in a summary report that detailed the various counter CB techniques that were being used by the Germans in that sector. I don't have the war diary source with me (currently visiting on the Western Front) but will look it out on my return. During Third Ypres, a significant proportion of German field artillery was told off to move forward in support of German counter-attacks - a 'scoot and shoot' function if you will. Jack describes this in his book on the German Army at Passchedaele, including IIRC the terrible effects on such batteries if they were observed and engaged by the British in the process of moving forward.

Robert

[Jack Sheldon]

I have not looked at this thread for a few days but, having done so, I should just like to comment on - and endorse - Robert's perceptive point in Post 102 concerning German defensive priorities and what conclusions the British should have drawn from them. In my Somme book, I discussed the process of Schwerpunktbildung vis-a-vis the defensive posture adopted by Second Army, once it became clear that Falkenhayn was not going to respond to requests for substantial reinforcement in the face of the Allied build up. The headline move, apart from inserting 2nd Gds Res Div into the line, thus enabling 52nd Inf Div and 26th Res Div to side step and compress their defensive sectors, was the shift north of the river of 10th Bav Inf Div and the subsequent placement of its infantry regiments. However,equally interesting and something I did not emphasise sufficiently in my book, is what happened on the artillery front, because it provides the clearest indicator of what the German defensive Schwerpunkt [Point of main effort] was.

I am prepare to argue now that had the British army been able to pick up on what was happening, it would have appreciated far more clearly where the German army considered the vital ground to be and Haig might well have given more of a hearing to Joffre on 3 July than he did. Far from Joffre being 'unable to read a map', my view is that J was right on the money. By concentrating subsequently on expanding the relative success to the south, the British yielded the operational initiative to the German army. I am not talking about tactical initiative here. In the context of the battle, the Allies chose (frequently poorly) when and where to attack but - and here is the point - the way they fought; the ground on which they fought the battle, was the least worst option for the German army. From the German perspective, if they had to fight a defensive battle at all,then rather in the woods than in open country overlooked from the sweep of high ground from Thiepval to Serre.

Here in summary is what happened. The ultimate Schwerpunkt - Schwaben Redoubt - was refined by a process which began at Second Army and filtered down through XIV Res Corps and 26th Res Div. That established, there was a need to build up the artillery in rear. This process did not begin until May 1916. The odds and ends of guns and howitzers which arrived at Second Army - 'a few drops of water on a hot stone' was the dismissive German view of these - were allocated to the newly created 26th Res Fd Arty Bde. The best gunner the army of Wuerttemberg could lay its hands on (Generalmajor Maur) was recalled from the Eastern Front where he had spent a year successfully commanding the guns of LXXIX Res Corps and put in charge. From the resources of the Wuerttemberg army a completely new regiment, RFAR 27 was raised from existing experienced formations to join RFAR 26 then, once 10 Bav Inf Div was ordered north, its entire artillery resources (primarily Bav FAR 20) were also allocated to Maur. Maur then centralised his assets, creating three groups - two of them under command of the experienced commanders of RFARs 26 and 27 and the 3rd under his direct command. This enabled him to command the entire arty assets - 154 guns and howitzers - centrally and determine minute to minute priorities in consultation with the Div Commander. When the battle began almost all of his assets were intact - why? Because his main priority during the bombardment was on camouflage and concealment, coupled with a policy (much objected to by the infantry) of ordering most of his guns to remain silent and masked until the main battle opened.

This centralisd policy in support of the Schwerpunkt continued on into 1 July when his priority was 52 Inf Bde. Thus, around B-H initially there was very little defensive gun fire, most of the damage being done by mortars and machine guns; on the other hand huge amounts of fire were directed against the formations attacking Thiepval and, in particular the Schwaben Redoubt and the ground leading down to Grandcourt. I could go on, but I hope the point is made.

Jack

[Old Tom]

I hesitate to get involved in the CB debate which is based on a lot of detail well beyond the scope of my knowledge. However there does seem to be a factor that is, perhaps, overlooked. CB fire was the task of RGA units and the expansion of the RGA was probably of a much greater degree than the RFA. I understand that in 1914 the RGA only deployed a battery of 60 pdrs with each division and an ad hoc unit of 6" hows. I would suggest that the training of all ranks to achieve effective CB fire was greater than that reuired for field artillry tasks, particularly as, as has been pointed out, the technigues were at an early stage of development. I would also hazard a guess that most artillery commanders/advisers were of a RHA/RFA background and that the bulk of their experience was not applicable to the Somme situation.

Old Tom

[nigelfe]

Not really. Actually the pre-1914 planning was to mobilise 6 btys of 6-in Hows, this duly occurred.

CB is not a battery problem, gun end gunnery is gunnery it doesn't matter what the target is. The training of the batteries is generally irrelevant, and in any case the relevant RGA companies were cross trained on both coast and mobilisation equipment. Even converting the TF coys wouldn't be a huge task, of course like all war formed btys totally new ones with a minimum cadre of experience took time.

RGA had trained in techniques to engage enemy guns using 'observation of fire' techniques, basically cross observation, when cordites appeared in the late 19th C. they had to change from 'smoke spotting' to 'flash spotting' and developed the training tools to create, locate and engage flashes. Until the early 1900s they had special instruments then adopted normal directors although the special instrunments were re-issued in 1915.

CB is a complex problem and pre-1914 there's no indication that any army had developed the necessary and effective TTPs and organisational arrangements. The Germans never got it properly sorted (ie run as a continuous corps level task - their divisional focus was a problem) and having had a quick squint at Gudmundsson 'On Artillery' (he deals with German and French arty in the first half of the 20th C.) I've yet to be convinced that the French did either. The key to CB is target acquisition, artillery intelligence processes and tactical fire control authority in the right place.

There's a lot of tosh written about 'shoot and scoot'. It appeared circa 1960 as the fundamental tactic for NATO nuclear artillery single gun/launcher sects/platoons, basically they remained concealed until ordered a fire mission, then came into action, fired one round and buggered off PDQ (about 90 secs for my sect/s, a bit longer if you had to get a towed 8-inch How out of action - the 6 foot rachet spanners to lift the mounting and drop the wheels took time).

Pistol uns, roving guns, gun manouvre areas, alternate positions, frequent movement, are not 'shoot and scoot' despite ill-informed attempts to re-write history or soldiers in field arty who didn't know what they were talking about but it sounds smart. Of course frequent movement was not a option with something like a 9.2 inch How!

[RodB]

Robert you supported made my points well. Wire cutting with shrapnel was pretty well abandoned after the Somme and replaced by HE / graze fuze combination. The large fragments from the HE shells doing the cutting. You don't use graze fuzes with shrapnel shells.

Bill raised the point about the success at Montauban. If I remember correctly the French barrage was quite short, was done with HE and graze fuzes and was successful. Again proving my point.

John

This raises a question with me that I hope forum members can clarify... I had got the impression that "graze" described a type of impact fuze that could be activated by a change in direction or momentum, typically by some internal plunger being set back on firing then moving forward when the fuze's momentum changed even if it hadn't hit anything headon. Example : No. 101 with a "graze pellet". This was different to "direct impact" requiring the nose to physically ram into something. I understood that graze fuzes were not instantaneous, resulting in craters.

I had thought that No. 106 was not "graze" in that it relied on direct impact of its nose with something to initiate it - it would not detonate if it was somehow deflected, whereas a true graze fuze would.

However - the below colour diagram (provided by nigelfe) of No. 106 Mk IV, presumably from an official manual, uses the term "on graze" to describe activation when the hammer is depressed, i.e. on direct impact. Based on everything I've read, including by I Hogg, that diagram should be labelled "on impact". So what exactly did "graze" mean ? Did "graze" come to include instantaneous direct impact ? However.. below that are b/w text & diagrams describing Mark 9/1 which describe the detonation image as "on impact" and text makes no mention of "graze".

The second question this raised in my mind was why didn't No. 106 also incorporate the graze pellet action of No. 101 - i.e. why does it appear to have been purely direct impact ? I would have thought that to be capable of detonating instantly in all situations it would need to include this - or was that seen as being of little benefit, as once it bounced and flew off it would detonate too far from the target to be of use ?

Rod. (I'm the wally who wrote the No. 106 fuze article on Wikipedia, so this I suppose is an attempt to get corrections if necessary).

[Old Tom]

Nigel, Thanks! Whats a TTP please? Is there any merit in my point about the backgrounds of senior RA officers appointed to Corps and Army HQs.

Old Tom

[Robert Dunlop]

There's a lot of tosh written about 'shoot and scoot'

I am sorry that you needed to put it this way. To move things forward, I am more than happy to abandon the term 'shoot and scoot'. Are you in agreement that, in the circumstances that I described, the Germans would move artillery, fire, then move back?

Robert

[Pete1052]

Shoot and scoot was an unofficial term much in use at the U.S. Army Field Artillery School in the 1970s-1980s. I once attended courses there as a private, lieutenant and captain. Shoot and scoot included the frequent moves of batteries, roving guns, offset registrations, and other things. I don't want to belabor the point 'cause it ain't Great War.

[nigelfe]

This raises a question with me that I hope forum members can clarify... I had got the impression that "graze" described a type of impact fuze that could be activated by a change in direction or momentum, typically by some internal plunger being set back on firing then moving forward when the fuze's momentum changed even if it hadn't hit anything headon. Example : No. 101 with a "graze pellet". This was different to "direct impact" requiring the nose to physically ram into something. I understood that graze fuzes were not instantaneous, resulting in craters.

I had thought that No. 106 was not "graze" in that it relied on direct impact of its nose with something to initiate it - it would not detonate if it was somehow deflected, whereas a true graze fuze would.

However - the below colour diagram (provided by nigelfe) of No. 106 Mk IV, presumably from an official manual, uses the term "on graze" to describe activation when the hammer is depressed, i.e. on direct impact. Based on everything I've read, including by I Hogg, that diagram should be labelled "on impact". So what exactly did "graze" mean ? Did "graze" come to include instantaneous direct impact ? However.. below that are b/w text & diagrams describing Mark 9/1 which describe the detonation image as "on impact" and text makes no mention of "graze".

The second question this raised in my mind was why didn't No. 106 also incorporate the graze pellet action of No. 101 - i.e. why does it appear to have been purely direct impact ? I would have thought that to be capable of detonating instantly in all situations it would need to include this - or was that seen as being of little benefit, as once it bounced and flew off it would detonate too far from the target to be of use ?

Rod. (I'm the wally who wrote the No. 106 fuze article on Wikipedia, so this I suppose is an attempt to get corrections if necessary).

I think the artist who did the colour graphic was given wrong information, the later text and drawing correctly refer to impact.

Graze meant acting on retardation. Graze was used as an option/backup with many Time fuzes. DA being a very simple mechanism didn't really need a backup. Of course graze also meant 'delay' hence it was useful in some cases.

Graze fuzes were available so could be fitted if required for delay effect. I think, heavier ammo would be delivered plugged with separate fuzes in any case. 18-pr and 4.5 were probably delivered fuzed but it would be possible to change the fuzes.

[nigelfe]

I am sorry that you needed to put it this way. To move things forward, I am more than happy to abandon the term 'shoot and scoot'. Are you in agreement that, in the circumstances that I described, the Germans would move artillery, fire, then move back?

Re-occuppying old positions was used, but on the W Front, except in summer 1914 and autumn 1918 positions would almost (I say this because there's sure to have been an exception) always be occuppied for days if not weeks.

The following, taken from contemporaneous sources in 1915 is a para from a fairly long page about CB, tgt acquisition and arty intelligence for my web site that I've been working on over a few years (its takes time to find primary sources):

"German artillery concealment and deception practices were also understood. These stressed concealment, including of tracks, dust from muzzle blast and earthworks. They would try to keep firing when under fire, stopping when the CB range was altered. If an empty position was engaged they would quickly put in a gun to fire a few rounds. Dummy batteries were also used but the British recognised these because air reconnaissance didn’t reveal the distinctive marks of an active position. The Germans also tried, unsuccessfully, mechanical flash reducers and in July 1915 one German formation banned howitzers and mortars from firing at night because of flash spotting. Dummy flashes and flash reducing powder was also tried."

Roving or 'wandering' guns as they seem to have been called at the time were also used. These would be single guns with a particular task but also useful for confusing the enemy intelligence effort.

'Shoot and scoot' has a nice ring to it, hence it has become popular in some circles that don't actually understand it. Moving a battery position a few times a day is relatively normal in some types of operation. The relatively short range of pre- and WW1 field artillery meant they had to move fairly frequently to keep up with the infantry's 3 mph (5000 yds). Rapid movement could also be a feature of cavalry operations so RHA would also move frequently in these conditions. This movement had nothing to do with avoiding CB, its normal re-positioning. Most movement on the W Front would be re-deployment to support operations (it was the realisition of the amount of this movement that led to the creation of Army Field Bdes). The battery survival method was not movement, it was the shovel. AFAIK a planned 'alternate' position and moving to it when attacked was not a feature of WW1 arty practices, for RA the first ref I've ever found is in WW2.

You've probably worked out that I'm pedantic about terminology, I make no apologies and will continue. It comes from having been a gunnery instructor (12 month course) and bred on fire discipline (precise and understood meanings are vital to prevent mistakes).

[nigelfe]

Nigel, Thanks! Whats a TTP please? Is there any merit in my point about the backgrounds of senior RA officers appointed to Corps and Army HQs.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.

Unfortunately while I've been keeping my eyes open for indications of the RHA/RFA/RGA background of senior officers I've come across nothing. However. I suspect you're right. That said while the CRA's would almost certainly have been RHA/RFA, the few HAR Gp comds and their successors the more numerous Corps heavy artillery commanders (all B-Gs) could well have been RGA and some could well have been elevated to GOCRA at corps on their merit, or being trusted by the Corps Comd. Above B-G there were only 6 RA M-G posts on the W Front.

[Pete1052]

You've probably worked out that I'm pedantic about terminology, I make no apologies and will continue. It comes from having been a gunnery instructor (12 month course) and bred on fire discipline (precise and understood meanings are vital to prevent mistakes).

Yeah, that's true, the Artillery needs subject matter experts and good gunnery instructors. That's the technical proficiency part -- the other part is being an all-around regular guy who can lead soldiers in combat. If you don't like standing in a chow line in the rain waiting for breakfast with Infantrymen or Artillerymen you probably shouldn't be in the Army. The regular-guy thing is the reason why so many intellectuals and educated people don't understand the military or why it works the way it does.

[Robert Dunlop]

You've probably worked out that I'm pedantic about terminology, I make no apologies and will continue.

I have absolutely no problem with such attention to terminology, FWIIW. Such an approach should ensure that the issues are spelt out clearly. This can only help the debate. It was the style that concerned me .

I will dig out the references to German use of movement and firing to reduce the effectiveness of CB fire.

Robert

[truthergw]

Shoot and scoot wasn't an option in WW1 (and isn't in any sustained operations). That said concealment and deception measures were used extensively, including pistol/roving guns. In many times and areas the real estate available for artillery deployment was limited especially when there were lots of batteries. Gun positions were often reused and part of the arty int problem was knowing which known positins were occuppied or not (with single gun deception.

All this greatly complicated gt acquisition.

Shoot and scoot was used extensively and very successfully by the Turkish batteries resisting the British naval operations at the Dardenelles. Lots of references to the howitzers being used to harass the minesweepers, moving position if they were spotted by the naval escorts.

[nigelfe]

Shoot and scoot was used extensively and very successfully by the Turkish batteries resisting the British naval operations at the Dardenelles. Lots of references to the howitzers being used to harass the minesweepers, moving position if they were spotted by the naval escorts.

Direct fire, easy, just big rifles. No survey, not aiming points and orientation. It's what tanks do moderately well.

[truthergw]

Direct fire, easy, just big rifles. No survey, not aiming points and orientation. It's what tanks do moderately well.

I am about as far from an artillery expert as one can reasonably imagine but these were batteries of howitzers and even I know that moving a battery of guns from place to place and bringing small ships under accurate fire would be a bit harder than using a tank. Would I be correct to say that the manner of using a howitzer means that they always use indirect fire? Not firing from a map but I don't believe direct observation equates to direct fire. Perhaps we have different definitions of shoot and scoot?

[Pete1052]

Tom, this has to do with the difference between direct fire, when the guys in the battery can see the target, and indirect fire done by computing data off a map. Artillery in the direct-fire mode can be located visually, with eyeballs. On the other hand batteries engaging in indirect fire can be located using sound and flash, the crater analysis of shell holes, aerial reconnaissance, radar etc. Whether the fire is direct or indirect if you've been located or you're about to be it's time for the battery to move, shoot and scoot as it were, even if the new position is only about 300 yards/meters away.

The reconnaissance and selection of new firing positions is an ongoing process that takes place every day. The modern U.S. Army Field Artillery has an acronymn for it, RSOP -- Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Position. I've done it many times. A few of the positions I found in 1980 in Germany made it into the war plans for Days One and Two of a potential WW III in Germany. Thank the Good Lord we never had to use them, it would have been Armageddon and the suicide of Western Civilization.