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Remembered Today:

Ineffective British Artillery


RammyLad1

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After reading a book ( Loos 1915 by Nick Lloyd ) in which the bombardment of the German front line left the barbed wire vitually intact why nine months later did the same happen on the Somme.Was there something wrong with the shells ie wrong type,if so why didnt they learn after Loos or were the guns too lightweight?

Duncan

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Shrapnel rounds break up wire better than High Explosive, even though it seems to be counter-intuitive. There were also exaggerated expectations placed in the effectiveness of prolonged artillery fire in destroying barbed wire entanglements. For a nation to replace its entire inventory of artillery weapons takes time, several years, so as Donald Rumsfeld said in 2003, "You go to war with the army you have."

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At both Loos and the Somme the British method for cutting wire was mainly by use of shrapnel fired by 18 pdr field guns. After the problems at Loos experiments were conducted on the beach at Calais to determine the best way of cutting wire using both 18 pdr and 4.5 in howitzers firing HE and shrapnel. Shrapnel, fired from a particular range (so as to get the optimum angle of descent of the shell), exploding just in advance of the edge of the wire to be cut and at a set height was determined to be the best method available. The idea was that the shell would explode and throw its shrapnel balls forward sweeping away the wire below. The tolerances for these factors were very narrow. If the shell was set to explode too high the balls lost velocity before they hit the wire. If too low it ploughed into the ground. Too far in advance the shells just scoured empty fields. There were numerous factors influencing the accuracy of the firing: wind speed and direction, pressure, temperature, the age of the barrel, the temperature of the barrel, the condition of the gun, the stability of the gun, the experience of the gun team, the accuracy of the spotting, etc., etc. As a result tens of thousands of shells were fired by each division's field artillery and some were more successful than others. HE was deemed unacceptable because it cratered the ground making the infantry's advance difficult and because it tended to throw the wire and its supports up and into new and difficult to shift tangles. Some divisions did use medium howitzers to try to cut wire without much success and for longer distance wire between support lines for example, 60 pdr guns used shrapnel.

The nature of the terrain also had an impact. The Loos battlefield is significantly different to the Somme with the Somme having more variation. German wire was thicker, better concealed by the nature of the ground, made difficult to spot in places by the height of the undergrowth in No Man's Land. Some attempts were made to destroy the wire using 2in trench mortars (toffee apples). Tests had shown this to be very effective but there was not much experience of using this in practice. The toffee apple was detonated by a fuse punctured by a pin which was activated by the shock of the explosion propelling the weapon from the mortar barrel. In at least one place (46th Division at Gommecourt) they were fired from too short a range for the shock to be sufficient to set the detonator and large numbers of the spherical bombs were found unexploded in No Man's Land when the infantry went over.

Where the wire was well cut the expenditure of 18 pdr shells was very large. For example, the 56th Division fired 27,500 18 pdr rounds of shrapnel on their front where the wire was fairly well cut though missed in certain crucial places. For various reasons the neighbouring 46th Division only fired 10,500 shrapnel rounds and, in places, the wire was barely cut at all.

Where the wire was well cut, for example on the front of the 36th Division at Thiepval, the division had the assistance of a group of French 75 mm quick firing field guns. The French had available two types of shell the British did not then possess: gas shells and, most importantly, shells with an instantaneous graze fuse. This fuse exploded on contact with anything and the French used HE shells with this shell to destroy wire both for the British and on their own front on the south end of the battlefield. The shells were unstable in flight and dangerous to use but very effective. The British would not have an equivalent fuse for some time. There were places where French batteries were employed but where the wire was not cut in large part (e.g. VIII Corps opposite Serre and Beaumont Hamel) and here, from my research, it would appear that the French guns were used more to fire gas shells than to cut wire (but my research is still ongoing into this issue).

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After reading a book ( Loos 1915 by Nick Lloyd ) in which the bombardment of the German front line left the barbed wire vitually intact why nine months later did the same happen on the Somme.Was there something wrong with the shells ie wrong type,if so why didnt they learn after Loos or were the guns too lightweight?

Duncan

I think we need to be more precise. At some parts of the battleground of Loos, wire was uncut or only partly cut. Reasons for this varied so there was not just one remedy to be found and applied. For example, at one sector, the local commander did not send out patrols to check how well wire had been cut in some blind ground. He did not wish to expose men to the inevitable losses these patrols caused. Result was that the attack found stretches of wire uncut. That is not something that teaches a general lesson. It was a mistake made by one man in a unique situation. What commander would dream that a subordinate would not check the results of a wire cutting exercise? As Bmac has said, the Somme is a very different terrain from Loos so new problems arose. (Congrats on the post, Bmac. Very informative.) A very different battle then with different artillery provision fighting over different terrain against vastly different defences. Loos had 3 or 4 divisions of New Army. The Somme was fought by a large majority of New Army. No soldiers, at any rank, learn by hearing what some other army did. They learn by fighting. The punishment for being a slow learner is very harsh.

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Thanks for the informative replys chaps

This has whetted my interest in all things artillery.If I've got it right the French 75mm ( 3 inches old money )were more effective because of the type of shell used, than a larger sized british gun at cutting barbed wire.If so why did the munition works back in Britain not supply the equivalent shells to the artillery? Obviously to fit the size of British guns

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Duncan, there is an analysis of the wire-cutting on the Somme here. bmac has mentioned the support of French 75s in one sector. Other sectors were cleared using 18 pdrs and 2" trench mortars predominantly.

Robert

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HE was deemed unacceptable because it cratered the ground making the infantry's advance difficult and because it tended to throw the wire and its supports up and into new and difficult to shift tangles. Some divisions did use medium howitzers to try to cut wire without much success and for longer distance wire between support lines for example, 60 pdr guns used shrapnel.

BMAC

In theory shrapnal cut wire but in practice it had to be poor wire or exceptional shooting for it to be cut. The German wire was very resilient. I would have gone the HE route because although the ground would have been cut up this would have also provided some cover for attacking troops, close to the front line trenches, and would probably even be within grenade range.

John

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John, airburst shrapnel bullets were effective in cutting wire. As Bill mentioned, the angle of the bullets was important in achieving maximal success. Observation was also crucial.

Although HE craters might afford cover, there was a more serious problem with respect to wire cutting. HE, with delayed fusing, did not cut the wire and simply deposited it back into the resulting craters.

Robert

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Gas was first used by Brtish guns in 1915, however, it wasn't until may 1916 that the CinC stated a preference for lethal gas, and sought delveries for July. SK gas (non-lethal) was the norm before lethal was widely available. The primary use of gas was against enemy artillery.

In summer 1914 there was very little HE held by UK field artillery and none for 18-pr. The HE fuzes were graze fuzes, this is a confusing terms for the unitiated it suggests something very sensitive that works instantaneously. It was very sensitive, it was designed to function when velocity was retarded, eg by penetrating something. In effect it was a delay fuze. Direct action fuzes for HE entered service in the summer of 1916, No 106, however it had problems and there was a delay until the No 106E appeared.

GHQ Artillery Notes No 4 was issued in April 1916. This pamphlet dealt with artillery in offensive operations. Wirecutting was covered in Note No 5 and trench mortsars in No 6. However, Notes No 3 does say that the effectiveness of wirecutting should be the opinion of an infantry officer before the assault.

However, the real artillery problem was not wire-cutting. CB fire started too late Z-7 IIRC, in 1917 it was Z-20. This meant that there was insufficient time to achieve extensive destruction of the German batteries, only two German divisions at the Somme had their artillery destroyed. Destruction needed air observation and in the week before Z there was a lot of bad weather that prevented observed shooting by the RFC. After Z enemy batteries should have been neutralised when they started firing (if not before), the RFC could help a lot but it needed other sources as well, reasonably accurate map shooting, and most importantly an effective CB organisation. It took another 6 months before CBSOs were in place to control the corps CB battle. Failure to defeat the German artillery meant the outcome was going to be failure. Worrying about wire is a diversion, its a second order issue.

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Every British Corps (apart from the VII at Gommecourt) had a group of three, 4 gun batteries of French 75s attached. Below is how they were used (Where known).

3eme Groupe 18th Regiment d’Artillerie de Campagne attached to 34th Division, III Corps. The various French war diaries of the group describe their activities as "registration in the sector La Boisselle, Mametz Wood, Contalmaison, Pozieres, Ovillers la Boisselle." On 1st July they fired gas shell at German batteries and HE "at the lines of German trenches we can see". No specific mention of wire cutting.

2eme Groupe 37th Regt d’Artillerie de Campagne attached to VIII Corps: 6th Battery to 48th Division, 4th and 5th Batteries to 29th Division. Their targets are given as: "The batteries register in a zone which it is indicated is in the zone of the general bombardment which starts during the night on U Day. This zone comprises an area around Beaucourt sur Ancre and to the north and then lines of communication which are to be kept under surveillance by the battery.... 170 high explosive and 30 shrapnel per gun per day with great intensity during the night." No specific mention of wire cutting.

1eme Groupe 20th Regiment d’Artillerie de Campagne attached to X Corps: 44th Battery is attached to the 32nd Division, the 45th and 46th Batteries to the 36th Division. 44th Battery is specifically used for wirecutting until Z Day when it supports the 36th Division using gas shell and shrapnel. "Several gaps are made in the wire and these gaps are confirmed by British artillery officers." The 45th and 46th Batteries are use mainly for wirecutting with some gas shell fired at German batteries. On Z Day fired gas shell at German batteries.

3eme Groupe 9th Regiment d’Artillerie de Campagne was attached to XIII Corps. Nothing specific in war diary nor is there any mention in the parts of Brig Gen R St C Lecky's artillery instructions that I have immediately available.

6eme Groupe 13th Regt d’Artillerie de Campagne was attached to XV Corps. Mainly used to fire HE and gas shell at specific targets in Mametz and Fricout (not wire) and for night time firing on communications.

From what I have read the wire was best cut on the XIII Corps front and on the 36th Division's front. Wire cutting north of the Ancre (VIII Corps) was generally poor.

On the French 6th Army's front to the south, German wire is reported to have been generally swept away so as to form no real obstacle.

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Re: counter battery fire. Senior British artillery officers admitted later that CB fire was not the priority it should have been and they learned at lot during this time. Inadequate numbers of sufficiently heavy guns were used (and guns rather than howitzers were the norm), the intensity of the fire aimed at German batteries was too weak, batteries ceased firing at German guns when they stopped firing not necessarily when they were destroyed, intelligence on the location of German batteries was poor, etc. Added to this the weather was fairly bad for most of the bombardment with either low cloud or fog (or both) making ground and aerial observation difficult. There was a lot of low lying mist on the morning of 1st July throughout the intense bombardment immediately prior to the attack which made observation very difficult.

The same applied to the French, of course, with mist/fog from the Somme river even more of a problem. Their philosophy, however was completely different. Gen Fayolle's instructions were that any German gun/battery in action was to be fired on by all available guns until neutralised or destroyed. This was the principle and applied whatever the initial priorities of the batteries involved were. Fayolle met with Corps and Divisional artillery commanders before the attack and drummed this principle into them. When a German gun/battery was seen in action it would be attacked not with the 20 or 30 shells typically used by the British but by 100 or 200 shells of HE and poison gas (not just the tear gas available to the British). Reports in Jack Sheldon's book about the German artilleryman's experience on the Somme testifies to the enormous weight of shell fired at German batteries on the French front. Of course, the French (because it was in their interests) helped with CB fire on the XIII Corps' front at Montauban. Here too German artillery suffered very badly. The results were that German artillery response to the attack on 1st July was far weaker than elsewhere.

The greatest intensity of German artillery fire fell on the northern end of the Somme battlefield, i.e. at Gommecourt and Serre and it is fair to say that the German artillery was very much responsible for the failure of the British attacks there. My understanding is that this is not so much the case the further south one goes. The attack on Ovillers, for example, was very much destroyed by flanking MG fire. Reinforcement of the 36th Division was also very much prevented by flanking MG fire from Thiepval and the area around Beacourt after the collapse of the attack north of the Ancre.

German artillery tactics also had an impact on the effectiveness or otherwise of Allied CB fire. On the French front and the southern end of the British front German artillery tended to respond to requests from the infantry thereby making themselves visible to OPs spotting for their positions. In some respect, for example, the casualties endured by the men of the Mortar 58 batteries in the French front trenches was in order to spot the German guns firing to hinder their activities. North of the Ancre German tactics were different with most guns remaining silent unless it was thought a general attack was imminent or that gas had been released. As a result, for example, on the Gommecourt front less than 50% of the German battery positions were identified before Z Day and even those that had were often empty by the time the attack started or were out of range of the guns used for CB work. Of course the Germans also had the advantage of not having to bother with CB fire on 1st July. Their plan, successfully carried out from La Boisselle northwards and especially on the VIII and VII Corps' front was to cut off the advancing troops from reinforcements and supply. Thus their blocking barrage fell on the British front line, No Man's Land and, where necessary, their own front line. British troops cut off in German trenches could then be dealt with by German bombing parties in the knowledge that the British had to run out of bombs because no-one could get across to re-supply them.

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Thankyou for the very informative details.This forum never ceases to amaze me with the in depth knowledge of its contributers! For a layman like myself its an education...thanks chaps.With regards to the Somme then it would appear that it was doomed from the start .The promise that when the infantry went over the top on the 1st that they could walk over no mans land to the German front line as nothing could withstand the intense bombardment was ( with hindsight ) completely false. PBI

Duncan.

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Certainly, on wirecutting and destruction of the German defences, expectations exceeded performance by a rather wide margin on a large chunk of the front and, while the French had certain technological advantages and learned some hard lessons on counter battery work, the British seem not have developed at the same rate in the latter area. One cannot ignore the quality of the German defences, tactics and performance either and, unfortunately for them, they performed less well under these headings in certain key locations, mainly at the southern end of the battlefield.

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The promise that when the infantry went over the top on the 1st that they could walk over no mans land to the German front line as nothing could withstand the intense bombardment was ( with hindsight ) completely false

Certainly the lessons that we now understand, but really only from modern scholarship, concerning the weight of artillery and the proportion of duds tells us that such a promise was nonsense. But no one in the British army had ever seen such a mass of artillery that was assembled for the Somme; no one had seen such stockpiles of ammunition; no one had seen such a great force of young and fit soldiery. It would have been very easy to get caught up in overenthusiasm. I've often tried to mentally put myself in a position where I was having to make decisions about deployments and tactics, and I am pretty sure it would have led me to say much the same things at the time. Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

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Certainly the lessons that we now understand, but really only from modern scholarship, concerning the weight of artillery and the proportion of duds tells us that such a promise was nonsense. But no one in the British army had ever seen such a mass of artillery that was assembled for the Somme; no one had seen such stockpiles of ammunition; no one had seen such a great force of young and fit soldiery. It would have been very easy to get caught up in overenthusiasm. I've often tried to mentally put myself in a position where I was having to make decisions about deployments and tactics, and I am pretty sure it would have led me to say much the same things at the time. Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

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Hindsight is a wonderful thing Indeed.

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We're teetering precariously on the edge of a Rawlinson plan v Haig plan debate. :unsure: Everyone step back carefully and move along. Nothing to see here. :P

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John, airburst shrapnel bullets were effective in cutting wire. As Bill mentioned, the angle of the bullets was important in achieving maximal success. Observation was also crucial.

Although HE craters might afford cover, there was a more serious problem with respect to wire cutting. HE, with delayed fusing, did not cut the wire and simply deposited it back into the resulting craters.

Robert

Hence the introduction of the graze fuze. Just the job!

John

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Hindsight is a wonderful thing Indeed.

As it was in 1917 at Messines where so many of the previous errors and misconceptions were rectified. At least hindsight shows you have listened...

John

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The problem with assuming in advance that artillery fire will break up barbed wire entanglements is that the advancing infantry won't find out that it hasn't until they have advanced right up to an intact barrier. Chances are when that happens that enemy machine guns will be sweeping the area. That's why advancing infantry needs to have its own wire-cutting tools or supporting engineers with Bangalore torpedoes.

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It should not be forgotten that in 1914 the British army had sufficient artillery for the 6 divisions of the BEF and suficient field artillery (18pr and 4.5" Hows for a few more divisions. But there was little available of the heavier natures. That number of divsions increased as the 'New Armies' formed and the Territorials took the field. The efforts of the War Office and armament manufacturers did not meet the growing need for artillery and the Minsitry of Munitions was formed in Jun 1915. Production increased as more factories were employed and as the war continued produced the required numers of equipments and ammunition. But the rate of increase was slow influenced by many factors such as the basic fact that the prewar armaments industry was small and the quantities of skilled workers and the necessary machine tools had to be increased before production got going. As a result the old equipments of the Territorial forces (15 prs etc) were deployed and existing equipments became worn and inaccurate before replacements were available. Another factor affecting artillery was the high rates of fire necessary to achieve the desired effect which together with the lack of experience of detachments, and the early type of recoil systems, lead to high rates of repair and unavailability.

Much has been said of the learning curve with regard to commanders and staff. A similar curve affected equipment.

Old Tom

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That is the applied hindsight of a complete war, Pete. We ought to remember that almost the whole British army on the Somme was brand new. That was true at all levels from commanders on down. No one, as Chris has pointed out, had any experience of a battle like the Somme. That was true on both sides of the wire. The men were under trained, the staff work patchy at best but really, it could not be any other way. The British artillery was not powerful enough nor well enough handled to do what was required but that was partly because they did not know what the requirements were. The deep dugouts were not suspected so not targeted but it is doubtful if artillery of the time could have targeted them anyway. The low level strategy of destroying the opposition was unsuccessful but it was the only one which could be applied. The later idea of suppression rather than destruction grew out of the failure of the latter but that was to take 2 years to become apparent and then the alternative had to be visualised and implemented. While the war was being waged, both sides were constantly leapfrogging each other. In the end, the Entente won but it is well nigh impossible to put ourselves in the shoes of the leapfroggers at the beginning of the contest.

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I understand the "learning curve" factor. The same principle applied to the AEF in 1917-18 and was the reason why amalgamation didn't take place on a large scale.

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Amalgamation ? please explain.

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