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Remembered Today:

Ineffective British Artillery


RammyLad1

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In 1917 when the U.S. entered the war the British and French proposed that American battalions serve under their command within their armies. A British general named Bridges went so far in 1917 as to recommend that Americans be conscripted directly into the British Army. The U.S. Secretary of War and Gen. Pershing refused to let it happen because it was an insult to American honor.

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Amalgamation ? please explain.

When the Americans landed in France, they made a point of fighting as a separate army. They trained with French and British units and in fact some of their units did fight alongside British and French but they were careful to preserve their separate identity as far as possible. There is some idea that this cost needless casualties.

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We're going off on a tangent here, but the British Gen. Bridges who recommended amalgamation was one of the heroes of Mons in 1914 who had led his men there with a toy drum. It is unclear whether his suggestion in 1917 that American men be conscripted into the British Army was his own personal idea or the considered and official policy of HMG. As it was it was seen in America as being tactless and led to the, "Not only no but dam*ed no" response. A more indirect approach might have worked better.

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Hi Pete

Thanks for the input but going back to the original point how did US artillery fare against the German defences ? did they have the benefit of years of allied experience which if so suggests close collaberation in the tactics used or did they just happen to manage to hit the ground running?

Duncan

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Hi Pete

Thanks for the input but going back to the original point how did US artillery fare against the German defences ? did they have the benefit of years of allied experience which if so suggests close collaberation in the tactics used or did they just happen to manage to hit the ground running?

Duncan

The US didn't have artillery

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The U.S. Army had artillery, but not enough for the rapid expansion of the army in 1917. Our main direct-support artillery weapon during the war was the 75mm gun the French gave us. All of this is rather academic because ever since 1943 the British have been the weaker of the two powers in the British-American alliance.

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Inadequate numbers of sufficiently heavy guns were used (and guns rather than howitzers were the norm), the intensity of the fire aimed at German batteries was too weak, batteries ceased firing at German guns when they stopped firing not necessarily when they were destroyed, intelligence on the location of German batteries was poor, etc. Added to this the weather was fairly bad for most of the bombardment with either low cloud or fog (or both) making ground and aerial observation difficult. There was a lot of low lying mist on the morning of 1st July throughout the intense bombardment immediately prior to the attack which made observation very difficult.

The French, of course, subscribed to the doctrine of 'artillery conquers, infantry occupies', this never entirely caught on in the BEF.

It had been recognised in 1915 that enemy artillery could be either destroyed or neutralised (the terms were not and are not synonymous), that there was no point in neutralisation before Z hr and that destruction of entrenched guns and howitzers could only be achieved by heavy howitzers, and this meant dealing with each gunpit, not just firing at the battery. Destruction needed direct hits (within 5 yards) from heavy HE shells, this needed time and observation, and since gun positions were seldom visible to ground observers it needed the RFC, who were vulnerable to poor visibility and enemy action.

In 1915 guns were recognised as unsuitable for destruction, first their shells weren't big enough, second plunging fire was more suitable, third their 50% zones were large, this meant more rounds to have a chance of a hit. Of course enfilade fire helped and was used wherever possible. Guns were useful pre Z if the enemy were not entrenched or they could catch the gun detachments in the open with a salvo or two of shrapnel. After Z neutralisation was required, not least because destruction was too time consuming and the goal was to stop the enemy shelling the infantry as they advanced. Guns, including 18-pr if they were in range, could be used for neutralisation.

Of course effective neutralisation post Z meant having an effective organisation to run the CB battle, as much intelligence (ie processed information) as possible about the enemy artillery, their whereabouts, zones of fire, tasks, and the means to identify which batteries were active against which areas (and hence the priority for neutralisation) and the means to accurately and quickly locate all the batteries that arty int didn't know about and revealed themselves post Z. The arrangements to achieve this didn't quite exist in the British Army (or any other) at the time of the Somme. It was in place the following year in the British Army (but not the German) and I've yet to come across anything reliable to suggest that the French had all their beans lined up.

CB was probably the most complex endevour on the W Front and had to be created from almost nothing. Another complicating factor was than the enemy artillery did not conform to own boundaries and the German predilection for enfilade fire exacerbated this.

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The importance of the US contribution in WW1 was being there, it panicked the German general staff into rushing their operations in the West after the Bolshevik Revolution released their E Front resources in the hope of victory before the AEF was up to speed and size.

Haig took the view that the US forces would not be ready for army level operations until 1919. In his view the problem was the need to develop the formation HQs at corps and army level to be able to conduct operations. Individual and unit training was not really an issue. You can understand the British concerns, they knew the Germans were very capable and good at exploiting opportunities, a misjudgement by a green US HQ with mostly new troops might result in a German breakthrough. Seeing what happened when the inexperienced Portuguese were hit hard by a German offensive probably didn't help.

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We're going off on a tangent here, but the British Gen. Bridges who recommended amalgamation was one of the heroes of Mons in 1914 who had led his men there with a toy drum. It is unclear whether his suggestion in 1917 that American men be conscripted into the British Army was his own personal idea or the considered and official policy of HMG. As it was it was seen in America as being tactless and led to the, "Not only no but dam*ed no" response. A more indirect approach might have worked better.

I think it would be true to say that the Foreign Office would never have allowed such a notion to be adopted by HMG, they were far too smart. Being a general has never been a bar to the odd weird idea in any army.

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GHQ Arty Notes No. 5, Wire-cutting, June 1916.

The weapons for wire-cutting are:

Medium Tranch Mortar

18-pr QF

Howitzers

60-pr BL

Summarising, leaving out quite a lot of detail.

2" trench Mor with Newton Fuze is the most suitable because bomb has sifficient weight of metal to cut wire, HE sufficient to create high velocity fragments, bursts immediately on impact.

18-pr best ranges with shrapnel between 1800 and 2400 yards. Shorter ranges problematic due to height of gun pit parapets, fuze irregularity below 1000 yds range makes it impossible. Abut 5% HE used when wire fixed on iron posts. Rule of thumb ammo 1/3 the number of hundreds of yards range per yard of wire front.

4.5 and 6 in How used with 18-pr to scatter posts and wire when cut. 8 & 9.2 in will cut lots of wire, but needs quick acting fuze (No 106) to void creating craters (obstacles).

60-pr, wire beyond 18-pr range, needs accurate observation, lot of shrapnel ammo needed, irregular burning of No 85 fze is the problem. Only a small proportion of HE rds will burst in wire (large 50% zone).

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The U.S. Army had artillery, but not enough for the rapid expansion of the army in 1917. Our main direct-support artillery weapon during the war was the 75mm gun the French gave us. All of this is rather academic because ever since 1943 the British have been the weaker of the two powers in the British-American alliance.

Never weaker, just smaller! And only since 1945.

John

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Please fine the following clip.

John

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Thanks John

A pretty conclusive experiment,

That 'll get the hares a running !!!

Duncan

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Thanks John for the lead to the clip. I suggest that the shrapnel test portrayed was not representative. I don't believe one simulated shrapnel round fixed to a post was comparable to a shrapnel round fired from a gun. The effectiveness of a graze effect shell was well illustrated.

Old Tom

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Would the speed of the balls not be higher if accelerated forward from an already fast moving projectile? As a Physics O-Level mega failure I can't answer. Also, graze fuzes were not yet available.

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If you listen to the commentry he said that HE ammunition should have been available not was available, the test was show that HE was more effective than shrapnel.

Please read "The Official History of the The Ministry of Munitions" Chapter 1 Gun Ammunition Programmes July 1915 to May 1918. The Relation of Gun Ammunition Programmes to Gun Programmes.

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If you read the documents to which I refer you will also see that the tests carried out at Calais in November 1915 used HE in two configurations (H.E. burst on impact and H.E. with delay action fuze) and that the conclusion was drawn that, in the absence of a suitable instantaneous graze fuse, shrapnel was the preferred option. I have no reason to believe that the ammunition supplies of the 46th and 56th Divisions for the opening of the Somme are in any way anomalous and, in their bombardment up to an including Z Day, 1st July 1916, the 46th Division fired 73,000 shrapnel against 57,000 HE. Of the shrapnel, 11,000 were used for wirecutting the rest for bombardment and infantry support. There would have been a more than adequate supply of 18 pdr HE if that had been the best option for wirecutting. The Calais tests showed they were not in the absence of the appropriate graze fuse. The 56th Division planned to used 41,000 shrapnel (27,500 for wirecutting) and had 26,500 HE shells available for bombardment in the planned U-Y Days bombardment. Again, had HE been shown to be the best option for wire cutting given the fuzes available, then it could have been used. The issue on 1st July (which is what this discussion was originally about) was the lack of a suitable graze fuse not the lack of 18 pdr HE. The French 75s with the instantaneous graze fuse clearly showed its value with the results they obtained. The British simply did not have such a fuze. It was not a case of a relative lack of HE shells (unless it is being suggested that the Calais tests were rigged to show shrapnel was best because more of it was available). Lastly, to blame British planners for a lack of foresight as to the eventual nature of the Western Front seems a bit harsh as all combatants expected the war to be rather more like that of autumn 1914 than that of 1916. And anyway, with the correct quantities of 18 pdr shrapnel applied to the task and no other issues such as the terrain to get in the way a lot of German wire was removed successfully. As previously mentioned, wire was not the only problem on 1st July and in some places it was not A problem at all.

The report from Calais is quite clear:

HE Burst on impact at 2700 yards range:

In the first 60 rounds there was practically no effect obtained.

After completion of the series there were some six or eight posts broken and a few strands of wire cut, but no important damage done; as a wire cutting series it was a failure.

There were four detonations in the first entanglement.

There were three detonations in the second entanglement.

There were four explosions in the second entanglement.

There were four sandbags blown down into the trench.

HE burst on impact at 3409 yards range:

The entanglement was undamaged by the fire.

Eleven sandbags were knocked down into the trench.

Seven shell had detonated and 7 exploded in the first entanglement.

One shell had detonated and 5 exploded in the second entanglement.

Conclusions.

As regards the first of these objects, the experiment conclusively proved the superiority of the 18-pr. shrapnel over H.E. burst on percussion for cutting wire.

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Would the speed of the balls not be higher if accelerated forward from an already fast moving projectile? As a Physics O-Level mega failure I can't answer. Also, graze fuzes were not yet available.

1. Of course, terminal velocity of shell + velocity of bullets. The trials on the Calais beach used 18-pr fired shells. Artillery Notes No 4 was replaced by a 2nd edition in early 1917 (this is the edition reprinted by the US) with more precise guidance on shrapnel density for wire cutting.

2. Wrong, graze fuzes were available at the beginning of the war, that's what was used with HE (ie the 10% of 4.5 How shells, and a slightly greater proportion of 60-pr IIRC). What was not available were direct action (DA) fuzes (ie a design where the striker head was at the front of the fuze nose and the pin stem below it dirctly struck the detonator). As I explained in an earlier post 'graze' fuze is a term than confuses the uninitiated, it did not cause instant detonation and wasn't designed to. No 106 was the first British DA 'instant' artillery fze, had to be hastily modified to No 106E, subsequently repackaged with a streamline shape as No 115 in the 1930s.

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I think the crucial part of the film is where the officer states that the large fragments from the HE shell had cut the wire, which to me implies that shrapnal balls were too small to be efective whereas large chunks of cast iron would cut wire effectively. So the theory of shrapnal cutting wire is good but the method (small lead balls) was ineffective. So delivering large metal fragments via HE shells is best.

John

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Yes, but this still presumes that the HE shell has burst on the surface rather than bury itself before exploding. With fuzes at the time burial (and a crater) was more likely to be the result thus the choice of shrapnel. HE was recommended for use after the wire had been cut and its purpose was scattering the posts and any wire still attached but here they refer to HE fired by 4.5 in and 6 in howitzers.

Also, I question the positioning of the shrapnel shell in the experiment. 'Artillery Notes Number 5, Wire Cutting, June 1916', Issued by the General Staff at General Headquarters, states that, ideally, the shell should burst about 4 feet off the ground and as close to the wire as possible. It should be fired at between 1,800 and 2,400 yards range. It states "A burst even five yards short has little effect". The video at 1:47 shows the relative height of the 'shell' and, at least to my eyes, it is considerably higher than 4 feet off the ground. It is not possible to tell where it is placed relative to the front edge of the wire.

There was also a rough formula for the numbers of shells needed per yard of wire which was:

((range/100)/3)x length of front. For the 56th Division this worked out as: 2100 yards (range)/3 = 7 shells per yard of front x 1600 (width of front) = 11200 (for one band of wire).

In other words, no-one expected wire to be cut by just one shell.

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Modern U.S. Quick fuzes can be set with a screwdriver for either point-detonating or fuze delay. Point-detonating is what they're set on when they leave the factory. Fuze delay is for penetrating overhead cover. Soviet HE rounds were said to have exploded into smaller fragments than U.S.-made ones. I don't know which of the two would be better for breaking up wire. With the benefit of hindsight in the aftermath of the Somme attacking Infantry should be supported by Engineers who can clear wire entanglements that Artillery preparations have not destroyed.

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I believe that availability was the crux. We may have had different types of shell but did we have them in sufficient quantity? I know that the answer was definitely not, until 1916 at least and even then quality suffered in the attempt to provide sufficient quantity. In the end, commanders had to make do with what they had. The Germans were not going to sit back for a year or eighteen months while we manufactured sufficient ammunition to overwhelm them. I believe we had lots of shrapnel and deciding how best to employ it seems like a rational approach. We had insufficient guns of the proper calibre, we had ditto ammunition and we desperately needed many, many more capable gunners to man the guns when we made them. In the meantime, there was a war to be fought with whatever we had, used as best we could.

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I don't think that a FOO could adjust the HOB (Height of Burst) of a shrapnel round 4 feet off the ground no matter how good he is, consider the fuze was being set by the use of a fuze key and the good eyeball MK 1. You must take into account the zone of the gun between 81 to 92 yards and with a very shallow angle of descent between 3 and 4 degrees. I can see why the 4 feet was required at this HOB there would be a very narrow cone of dispersion but I don't this feasible.

By the way Pete1052 if I remember the delay on a M557 fuze was 0.05 secs

John

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