Ineffective British Artillery

[truthergw]

That was the problem at Loos,Tom .In Nick Lloyds book Loos 1915 chapter four his final assessment was that in spreading his guns,Haig effectively neutralised his own artillery.

Duncan

Hi Duncan. Yes, exactly. That is the point I was hoping to make. Haig did not spread his guns too thinly, he did not have enough to concentrate them sufficiently. The early battles of Neuve Chappelle, Aubers Ridge and Festubert had shown that to attack on too narrow a front left the attacking force at the mercy of flanking fire. The remedy at Loos was to extend the attack widely to each flank of the points where break through was planned; Hohenzollern Redoubt and Loos village towards Hill 70. He also planned diversionary attacks north of the canal. All of that required much more artillery than was available. The more one looks at Loos, the more one realises the impossible position that the CiCs of the BEF were put in when placed under the de facto command of the French CiC but still retaining full responsibility for the BEF as a British Army.

[Gunner Bailey]

John,

I agree that this discussion is pointless just as much as I disagree with your assumption "that millions of shrapnel shells clearly did not work". There is nothing clear cut on this subject but, in order to justify your comments, I feel you have to explain how British troops carried several lines of trenches south of Gommecourt, in front of the Schwaben redoubt, at Fricourt, Mametz and Montauban when the methods used to cut the wire were the same the entire length of the line (though there were clear variations in the results). The only other guns used to cut wire were 60 pdrs firing shrapnel at more distant targets. I have gone through field and garrison artillery diaries by the dozen. Nowhere (with one exception) do they talk of heavy or medium howitzers being used to cut wire (which might, according to your thinking, explain the places where it was cut). That exception is the 46th Division where some attempt was made by 6in howitzers to cut wire in front of the second and third lines in front of Gommecourt Wood. It is impossible to tell how effective this was as no-one got there on the day.

Bill, the methods may have been the same but who can say that the wire was the same all along the front? Depth, concentration and different methods of anchoring the wire could account for the success at Fricourt, Mametz and Montauban. Maybe the 21st Division was just the best? (My grandfather was at Fricourt and Mametz). I appreciate your review of the diaries but heavy HE shells aimed at trenches but falling short could well have taken out the wire in these locations. We will never know. What we do know is that tactics changed in 1917 and the barrages of shrapnel shells lasting for days never happened again. To me that says the Staff knew it was a failed method.

John

[bmac]

"To me that says the Staff knew it was a failed method."

No, it means that they had an instantaneous graze fuze available, the 106 I believe, which changed the methods by which wire was cut by the British. As previously mentioned this type of fuse had been available to the French and their wire cutting was significantly better at this time. But, with respect, you are also now shifting your ground rather. Wire apparently could be cut where it was 'weaker' whereas previously 'shrapnel could not cut wire'. I also disagree 'that we shall never know'. If aerial photographs and on the ground observation shows no evidence of HE shells falling in areas of cut wire then one must assume that the wire was cut by shrapnel. I have aerial photographs of several fronts and there is no particular correlation between shell holes and cut wire whereas there is between striations on the ground caused by shrapnel and cut wire.

[RammyLad1]

To all of the protagonists

I think that we should draw this to a close. When the original question was posed it was never meant to make members of the forum fall out with each other, it was asked as a general observation from a layman as to why history repeated itself. What a can of worms!

Duncan

[bmac]

Duncan,

Worry not. This is merely robust. You should see what happens when one of us really loses the plot.

[Robert Dunlop]

What we do know is that tactics changed in 1917 and the barrages of shrapnel shells lasting for days never happened again. To me that says the Staff knew it was a failed method.

John,

Just to add to Bill's comment above, the introduction of the instanteous fuze did not stop the requirement for long barrages to cut wire. I have also studied the techniques used for wire-cutting prior to the Battle of Pilckem Ridge, which took place on 31st July 1917. There was an extensive wire-cutting programme that lasted longer than the build-up to the Somme. The big difference was that the other types of artillery could be involved in the process, thanks to the new fuze type. In particular, medium howitzers were able to play more of a role. This was important for wire-cutting in areas that could not be reached by flat-trajectory field guns. Aerial photographs were taken of the process on a daily basis, the results were analysed late afternoon and evening, and then new programmes of wire-cutting were issued for the next day.

The next radical improvement to the challenge of wire was the tank. When used in large numbers, they almost obviated the need for artillery to perform wire-cutting. This significantly altered the barrage programmes, enabling the use of hurricane bombardments. It was possible to catch the enemy unawares and still enable the infantry to get through even the thickest belts of wire, as demonstrated during the first day of the Battle of Cambrai.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

After reading a book ( Loos 1915 by Nick Lloyd ) in which the bombardment of the German front line left the barbed wire vitually intact why nine months later did the same happen on the Somme.Was there something wrong with the shells ie wrong type,if so why didnt they learn after Loos or were the guns too lightweight?

Duncan, back to your original question. It was not the case that barbed wire was left virtually intact on the Somme. There were many places where wire-cutting was effective, though not uniformly along the front that was attacked on July 1st 1917. Shrapnel shells did work, especially then the wire and the effects of the wire-cutting could be observed. There were problems, however, with uncut wire in some sectors. Lessons had been learned but further improvements were made.

Robert

[Gunner Bailey]

John,

Just to add to Bill's comment above, the introduction of the instanteous fuze did not stop the requirement for long barrages to cut wire. I have also studied the techniques used for wire-cutting prior to the Battle of Pilckem Ridge, which took place on 31st July 1917. There was an extensive wire-cutting programme that lasted longer than the build-up to the Somme. The big difference was that the other types of artillery could be involved in the process, thanks to the new fuze type. In particular, medium howitzers were able to play more of a role. This was important for wire-cutting in areas that could not be reached by flat-trajectory field guns. Aerial photographs were taken of the process on a daily basis, the results were analysed late afternoon and evening, and then new programmes of wire-cutting were issued for the next day.

The next radical improvement to the challenge of wire was the tank. When used in large numbers, they almost obviated the need for artillery to perform wire-cutting. This significantly altered the barrage programmes, enabling the use of hurricane bombardments. It was possible to catch the enemy unawares and still enable the infantry to get through even the thickest belts of wire, as demonstrated during the first day of the Battle of Cambrai.

Robert

Robert you supported made my points well. Wire cutting with shrapnel was pretty well abandoned after the Somme and replaced by HE / graze fuze combination. The large fragments from the HE shells doing the cutting. You don't use graze fuzes with shrapnel shells.

Bill raised the point about the success at Montauban. If I remember correctly the French barrage was quite short, was done with HE and graze fuzes and was successful. Again proving my point.

John

[Gunner Bailey]

To all of the protagonists

I think that we should draw this to a close. When the original question was posed it was never meant to make members of the forum fall out with each other, it was asked as a general observation from a layman as to why history repeated itself. What a can of worms!

Duncan

Hi Duncan

Don't worry. This is what this forum is for. I have high regard for Bill and Robert and think this is a very healthy debate.

John

[bmac]

John,

The French bombardment lasted the same length as the British one, north and south of the river. This from the war diary of the French 20th Corps: "24th June. Start of bombardment on the 1st German position." Apart from the group of French 75s attached to the XIII Corps (whose actions are not recorded as far as I can yet find) and the assistance of some of the Mortar 58s, the French did not assist with British wire cutting having the front of Bois Faviere to contend with and the trenches beyond. In other words, the well cut wire in front of Montauban was mainly a British success using shrapnel.

Cutting lanes through thick wire was a slow and laborious process whichever sort of shell/fuze combination you used. As with the British shrapnel the French 75s fired to cut lanes in the wire not get rid of it completely. It is undoubtedly the case that the French cut the wire quicker/batter with their instantaneous graze fuse (French I.A. modèle 1915. I.A. stands for ‘Instantanée Allongée’) although, because of the fuse's length (see here: http://www.passioncompassion1418.com/decouvertes/english_fusees_collection_fr.html#InstantAll) they were affected in flight and were also rather dangerous to the gunners firing them. As Robert says above, the British were successful in cutting lanes through the wire but, sometimes, the terrain (let along the weather which was pretty poor throughout the bombardment with rain, low cloud and fog hindering observation) prevented proper observation and even, as on the 46th Division front, made it nearly impossible to fire on various stretches of wire (thus the failed use of 2 in mortar bombs on this front. Most failed to explode). Clearly, the condition of the defences had a major impact and Ralph Whitehead's book shows that they were weaker south La Boisselle which undoubtedly gave the artillery, field and heavy, of the XV and XIII Corps and advantage. What I have not yet done is done a comparative study of the methods used on each divisional front to cut the wire, i.e. guns/mortars used, quantity of ammunition expended, details of wire reports, etc. I hope this will be revealing as I plan to spend rather a lot of time on this subject soon!

[nigelfe]

Robert you supported made my points well. Wire cutting with shrapnel was pretty well abandoned after the Somme and replaced by HE / graze fuze combination. The large fragments from the HE shells doing the cutting. You don't use graze fuzes with shrapnel shells.Bill raised the point about the success at Montauban. If I remember correctly the French barrage was quite short, was done with HE and graze fuzes and was successful. Again proving my point.

Mate if you are going to pontificate about artillery technology do try and get it right. Using the graze option with the time fuze on shrapnel shells was entirely legitimate and normal. That's why they had a graze option (and it was graze not DA or instantaneous if you like big words or Super Quick if you are of the Americam persuasion). Of course graze would be entirely useless for wire cutting with shrapnel as it was with HE. The purpose of the graze action fuze was to penetrate 'light cover', what today would be called light protection. At the beginning of the war shrapnel fzed graze was considered the weapon of choice for frontally attacking hostile guns, the PEr data supported this, the idea being that they would penetrate the gun shields. Similarly if infantry had taken 'cover' in a building graze fzed shrapnel was the solution.

And just to repeat because we seem to have some slow learners in class, No 106 was NOT a graze fze.

The attraction of mortars for wire cutting was their low terminal velocity helping to minimise crater depth and a steep angle of descent that together meant most of the forward fragments got out of the crater at a usefully low elevation angle which maximised their effect for wire cutting.

However, the account of Gommecourt in the London Scottish history is interesting (they were one of the forward bns in 168 Bde, 56 Div. A 11pm on 30/6 they snet t6he bn scouts out to check the wire, they found it uncut, their assigned sappers then went and used two Bangalore torpedoes to finish the job and the bn requested additional artillery wire cutting during the preliminary bombardment. Once they wer in the assembly trenches and the prelinamy bombardment started they came under heavy German artillery fire and suffered 'heavy casualties' (ie the CB plan failed in this area). They suffered more 'serious losses' from artillwery fire as they crossed 300 yds of no man's land. Those that reached german wire, A coy on the right was badly mauled by GE arty fire and found the wire uncut (although they may have been in the wrong place, B found the wire 'destroyed, and C found it 'well cut down'. D had lost a pl to arty fire in the assy trenches, the other pls found uncut wire but found a path through it. Its useful to note that the bn reached the third objective trench line.

[bmac]

A large part of A Company wandered off line in the thicker than anticipated smoke screen and ended up too far to the south opposite wire not targeted. A problem also partly caused by the alignment of the British and German trenches which did not run parallel to one another at this point. In general, though, artillery was the problem for the 56th not wire.

[JimSmithson]

I'm enjoying this 'banter', however; I would rather not see members questioning the speed at which other members learn. Let's keep things civil please.

Can I add two points. Firstly I feel the following statement to be flawed when later events are taken into consideration, in your first post Nigel

However, the real artillery problem was not wire-cutting. CB fire started too late Z-7 IIRC, in 1917 it was Z-20. This meant that there was insufficient time to achieve extensive destruction of the German batteries, only two German divisions at the Somme had their artillery destroyed. Destruction needed air observation and in the week before Z there was a lot of bad weather that prevented observed shooting by the RFC. After Z enemy batteries should have been neutralised when they started firing (if not before), the RFC could help a lot but it needed other sources as well, reasonably accurate map shooting, and most importantly an effective CB organisation. It took another 6 months before CBSOs were in place to control the corps CB battle. Failure to defeat the German artillery meant the outcome was going to be failure. Worrying about wire is a diversion, its a second order issue.

CB fire leading up to the first Battle of the Scarpe in April 1917 was only 5 days in duration and was so effective that most reports on the 9th, the first day of the offensive, talk of a poor response by German artillery. Time was not the important factor, intelligence and correct target allocation were. That said, the attack failed badly in the 30th Division and 21st Division areas because the wire was uncut. There was little effective artillery fire to stop those troops, it was the wire and machine guns that did for them. Not a second order issue in this case. To their left elements of the 56th division only succeeded when a tank made the necessary gaps for them to proceed, again German artillery fire was poor.

Secondly John you say; Wire cutting with shrapnel was pretty well abandoned after the Somme... At the same offensive in April 1917 shrapnel was indeed still used by a lot of 18 pdrs on wire cutting duties. Complaints are often made in diaries that the ranges were unsuitable and thus the results were poor (see above). Some units were fortunate to have Fuse No. 106 and where used the descriptions of the state of the wire range from 'non-existant', to 'well cut'. It was in these areas that troops were able to make their 2 and 3 mile advances on the first day. I am still trying to ascertain which units had how many of these fuses as their distribution seems to have had an important effect on the outcome of the day.

Another interesting aside is a diary entry from a Divisional Artillery Unit that the 'heavies were not doing the wire cutting that they were supposed to be doing'! Seems that some units may have gone their own way at times - I am still investigating that claim so the jury is still out.

Jim

[bmac]

The plot thickens

[Gunner Bailey]

Thanks Bill. You said it well.

It is undoubtedly the case that the French cut the wire quicker/better with their instantaneous graze fuse (French I.A. modèle 1915.

I'm pretty sure that in one location (if not Montauban) the French soley supplied the artillery and the 1/7 attack was a success.

Although people are trying to counter my arguement that shrapnel was not effective they seem to be supplying answers regularly that support my position. I can see no logic at all in using graze fuzes with shrapnel shells. In most cases these would just fire the balls into the soil at the point of impact. If they hit the wire you still have the problem that most wire defences are 80% air and 20% steel. If you throw 300 lead balls at a wire fence from say 10 feet, most will pass through harmlessly only a few will hit. The efficiency rate of shrapnel shells must be about 5%.

Niglfe states 'Of course graze would be entirely useless for wire cutting with shrapnel as it was with HE.' In that case why was the graze fuze plus HE seemingly the preferred option from 1917? Why did the French use it exclusively? I would also content that the role of the 2" Trench mortar (the Toffee Apple - lots of blast and big chucks of iron) seems to have been lost over time and I suspect they cut more wire than shrapnel shells in 1916.

You have also to remember that the artilery was huge organisation and had a lot of clout. They would defend their methods, wouldn't they?

John

[JimSmithson]

Niglfe states 'Of course graze would be entirely useless for wire cutting with shrapnel as it was with HE.' In that case why was the graze fuze plus HE seemingly the preferred option from 1917? Why did the French use it exclusively? I would also content that the role of the 2" Trench mortar (the Toffee Apple - lots of blast and big chucks of iron) seems to have been lost over time and I suspect they cut more wire than shrapnel shells in 1916.

You have also to remember that the artilery was huge organisation and had a lot of clout. They would defend their methods, wouldn't they?

John

I think the misunderstanding over the use of 'graze fuse' has to be cleared. A graze fuse uses a change of direction or deceleration to cause either the detonator to move backwards or the firing pin forwards. This fuse can be in the base of the shell (thus allowing a delay if required). Fuse no. 106 was a 'direct action' fuse meaning exactly that. It required an impact on the fuse to detonate, even hitting barbed wire would do that or the very least first impact with the ground, however soft.

Now I feel the debate can move on without confusing the issue.

Jim

[bmac]

Nowhere on the British front did the French provide anything other than a single group of three batteries of four 75 mm guns, i.e. 12 in total and the same number as one RFA Brigade of which each division had four. The details are posted earlier and their uses. They were icing on the artillery cake. (NB none were used at Gommecourt).

The 18 pdr shrapnel fired used timed fuses. It was ideal that observation of the cutting should be from two locations:

1. under the flight of the shells for line; and

2. at right angles to the shells flight to check for range/burst.

This was not always possible and front line OPs were regularly targeted by German artillery/mortars making observation difficult but this twin aspect observation was the avowed policy along the entire front. The reasons why attacks succeeded or failed are many and various but it is, in my view, indisputable that 18 pdr shrapnel fired using timed fuses adequately cut the wire in a significant number of places on the Somme front by 1st July. In the areas where the attack then went on to fail it was for reasons other than uncut wire.

The difference between the graze fuze available in 1916 and the later 106 was that there was a delay after contact with the former, i.e. it exploded after the contact thus, if used against wire, the shell would go into the already soft ground before exploding thus creating a crater and not a spread of shell fragments plus the effect of the charge which might cut the wire. The 106 fuse exploded on contact (or as near as damn it) so it detonated amongst the wire allowing shell casing and explosion to destroy the wire. Whichever gun/howitzer fired at wire with a graze shell before 1st July would have the same result as an 18 pdr shell, i.e. burial and a crater especially as the ground was very soft as a result of remarkably poor summer weather.

So, again, where the wire was adequately cut, it was cut by firing 18 pdr shrapnel with a timed fuse and there are many examples of places where the wire was sufficiently cut for the troops to get through and into the German defences. What then happened was determined by other factors.

[nigelfe]

I think that for an impact (DA or graze) fze to function on hitting wire it would have to be a taut strand and at right angles to the shell's long axis. Anything else and I suspect that there would not have been enough impact force to drive the striker pin back hard and the wire would slip to the side. I suggest the chance of this happening is somewhat low, but not impossible - I have seen a 25-pr shell fzed DA burst in the air, the only possible cause being a hit from another fragment.

I gave a lengthy description of the DA fze function in an earlier post.

The preparation stage, mostly CB, started at Z-20 days at Messines, this may have been a Cdn Corps decision, but it could also have been that Army's policy. At the Somme it was too short, even though Z was delayed a few days mainly due to poor weather making aerial observation difficult.

[JimSmithson]

The preparation stage, mostly CB, started at Z-20 days at Messines, this may have been a Cdn Corps decision, but it could also have been that Army's policy. At the Somme it was too short, even though Z was delayed a few days mainly due to poor weather making aerial observation difficult.

Not sure where you mean here. If you mean Cdn as Canadian Corps, they were not at Messines. Attacking were the X, IX and II Anzac Corps of 2nd Army. If you mean at Arras, which would make sense in mentioning the Canadians then Z-20 is correct; but only for that Corps. 3rd Army did not start the barrage until 4th April (i.e. everybody except the Canadian Corps) and it was extremely effective in CB, as mentioned previously. The majority of targets from March 20th to April 4th on Vimy Ridge were on the trench system, which was already about 50% obliterated by that date, not CB. This longer bombardment was, I feel, due to a fear of failing to take the ridge on the first day. Had some more of these resources been available further south for 30th Division events might have taken a different course on the right of the offensive and who knows where that might have led.

Jim

[Robert Dunlop]

At the Somme it was too short, even though Z was delayed a few days mainly due to poor weather making aerial observation difficult.

May I double-check please? Do you mean that the counter-battery fire programme was too short?

Robert

[nigelfe]

Mistake, disconnect between fingers and brain, not Messines but Vimy.

The Somme CB program too short - Yes. And exacerbated by technical and process limits on target acquisition and CB in Spring 1916.

According to Farrar-Hockley's 'The Somme' only two German divs had their artillery destroyed. The only way of destroying batteries was with heavy howitzers and rounds within very few yards of each gun (unless they were not it pits), this had to be observed fire controlled by the RFC. It also took time and good flying weather.

After Z the issue was to locate batteries that either revealed themselves for the first time or had survived the preparation pre Z. Sound ranging wasn't up to it (the mikes were still inadequate) and flash spotting only worked at night (and wasn't fully up to speed anyway). This left the RFC (a/c and balloon) or the infantry being able to report the hostile fire and the direction it was coming from and an artillery intelligence organisation able to connect this to known hostile batteries and arrange prioritised immediate neutralization using map shooting.

At the Somme all these beans were definitely not lined up. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but few historians seem to understand enough about artillery to write sensibly about these issues in the context of a particular battle. I'd probably include the official historian in this and Farndale wrote a regimental history that was not even faintly technical!

[bmac]

The fact that systems, observation and resources devoted to CB fire were inadequate pre: 1st July suggests to me that the BEF had not learnt many lessons re: CB especially compared to the French. Fayolle, commanding 6th Army, not only devoted far more resources to the process of neutralising or destroying German batteries, his philosophy was quite precise: if German guns were seen firing then, basically, anything that could be brought to bear on it should be brought to bear on it whether they fired HE, gas or shrapnel, be they medium guns or heavy howitzers. His instructions on this to initially reluctant Corps commanders were precise and demanding. Then, once identified, these batteries were plastered by shells in a far greater concentration than attempted by the British. As a result, come Z Day, although they had suffered just as much from the weather hindering observation (and, perhaps, even more as their proximity to the river presented regular problems of mist over their battlefield) the German artillery response to the attack was feeble from Maricourt to Foucaucourt. XIII Corps undoubtedly benefited from this attention to the German guns as the heavy weapons supporting the French XX Corps spent some time firing on batteries ranged through and between Bernafay and Trones Woods and beyond.

[Robert Dunlop]

The duration of preparatory counter-battery fire is an interesting issue. Contrast the time taken before the Somme with Cambrai or the Battle of Amiens. Neither of the latter two battles had any preparatory counter-battery fire, by comparison. German batteries were systematically targeted in the Battle of Amiens once the bombardment got underway on the morning of the attack. This poses some interesting challenges, if duration of CB fire is considered of vital significance.

It is true that a lot of work went into plotting positions of the German batteries before the Battle of Amiens. This reflected, in part, improvements in both sound-ranging and flash spotting. But this isn't the whole answer either. We know that many German batteries at Cambrai were unaffected by the British barrages. They weren't spotted and/or they weren't accurately engaged. The tank crews around Flesquieres paid dearly for this. There was, however, an interesting corollary that must be borne in mind. Because the British barrage was so sudden, there were fewer guns and less ammunition available to the Germans than would have been the case if a prolonged CB programme had preceded the attack.

The preparatory programme for Third Ypres throws up some other interesting issues too. I won't go into details but the Germans developed numerous counter-measures to nullify the CB programme. Ultimately, as with Amiens, the German defensive barrages were significantly reduced in no small part by the CB fire on the day of the attack. Evidence for this can be gleaned by comparing the Battle of Pilckem Ridge with the Battle of Menin Road. CB fire of the day of the attack was more effective in the latter because the weather was so much more helpful to aerial observation and fire control.

Bill, I still don't buy your argument that the British had not learned 'many' lessons of CB fire before the Somme. FWIIW, I have no trouble agreeing with the fact that CB fire was less effective. The issues underpinning this are more complicated though. Not having 'learnt many lessons' is too simple an explanation, IMHO. There is a difference between this concept versus not being able to execute against lessons learned.

Robert

[bmac]

My point is that, relative to the French, there seemed to be a lag in development and a difference in philosophy. Unfortunately my papers are still all over the place following my move but somewhere within there are quotes from senior artillery officers admitting that CB was not an area that had received the attention it deserved and hard lessons were learnt as a result. I will try to find the quotes at some point.

[bmac]

This is Sanders Marble's view:

In the seven-day bombardment before 1 July when the Somme offensive began there was little counter-battery work. Counter-battery fire was the third priority, behind harassing fire and wire-cutting, indicating a return to the priorities of mid-1915 rather than learning from the later stages of Loos. Although the preparatory bombardment was lengthened due to bad weather, the extra effort was put into bombarding trenches, not German artillery. Each corps in the Fourth Army decided how it wanted to conduct counter-battery fire, which inevitably produced significant variations. Some paid hardly any attention to the subject, being quite busy enough bombarding enemy defenses, cutting barbed wire, interdicting communications, firing feint barrages, and planning infantry support. Since the British plan was to break through rather than capture a portion of the German line, the entire depth of the German position had to be bombarded, which increased the number of targets, which then increased the priority of trench bombardment still higher.

For those corps that did make a significant counter-battery effort, the main goal was neutralization, often by retaliation. This would kill German gunners and might damage guns, but with the few resources available nobody expected much destruction. (This was a half-step back from the principles laid down in 1915, which shows they had not been entirely accepted. Before the Somme, there would be destructive counter-battery fire only during ordinary trench warfare, but during both the preliminary bombardment and the actual attack the goal was neutralization.) Planners realized that the counter-battery resources were still inadequate for sufficient destruction before Z Day, which forced a decision on how best to reduce the effectiveness of the surviving German guns. Some corps thought it was best to force German batteries to move to secondary positions because confusion, disorganization, and supply problems would reduce their effectiveness. Other corps thought it better that the BEF know where the German guns were located so that neutralization could be ready for Z Day. X and XIII Corps had clever plans to fire on German howitzers (which were most dangerous to infantry in trenches) before Zero Hour and neutralize field guns (the bigger threat to troops in the open) as the infantry advanced, while VII Corps had exactly the opposite idea. Also, some gas would be used for neutralization on Z Day since wearing gasmasks would significantly hinder German gunners, thus reducing their rate of fire and therefore their effectiveness. This was not the cloud gas (released from cylinders in the British front line) that had been so disappointing at Loos. Now a limited supply of gas shells was available, some from the French (who gave the shells and lent some 75s) and some for the British 4.5-inch howitzer. Using the field howitzer was a limited step away from the previous situation in which only medium guns were used for counter-battery fire.