British rifle-fire mistaken for machine-guns

[Thunderbox]

Can I repeat an earlier question I posed.

Accepting the 15 round per minute as a minimum,in 1914.

How many personal rounds of .303 did a rifleman carry at Mons i.e. in his webbing,additional bandoliers and how easy was it for him to be resupplied?

George

Most soldiers would have had Pattern 1908 webbing, with fives charger pouches each side containing 75 rounds left and right - 150 rounds total. Prior to expected battle, soldiers would also be handed one or more cotton bandoleers of five pouches each containing two chargers - 50 rounds per bandoleer. Many accounts indicate that soldiers usually were issued two extra bandoleers - so their "war load" would typically be 250 rounds. Thats quite a significant weight of ammunition.

There were other types of webbing still in service in 1914, but the total ammo load would be more or less the same.

The Army had (has) a highly efficient resupply system. Each unit would report its ammunition states at various times during the day. The unit would compile a logistical return and send this up to the next higher level. The reports were compiled at division, which was the basic accounting level for an army. The unit quartermaster staff would be the bottom portion of a divisional supply chain stretching back to supply dumps in the divisional rear area, thus replacement ammunition and other supplies would be pushed down to the units via this system.. All units would hold a buffer stock of ammunition at Company level - and again at Battalion level - so there was no reason to run short, even under very heavy usage. Most WW1 accounts, from Mons through to the armistice, tend to note that the front line soldiers were usually overflowing with SA ammunition.

In fact the overwhelming triumph (or relief) about Mons - from the Army's actual perspective - was that the British Army, having not fought a major campaign in Europe for nearly 100 years (ironically, of course, Waterloo - not far from Mons), has successfully fought a series of delaying actions - and had managed not only to stand up to a modern European army, but had survived "withdrawal in contact" and remained in good order. The Army's success was that the Mons forces remained largely intact and in good order, and that the command, supply and support services had all managed to function under stress. Many accounts by individuals during the retreat from Mons describe how they were kept fed and resupplied by their unit's echelon as the retreat progressed.

[truthergw]

15 aimed rounds per minute may well have been the standard which was expected but I find it hard to envisage a target at Mons which would demand it. Only when a target like a column of men or body of cavalry came into range would that mode of firing be useful. Two or three rounds at a moving target or a steady fire on a place of concealment, to keep the heads down, would be more common. This was largely street fighting and there are complaints of the limited fields of fire. I think there is a difference between being able to fire off 150 rounds in 10 minutes and that actually ever happening. As to supply, it would be the platoon commander's job to make sure his men were not put in a position where they could not withdraw or be supplied. Not always possible to implement that of course. We know that many men were cut off but that was considered unfortunate and something to be avoided if at all possible. I am inclined to agree with those who think that throwaway remarks were later seized upon, embellished and set in stone. Mons was the first encounter and ended in withdrawal. There are all sorts of reasons for putting the performance of the men in the best possible light both at the time and in retrospect.

[Thunderbox]

To a soldier, the difference between the weapon firing sound of rifle fire and MG fire is easily distinguishable, even during periods of intense fire. The rhythmic note of a machine gun is easily detected, even when mixed in with rifle fire. You can even hear it when the weapons in question are identical - e.g. on a modern range with 19x SA80s firing repetition and just one firing auto by accident!

The target effect at very long range might be a lot harder to distinguish, if the sound of the firing weapons is masked or there is uncertainty as to which way a detected MG is actually firing.

[dycer]

Can I pose another question.

At Mons were Maxims used in the sustained fire role or was the three round and adjustment procedure adopted?

George

[Jack Sheldon]

Thunderbox

Thank you for your useful contribution concerning the distinct sound of MGs v massed rifle fire, with which I concur entirely. I am less sure about your remarks concerning service support during the retreat. How do you square your remarks with BOH (Mons Volume) p 260 'The misery that all ranks suffered is well summed up in the phrase of an officer, I would never have believed that men could be so tired and hungry and yet live.' & P 261 'They were short of food and sleep when they began their retreat, they continued it always short of food and sleep for thirteeen days.'

Of course the order by Henry Wilson to II Corps on 28 Aug to, 'Throw overboard all ammunition and impedimenta not absolutely required and load up your lame ducks on all transport, horse and mechanical, and hustle along' did not help. (Terraine, Mons p 151) This would have left the BEF in dire straits if it had not been for the fact that, 'Sir William Robertson had fortunately hit upon the sensible idea of making sure of the supply of basic necessities by dumping them along the line of march; it was a wasteful method, but it did mean that the troops were not left entirely unfed and short of ammuition'. (Terraine, same page).

This policy is borne out by two eye witness statements in Diary of an Old Contemptible pp 16 and 22 respectively; viz. Pte Edward Roe E Lan R, 'Dead horses, sides of beef, boxes of milk, tea, jam, bully and biscuits mark our line of retreat. Dumps could not be formed owing to the hurried retrograde movement. The difficulty of feeding the retreating troops was solved in the above manner'. Rifleman E Gale Rifle Brigade, 'The Army Service Corps who had our rations. They could not stop. They just threw our rations on the side of the road and left us to pick them up'.

Could you please provide us some examples of the 'many accounts' you have found by individuals telling a different story?

Jack

[Piorun]

Good morning Antony (Piorun),

I think we are perhaps using a different definition of propaganda. I merely mean the propagation of an idea or viewpoint, whether it be fact, fiction or an elaboration of fact. I am not sure it enhances the standing of the BEF to believe the Germans advanced like described (which was of course contrary to the Germans' training and tactical doctrine).

I acknowledge your points - and the courtesy with which they are made. Yours, Antony

[Robert Dunlop]

There is an example of how the SAA resupply system worked during battle here. The example relates to the 4/Middlesex Regiment at Mons.

Robert

[MikB]

To a soldier, the difference between the weapon firing sound of rifle fire and MG fire is easily distinguishable, even during periods of intense fire. The rhythmic note of a machine gun is easily detected, even when mixed in with rifle fire. You can even hear it when the weapons in question are identical - e.g. on a modern range with 19x SA80s firing repetition and just one firing auto by accident!

The target effect at very long range might be a lot harder to distinguish, if the sound of the firing weapons is masked or there is uncertainty as to which way a detected MG is actually firing.

I think your second paragraph may be pertinent - as far as I remember the legends of the MG belief arose in actions in the order of 1000-yard-ranges. I'm sure you're right within the 300-yard-odd usual range of the SA80, and think I've even heard the condition you mention when firing alongside the military at Kingsbury. But I think with quantities of bullets arriving trans- or subsonically, at distances to degrade the thump of discharge, the people in the target area might have much more difficulty separating the "stuttering rifle's rapid rattle" from that of the MG. Anybody know which way the wind was blowing? Might have influenced what was audible.

Regards,

MikB

[SiegeGunner]

Anybody know which way the wind was blowing? Might have influenced what was audible.

Regards,

MikB

What a very good question. Puts me in mind of the common mistake of overlooking the fact that the Zeebrugge Raid took place at night.

[Guest]

Anybody know which way the wind was blowing? Might have influenced what was audible.

Regards,

MikB

From The First Seven Divisions by Ernedt W Hamilton

THE BATTLE OF MONS

This morning of the 23rd opened sunny and

bright. The weather was set fair with

a breeze from the east, a cloudless sky, and the

promise of great heat at midday. A pale blue

haze rounded off the distance, and softened

the outlines of the tall, gaunt chimney stacks

with which the entire country is dotted.

Mike

[MikB]

From The First Seven Divisions by Ernedt W Hamilton

THE BATTLE OF MONS

This morning of the 23rd opened sunny and

bright. The weather was set fair with

a breeze from the east, a cloudless sky, and the

promise of great heat at midday. A pale blue

haze rounded off the distance, and softened

the outlines of the tall, gaunt chimney stacks

with which the entire country is dotted.

Mike

Thank you. Tommy and Fritz seem to have been fighting NE and SW-ward respectively.

Regards,

MikB

[Guest]

Then there is this " THE WEATHER

The morning of the 23rd of August started out with mist and rain, but this cleared around 10am to fair weather with a prevailing westerly wind. Conan Doyle [as historian] describes a warm August sun later in the day, and Ascoli, a stifling August heat and hot sunshine. There is no mention in any of the texts of any unusual cloud formations." from HERE

Mike

[Guest]

I'm not sure how you get it, but this;

Is available HERE

Mike

[salesie]

As promised:

A review of Blood Test Revisited by James McRandle & James Quirk (July 2006)

The paper starts with a synopsis:

“This paper presents a "new" set of data on German casualties in World War I, using the German medical corps's official history to resolve two major controversies concerning casualty comparisons in Winston Churchill's "Blood Test" chapter in The World Crisis: first, treatment of the 496,000 German casualties that Churchill could not assign to battle periods; and second, provision of German casualty data comparable to that of the French and British through the inclusion of "lightly wounded" German casualties. Finally, these data weaken somewhat, but do not overturn Churchill's argument that, in every battle period on the Western Front, Allied casualties were greater than German casualties.”

.

The main body then opens with mention of Charles Carrington’s strong warning, in 1965, that the validity of the comparative casualty tables given by Churchill in his World Crisis has been completely demolished by the later work of Sir Charles Oman. Followed by a quote from Terraine, some fifteen years later, saying that he wasn’t convinced either way, “Nothing is more frustrating for the historian than trying to reach some firm ground on the subject of World War One casualties.” Following this demonstration of “opposing” views, McRandle & Quirk then tell us that, “this paper returns to the long-standing controversy concerning Field Marshal Haig’s ‘war of attrition’ strategy in World War I, with central focus on the related controversy concerning casualty counts of the two sides during that war.”

Then follows some six pages (668-673) detailing both the criticism, by Churchill and Lloyd George, of “Haig’s attrition strategy” (during as well as post-war), and an overview of the historiography of the casualty controversy; an overview that includes names such as Edmonds, Oman, Williams, Liddell Hart, Prior, et al.

The authors then go on to explain the provenance of their “new” data: “We turn now to the present paper. What it has to offer is a "new" set of statistics on German casualties, one that, to our knowledge, has not appeared in the literature dealing with the casualty issue. These monthly data, covering the war through 31 July 1918, appeared in print in 1934, in the official history of the German medical service during World War I, Sanitaitsbericht iiber das Deutsche Heer (Deutsches Feld-und-Besat-sungheer) im Weltkriege 1914/1918.This source is relatively rare (only three copies-on microfilm-are available in United States libraries). is a voluminous treatise on all aspects of health care for German soldiers during the war, over 2,000 pages in length, with countless tables, charts, and diagrams, providing information in elaborate detail on the sick, wounded, and dying under treatment during the war. While this history (hereinafter referred to as Sanitats) has been cited several times in the existing literature, the breakdown of casualties given in tables near the end of the three-volume study has not been mentioned in those citations. That omission is corrected in the present paper.

The source of the Sanitats data is not known with certainty, but strong circumstantial evidence indicates that these data come from the records of the medical units in the field and hospitals, because included in the data is a breakdown between those patients (WIA and sick combined) who were returned to action after treatment, either at the front or at base hospitals, and those who required longer treatment periods at hospitals. These data would not be known at the time by those preparing the Verlustliste reports that provide the basis for Churchill's tables, but would be an essential part of bookkeeping at treatment centres. Thus, it certainly appears that Sanitats provides a separate source of casualty data relative to that underlying Churchill's analysis. In effect, in the jargon of economists, Churchill's data report numbers of casualties from the point of view of the "demanders" for health treatment, and Sanitats is reporting data on casualties from the point of view of the "sup-pliers" of health treatment. Moreover, the fact that the Sanitats data explicitly include the lightly wounded (unfortunately explicitly identified as such only in data where they are combined with sick patients with similar short-term treatment characteristics) means that there is concrete evidence to support Edmonds's contention of the existence of a second set of statistics of German casualties that include the lightly wounded, a refutation of Williams's claim noted earlier.”

The next twenty-odd pages are full of tables from various sources, with the authors drawing comparisons between Churchill’s figures in his World Crisis (based on the German Verlustliste reports), the Nachweiseamt figures, the U.S. War Department’s estimates on German casualties from the 1920s, and the “new” Sanitats figures. These comparisons are accompanied by adjustments made by the authors, adjustments they explain and say are necessary to make sense of the comparisons.

This all leads to a conclusion on page 693: “Our main objective in writing this paper was to bring forward this "new" source of casualty statistics, in order to resolve certain disputes concerning casualty counts, for example, the Edmonds-Williams dispute concerning the very existence of a data set such as Sanitats; and to put to rest any lingering doubts concerning Churchill's "Blood Test" conclusions, based on the lightly wounded issue. In particular, if it is asserted that, because Sanitats simply reduces, but does not eliminate, the advantage that German troops held over Allied troops, in terms of productivity and hence in terms of attrition effects, then there is no important contribution from the unearthing of the Sanitats data set, and this is sim-ply a misunderstanding. Without the Sanitats data, Churchill's conclusions would continue to be tentative, awaiting a resolution of the lightly wounded problem. Sanitats not only solves the lightly wounded problem, but it also provides a quantitative measure of the extent to which Churchill's comments overstated the strength of the advantage the German army had over the Allies. No doubt the Sanitats data set will help to shed light on other issues concerning World War I, beyond those discussed here.”

On first reading this paper, I had a strong feeling of disappointment – I had expected much more. Indeed, the authors use of language, in their rather brief conclusion, left me with the impression that they, too, were pretty disappointed with their ambiguous, neither here nor there, findings.

Their initial aims, though, were clear enough i.e. validation of Churchill’s figures (and, thus, criticism of Haig) by the use of a “new” set of statistics on German casualties - a “new”, wholly German, set called the Sanitats. Critics of Haig’s “war of attrition”, and brief details of their criticism, are mentioned several times throughout the paper. Whereas, Haig’s defenders are only mentioned in passing (to detail the historiography), and no mention at all is given to the fact that Haig’s critics, including Churchill, have never ever come up with a viable alternative strategy that would have dramatically reduced casualties and still won the war. The “ee-aw” bias of the authors of this paper is there for all to see – the silence, on an alternative strategy, emanating from such critics speaks volumes to me.

The authors wish us to believe that, with statistical sleight of hand, Churchill’s Blood Test chapter’s superior “German productivity figures”, though reduced by the Sanitats, are still valid to a greater degree. They tell us that, “From an overall point of view, Sanitats reduces the productivity measure of the German army over the course of World War I from 1.59 to 1.42, a reduction of roughly 11 percent. After the first few months of the war, German casualty-inflicting productivity fell rather steadily, as the Allied armies moved up their learning curve, and as the course of the war and its attrition eroded the initial advantages in training and leader-ship of the elite units of the German army. But this trend is evident in Churchill's data set as well as in Sanitats. And there is no evidence to overturn Churchill's basic point, that the battles fought on the Western Front wore down the Allied armies more than they wore down the Germans, and this was true for every battle during the war. The added lightly wounded casualties in Sanitats simply lessen somewhat the German advantage over the Allies, but do not provide evidence that would over-turn that advantage, in any battle on the Western Front.”

I say statistical sleight of hand, simply because to reconcile four sets of German casualty stats; three German casualty lists (Sanitats, Nachweiseamt, and Churchill’s based on the Verlustliste) and the U.S. War Department’s estimated list, the authors have needed to “adjust” the figures. But they haven’t managed to reconcile the glaring discrepancies in the individual categories of those lists, they’ve only managed to bring the totals near enough for them to claim that they balance – and the explanations for these “adjustments” contain too many phrases such as “estimates must be made”, “guesstimates”, “presumably”, such and such “might reflect” etc. for my liking.

Then we must address the assertion made a few times in the paper that “the battles fought on the Western Front wore down the Allied armies more than they wore down the Germans, and this was true for every battle during the war.” If we accept the bare statistics in the German lists, we have no choice but to accept such an extremely shallow assertion, but how can we accept such a thing at face value? We know for a fact that neither Haig nor Foch sent civilian politicians with orders to accept an armistice on any terms, we know that it was Hindenburg and Ludendorff who did that just in time to prevent the German field army from totally disintegrating. We know that the allied armies did not collapsed as the German field army did, we know that neither British nor French troops fought each other in the streets of London or Paris, we know for certain that that was the sole domain of elements of the German army on the streets of German cities. We know that neither King George V nor the French President was forced to flee from their own people, we know that that was the fate of the German Kaiser.

And this is why I hate casualty “productivity figures” so much – even if the “new” Sanitats’ figures are accurate (and I don’t accept that they are, as you will see later), all that reducing them to “productivity” ratios does is trivialise events by giving an extremely shallow view. Reducing these stats to “football-score” figures only serves one useful purpose as far as I can see i.e. to tell us that “best team” lost, and that little gem only reinforces one thing, the stab-in-the-back theory – the German army was worn down to a point of disintegration (as was the German state), it did not go through the war undefeated in the field, and no amount of statistical sleight of hand will alter these facts.

In one way, I suppose, I should welcome this paper and accept it at face value. After all, if the “best team” in the field did in fact lose then it would “prove” beyond doubt my numerous assertions on this forum when “preaching” that in total-war no pure military victory in the field is possible, that whatever military tactics are employed, by any side, they’re irrelevant, that Germany was on a strategic hiding to nothing from virtually the outset, and that the German High Command are the true “donkeys” of this war for not recognising the strategic implications of their actions. But there are too many flaws in this paper for me to do that.

There are other things in this paper that I could criticise, but I won’t, they are only minor criticisms and for those not having read the paper they may make their eyes gloss over (if that hasn’t happened already). But there is one major flaw that I see which raises serious doubts about the authors whole stance, and this is the one that I have saved until last:

The authors tell us that Edmonds was correct in his assertion that there was another German list showing lightly wounded, but that he was wrong in saying that any published German casualty lists, especially relating to the Somme, should be increased by 30%. Their “proof” of this is the “new” statistics in the Sanitats, and they tell us that because the totals of the Sanitats, the Nachweiseamt and Churchill’s figures based on the Verlustliste, as well as the U.S. War Department’s estimated list, can be adjusted to be almost in balance then this is proof of consistency and therefore accuracy. They tell us that German Casualty stats only need adjusting by 11%, not Edmonds’ 30%, and that Churchill’s was an understandable error because he didn’t have the Sanitats figures, with the lightly wounded included, with which to be more accurate in comparison. In other words, Churchill was only wrong by degree, the true “productivity” rate was 1.42 in Germany’s favour as opposed to Churchill’s 1.59.

The authors also tell us on page 690 that, “Note that the MIA/POW cumulative totals for Zentral Nachweiseamt and Sanitats track each other very closely right up to 1918. In 1918, there is a gap of over 300,000 between the two. This almost certainly reflects a mistake in the 1918 MIA/POW count in the Zentral Nachweiseamt data, since there is a correction of roughly 220,000 (net) in 1919 to bring the cumulative MIA/POW count more in line with Sanitats.”

It is the MIA figures that I find to be so informative. The medical services would have accurate counts of those using their services, but could not possibly have their own count of the missing; if you rang the local hospital and asked how many had gone through A&E in the last calendar month, and they replied 20,000 attended A&E and 2,000 didn’t, then you would be in order asking if they’d conducted a put your hand up if you’re not here count. The missing figures could not, by definition, be derived from the medical services own count – I would also guess that not every dead German soldier was sent to aid-posts and hospitals to be confirmed as dead (which may account for the much higher number of KIA in the Nachweiseamt when compared with Sanitats), but that is speculation on my part, so I’ll stick with the MIA figures which could not possibly be derived from the Sanitats own resources.

This begs the question, why did the Sanitats feel the need to include the MIA/POW figures. What possible use could these figures be to the medical services in planning for a future war, why plan for men that you’re never going to see? And, where did the Sanitats get its MIA data from?

The authors of the paper tell us that the MIA figures for the Nachweiseamt and Sanitats track each other closely (but not exactly in the Table 11 comparisons), until 1918, but that adjustments are made in 1919 to bring them more in line (as if this is further proof of legitimacy). Given that these two sets of cumulative MIA figures are not exact matches, and in 1918 varied wildly, until converging, though not fully, in 1919, I would conclude that this is clear evidence of the existence of at least two other German casualty lists. I say two others because the authors claim that Churchill’s figures match the Verlustliste, and when looking at Table 8 (Comparison between Churchill’s figures and the Sanitats) we can see that there is not even close matching in MIA figures, so that rules out the Verlustliste as source for both the Nachweiseamt and Sanitats (in fact, when looking at these two Tables, 8 & 11, we can see that different figures are given for Sanitats totals, but that is of no importance compared to the outrageous notion that medical services personnel would count or even attempt to count those they hadn’t seen or were ever going to see). So, I see this as evidence of at least two other, unknown as yet, German casualty lists “feeding” information to the Nachweiseamt and Sanitats – if discovered, perhaps Edmonds' 30% figure may just be vindicated?

There are two other explanations, of course. Firstly, the Germans were crap at counting and making lists – but I think we all know that’s not a reasonable assertion. Or, secondly, this is a clear case of false/creative, accounting – all these discrepancies are a hallmark of such practices. After all, we know that proper audits of the detail making up the totals are not able to be done because of the firestorms of WW2. I mean, would you buy a business if presented with four sets of differing accounts, whose totals nearly balance only because of adjustments made on the basis of “estimates must be made” (with the individual categories varying wildly), without insisting on a detailed audit to verify due-diligence?

If you would like to buy on such a basis, get your money out and I’ll knock up a few sets of accounts forthwith!

Cheers-salesie.

[dutchbarge]

I don't have the background to comment on the veracity of the argument in your last posting, however, based on common sense alone it seems plausible. In any event I must admit to being most impressed by the time you have given to both researching and putting it forward. Cheers, Bill

[Pete1052]

It would seem to me that every nation involved in a war has organizational elements within its government and armed forces that compile lists of casualty statistics -- it isn't surprising that these different tabulations have variances from each other because of different input data and methodologies, and also because over time some of those listed as Missing in Action or Wounded in Action will later be moved to a different category of casualty. I have no doubt that the "official" casualty statistics of the British and U.S. armed forces during the world wars were not published until the discrepances between different lists had been reconciled with each other. I recall a thread a couple of years ago in which it was said that French casualty figures are notoriously unreliable.

[George Armstrong Custer]

A very well reasoned deconstruction of McRandle & Quirk, Salesie, setting out clearly what they do and do not convincingly demonstrate.

George

[Latze]

Hi Salesie,

I am a bit late in replying... bad day at the office. I really appreciate it that you took the time to read the paper. Unfortunately we do still disagree as to what to take home from it.

NOTE: the forum software complained about 'to many quotes'. So I but everything into one block again and numbered it. Sorry - this is no attempt to manipulate what you wrote.

1)

And this is why I hate casualty "productivity figures" so much – even if the "new" Sanitats' figures are accurate (and I don't accept that they are, as you will see later), all that reducing them to "productivity" ratios does is trivialise events by giving an extremely shallow view. Reducing these stats to "football-score" figures only serves one useful purpose as far as I can see i.e. to tell us that "best team" lost, and that little gem only reinforces one thing, the stab-in-the-back theory – the German army was worn down to a point of disintegration (as was the German state), it did not go through the war undefeated in the field, and no amount of statistical sleight of hand will alter these facts.

In one way, I suppose, I should welcome this paper and accept it at face value. After all, if the "best team" in the field did in fact lose then it would "prove" beyond doubt my numerous assertions on this forum when "preaching" that in total-war no pure military victory in the field is possible, that whatever military tactics are employed, by any side, they're irrelevant, that Germany was on a strategic hiding to nothing from virtually the outset, and that the German High Command are the true "donkeys" of this war for not recognising the strategic implications of their actions. But there are too many flaws in this paper for me to do that.

....

2)

It is the MIA figures that I find to be so informative. The medical services would have accurate counts of those using their services, but could not possibly have their own count of the missing; if you rang the local hospital and asked how many had gone through A&E in the last calendar month, and they replied 20,000 attended A&E and 2,000 didn't, then you would be in order asking if they'd conducted a put your hand up if you're not here count. The missing figures could not, by definition, be derived from the medical services own count – I would also guess that not every dead German soldier was sent to aid-posts and hospitals to be confirmed as dead (which may account for the much higher number of KIA in the Nachweiseamt when compared with Sanitats), but that is speculation on my part, so I'll stick with the MIA figures which could not possibly be derived from the Sanitats own resources.

This begs the question, why did the Sanitats feel the need to include the MIA/POW figures. What possible use could these figures be to the medical services in planning for a future war, why plan for men that you're never going to see? And, where did the Sanitats get its MIA data from?

...

3)

There are two other explanations, of course. Firstly, the Germans were crap at counting and making lists – but I think we all know that's not a reasonable assertion. Or, secondly, this is a clear case of false/creative, accounting – all these discrepancies are a hallmark of such practices. After all, we know that proper audits of the detail making up the totals are not able to be done because of the firestorms of WW2. I mean, would you buy a business if presented with four sets of differing accounts, whose totals nearly balance only because of adjustments made on the basis of "estimates must be made" (with the individual categories varying wildly), without insisting on a detailed audit to verify due-diligence?

If you would like to buy on such a basis, get your money out and I'll knock up a few sets of accounts forthwith!

1)

I understand your general opposition to 'productivity figures'. The reduction of everything that goes on in a war to a number is certainly fraught with errors, misapplication and possibly obscures as much as it enlightens. On the other hand: that people use casualty counts to arrive at those numbers cannot be an argument against the numbers per se. And: the fact that one side looses cannot from the viewpoint of logic be taken as proof that the loosing side has suffered more casualties in relative or absolute terms. For a given side to 'win' in a war of attrition the productivity can be crap - as long as it has a sufficient lead in man- and willpower. And yes: probably there was no better strategy available. If the application of that strategy (operations and tactics) were adequate is again another question.

2)

The data in the Sanitätsbericht is based on 10-day strength returns of army units. These did include missing personnel. I think (but I would have to confirm that) that the authors thought this place to publish this data to be as good as any place else. We all know that the British published the Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914–1920 but there is jus no equivalent in the German OH. There is one tome "Kriegsrüstung und Kriegswirtschaft" that deals with other 'statistical data' concerning ammunition production and the like. Yes, it would be fortunate if everybody would have agreed on the one true way of publishing and arranging all stuff to know, but alas that did not come to pass. So the answer to your question: it was convenient.

3)

You being – possibly an accountant – perceived sets with differing figures as 'clear cases of false/creative' accounting. Let me tell you that in most empirical sciences the opposite is true. If four independent measurements taken all bring back the same values in most cases your equipment is not working or somebody is in fact falsifying his data.

I think that your analogy of this being the equivalent of 'us' being a business and the owner presenting us with four different books is lawed. Let us suppose that we are an insurer and the client has valid claims. Question is: how big are these claims. Unfortunately somebody had good reason to throw a firebomb in our claimants home so all original data is lost. But we have two lists of his possessions he has created before. These two lists count different things so we have to see what to make of them.

But wait: we have to estimates from third parties (in fact a third goes by the name of Winston and a fourth, called Sam). These two estimated independently the size of the claims - and these estimates are damn near to the stuff our guy claims.

But to ask it differently: if Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War gives us 908.371 dead and Official Medical History of the War gives just 876.084 is then valid to ask where the difference comes from and possibly advance arguments why these differences exist or do we have to assume that it is a clear case of false accounting also?

regards

Matt

[truthergw]

Very interesting and indeed, impressive post, Salesie. I am off to print it and stew on it for a bit.

Matt, Just one thing. These figures are not measured, they are counted. Four sums ought to tally and discrepancy needs to be explained.

[salesie]

Hi Salesie,

I am a bit late in replying... bad day at the office. I really appreciate it that you took the time to read the paper. Unfortunately we do still disagree as to what to take home from it.

NOTE: the forum software complained about 'to many quotes'. So I but everything into one block again and numbered it. Sorry - this is no attempt to manipulate what you wrote.

1)

I understand your general opposition to 'productivity figures'. The reduction of everything that goes on in a war to a number is certainly fraught with errors, misapplication and possibly obscures as much as it enlightens. On the other hand: that people use casualty counts to arrive at those numbers cannot be an argument against the numbers per se. And: the fact that one side looses cannot from the viewpoint of logic be taken as proof that the loosing side has suffered more casualties in relative or absolute terms. For a given side to 'win' in a war of attrition the productivity can be crap - as long as it has a sufficient lead in man- and willpower. And yes: probably there was no better strategy available. If the application of that strategy (operations and tactics) were adequate is again another question.

2)

The data in the Sanitätsbericht is based on 10-day strength returns of army units. These did include missing personnel. I think (but I would have to confirm that) that the authors thought this place to publish this data to be as good as any place else. We all know that the British published the Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914–1920 but there is jus no equivalent in the German OH. There is one tome "Kriegsrüstung und Kriegswirtschaft" that deals with other 'statistical data' concerning ammunition production and the like. Yes, it would be fortunate if everybody would have agreed on the one true way of publishing and arranging all stuff to know, but alas that did not come to pass. So the answer to your question: it was convenient.

3)

You being – possibly an accountant – perceived sets with differing figures as 'clear cases of false/creative' accounting. Let me tell you that in most empirical sciences the opposite is true. If four independent measurements taken all bring back the same values in most cases your equipment is not working or somebody is in fact falsifying his data.

I think that your analogy of this being the equivalent of 'us' being a business and the owner presenting us with four different books is lawed. Let us suppose that we are an insurer and the client has valid claims. Question is: how big are these claims. Unfortunately somebody had good reason to throw a firebomb in our claimants home so all original data is lost. But we have two lists of his possessions he has created before. These two lists count different things so we have to see what to make of them.

But wait: we have to estimates from third parties (in fact a third goes by the name of Winston and a fourth, called Sam). These two estimated independently the size of the claims - and these estimates are damn near to the stuff our guy claims.

But to ask it differently: if Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War gives us 908.371 dead and Official Medical History of the War gives just 876.084 is then valid to ask where the difference comes from and possibly advance arguments why these differences exist or do we have to assume that it is a clear case of false accounting also?

regards

Matt

Matt, don't have too much time to deal with this - so will give brief answers if I may.

1) I agree that my point about the trivialising of events by reducing casualty stats to nothing more than "football scores" is not an argument against the veracity of those stats per se. But I thought I made it plain that I was arguing against the authors' use of language in their consistently implied, one-sided, criticism of "Haig's strategy of attrition" - I did, after all, write a review of the whole paper not just the statistical validity of the data used.

2) My main point about the Sanitats' MIA figures is that the medical units, from which the authors claim (probably rightly) that these figures are derived, could not possibly have counted the MIA because the MIA would not, by definition, have presented themselves for medical treatment - how could they count men that they never saw or were never ever going to see? Whether they were ten-day or ten-month or ten-year or ten-hour returns is completely irrelevant to this point. Consequently, it may have been convenient to include MIA figures in the Sanitats, but convenient for whom? Certainly not the medical services in the field.

3) I’m no accountant, but do have a certified diploma in accounting and finance, and was in business for some twenty-odd years (nine years as managing director).

And, although I'm willing to accept that a little empirical measurement is needed in the compilation of casualty lists, surely the vast majority of the figures would be based on actual counts?

Also, your comparison with an insurance claim is not valid. An insurance company has a clear contractual responsibility to the insured, and, unless it can prove fraud and/or lack of honest information from the insured when taking out the policy, it has a legal obligation to pay out - the way the amount of any pay out is arrived at is a matter for the loss-adjusters and does not infringe on the basic contractual obligation between the two parties. Whereas, when buying a business there is no contractual obligation at the outset and, even after any agreement to buy, any contract would normally be subject to a due-diligence clause (due-diligence being an audit to ensure that the financial information given in the accounts was a true and honest reporting of said business' financial trading).

In other words, an insurance company needs to prove fraud to walk away, but a potential business buyer only needs to suspect it to do the same. With four sets of wildly differing accounts, and no chance at all of auditing for due-diligence, I will certainly not "buy" the "business" that you and others are touting around.

That said, my allegation of false/creative accounting was levelled at the authors of said paper as much as at the compilers of the lists many decades ago - but that was an alternative allegation, I also said that I saw evidence (based on the MIA figures) of the existence of at least two other, as yet undiscovered, German casualty lists. One has to wonder just how many German casualty lists we will eventually end up with.

Cheers-salesie.

[Latze]

Hi Tom,

Very interesting and indeed, impressive post, Salesie. I am off to print it and stew on it for a bit.

Matt, Just one thing. These figures are not measured, they are counted. Four sums ought to tally and discrepancy needs to be explained.

I don't know... two of these figures we are talking about are estimates (the Churchill data and the US data). The other two sets we have used different counting standards. I agree totally with the assertion that if we do two counts using the same criteria for counting that these should come out the same. The whole point it that this was not the case here.

regards

Matt

[Latze]

Hello salesie,

Matt, don't have too much time to deal with this - so will give brief answers if I may.

1) I agree that my point about the trivialising of events by reducing casualty stats to nothing more than "football scores" is not an argument against the veracity of those stats per se. But I thought I made it plain that I was arguing against the authors' use of language in their consistently implied, one-sided, criticism of "Haig's strategy of attrition" - I did, after all, write a review of the whole paper not just the statistical validity of the data used.

2) My main point about the Sanitats' MIA figures is that the medical units, from which the authors claim (probably rightly) that these figures are derived, could not possibly have counted the MIA because the MIA would not, by definition, have presented themselves for medical treatment - how could they count men that they never saw or were never ever going to see? Whether they were ten-day or ten-month or ten-year or ten-hour returns is completely irrelevant to this point. Consequently, it may have been convenient to include MIA figures in the Sanitats, but convenient for whom? Certainly not the medical services in the field.

3) I'm no accountant, but do have a certified diploma in accounting and finance, and was in business for some twenty-odd years (nine years as managing director).

And, although I'm willing to accept that a little empirical measurement is needed in the compilation of casualty lists, surely the vast majority of the figures would be based on actual counts?

Also, your comparison with an insurance claim is not valid. An insurance company has a clear contractual responsibility to the insured, and, unless it can prove fraud and/or lack of honest information from the insured when taking out the policy, it has a legal obligation to pay out - the way the amount of any pay out is arrived at is a matter for the loss-adjusters and does not infringe on the basic contractual obligation between the two parties. Whereas, when buying a business there is no contractual obligation at the outset and, even after any agreement to buy, any contract would normally be subject to a due-diligence clause (due-diligence being an audit to ensure that the financial information given in the accounts was a true and honest reporting of said business' financial trading).

In other words, an insurance company needs to prove fraud to walk away, but a potential business buyer only needs to suspect it to do the same. With four sets of wildly differing accounts, and no chance at all of auditing for due-diligence, I will certainly not "buy" the "business" that you and others are touting around.

That said, my allegation of false/creative accounting was levelled at the authors of said paper as much as at the compilers of the lists many decades ago - but that was an alternative allegation, I also said that I saw evidence (based on the MIA figures) of the existence of at least two other, as yet undiscovered, German casualty lists. One has to wonder just how many German casualty lists we will eventually end up with.

Cheers-salesie.

sure. Short is sweet.

Concerning the MIA figures. I will go to the library and check. Might take a couple of days though... But if I may ask beforehand: is there any answer that would satisfy you that could be given in the book? Or is just about any statement of source for MIA a priori fraudulent if coming from SanB?

As to the question of convenience, find a photo attached. I think you have these guys in mind standing around during the inauguration of the monument to the Sanitätspersonal (medical service) in 1929. Note avowed Nazi enemy v.Hammerstein-Erquord in front row. Or did you think of anybody else?

I hope that this is not considered rude if I repeat a question asked earlier, but as you insist on the accounting analogy and on the fact that if two set of figures exists that these can only be explained by fraud would you say than that the two sets of British war dead have to be seen in the same light?

regards

Matt

[truthergw]

Hi Tom,

I don't know... two of these figures we are talking about are estimates (the Churchill data and the US data). The other two sets we have used different counting standards. I agree totally with the assertion that if we do two counts using the same criteria for counting that these should come out the same. The whole point it that this was not the case here.

regards

Matt

Patients were counted. There can be no dubiety as to whether we had 12 or 11 patients in a ward. If there is more than one figure given then different criteria are being applied as to what should be counted. That is exactly the point at issue here. When Churchill quotes a figure for casualties, is he counting the same thing as the Official History? Without a complete description of exactly what was counted, we are wasting our time. We only need to look at DLG's mis-use of figures in his statements to the House in 1918 to see what a politician can do with statistics. I am not being chauvinistic when I insist that as far as I am aware, the best figures available are in the OH. They are listed there for all to see. What was counted, who counted etc. The editors detail their sources and the means employed for acquiring, verifying and correcting information made available to them. Lay me out an equally detailed and comparably referenced set of figures from any other source then I would be more than happy to go over them, contrast and compare and hopefully arrive at a meaningful conclusion.

[Jack Sheldon]

Can I recommend, as I have done previously in at least one other thread, that anyone with a serious interest about how the BOH and indeed Churchill, handled the German casualty question, reads the 1966 article by MJ Williams which appeared in the Journal of the RUSI and which is readily obtainable from the Institute? Title: The Treatment of German Losses on the Somme in the British Official History: 'Military Operations France and Belgium 1916' Volume II. I know that GAC has some problems with at least part of the article, but at present it would be unfair to distract him from more important studies, by asking him to explain. He has promised to address the issue when he is free to pursue other matters once more. Nevertheless, nobody can regard themselves as properly briefed (or at least fully exposed to the issues) unless and until they have read Williams. Until fresh evidence is produced, I buy completely into Williams' argument He rounds off his devastating critique by stating of the BOH that, 'Unfortunately its treatment of German casualties is unscholarly and unreliable'. - this after remarking that, 'General Edmonds's methods in using German casualty figures here and throughout his Preface to '1916' Volume II have a strong resemblance to Humpty Dumpty's use of words in 'Through the Looking Glass'.

Jack

[salesie]

Hello salesie,

sure. Short is sweet.

Concerning the MIA figures. I will go to the library and check. Might take a couple of days though... But if I may ask beforehand: is there any answer that would satisfy you that could be given in the book? Or is just about any statement of source for MIA a priori fraudulent if coming from SanB?

As to the question of convenience, find a photo attached. I think you have these guys in mind standing around during the inauguration of the monument to the Sanitätspersonal (medical service) in 1929. Note avowed Nazi enemy v.Hammerstein-Erquord in front row. Or did you think of anybody else?

I hope that this is not considered rude if I repeat a question asked earlier, but as you insist on the accounting analogy and on the fact that if two set of figures exists that these can only be explained by fraud would you say than that the two sets of British war dead have to be seen in the same light?

regards

Matt

Matt, my patience with you is beginning to wear very thin indeed - either you are deliberately avoiding addressing my main points, or there is a problem with translation, or I have lost the ability to communicate effectively when using the English language. Whichever option is true, your last post is decidedly non sequitur, and, thus, your desperation to defend your "faith" is beginning to show through once more.

1) The MIA figure given in the Sanitats is at odds with McRandle and Quirk's assertion in the paper that: "The source of the Sanitats data is not known with certainty, but strong circumstantial evidence indicates that these data come from the records of the medical units in the field and hospitals, because included in the data is a breakdown between those patients (WIA and sick combined) who were returned to action after treatment, either at the front or at base hospitals, and those who required longer treatment periods at hospitals. These data would not be known at the time by those preparing the Verlustliste reports that provide the basis for Churchill's tables, but would be an essential part of bookkeeping at treatment centres. Thus, it certainly appears that Sanitats provides a separate source of casualty data relative to that underlying Churchill's analysis. In effect, in the jargon of economists, Churchill's data report numbers of casualties from the point of view of the "demanders" for health treatment, and Sanitats is reporting data on casualties from the point of view of the "suppliers" of health treatment. Moreover, the fact that the Sanitats data explicitly include the lightly wounded (unfortunately explicitly identified as such only in data where they are combined with sick patients with similar short-term treatment characteristics) means that there is concrete evidence to support Edmonds's contention of the existence of a second set of statistics of German casualties that include the lightly wounded, a refutation of Williams's claim noted earlier.”

In other words, the authors claim that the Sanitats is accurate, and therefore a good basis to validate other lists, because it comes directly from the "suppliers of health treatment", that it is based on counts of medical units in the field and hospitals. So how on earth can "suppliers of health treatment" count the MIA, how can they possibly count those who were never "demanders for health treatment"?

This is the question I posed, not least because, when tied in with other lists, it is evidence of at least two other German lists "feeding" the Sanitats and Nachweiseamt. Now, you can either answer this question or not, Matt, but please stop faffing around with nonsensical, non sequitur replies.

2) In my review of Blood Test Revisited, I deliberately avoided any mention of potential Nazi involvement in the Sanitats publication in 1934. I did this in order to see how quickly others would bring up the issue. As I said earlier in the thread, those with nothing constructive to offer the debate return to the Nazi issue in order to cover-up their own shallowness - you didn't let me down, Matt. An old photograph, accompanied with a few words from you mentioning a nazi, adds nothing to the debate except nonsense.

3) You've already confirmed that the British OH is accompanied by a detailed reference work of its statistical basis and that the German OH is not (due-diligence for the British figures, no-diligence for the German?).

And you ask: "if Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War gives us 908,371 dead and Official Medical History of the War (British) gives just 876,084 is it then valid to ask where the difference comes from and possibly advance arguments why these differences exist or do we have to assume that it is a clear case of false accounting also?"

This is a discrepancy of some 32,287 British dead. I’ve already covered this in my review when saying, "I would also guess that not every dead German soldier was sent to aid-posts and hospitals to be confirmed as dead (which may account for the much higher number of KIA in the Nachweiseamt when compared with Sanitats), but that is speculation on my part, so I’ll stick with the MIA figures which could not possibly be derived from the Sanitats own resources.”

I repeat, not every dead soldier would be presented at aid-stations and hospitals to be "counted" by medical staff, and the British figures you quote simply reinforce this view. But, by definition, they also undermine the notion that the Sanitats' dead count is highly accurate.

I've said before, Matt, that I really don't have much time for this, and if you continue to go around in circles, missing key points (deliberately or otherwise) then I will stop contributing, and leave the readers of these posts (if there are any left) to decide for themselves the merits of both arguments.

Cheers-salesie.