British rifle-fire mistaken for machine-guns

[Gunner Bailey]

Statements to that effect have been repeated so many times in books that rely heavily on secondary sources that they have come to be regarded as the Gospel Truth. Over time the prowess of the 'Old Contemptibles' at Mons has been raised to the level of the Spartans at Thermopylae. The Regulars fought well, but not as brilliantly as the cherished legend would have it.

Well Pete, nobody has so far come up with evidence to the contrary.

There are many books written about the Blitz by people who were not there. It does not mean that the toughness of the British civilians and the fact they 'carried on' despite everything was a myth. If the average Tommy in 1914 was capable of firing over 20 rounds a minute and the average German 10-12 then on firepower alone there is a strong basis for this being true.

These things happened.

John

[Chris Boonzaier]

The Machine Guns of Mons thread examined such descriptions and could not find objective confirmation of them or casualty figures that would support the lurid claims of wholesale slaughter of massed ranks. There is more to the myth than just the stuff about rifle fire being mistaken for machine guns.

Here is a thought....

Much has been written about the HUGE bombardment starting off the battle of Verdun. paulh has been researching this and argues pretty convincingly that it was not really as huuuuuuge as it is supposed to have been.

I think however that the trrops that were opposing had been in a quiet zone and did not have much to compare "their" bombardment to. So any large bombardment may have seem huuuuuge.

I was not in WW1, but have had the odd explosion go of near me... and to be quite honest... they all seem rather huuuuuge to me.

So, maybe a Guy who had been at Verdun in Feb 1916 would have thought... "hmmm... this is huuuuge".... but if later that year he changed sides and was in a German trench on the Somme he would have thought... "hmmmmm... this is even huuuuuger!"

So.....

Maybe German troops under fire in 1914, facing bullets for the first time, would have had the "Aaaargh!" reaction and thought "This is like a machine gun!"... because he really had nothing to compare it to. Take the same guy 6 months later and he may have known what was what. Bullets flying around your ears is not really a good way to promote rational thinking and does impair the ability to analyse what is going on around you, especially when it is the first time.

[salesie]

Statements to that effect have been repeated so many times in books that rely heavily on secondary sources that they have come to be regarded as the Gospel Truth. Over time the prowess of the 'Old Contemptibles' at Mons has been raised to the level of the Spartans at Thermopylae. The Regulars fought well, but not as brilliantly as the cherished legend would have it.

von Kluck, no less, would seem to disagree with you, Pete:

Quote from a letter dated 22nd June 1924 from Major-General the Hon. Sir F. Bingham to Horace Smith-Dorrien. Bingham had recently become Governor of Jersey, just after resigning the position he held for years as British Chief of the Military Mission in Germany.

"I saw von Kluck again and asked him if you might quote what he said, and he said: ' Certainly, he may say that I always had the greatest admiration for the British Expeditionary Force. It was the wonderful kernel of a great Army. I have already said it in my book. The way the retreat was carried out was remarkable. I tried very hard to outflank them, but I could not do so. If I had succeeded the war would have been won.' "

Whether the Germans thought they were under fire from machine guns or not is, in my opinion, an irrelevance - the Old Contemptibles did their job and did it well; they punched well-above their weight. For me, Anthony Farrar-Hockley admirably sums up their achievement in his book, Death of an Army, subtitled, the first battle of Ypres in which the British Regular Army was destroyed, published 1967, page 180 - it is perhaps the most poignant and relevant tribute to the original BEF that I've ever read:

"For a little while the attacks dragged on. Attempts were made by the Germans to secure positions of advantage for the trench warfare of the gathering winter. They did not succeed. The line settled. German units began to move back from Flanders en route to Poland. The British handed over to the French their sector of the line between Zonnebeke and the Ypres-Comines railway. I Corps went back for a short spell of rest and refitting. The 8th Division arrived and, with the 7th, reconstituted IV Corps under Rawlinson. Soon the whole Expeditionary Force was settled in and behind the line from Ploegsteert Wood to La Bassee.

No; not the whole Expeditionary Force. It would never be whole in the original sense again. Typical of its battalions, 2nd Highland Light Infantry was relieved on 16th November by the French to set off'... marching through Ypres to Bailleul and losing an officer and four men by shellfire on the way. Out of all the officers and men mobilized at Aldershot a bare three months before, there were now scarcely thirty left.'

The tale of losses is too continuous to sustain an impact; the mind becomes saturated with figures. It is true, too, that the total number of their casualties is insignificant in comparison with those suffered on the Somme or in the attempt to clear the Ypres ridge again in 1917. But it is not for the number fallen, much as they were mourned, that they deserve to be remembered; or for their courage and patriotism - they were, after all, doing their duty as professional soldiers, holding the ring while their countrymen took up arms. What marks them is the standard they set as fighting men, holding for weeks a wide sector of attack against an enemy four to seven times their strength.

Falkenhayn might write after the war, 'That which had to be attained under any circumstances, if the war was to be carried on with any hopeful prospects, was attained' - that is, stabiliza-tion of the western front from the Alps to the sea. But that was not what he had aimed at. He had aimed to break through to Calais.

It is only fair to say that the allies too had hoped to envelop the enemy line or to break through, but the point is that while it was most desirable for them to do so it was not essential. It was essential for the Germans. Time was not on their side, notwithstanding the errors of their adversaries."

Cheers-salesie.

[edwin astill]

One thing is surely certain: the reputation of the musketry school at Hythe was enhanced.

Edwin

[Gunner Bailey]

One thing is surely certain: the reputation of the musketry school at Hythe was enhanced.

Edwin

Don't forget Lydd, just down the road as well. Both still centres of excellence for Army shooting.

John

[Jack Sheldon]

Salesie

At the risk of deviation, I wonder if it would be of interest to explore one or two of F-H's remarks a little further? Note this has nothing to do with point scoring, just a search for clarity and objectivity. I too have been long familiar with his book. I see that I bought mine in 1967/68. I have always admired both the man and his book, but I wonder slightly about some of the claims he makes. If it is true that 'What marks them [the BEF] is the standard they set as fighting men, holding a wide sector of attack against an enemy four to seven times their strength', how should he have described the French performance (who do not get a mention in the conclusion), given that its troops were holding twice the length of front that the BEF was and the fact that French timely reinforcement at critical points was more than once the only thing between the BEF and collapse?

How (and this is a genuine question) do you think he arrived at odds of between 4 & 7:1? I am not sure if the statement is correct, even if the assumption is made that the entire German forces were ranged purely against the BEF, which of course, cannot be true. If the French and Belgians numbers are factored in, I really doubt the assertion. On 19 Oct 14 the German Fourth Army deployed five corps, comprising 11 divisions, eight of which were completely raw and half trained, between the channel coast and the Lys. Later in the battle after the above had been fought pretty well to a standstill - at least half of them by the French and the Belgians,the German army introduced 'Army Group Fabeck', which had five divisions (which had already been involved in recent heavy fighting) and then the scratch Guards Division which failed to break through near Polygon Wood.

Someone with a better knowledge of the Allied dispositions and strengths may be able to come in here and help - not that it is critical. Surely the point is that the BEF, together with its Allies brought about the complete scuppering of German ambition on the northern flank and that the BEF was largely instrumental in preventing the advance along the Menin Road or beyond the Messines Ridge. Surely that and not exaggeration of its overall role is what marks the BEF; that and its ability to stay a coherent force, despite being severely shaken from time to time and suffering casualties within its units so great that a lesser force would have disintegrated totally?

Jack

[Steven Broomfield]

On the subject of a round passing through more than one man, IIRC the Bloody Sunday inquiry revealed that one casualty had been hit (killed?) by an SLR round that had already passed through another casualty.

Surely, part of the reason for abandoning the .303/7.62 size for the smaller SA80-style was to prevent that sort of thing?

I'd have thought a closely-packed mass of men (OK, not Napoleonic, but certainly a dense mass, however you define it) would be quite likely to suffer second-strike injuries.

[salesie]

Salesie

At the risk of deviation, I wonder if it would be of interest to explore one or two of F-H's remarks a little further? Note this has nothing to do with point scoring, just a search for clarity and objectivity. I too have been long familiar with his book. I see that I bought mine in 1967/68. I have always admired both the man and his book, but I wonder slightly about some of the claims he makes. If it is true that 'What marks them [the BEF] is the standard they set as fighting men, holding a wide sector of attack against an enemy four to seven times their strength', how should he have described the French performance (who do not get a mention in the conclusion), given that its troops were holding twice the length of front that the BEF was and the fact that French timely reinforcement at critical points was more than once the only thing between the BEF and collapse?

How (and this is a genuine question) do you think he arrived at odds of between 4 & 7:1? I am not sure if the statement is correct, even if the assumption is made that the entire German forces were ranged purely against the BEF, which of course, cannot be true. If the French and Belgians numbers are factored in, I really doubt the assertion. On 19 Oct 14 the German Fourth Army deployed five corps, comprising 11 divisions, eight of which were completely raw and half trained, between the channel coast and the Lys. Later in the battle after the above had been fought pretty well to a standstill - at least half of them by the French and the Belgians,the German army introduced 'Army Group Fabeck', which had five divisions (which had already been involved in recent heavy fighting) and then the scratch Guards Division which failed to break through near Polygon Wood.

Someone with a better knowledge of the Allied dispositions and strengths may be able to come in here and help - not that it is critical. Surely the point is that the BEF, together with its Allies brought about the complete scuppering of German ambition on the northern flank and that the BEF was largely instrumental in preventing the advance along the Menin Road or beyond the Messines Ridge. Surely that and not exaggeration of its overall role is what marks the BEF; that and its ability to stay a coherent force, despite being severely shaken from time to time and suffering casualties within its units so great that a lesser force would have disintegrated totally?

Jack

All relevant points, Jack. However, I can't see where Farrah the Para ignored French and Belgian involvement - French and Belgian units (including their reinforcement of British units) are mentioned on no less than 90 pages out of 180 (50%). And, is it really surprising that a book focusing on the "death" of the old British Regular Army should only mention this army in conclusion?

I agree though, that French/Belgian involvement in this battle does seem mainly ignored by British writers - but, I'm sure that French writers more than make up for this - after all, it's not so long ago that Robert (Dunlop) posted extracts from Joffre's memoirs where said Marshall mentioned on more than one occasion his need to "protect" the BEF during the retreat from Mons (contrary to the telegram he sent to GHQ in August 1914 thanking II Corps for standing at Le Cateau and saving Lanzerac's left flank).

As for the numbers F-H gives, I've no idea how he came up with them - but is that crucial? Does not your last sentence in the your last post i.e. "its ability to stay a coherent force, despite being severely shaken from time to time and suffering casualties within its units so great that a lesser force would have disintegrated totally?" show that you, in line with F-H's conclusion, also believe that what marked the Old Contemptibles, more than anything else, was the standard they set as fighting men?

Cheers-salesie.

[Jack Sheldon]

Salesie

An entirely fair reply and I agree with you. I suppose what I was groping for is that even F-H seems to have been drawn in to a (possibly entirely unconscious) need to gild the lily when it comes to the BEF. My view and I speak as one extremely proud of what my Lancashire predecessor regiments achieved in 1914 is that the record of the BEF, man for man, stands for itself. There is no need to bang on in a way which exaggerates a first class performance. In other words, they did well, really well at Ypres, but so did the neighbours and the whole could not have been achieved by any one contingent alone.

Off to shovel snow.

Jack

[salesie]

Salesie

An entirely fair reply and I agree with you. I suppose what I was groping for is that even F-H seems to have been drawn in to a (possibly entirely unconscious) need to gild the lily when it comes to the BEF. My view and I speak as one extremely proud of what my Lancashire predecessor regiments achieved in 1914 is that the record of the BEF, man for man, stands for itself. There is no need to bang on in a way which exaggerates a first class performance. In other words, they did well, really well at Ypres, but so did the neighbours and the whole could not have been achieved by any one contingent alone.

Off to shovel snow.

Jack

Point taken, Jack - we British don't like to bang-on about our achievents (well, not too much).

As for shovelling snow? It could be much, much worse - in the words of the old army song, we could be on the Isle of Capri shovelling sh...you know what!

Cheers-salesie.

[Gunner Bailey]

On the subject of a round passing through more than one man, IIRC the Bloody Sunday inquiry revealed that one casualty had been hit (killed?) by an SLR round that had already passed through another casualty.

Surely, part of the reason for abandoning the .303/7.62 size for the smaller SA80-style was to prevent that sort of thing?

I'd have thought a closely-packed mass of men (OK, not Napoleonic, but certainly a dense mass, however you define it) would be quite likely to suffer second-strike injuries.

Thanks for your support Steve. This is common sense stuff and did I'm sure contribute to the number of hits achieved on densely packed troops.

John

[4thGordons]

Surely, part of the reason for abandoning the .303/7.62 size for the smaller SA80-style was to prevent that sort of thing?

Not to deviate from a fascinating thread but I don't think this (the danger/possibility of through-and-through casualties) was really one of the primary considerations (although it may be a "side benefit") - As far as I know, the change had more to do with rates of fire & weight of ammunition to be carried and arguments over the relative ballistic capabilities of the rounds, where the 7.62mm round was considered "overkill" in most combat situations and, particularly in semi-auto weapons, unnecessarily powerful - anyone who has compared the recoil of an M16/SA-80 to that of an M14/L1A1 will know what I mean. There were also political and economic considerations in the context of NATO standardization (which had also influenced the earlier adoption of the 7.62mm round!)One example where there were considerations of this is the use by counter terrorist/hostage rescue teams of low velocity 9mm rounds (or even semi-frangible ammunition)in sub-machine guns where there is a concern with rounds injuring those other than their intended target after passing through that target or a wall/floor etc.

In the context of the Great War I think it highly probable that quite a few casualties were sustained by both sides by ricochets, rounds passing through one individual and hitting others, friendly fire, and extreme range (spent) rounds etc. The number of examples of "bullets stopped by bibles/mirrors/cigarette lighters/matchfolds" etc (we have had several threads with pictures in the past) suggest it was relatively common for individuals to be struck by spent or nearly spent rounds - as under normal circumstances it would take significantly more than a soldiers' new testament to stop a 7.92mm Mauser round or a .303" I suppose a medieval parchment old testament might do it.

Sorry for the deviation and again - a wonderful and well informed thread I have read with great interest.

Chris

[squirrel]

FWIW - the other consideration was that the smaller calibre round, as 4thGordons states, meant that the weight carried by soldiers could be decreased (mind you, there would always be something else to carry!) and/or the amount of ammunition carried increased. It was also because research had shown that most fire fights take place at 300 metres or less, so what was the point of going to the expense of supplying a rifle which allowed soldiers to "shoot a flies eyes out" at 1000 yards and had a kill capability of 1500 metres or more.

[healdav]

Just as a point of interest. Until the advent of the rifle in the British army, there was no order 'aim'. The order was 'level'. Muskets of the time were so inaccurate that at any distance over 100 yards the likelihood of hitting anything was small to nonexistent. 50 yards was possibly the optimum. Hence, 'level' i.e. fire in a straight line at shoulder height. 'Wait until you see the whites of their eyes' was no joke.

[lostinspace]

At the risk of having my head handed to me, does anyone happen to know where all the British machine gun sections were located? It seems to me that most of them would have been placed at the logical crossing points (the bridges), so that any Germans trying to force their way across the canal would have to "bunch up" and provide excellent targets for both rifles and machine guns. Could it be that the majority of German casualties were in fact caused by machine gun fire? This would explain the accounts from both sides - heavy casualties in some German units and British riflemen seeing their enemy falling (or going to ground). Just a thought.

Regards,

Dave

[Pete1052]

Well Pete, nobody has so far come up with evidence to the contrary.

There is German casualty data in the Machine Guns of Mons thread that casts doubt on the legend.

[Gunner Bailey]

There is German casualty data in the Machine Guns of Mons thread that casts doubt on the legend.

Pete

A fairly inconclusive thread. You have to remember that at this time the Germans took truck loads of bodies away from the battlefield for burial, leading to other myths. I too had looked at the 'local' casuatlies for the Germans and it was clear they were taken elsewhere for burial, probably back to Germany at that time.

I think there is a lot of narrative evidence in books and the thread you mention of the effect of British rifle fire. Those who doubt it just want to be doubters, that's all. I'll stick with the positive evidence and my belief in the BEF.

John

[Gunner Bailey]

FWIW - the other consideration was that the smaller calibre round, as 4thGordons states, meant that the weight carried by soldiers could be decreased (mind you, there would always be something else to carry!) and/or the amount of ammunition carried increased. It was also because research had shown that most fire fights take place at 300 metres or less, so what was the point of going to the expense of supplying a rifle which allowed soldiers to "shoot a flies eyes out" at 1000 yards and had a kill capability of 1500 metres or more.

To give some evidence to this I've just weighed some inert

ammo in my shop. Obviously cordite would add a little more.

5 X.303 plus charger = 116 G

5 X 7.62 plus clip = 106 G

10 .223 plus clip = 94 G

8 .308 plus clip = 219 g

On bullet numbers to weight the .223 is the most efficient.

John

[Jack Sheldon]

John

I hope that we are not going to go round the houses yet again on the subject of casualties at Mons and Le Cateau. The real subject matter expert is Ralph Whitehead, who has large quantities of micro-filmed information taken directly from the German ten day casualty reporting figures. In correspondence with him - and I am sure he will not object to confirming this if you pm him - I established that it was impossible to discover a discrepancy of more than the odd handful between the figures listed in the German regimental histories and those derived from the official casualty returns. I personally would have been surprised if that had not been the case, because the published Rolls of Honour are usually the only formal acknowledgement of the sacrifice of many individuals; there being no memorials to the missing for the German army.

The main point to make is that for whatever reason, the losses suffered by the First German Army at Mons and Le Cateau were far lower than the Anglophone sources claim. You should also note, however, firstly, that there were no motorised columns of any description in the German ORBAT below army level until September 1914, so whoever informed you that 'truckloads of bodies' were transported from the battlefield was misleading you and, secondly, that it is not 'clear' that, 'bodies were taken elsewhere for burial, probably back to Germany ... ' because it did not happen and, if you believe that, you are labouring under a misapprehension: your 'positive evidence' (whatever that may be) notwithstanding.

Jack

[Piorun]

What a fascinating and sometimes informative carousel. Original question asked whether there was any evidence to support the thought. Skipman answered in the affirmative and quoted such evidence eight posts later. However slight the evidence might be, it's there, and it shouldn't be surprising to those who've seen or fired the SMLE at upwards of twenty-five rpm. In the hands of a steady line - devastating! Antony

[TonyE]

I have been reading this thread with interest, whilst not contributing as I only returned from the USA on the "red eye" this morning.

However, to digress slightly and return to the subject of multiple casualties from a single bullet, whilst it may have no great implications for the argument under discussion, it must certainly have happened, given the penetrative power of the ammun ition used by all sides.

I have not had time to look out the exact penetration details of the .303 inch Mark VII ball round, but in broad terms it was about two feet of soil at 100 yards. I do have to hand however some tests carried out just after the war by the US with .30-06 M1 rounds. This is very slightly more powerful, 175 grn bullet at 2,650 fps versus 174 grn bullet at 2,450 fps, but hardly an order of magnitude different. To all intents and purposes the results will be similar.

Maximum penetration at 200 yards was:

Gravel 8.0"

Bricks 6.5"

Solid Oak 18.0"

Dry sand 8.2"

Loam 24.0"

Loose earth 19.0"

Another measure is that the General Staff requirement in 1945 for the new infantry round was penetration of 24 inches of loose soil at 100 yards, i.e not less than than the .303 it was to replace.

If a bullet can penetrate 18 inches of solid oak at 200 yards, secondary casualties will hardly be a problem!

Regards

TonyE

[salesie]

John

I hope that we are not going to go round the houses yet again on the subject of casualties at Mons and Le Cateau. The real subject matter expert is Ralph Whitehead, who has large quantities of micro-filmed information taken directly from the German ten day casualty reporting figures. In correspondence with him - and I am sure he will not object to confirming this if you pm him - I established that it was impossible to discover a discrepancy of more than the odd handful between the figures listed in the German regimental histories and those derived from the official casualty returns. I personally would have been surprised if that had not been the case, because the published Rolls of Honour are usually the only formal acknowledgement of the sacrifice of many individuals; there being no memorials to the missing for the German army.

The main point to make is that for whatever reason, the losses suffered by the First German Army at Mons and Le Cateau were far lower than the Anglophone sources claim. You should also note, however, firstly, that there were no motorised columns of any description in the German ORBAT below army level until September 1914, so whoever informed you that 'truckloads of bodies' were transported from the battlefield was misleading you and, secondly, that it is not 'clear' that, 'bodies were taken elsewhere for burial, probably back to Germany ... ' because it did not happen and, if you believe that, you are labouring under a misapprehension: your 'positive evidence' (whatever that may be) notwithstanding.

Jack

Jack, I too don't wish to go around in circles yet again about German casualties at Mons and Le Cateau, and this is the first time I've heard it said that German casualties were "shipped-out" of the area en-masse (I'm sure Gunner will expand on this if he feels inclined to do so) - but I cannot let your last post pass without comment.

The veracity of German casualty stats, honour-rolls etc. that you (and Pete) refer to was seriously challenged in the Machine Guns of Mons thread. GAC's posting, for example, raised many questions about the veracity of the German figures that have yet to be adequately answered. This is a lengthy post by GAC but well worth a read for those interested in these matters: http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=105402&view=findpost&p=1012424

Also, in that thread I pointed out a paradox raised by such statements as yours i.e. "The main point to make is that for whatever reason, the losses suffered by the First German Army at Mons and Le Cateau were far lower than the Anglophone sources claim." And, as yet, the main question stemming from this paradox has not been adequately answered by those who claim that the effects of the BEF's musketry in the early days has been grossly exaggerated.

Here's the main question stemming from that paradox. It seems to me, that casualty figures are pure window dressing. Whether heavy casualties or not the German army, when enjoying numerical superiority over the BEF, did not roll-over and flatten the "contemptibly small army" at Mons or in subsequent actions (up to and including 1st Ypres). Also it has been clearly shown that the German First Army, after Mons and Le Cateau, did not pursue the BEF with much zest at all. Indeed, one informed commentator (Spiers) regarded their "pursuit" as timid, all of which would seem to show that the German Army quickly learnt to respect their British foe. If this failure at arms on the German part was not down to them being shot-flat and suffering high casualties when in first contact with the BEF then logic says there must be some other reason, and, this early in the war, it has to be a military one (no war-material/manpower excuses at this stage of the war). And I don't believe for one minute that German soldiers would gain so much respect for an opponent so quickly if taking only light casualties. So what was the reason?

Cheers-salesie.

[Gunner Bailey]

Tony and Salasie

Thanks for your posts. They support my points well.

As I alluded to in the earlier posts the German casualties were officially low at Mons and the photos of rail truck loads of bodies indicate they were moved away from the battlefields in the early part of the war. As Salasie say's, perhaps to playdown the success of the BEF. This in turn led to stories of bodies being taken to factories and processed for fat and chemicals. All of this has been chewed over on the forum before. War does spawn myths (queue 9/11?), but often there is a core of truth. You just have to get rid of the sometimes silly wrapping.

Tony has said 24 inches of soil but I believe I can remember having seen a WW2 document that gives the penetration of a MkVII as nearer 3 feet from 200 yards. I'll check. In that case a bullet could probably kill or injure perhaps 3 closely grouped soldiers.

To me all this adds up to supporting the fact that the small BEF outgunned a far larger German Army with a superior rifle and superior marksmanship, but sheer numbers and better artillery, allowed the Germans to push the BEF back. Nothing to be ashamed of on either side!

John

[Guest]

I am not sure whether the author was actually there, or whether this is a reliable account, but thought it worth posting; From another online book

The undying story : the work of the British Expeditionary Force on the Continent from Mons, August 23rd, 1914, to Ypres, Nov. 15th 1914 by W Douglas Newton.

Page 17

The Germans rolled forward, chanting their

hymns, some say, evidently exultant, evidently

certain that the massed rush was going to sweep

the British out of the field. The British lines

remained inscrutably calm. So they remained until

the enemy arrived at the most deadly point of their

rifles' trajectory. Then in a crash every trench

loosed, every spitting maxim was turned on full at

the tap.

"

It was like cutting down hay," the

privates said. Before that awful pelting of nickeled

bullets, rank after rank of the blue-grey host went

sinking into the earth. The Germans stuck to it

gamely, pushing on in a dazed way ;

but the gale

Page 18

of that awful, steadily calm British firing was too

much for them; its scythe-like cut threw them down

in heaps. They wavered, broke, and went back.

The German hosts were charging British infantry

for the first time in history. They were in for the

lesson that other nations had learnt since the bowmen

taught it at Cressy ; they were suffering as

others had suffered in their ignorance.

" Our line

in the trenches was thin, but our shooting was

very accurate, and the fellows were very cool,"

one man wrote home in a letter ; and this was quite

true. The infantry were not only shooting, they

were aiming as though they were out for efficiency

marks at the butts. Even when they got the

order for rapid firing, they did not throw a shot

away, and in any case it was almost a difficulty to

miss the massed Germans, for they moved forward

against the positions in flat grey plaques that gave

the riflemen a target like a wall.

"

It was like

shooting down rabbits. They fell down in heaps."

In one place a breastwork five feet high was formed

of piled corpses, and the men had to run from the

trenches to find out when and how the Germans

were advancing. It was an awful reaping of

slaughter. Greedy as he is for a fight, the British

private was filled with disgust at this wholesale

and abominable killing.

Page 20 Gordon Highlanders

The Highlanders looked at this incredible idiocy

of armed men amazed; the German advance continued

in the precise and solid way ; with grim

smiles the Highlanders pulled clear the cut-outs

of their rifles, thumbed-in their magazine-clips, and

made ready. Along the trench-tops, and in the

verges of the woods, the men of the maxim sections braced

themselves more firmly .at the ' triggers,swept the sights in

line, and eased the belts so that

they could race at full pitch when the command

to fire was uttered.

Page 21

What followed was massacre. The Germans,

pressing on in companies of 150 men, five deep,

were met by a solid blast of lead and flung to the

earth in ranks by that devastating wind of slaughter.

The wicked little maxims on the trenches and in

the wood flared up, and bored into the throng with

the everlasting stream of their bullets. The guns

joined in the slaying, and soaked the field in blood.

The terrible fight went on all day, the Highlanders

smashing down every attempt of the

Germans to come on. In the evening, so great had

been the enemy's loss, that they drew off, leaving

only their slain behind.

Page 25

The Gordons and the

Irish Rifles blew great wounds in the hurling ranks,

and the stuttering maxims in the trenches carved

and slashed the squadrons into rags.

Mike

[salesie]

Tony and Salasie

Thanks for your posts. They support my points well.

As I alluded to in the earlier posts the German casualties were officially low at Mons and the photos of rail truck loads of bodies indicate they were moved away from the battlefields in the early part of the war. As Salasie say's, perhaps to playdown the success of the BEF. This in turn led to stories of bodies being taken to factories and processed for fat and chemicals. All of this has been chewed over on the forum before. War does spawn myths (queue 9/11?), but often there is a core of truth. You just have to get rid of the sometimes silly wrapping.

Tony has said 24 inches of soil but I believe I can remember having seen a WW2 document that gives the penetration of a MkVII as nearer 3 feet from 200 yards. I'll check. In that case a bullet could probably kill or injure perhaps 3 closely grouped soldiers.

To me all this adds up to supporting the fact that the small BEF outgunned a far larger German Army with a superior rifle and superior marksmanship, but sheer numbers and better artillery, allowed the Germans to push the BEF back. Nothing to be ashamed of on either side!

John

I'm pretty sure, John, that my post does not support your assertions that German bodies were "shipped-out". This is the first I've heard of such a thing happening, and, although it would solve the paradox I talk about, I have to say that I would need to see plenty of evidence before accepting it as fact.

Cheers-salesie.