British rifle-fire mistaken for machine-guns

[Moonraker]

It's generally recognised that the prewar British Army was capable of very rapid rifle fire, thanks to the emphasis placed on it in training. It's said that early in the war German soldiers facing rifle fire from British Regulars thought it was from machine-guns.

Is there evidence of this supposition being voiced by Germans? Or was it "spun" into correspondents' reports to boost the army's public image, especially at a time of reversals?

Moonraker

[Pete1052]

Clickety-click.

[Moonraker]

Ah! Thanks Pete. I have a vague recollection of the thread, but it was two years ago. It turned out to be a very long one and got quite heated, so I hope I haven't brushed any scars.

Moonraker

[SiegeGunner]

I hope I haven't brushed any scars.

I think the discussion later migrated to another thread and only fell quiet comparatively recently. In any event, it is still very much a live subject and several Pals are engaged in ongoing research into Mons and Le Cateau. Dieter Scholz, a senior curator at the Bavarian Army Museum at Ingolstadt, gave a talk on 'Mons from the German perspective' at a one-day conference organised by the Historic Breechloading Smallarms Association at Bisley in August and cited reports from the German units involved which demonstrated that, at least at the command level, there was no question of massed rifle fire being mistaken for machine-gun fire.

The discussion has moved a long way from the 'original myth', but there is still much more to come on this subject and no reason why anyone with new information should hesitate to air it.

[bob lembke]

I think the discussion later migrated to another thread and only fell quiet comparatively recently. In any event, it is still very much a live subject and several Pals are engaged in ongoing research into Mons and Le Cateau. Dieter Scholz, a senior curator at the Bavarian Army Museum at Ingolstadt, gave a talk on 'Mons from the German perspective' at a one-day conference organised by the Historic Breechloading Smallarms Association at Bisley in August and cited reports from the German units involved which demonstrated that, at least at the command level, there was no question of massed rifle fire being mistaken for machine-gun fire.

The discussion has moved a long way from the 'original myth', but there is still much more to come on this subject and no reason why anyone with new information should hesitate to air it.

The second I saw this thread I thought of Jack Sheldon's most authorative contribution to the question, accessed through Pete's link.

There is a similar epic thread in another corner of the Forum that some of you may not be aware of; the question of how many, if any MGs the Turks had at Gallipoli during the first few days of the Allied invasion. On one hand there are many accounts, for example from memoirs of Australians landing at ANZAC cove, of landing soldiers reporting machine gun fire at many locations; on the other hand students of the Turkish side of the conflict point out that the Turks at that time had very few MGs in their army, nominally four per division, possibly not that many in reality, and that naturally at the onset these would not have likely to have been deployed in the very front line, at least not until the reality of the invasion was fully understood. The common link here is the possibility of mistaking massed rapid rifle fire for machine gun fire. (Not long after the invasion the German naval forces at Istanbul, realizing the critical shortage, formed volunteer naval MG detachments, armed with, probably, MGs from the armories of the Goeben and Breslau, which rushed to the Gallipoli front and then provided many more MGs in the front lines. The first detachment, in heavy fighting, lost all of their Maxims and many of their sailors, but the Turks presented them with 11 Vickers that they had captured in a counter-attack, and they were back in action.)

Bob Lembke

[dycer]

From a British Pioneer Battalion History recording its service during the 1918 German advance.

"It is impossible to estimate the casualties inflicted on the enemy,as time and again he was caught in close formation,and his masses of men were staggered again and again by the withering fire brought to bear on them."

George

[edwin astill]

Surely your perception as to whether a machine guns was firing at you, or just hundreds of men with rifles, would depend upon your knowledge as to how many of the enemy were firing at you. If they thought it was machine guns, then they must have thought there were very few men with rifles. Did an individual round from a machine gun sound significantly different in pitch (?) to that fired from a rifle, given that they were of the same calibre?

Edwin

[bob lembke]

In the Gallipoli thread I mentioned (something like "Did the Turks have Machine Guns at Gallipoli?") many supporters of the Many MG Theory get indignant when one questions the attackers' memoirs. One problem is that, in general, on the opening days, there were not that many Turks of any description, let alone machine gunners. It was maintained that experienced soldiers can easily distinguish between MGs and massed rifles. But the landing ANZACs were under lots of stress, landing at night on strange shores (and at the wrong places), under fire.

I have to observe that the memoirs of Allied soldiers that served at Gallipoli (I have read dozens) sometimes included rather fantastic observations, like Allied soldiers bathing on the beaches sometimes being eaten by sea monsters, and the fact that the Egyptians, when they built the pyramids, had the assistance of tamed dinasours. (One or both of those accounts came from the pen of an OR who later rose to be a general!) There are many mentions of the explosion of Turkish shells (which rarely exploded) of calibers that the Turks never possessed. So mistaking massed riflemen for one or two MGs is not that remarkable.

Bob

[Guest]

I don't know if this adds anything new to the Mons/Machine guns debate, but it's an interesting read on the subject.

The retreat from Mons

The retreat from Mons Arthur Corbett-Smith

Page 60-61

The British Forces

A British Army Corps, of two Divisions,

contains about 36,145, all ranks, with 152 fieldand

48 machine-guns.

A Cavalry Division contains about 9,270,

all ranks, with 24 field- and 24 machine-guns ; a

Cavalry Brigade about 2,285, all ranks, 6 fieldand

6 machine-guns.

The force actually present at Mons on

August 22nd consisted, nominally, of two

Army Corps, a Cavalry Division and a Cavalry

Brigade. But several authorities, including

Mr. Hilaire Belloc, assert that one of these

corps was considerably below strength, and

that, in round numbers, the strength of the

Force was no more than 75,000, with 250 guns.

If we calculate up the official strength the

numbers should work out at 83,845 all ranks,

334 field- and 126 machine-guns.

Page 62

Taking everything into account it is, I think,

reasonable to put the British strength at about

80,000 men, 300 field- and 100 machine-guns

when battle was first joined.

Let me put these figures in tabular form

so that we can get a comparison at a glance.

Actual Appnoximate Numbers on August 22nd

Machine-

All ranks. Field-guns. guns.

British . . . ... 80,000 300 100

French . .40,000 960 288

German ... 812,500 3,016 936

Excess German

strength over

Franco-British 492,500 1,756 548

Page 89

Now at Mons, and after, a German battalion

generally attacked in three double ranks. The

rear double rank had with it four or six machineguns.

They count upon the first three or four

ranks stopping the enemy's bullets, but, by the

time these are swept away, the last ranks (with

the machine-guns) should be sufficiently near

to carry the position attacked : say about 300

yards.

This reckless sacrifice of life is typical of the

German " machine," as opposed to the British

"individual."

As a matter of fact their method never

succeeded over open ground before the British

fire, for the front ranks were always swept away

at the very beginning of the attack, and so

they did not get near enough with the rear

ranks.

The German officer who gave me these

details remarked that the rapidity and accuracy

of the British fire were simply incredible, that

they never had a chance.

" Our men," he said, " have come to believe

that every one of you carries a portable Maxim

with him*."

Mike

[Guest]

Mike

[Gunner Bailey]

I would have thought that the sound of a machinegun mixed with rifle fire would have been very distictive. I live near and also shoot at Hythe Military Ranges. The sound of large volumes of rifle fire is frequently heard but you an easly tell when a MG is firing because the regular repetition of the MG makes it stand out. Even when the sounds are mixed you can say "That's one MG or There are two MGs in there today".

I think it was German 'spin'. They could not admit they were being beaten by a smaller force - the wonderful BEF.

John

[Jack Sheldon]

I remember, quite distinctly, being told this story during the 1950s by my grandfather and his friends. They clearly believed it but, on mature reflection, it is obvious that they were passing on hearsay. They were all Kitchener men and not one of them had been in France or Belgium in 1914. It is easy to imagine that tales of 'the old BEF' circulated freely during the war, so this allegation has long roots. The fact that the BOH picked up on it and repeated it in the Ypres 1914 volume gave it the ring of authenticity, but it does not mean that it is correct. I have previously investigated and posted the origin of the BOH quote, demonstrating that it is the result of highly selective and improper use of a poor German source and an inaccurate translation of the original.

Nevertheless I kept the matter firmly in mind as I researched my The German Army at Ypres 1914 (which is due out this coming week). I was looking for any reference in the histories or the eye witness reports to Allied rifle fire being mistaken for that of machine guns - and I drew a complete blank. Not only that, it is quite clear, for example, from the accounts of men who faced French machine guns that they were swiftly so familiar with their firing signature and weapon characteristics that they remained in cover until they could tell that the twenty five round strip of bullets had been fired, then moved while the weapon was being reloaded. I have taken the opportunity provided by the publication of this book to return to the subject in print, but I have no confidence that I shall be able to put a much needed dent in this myth. Not only is it too well entrenched; it also contributes to the version of history that a large part of the audience wants to read.

Jack

[RodB]

II've got the impression that soldiers learned to instantly recognise the sound signatures of anything that was likely to hurt them, as a survival response. Certainly as regards types of artillery... and I would assume that would apply to rifle & machine gun fire too. What Jack says makes sense. I think possibly some people took German reports too literally - an officer giving a throwaway comment that men hought the British all had machine guns sounds rhetorical, not a statement of fact. I've heard a Lewis gun firing and it scared me - hard and cold and continuous, even in a short burst. I will never forget it. I would think any German soldier even in 1914 would learn instantly to differentiate between a Maxim, Mauser, Lee-Enfield or Vickers firing simply because his will to survive forced him to. Is this how it in fact was ?

My interest here is related to many eyewitness accounts referring indiscriminately to "shrapnel" e.g. an Australian private referring to shrapnel bursting overhead at Pozieres and wounding him. As far as I understand it, just above you was the best place for shrapnel to burst, the worst place was 100 yards ahead of you. This report appears to refer in fact to high-explosive. Again based on what I've said above about ability to identify what the enemy is firing being necessary to survive - I would assume that a competent soldier would know that the telltale signature of shrapnel bursts ahead meant lethal bullets approcahing, whereas HE burst ahead meant the enemy was shooting short. Did the Germans in fact use air-burst HE ? My understanding is it was all impact fuzed. So the report of "shrapnel bursting overhead" and causing wounds seems doubly odd - is he referring to an HE shell hitting the parapet while he crouches in a trench below ? To me this matters if say an officer or NCO needs to make a decision - would he simply take for granted that all his men's references to fall of "shrapnel" refer to HE because he knows the Germans won't be in fact using shrapnel ? To me this type of generalisation would be dangerous facing an enemy using both - I would want to know what was busting where if possible. ??? Does anybody know if German troops differentiated in describing HE or shrapnel bursts ? I would think that facing the Brtish, with their use of both, differentiating between them would be essential for both personal survival and communicating what was happening up the chain. ?? Or was the reality that in all the chaos nobody had time to notice any of this detail on a conscious level, but registered what they needed to know subconsciously and responded instinctively ? In which case we really can't know much from their verbal reports about what they were thinking or experincing at the time, because it wasn't at an intellectual or verbal level, more at a purely sensory level. Like one long car crash ??

[PMHart]

I would have thought that the sound of a machinegun mixed with rifle fire would have been very distinctive. I live near and also shoot at Hythe Military Ranges. The sound of large volumes of rifle fire is frequently heard but you an easily tell when a MG is firing because the regular repetition of the MG makes it stand out. Even when the sounds are mixed you can say "That's one MG or There are two MGs in there today".

I think it was German 'spin'. They could not admit they were being beaten by a smaller force - the wonderful BEF.

John

Hi John,

I think the point is that if there was an exercise on Hythe ranges where both sides firing an unknown possible mixture of machine guns/and or rifles at each other could you tell which machine gun was on which side? Further more when you hear the sounds of the shooting are you yourself under heavy fire lying in a ditch, terrified to raise your head, probably exhausted and in imminent danger of death or serious wounds? If so then you should move!

Pete

[healdav]

When the Germans invaded Luxembourg they arrived at the city entrance and then turned round and fled. When asked why, later, they said that they had thought that the crosses and lightning conductors on the houses and churches were French bayonets! and they assumed that the unarmed Luxembourg Gendarme officer who was riding on his bicycle to meet them and ask what they wanted (the country had no idea that they were being invaded)was a French officer leading his men in a charge!

Anything is possible.

[Jack Sheldon]

I hate to risk bringing subjective matters up, but I hope that others of similar experience might come in here. I was an infantryman all my working life and from the earliest days of fieldcraft lessons learned to distinguish the two types of fire. This was important because, as a rough rule of thumb, whilst a couple of riflemen could be taken on by a strong section, the presence of an automatic weapon triggered a response in at least platoon strength. A generation older than mine in the British army was taught to use the single shot setting of their Bren guns initially in defence to disguise the presence of an automatic weapon to a would be attacker.

Even in a modern setting the cyclic rate of a machine gun is very distinctive - especially firing bursts, which would have been the case on the whole in 1914 because of the need to conserve ammunition. Not only that, but the battle ranges at Ypres were very short generally speaking and it would have been obvious if fire was coming from all along a hedgerow, say, or just from one corner. I have incorporated in my Ypres book a German company taking on a single machine gun which they had detected and suffering severely at the hands of adetermined old machine gunner. Nobody was in any doubt about what they were attacking. The cyclic rate of 1914 guns was really quite low and obvious to the ear. Massed rifle fire,on the other hand, tends to sound like an amplified version of a piece of cloth being ripped.

What is all this worth? Enough for me, both from personal experience and study of the sources to believe that the myth of rifle fire being mistaken for that of machine guns is just that.

Jack

[Gunner Bailey]

Hi John,

I think the point is that if there was an exercise on Hythe ranges where both sides firing an unknown possible mixture of machine guns/and or rifles at each other could you tell which machine gun was on which side? Further more when you hear the sounds of the shooting are you yourself under heavy fire lying in a ditch, terrified to raise your head, probably exhausted and in imminent danger of death or serious wounds? If so then you should move!

Pete

I'll ponder that point next week when I'm doing my turn in the butts!

John

[SteveMarsdin]

Good evening All,

As someone speaking without the benefit of a military background, when discussing the battle does it really matter whether the Germans mistook the BEF rifle fire for machine guns or not ? Surely it's the effects of that fire that are important, whether it came from rifles, machine guns or whatever. If we are discussing the issue from the perspective of both sides use of propaganda, then it is of greater relevance but from the perspective of the actual fighting surely it's the actual casualties inflicted that are of paramount importance ?

[dfaulder]

Could it just be "Chinese Whispers"

- "you know son, they were firing so fast they could have had machine guns"

- "my dad says they fired at him with machine guns"

Chinese Whispers are usually subject to what people want to hear.

Repeat until it becomes a myth!

David

[Guest]

I too have no military background, and am at the beginning of a steep learning curve.I doubt if I will ever reach the level of expertise of Jack, or Peter, or many more of the excellent pals on this forum.

Are most of these old accounts unrealiable?

The first seven divisions : being a detailed account of the fighting from Mons to Ypres (1916)

The Four Days' Battle near Mons 33

Letter ii.—From a wounded Gordon Highlander to

his father Mr. Alexander Buchan, of Monymusk

*]

We had a pretty stiff day of it last Sunday.

The battaUon went into small trenches in front

of a wood a few miles to the right of Mons, and

the Germans had the range to a yard. I was on

the right edge of the wood with the machine guns,

and there wasn't half some joy.

The shells were bursting all over the place. It

was a bit of a funny sensation for a start, but you

soon got used to it. You would hear it coming

singing through the air over your head ; then it

would give a mighty big bang and you would see

a great flash, and there would be a shower of

lumps of iron and rusty nails all around your ears.

They kept on doing that all Sunday ; sometimes

three or four at the same time, but none of them

hit me. I was too fly for them.

Their artillery is pretty good, but the infantry

are no good at all. They advance in close column,

and you simply can't help hitting them. I opened

fire on them with the machine gun and you could

see them go over in heaps, but it didn't make any

difference. For every man that fell ten took his place.

The Scots Greys, early that

morning, had decoyed the Germans right in front

of the machine guns of the French, and they just

mowed them down. There was no escape for

them, poor devils, but they deserve it the way

they go on.

Cheers Mike

[dycer]

In the example I have quoted from concerning a British Pioneer Battalion,in 1918.

Clearly the Battalion,lost men,equipment,weapons,etc during the first days of the German advance and were tired,dispirited,hungry,etc.

But the remains of the Battalion gathered itself,possibly due to the efforts of its Commanding Officer,and when seeing the enemy advance on its front,in close company,it laid down fire,whether rifle or machine gun is open to debate.How many Lewis Guns would have a Pioneer Battalion lost when initially overrun?

But for some reason the men of the Battalion kept hold of their personal weapons.had sufficient ammunition, possibly augmented with an odd Lewis Gun to shudder a shoulder to shoulder,German advance.

George

[Gunner Bailey]

History point - Forget the Lewis in early to mid 1915. I don't think it got to France until the winter of 1915, after Mons, Loos and all the other early battles. I think it was only licensed for use from October 1915. I may be wrong if supplies were obtained direct from the USA. Can anyone clarify this point? I'm happy of course to conceed the point if wrong.

When did the Lewis go to war?

The Germans could only have faced Vickers Machine Guns in the early part of the war.

John

[dycer]

History point - Forget the Lewis in early to mid 1915. I don't think it got to France until the winter of 1915, after Mons, Loos and all the other early battles. I think it was only licensed for use from October 1915. I may be wrong if supplies were obtained direct from the USA. Can anyone clarify this point? I'm happy of course to conceed the point if wrong.

When did the Lewis go to war?

The Germans could only have faced Vickers Machine Guns in the early part of the war.

John

History point - Forget the Lewis in early to mid 1915. I don't think it got to France until the winter of 1915, after Mons, Loos and all the other early battles. I think it was only licensed for use from October 1915. I may be wrong if supplies were obtained direct from the USA. Can anyone clarify this point? I'm happy of course to conceed the point if wrong.

When did the Lewis go to war?

The Germans could only have faced Vickers Machine Guns in the early part of the war.

John

[squirrel]

More likely to have faced Vickers made Maxims than the actual Vickers that early in the war.

[dycer]

John,

The early TF Battalions took their Maxim Guns to France,whether they were fit for purpose is open to debate but none of us will ever know.how effective they were.

Some TF NCO's choose to stay,or avoided being detailed to join a Machine Gun Company.

Whether a Pioneer Machine Gun NCO,would have encouraged his men to become familiar,in use of the Lewis Gun,is open to debate.

But clearly he lost his life before"the withering fire" was expended.

George