Importance of Verdun

[Robert Dunlop]

The artillery plans for Verdun were based on three success factors. The first principle was well-known from before the war. Verdun was a re-entrant into the German lines. This meant that the artillery could be set up in a semi-circle, focusing the fire from multiple directions onto the French lines. The other advantage from this set up was the dispersal of the artillery, which made it easier to create artillery sites without the work being detected. The efforts were not focused in one area. The terrain around Verdun helped too. The forested areas provided protection from observation.

A second principle was the maintenance of strict secrecy, then suddenly launching the artillery attack. In contrast to Entente attacks, the infantry assault was to begin soon afterwards (though not within hours). This principle was established by von Falkenhayn during the planning for von Mackensen's first attack on the Eastern Front in 1915.

The third principle was the concentration of heavy artillery. The heavy Mörsers were particularly suited to use in the hilly terrain around Verdun. During von Mackensen's offensives, the heavy artillery had smashed a hole in the Russian defences, enabling the infantry to advance with minimal casualties. When the next Russian defence line was reached, the assault forces stopped while the heavies were got forward to support the next phase of attack. At Verdun, however, this approach proved extremely difficult, thanks in no small part to the ground conditions.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

One factor not mentioned in relation to the artillery, one critical at Verdun, was observation. The Germans had problems observing even the French second line during the initial stage of the battle, and had some nasty surprises in store when they attacked the woods in the initial days. The hilly terrain may have favored the mortars, but it's hard to shell what you can't see.

As the attack advanced into the French fortified zone observation became even more difficult. The French had the benefit of pre-war shelters, many with buried phone lines, while the Germans found themselves trying to direct fire from shellholes. As one German officer put it, "We were eventually reduced to using area fire, while the French could place accurate point fire on our troops."

There was only one large forward movement of the guns at Verdun--started on 25 February. The was slowed more by the bad roads than the terrain. The difficulties were compounded by the bad transport conditions, which limited munitions reaching the batteries that had moved forward. Some of the batteries were found to be too exposed, and eventually had to be moved to positions further back.

In general the Germans were dissapointed in the performance of their artillery at Verdun. Coordination and command and control were poor, and the results were not what they had hoped for the amount of resources expended. It's important to remember that the Germans were trying very hard to move forward and capture ground, not only "bleed the French white."

Even in the initial stage of the battle, when the artillery force ratio was the most advantageous for the Germans, they suffered very heavy losses in their infantry units.

The Germans suffered heavy losses at the hands of the French long-range guns as well.

Paul

[Christina Holstein]

The French may have had buried phone lines in some of their defensive positions but the lines were smashed very soon by the German bombardment. After that, it was a question of pigeons, flags, lights or runners, as was the case in Fort Vaux. In any case, many of the positions had not had telephone lines installed.

One of the reasons why the Germans had some nasty surprises at the start of the battle was that the French had thrown up a series of defences - marked E on the battlefield maps - which were unknown to the attackers. Although they were only small positions and often unfinished, machine gun fire coming from and unexpected direction often through the attackers into disarray.

On French 'heavy' artillery, the heaviest guns they had at Verdun at the start of the battle were 155s - not a match for the German really heavy stuff. They could only bring really heavy guns up after the new standard gauge railway line was running and that was at the end of June 1916. However, German accounts speak time after time of the accuracy of the terrible French artillery, 'out-dated' though it was compared with much of the German artillery.

The Vth Army had been in position in the Verdun sector for 15 months before the start of the Battle of Verdun. I can't believe that they were having problems with observation at the start of the battle when they had been there, with their detailed maps, for so long.

I still have a problem with this idea of taking the high ground and the forts and then stopping. What purpose did that serve? Unless Falkenhayn believed that he would lose fewer men than the French, the idea was a loser from the start. So presumably he did believe that he would lose fewer men. If so, we're back to the bleeding white idea.

Christina

[Robert Dunlop]

Von Falkenhayn had the prior example of von Mackensen's attacks to go by. These attacks, carried on the Eastern Front, comprised sudden heavy artillery barrages, which stunned the defenders. The assault troops were able to make rapid progress with minimal casualties. Going by this example, von Falkenhayn will have expected the attack to progress quickly and with few losses. Once the high ground was taken, then the Germans would take a leaf from the autumn 1915 battles - defend the reverse slopes and let the French attacks fail. If this process succeeded, then the French and British would have to attack elsewhere to relieve the pressure. Same potential result. Except the French were learning and adapting too.

Robert

[salesie]

If I may, I would like to take the debate back to the post which originally caught my eye. Robert's post #68 gave the following information:

"...been re-reading Robert Foley's account of von Falkenhayn and the planning for Verdun...Foley quoted a key diary entry from Plessen. It was a record of the conversation between Kaiser Wilhelm and von Falkenhayn on December 3 1915:

"General von Falkenhayn rolled out for His Majesty a serious picture of the situation with the conclusion that to carry the war to its end, an attack in the west, where all available strength has already been collected, must be conducted... it is to be then that the Entente will attack us in the west and thereby bleed themselves white [sich dabei verblutet]." (Plessen, "Tagebuch")."

If this account is accurate, and I have no reason to doubt its veracity, then the date of this conversation is significant i.e. it is evidence of prior intent, not after the fact excuse making, on Falkenhayn's part. I understand all this talk about why Verdun would be geographically, logistically and idealistically a temping place for a German assault. I also understand how the prior experiences of Mackenson's success in the east, and of inflicting serious losses on the French in Champagne in 1915, could influence Falkenhayn's decision making. But what I can't understand is how, given the strategic situation, he believed that a limited offensive, with see-sawing objectives, would deliver the desired results as stated in Robert’s quote.

What I mean by see-sawing is that, although the quote from Robert shows prior intent to lure the enemy into fighting an attritional battle (which elevates attrition from a means to an end), the orders emanating from 5th Army were not seeking limited objectives aiming to maximise French losses and minimise German ones, they advanced as far and as fast as they could as if seeking breakthrough, and as a result had suffered almost as many casualties as the French by 25th February (and did so for the remainder of the battle). I can understand a train of thought that says the French would respond much quicker and heavier if believing breakthrough to be imminent - if so, why launch a limited offensive and why take relatively heavy casualties yourself when the relative losses were definitely not in your favour?

Previous operational/tactical experience (Mackenson, Champagne etc.) may be logical enough, but what is much more perplexing is that these ideas, when applied to Verdun, are at odds with the strategic situation. Falkenhayn, at this point in time, was not just an operational commander - as Minister for War under the German system, he was in overall command of not just the army on both fronts but, de facto, of the home front as well. Consequently, the strategic situation was within his remit, and it was his responsibility to ensure that strategic and operational matters did not become counter-productive to each other.

On the strategic level he made serious miscalculations:

1) He recognised that the war would be won or lost in the west, but trusted Conrad to help keep the pressure on a weakened Russia so he could focus on the western front in order to bring the war to an end. In the event, after overrunning Montenegro, Conrad's focus turned to Italy, which allowed Russia to successfully attack in Galicia, thus prompting the June 1916 crisis which took Falkenhayn by surprise.

2) Why launch an offensive at all when he had no need to provoke an allied response in the west? They would come-on to his forces regardless of what initiatives Germany adopted (as they had done almost constantly since the Marne) - if attrition of the enemy had been elevated from a means to an end in his mind in December 1915, as Robert's quote clearly implies, he simply had to organise his forces, sitting in good defensive positions almost everywhere, in readiness for the attrition to come to him.

3) And, following on from 2), as Minister for War he was well aware of the manpower/material shortages (shortly to become critical) so why risk wasting valuable resources, and exacerbate those shortages, in an attack which clearly had no strategic merit as the Allies would come on to his forces without provocation?

4) He grossly overestimated the Imperial Navy's ability to take-on Britain's maritime power, which in reality was the true strategic necessity i.e. to break the blockade (but Falkenhayn's successors were equally culpable in this failing).

All in all, Falkenhayn's strategy did not join-up, but much of it was largely outside his control (because of Allied actions), and because of this it seems that the increasingly restrictive strategic straightjacket he found himself in had a negative impact on his operational thinking - it seems to me that Verdun was as desperate a move for Falkenhayn as the Spring Offensives were for Ludendorff, smaller in scale maybe, and Falkenhayn didn't go all-in, but still desperate gambles conducted by men caught in the glare of strategic realities beyond their control.

Consequently, though relying on a newly realised interest in this battle, I think it a mistake to look at Verdun from an operational/tactical viewpoint alone.

Cheers-salesie.

[Paul Hederer]

The French may have had buried phone lines in some of their defensive positions but the lines were smashed very soon by the German bombardment. After that, it was a question of pigeons, flags, lights or runners, as was the case in Fort Vaux. In any case, many of the positions had not had telephone lines installed.

One of the reasons why the Germans had some nasty surprises at the start of the battle was that the French had thrown up a series of defences - marked E on the battlefield maps - which were unknown to the attackers. Although they were only small positions and often unfinished, machine gun fire coming from and unexpected direction often through the attackers into disarray.

On French 'heavy' artillery, the heaviest guns they had at Verdun at the start of the battle were 155s - not a match for the German really heavy stuff. They could only bring really heavy guns up after the new standard gauge railway line was running and that was at the end of June 1916. However, German accounts speak time after time of the accuracy of the terrible French artillery, 'out-dated' though it was compared with much of the German artillery.

The Vth Army had been in position in the Verdun sector for 15 months before the start of the Battle of Verdun. I can't believe that they were having problems with observation at the start of the battle when they had been there, with their detailed maps, for so long.

I still have a problem with this idea of taking the high ground and the forts and then stopping. What purpose did that serve? Unless Falkenhayn believed that he would lose fewer men than the French, the idea was a loser from the start. So presumably he did believe that he would lose fewer men. If so, we're back to the bleeding white idea.

Christina

Good Morning,

Christina, sorry, I should explain that when I was referring to 'guns' I meant the term literally--flat trajectory cannon, not to mean howitzers or mortars. This was a real weak point in the German artillery make up. It's interesting to note that contrary to what most people think, by far the largest area of expansion for the Germans during the war was not high-trajectory artillery, but long-range cannon. I've seen this weakness lamented over and over in German reports from the battle.

The point you make about the unknown French defenses, is the same as I'm trying to make. The Germans may have been at Verdun for 15 months, but that didn't guarantee they had good observation--those unknown French positions are at odds with that view. I remember a case that illustrates this case perfectly. One infantry unit advancing in the first days had to take out a French concrete MG position. After they had stormed the position they noticed that there was a group of tightly placed mortar craters to the side of the position--the result of precise, but inaccurate fire.

The stated objective for 5th Army was the seizure of the Meuse Heights. The attack orders show that clearly. 5th Army had nothing in place logistically, nor in reserves to suggest that this was meant to be a breakthrough attempt. I think it important to remember that is was Falkenhayn's concept, but 5th Army's battle.

@Salesie

I agree with most of what you write, but you've turned things around a bit. Specifically, Falkenhayn's concept was an attritional battle at Verdun, that is clear. He stated that well before the battle, and it fits in with his view of the futility of massed breakthrough efforts on the Western Front. Where the excuse making comes to light is when considering how the battle was fought. The original concept was for a quick seizure of the Meuse Heights. This was defined as success by 5th Army--it's clearly stated in their planning. This was not in any way at odds with Falkenhayn's concept. Makes a lot more sense to defend against French counter-attacks from the top of those heights and inflict losses from there--it doesn't make much sense (as we've all pointed out) to try and inflict losses attacking into a heavily fortified area, with terrain that favors the defender--Falkenhayn had taken note of the Allied failures of 1915. In other words, the concept was never applied in the way it was conceived--inflicting losses as a defender in a strong position, presenting what happened as the plan was the excuse making.

On your last point, "I think it a mistake to look at Verdun from an operational/tactical viewpoint alone..." that's not what I wrote. I wrote, "I think an examination of the battle from the tactical and operational level, divorced from the speculation of Falkenhayn's motivations (which I think will become self evident in the end) can shed new light on the battle." That's different--all three levels of operations are intertwined. Your fascination for this area mirrors mine--the interaction between the three. I want to distance the study away from the speculation, not the strategic level.

What has been written before about Verdun in popular and academic literature, as well as the discussion here, as well as others on this forum, show that an analysis of the battle at the operational/tactical level is much needed. I believe a lot of the questions that are raised about the battle would be answered as a result.

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, one minor point of correction. Von Falkenhayn was no longer Minister of War when he planned Verdun. Von Hindenburg's initial attempts by to oust von Falkenhayn included the threat of resignation. The situation came to a head in January 1915. The Kaiser was furious at von Hindenburg's insubordination, but he was such a popular general (and the extent of anti-Falkenhayn feelings so widespread - von Hindenburg was not alone) that the Kaiser had to find a compromise. He retained von Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff but split off the post of Minister of War. This was given to Adolph Wild von Hohenborn.

You raised several questions about Falkenhayn's plans, and the rationale behind them. I will pick up on these later.

Robert

[phil andrade]

2) Why launch an offensive at all when he had no need to provoke an allied response in the west? They would come-on to his forces regardless of what initiatives Germany adopted (as they had done almost constantly since the Marne) - if attrition of the enemy had been elevated from a means to an end in his mind in December 1915, as Robert's quote clearly implies, he simply had to organise his forces, sitting in good defensive positions almost everywhere, in readiness for the attrition to come to him.

Cheers-salesie.

He had a "window of opportunity" in the early months of 1916 to try and inflict terrible damage on the French before the new British army of volunteers could be brought to bear effectively.

Perhaps this makes his plan more understandable. The year 1915 had demonstrated German prowess on the offensive in the East and on the defensive in the West. To reiterate a point I mentioned earlier, it would be interesting to find out how much German intelligence had picked up on the Allied coalition strategy as planned at Chantilly. Maybe Falkenhayn - and the discussions mentioned in the posts above took place at about the same time as Chantilly - felt that it was a "now or never" moment.

If his method of attack could kill or capture more than two Frenchmen for every German - a formula that was vindicated between February and June 1916 - then the attritional aspect had some feasibility to it.

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

On the strategic level [Falkenhayn] made serious miscalculations:

1) He recognised that the war would be won or lost in the west, but trusted Conrad to help keep the pressure on a weakened Russia so he could focus on the western front in order to bring the war to an end. In the event, after overrunning Montenegro, Conrad's focus turned to Italy, which allowed Russia to successfully attack in Galicia, thus prompting the June 1916 crisis which took Falkenhayn by surprise.

According to Foley's account, von Falkenhayn knew that Conrad wanted to attack Italy. He refused to condone this until the Russians had been dealt a mortal blow. The miscalculation was not in respect of Conrad's intentions. It was to over-estimate the effect of the Russian defeats in 1915.

2) Why launch an offensive at all when he had no need to provoke an allied response in the west? They would come-on to his forces regardless of what initiatives Germany adopted (as they had done almost constantly since the Marne) - if attrition of the enemy had been elevated from a means to an end in his mind in December 1915, as Robert's quote clearly implies, he simply had to organise his forces, sitting in good defensive positions almost everywhere, in readiness for the attrition to come to him.

Falkenhayn miscalculated the offensive capabilities of France and Britain. Considering the BEF first, the German High Command was somewhat in the dark about how the BEF was developing. They correctly interpreted the impact of the serious losses in First Ypres. They knew about the Territorials and the Kitchener's forces that were flowing into France. Falkenhayn believed that the British would be unable to mount a serious offensive, though he did not doubt their resolve to do so. The inexperience of the British forces, however, would mean that they could be easily dealt with by existing German defences.

As regards the French, German Intelligence calculations suggested that the French Army was in decline numerically. There was evidence of poor morale from deserters, and Falkenhayn was uncertain that the French would attack. It was considered better to dictate to the enemy, so waiting for the Entente to attack was highly unlikely to have been on his mind. Far better to choose the place of battle and impose this on the enemy.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

3) And, following on from 2), as Minister for War he was well aware of the manpower/material shortages (shortly to become critical) so why risk wasting valuable resources, and exacerbate those shortages, in an attack which clearly had no strategic merit as the Allies would come on to his forces without provocation?

Although Falkenhayn was not Minister of War at this time, he was acutely aware for the shortages in manpower and material. In my previous post, I noted some reasons why he wanted to attack. There is another reason, which is not quite so obvious. From his appointment, Falkenhayn had been fighting a second 'war'. He was constantly battling against von Hindenburg, Ludendorff, von Bethmann Hollweg, von Moltke the Younger and the whole cabal of high-ranking officers who were opposed to his remaining Chief of the General Staff. Falkenhayn had taken the initiative in Russia, by appointing and staying in close touch with von Mackensen. For political reasons, it seems likely that he needed to take the intiative and dicatate his will upon the German Army in 1916 as well.

4) He grossly overestimated the Imperial Navy's ability to take-on Britain's maritime power, which in reality was the true strategic necessity i.e. to break the blockade (but Falkenhayn's successors were equally culpable in this failing).

Falkenhayn well understood this strategic issue. He advocated total submarine warfare for example. At the time, it could not be predicted with certainty that submarine blockade would not counter the British naval blockade. It had never been tried before, and the vulnerabilities of surface vessels to submarine attack suggested it could work. Another significant strategic initiative was the effort to get a negotiated settlement with one or more of the Entente partners. Having 'defeated' Russia, however, this possibility became even more remote. The anti-Falkenhayn league were even less likely to go for this option, given that military force still appeared to be capable of delivering results.

Robert

[Jack Sheldon]

Could I just add to Robert's point about evidence of morale based on desertion? I cannot speak for the French offensives in Champagne, but I did a special sub-study about this in Artois when I wrote my Vimy book. The documentary evidence of low French morale as a result of the hammering they received during the Spring and Autumn offensives of 1915 is quite clear. One interrogation report after another concerns desertions. Sometimes one deserter would go over, arrange a signal with the Germans and others would follow the next night. Sometimes there were mini mutinies, whole groups of soldiers would refuse to resist and simply wait to be captured by German attackers. Given the importance of analysis of this type of intelligence, it is easy to see why F and his staff advisors may well have thought that they had detected a slackening of French resolve.

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

...it would be interesting to find out how much German intelligence had picked up on the Allied coalition strategy as planned at Chantilly. Maybe Falkenhayn - and the discussions mentioned in the posts above took place at about the same time as Chantilly - felt that it was a "now or never" moment.

Phil, I haven't seen any evidence to support any link between Chantilly and Falkenhayn's sense of urgency. Presuming that Falkenhayn could have known about the content of the Chantilly meetings, I doubt he would have changed his opinion about the Entente's seeming lack of ability to execute on the plans. This was at the core of his planning process. There is no doubt, however, that Falkenhayn understood the serious implications of not dictating a defeat on the Entente. He regarded Britain as the number one enemy. While the BEF seemed weak, it was only a matter of time before they became the force to be reckoned with. In response to this longer term threat, Falkenhayn felt he had to knock France, the 'sword', out of Britain's hand. When thinking about what to do on the Western Front in 1916, Falkenhayn commissioned the German 6th Army to plan an attack that would drive from the area of Arras to the sea, splitting the French and British forces.

Robert

[salesie]

Paul, I do respect your undoubted expertise on this subject but can't accept that the operational/tactical aspects of Verdun need to be separated from the strategic ones in order to gain a better understanding of this battle - it seems to me that to do so would negate the highly relevant causal-links between the strategic and operational aspects.

Robert, thanks for picking up on a couple of errors on my part, but these do not detract from my points i.e. even as C.O.G.S and no longer Minister of War, Falkenhayn was still well-aware of the strategically important negative manpower/material situation developing, and thus it is still perplexing, given the strategic situation, especially if Falkenhayn was the strategic realist many believe, that he should risk wasting such valuable assets on what seems to be an unnecessary, limited, and ill-conceived assault on Verdun. Also, my reading of Hew Strachen says that Falkenhayn was not wholly aware of Conrad's premature intentions towards Italy because their relationship was at its nadir whilst planning for, and during, the assault on Verdun - but if you're right, it does not change my point; Falkenhayn seriously misjudged the situation in the east and was taken completely by surprise by Russian resurgence in June 1916 (whilst Verdun was still in play).

No matter what the antecedent logic was in planning and executing this battle, the glaring fact is the German Army failed to achieve any of its stated objectives at Verdun, and this failure is as palpable as German failure in 1914 was (and just as palpable as the many allied operational/tactical failures). PJA tells us that the attritional aspect had some feasibility to it - I say, only if we accept at face value the figures he gives, and then use them like football scores; German failure in this battle had much deeper consequences than bare casualty statistics can show us, and Falkenhayn, at his level, should have known this.

That said, my main reason for entering the fray, Gents, is that I now see Verdun as a prime example, amongst several, of German folly. I see this battle as being a good example that demonstrates the inherent strategic/geo-political naivety of German leadership, in that its leaders could never seem to see beyond military solutions i.e. for every strategic problem they came up against they sought an operational military solution. And this goes for Falkenhayn as well as the rest; a strategic realist he may have been when compared to his colleagues, but he still sought military solutions in the field when feeling the effects of the strategic realities (even the U-boat threat lacked strategic credibility, the German Navy, after war started, could never be strong enough to fully choke Britain and break Britain's blockade on Germany).

I think the answer to this lack of German geo-political nous lies in its own history. Germany itself was forged from Prussian military prowess, but this undoubted Prussian military ability did not achieve golden success on its own, it had a certain geo-political genius directing its rise to pre-eminence. Otto von Bismarck, an undoubted geo-political master, led Prussian emergence from being just a local power and on to German unification, and thus its emergence on the world stage. Unfortunately for Germany, and much of the rest of Europe, when Kaiser Bill came to the German throne he saw no further use for Bismarck and dismissed him on the grounds of retirement, and, like so many people do, Kaiser Bill saw the geo-political machinations of power to be subordinate to military considerations - Kaiser Bill could not see the subtleties and complexities that underpin military power. And thus, Germany entered a period of believing in the power of its army as being the be-all and end-all of its rise to successful statehood.

And thus, Germany entered into WW1 with but one truly strategic weapon, its army. A single truly strategic weapon is fine when being directed by a genius such as Bismarck in highly localised European wars, but the German leadership had become so ingrained in its belief in its army's superiority that it forgot all about the warnings from the man who had led them to such great heights in the first place; Bismarck strongly warned before his death of the dire consequences to Germany of entering into a Pan-European war.

The German leadership even ignored a glaring strategic lesson stemming from Prussia's own rise to power. Britain had used to great effect the Naval blockade strategy against Napoleon, a strategy which actually helped Prussia free itself from Napoleon's grip and go on to greater things - once they'd failed to win a quick war in 1914, why did Germany's leaders believe that the blockade could be negated with a non-strategic navy whilst its army made everyone else's dance to its own tune?

It seems to me, that German self-delusion led Europe into war in 1914, and remained with it right up until 1918, and then, most appallingly, this military self-delusion led Germany into even greater misery some twenty-odd years later.

Falkenhayn was a strategic realist in one respect, he believed Britain to be Germany's greatest threat and therefore the war could only be won or lost in the west, but he was never able to relate strategic reality into operational actuality, partly because the true strategic situation was beyond any German's control once the German quick-war fantasists had failed to deliver, but partly because of his own failings - and Verdun’s importance, in my opinion, is that it is a prime example of German failings in general, and Falkenhayn's in particular.

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

Churchill's assessment of this stands repetition. In his chapter on Verdun, following a fairly comprehensive analysis of the battle's statistics, he wrote " To this extent therefore the tactical and pyschological conceptions underlying Falkenhayn's scheme were vindicated."

Phil

[Paul Hederer]

Salesie wrote:

"Paul, I do respect your undoubted expertise on this subject but can't accept that the operational/tactical aspects of Verdun need to be separated from the strategic ones in order to gain a better understanding of this battle - it seems to me that to do so would negate the highly relevant causal-links between the strategic and operational aspects."

No, no..we agree. I thought I made that clear (?) All three levels are intertwined. We are actually agreeing on something--pretty scary.

Paul

[truthergw]

Without a lot of ifs and buts, I don't think I would accept Winston's strategic judgement. His contemporaries certainly didn't.

[salesie]

Salesie wrote:

"Paul, I do respect your undoubted expertise on this subject but can't accept that the operational/tactical aspects of Verdun need to be separated from the strategic ones in order to gain a better understanding of this battle - it seems to me that to do so would negate the highly relevant causal-links between the strategic and operational aspects."

No, no..we agree. I thought I made that clear (?) All three levels are intertwined. We are actually agreeing on something--pretty scary.

Paul

Sorry, Mate, my mistake, you did make it clear - I must have been on the stupid pills when reading that particular post of yours! I believe this is a new experience for both of us? We're actually agreeing about something!

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Churchill's assessment of this stands repetition. In his chapter on Verdun, following a fairly comprehensive analysis of the battle's statistics, he wrote " To this extent therefore the tactical and pyschological conceptions underlying Falkenhayn's scheme were vindicated."

Phil

I hate to criticise the great man himself - but it has to be said that on occasion he had much more bottle than brains. Thank God!

Cheers-salesie.

[Christina Holstein]

I don't agree with Churchill either.

I'm interested in Robert's post about Falkenhayn also fighting a number of other German leaders. That seems to me to be a factor in his decision that should not be overlooked. He certainly wasn't popular with some of them and it must have irked him a great deal.

But the arguments put forward all still come down to bleeding white. Whether you stop on the Meuse Heights or you stop on the outer fortress line or on the inner fortress line, you can only be sure of success if you can be sure of inflicting greater casualties on the enemy than you suffer. Even with the experience of 1915 behind them, Falkenhayn couldn't be absolutely sure that it would happen.

Furthermore, is it likely that any army would just stop when the possibility of going forward was there? I can't see commanders on the ground saying OK that's it, lads, we stop here and let them come to us. I can't see troops doing it either. It certainly didn't happen on 25th February before Ft. Douaumont.

Petain certainly didn't believe that Falkenhayn only intended to bleed the French white. He believed that Falkenhayn attacked only on the Right Bank in order to draw the reserves over from the Left Bank, leaving it lightly defended and open to a sudden offensive between the Meuse and the Argonne aimed at the railway line from Chalons to Verdun. The French on the Right Bank, being unable to retreat quickly across the river, could then be rounded up and a breach would be driven through the French line which could then be exploited. If the Germans had actually got south of the railway line, they would have been close enough to the Voie Sacrée to endanger it.

In the very early days of my research on Ft. Douaumont about 9 years ago, I came across a reference to a comment about Verdun made by Falkenhayn in July 1915 to the effect that Verdun was quiet and that commanders in the field should keep it that way so that the French would think nothing was going to happen there. I didn't make a note of where I saw it so I can't give you the reference but it's something I always have in the back of my mind when there is talk of Falkenhayn producing his plan for the Kaiser on 25 December 1915.

Christina

[Robert Dunlop]

But the arguments put forward all still come down to bleeding white. Whether you stop on the Meuse Heights or you stop on the outer fortress line or on the inner fortress line, you can only be sure of success if you can be sure of inflicting greater casualties on the enemy than you suffer. Even with the experience of 1915 behind them, Falkenhayn couldn't be absolutely sure that it would happen.

Christina, you are right. The problem was that Falkenhayn couldn't be sure that it wasn't happening. Several months into the battle, Falkenhayn believed that the French were losing twice as many men as the Germans. He felt that the French lacked sufficient reserves to participate in the battle of the Somme.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

Christina,

There was no plan for an attack on the west bank as you describe it, as far as I know. 5th Army originally wanted to attack along both banks, but was not given the required strength to do this. When the attack kicked off there it was limited in scope. German resources were far from limitless in the beginning of 1916. The OHL artillery reserve was almost empty after the allocation of additional heavy batteries to the west bank in early March. Many of the other armies on the Western Front had been stripped of heavy batteries and had them replaced with captured guns to make up the initial artillery deployment at Verdun.

In the archives in Freiburg there is a transcript of an interview with the then ex-Kaiser about the meeting with Falkenhayn concerning the Verdun plan. Wilhelm stated clearly remembering that the plan was to seize the heights on the east bank and defend there.

Robert's observation about French casualties is a good one. I think Falkenhayn went to his grave thinking the French had suffered many more casualties than the Germans at Verdun. Tappen, when presented with the loss figures for both sides by the archives in the 30's was genuinely surprised. I think the 'Noria' system had a lot to do with this assumption. German intelligence was seeing a huge number of French units cycle through Verdun--it would have been an obvious conclusion to think they were being relieved due to heavy losses.

Your point about Falkenhayn not knowing exactly what would happen points to the very nature of war.

Robert Foley's research placed Verdun in its full context for the first time--as only part of the German strategy for 1916. It was never meant to be a 'war winning' contest, but part of a series of actions over time. The battle is so often spoke about in superlatives that it's easy to forget that.

Paul

I don't agree with Churchill either.

I'm interested in Robert's post about Falkenhayn also fighting a number of other German leaders. That seems to me to be a factor in his decision that should not be overlooked. He certainly wasn't popular with some of them and it must have irked him a great deal.

But the arguments put forward all still come down to bleeding white. Whether you stop on the Meuse Heights or you stop on the outer fortress line or on the inner fortress line, you can only be sure of success if you can be sure of inflicting greater casualties on the enemy than you suffer. Even with the experience of 1915 behind them, Falkenhayn couldn't be absolutely sure that it would happen.

Furthermore, is it likely that any army would just stop when the possibility of going forward was there? I can't see commanders on the ground saying OK that's it, lads, we stop here and let them come to us. I can't see troops doing it either. It certainly didn't happen on 25th February before Ft. Douaumont.

Petain certainly didn't believe that Falkenhayn only intended to bleed the French white. He believed that Falkenhayn attacked only on the Right Bank in order to draw the reserves over from the Left Bank, leaving it lightly defended and open to a sudden offensive between the Meuse and the Argonne aimed at the railway line from Chalons to Verdun. The French on the Right Bank, being unable to retreat quickly across the river, could then be rounded up and a breach would be driven through the French line which could then be exploited. If the Germans had actually got south of the railway line, they would have been close enough to the Voie Sacrée to endanger it.

In the very early days of my research on Ft. Douaumont about 9 years ago, I came across a reference to a comment about Verdun made by Falkenhayn in July 1915 to the effect that Verdun was quiet and that commanders in the field should keep it that way so that the French would think nothing was going to happen there. I didn't make a note of where I saw it so I can't give you the reference but it's something I always have in the back of my mind when there is talk of Falkenhayn producing his plan for the Kaiser on 25 December 1915.

Christina

[Robert Dunlop]

I think the 'Noria' system had a lot to do with this assumption. German intelligence was seeing a huge number of French units cycle through Verdun--it would have been an obvious conclusion to think they were being relieved due to heavy losses.

Paul, that is an excellent point. The system of rotation implemented by Petain was very different from the usual German approach.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

That said, my main reason for entering the fray, Gents, is that I now see Verdun as a prime example, amongst several, of German folly. I see this battle as being a good example that demonstrates the inherent strategic/geo-political naivety of German leadership, in that its leaders could never seem to see beyond military solutions i.e. for every strategic problem they came up against they sought an operational military solution. And this goes for Falkenhayn as well as the rest; a strategic realist he may have been when compared to his colleagues, but he still sought military solutions in the field when feeling the effects of the strategic realities (even the U-boat threat lacked strategic credibility, the German Navy, after war started, could never be strong enough to fully choke Britain and break Britain's blockade on Germany)...

salesie, the Retrospectroscope is a fabulous tool, isn't it

Robert

[phil andrade]

Robert's observation about French casualties is a good one. I think Falkenhayn went to his grave thinking the French had suffered many more casualties than the Germans at Verdun. Tappen, when presented with the loss figures for both sides by the archives in the 30's was genuinely surprised.

Someone wrote that the German "unwisdom" in attacking at Verdun was cancelled out by French casualties. I really can't remember who wrote it...it might have been Churchill..I certainly remember the impact of that extraordinary word "unwisdom"...who else but Winston would write using words like that ?

The apparent similarity of the casualties, the Germans recording about 90% of those recorded by the French, if taken at face value, makes the German plan to triumph in an attritional battle seem absurd : but look again at the figures and you'll see that while 43% of the French casualties were killed or prisoners, the German proportion was barely half that. Forgive my repetition of this, but surely the great preponderance of the French "irreplaceable" losses over those of the Germans should be acknowledged and emphasised. Churchill discerned this and commented on it. I'm sure that Paul has also furnished us with statistics from a different source that also bear that out.

Phil

[salesie]

salesie, the Retrospectroscope is a fabulous tool, isn't it

Robert

With such a device, Robert, one day we may be able to see ourselves coming before we even went.

Cheers-salesie.