Importance of Verdun

[Paul Hederer]

If following that line, Tom, I would say regain rather than "keep" the initiative - by arguing that direct German military initiative in the West was lost in 1914. But, it seems to me, for the reasons given in my previous post, that the quote which Robert gave is evidence that Falkenhayn seriously misread the strategic situation that prevailed in late 1915, which had highly negative implications for the operational planning of Verdun? In other words, was it simply an attempt to provoke the Allies, as per Robert's quote? If so, it backfired even more spectacularly if accepting that it was unneccesary in the first place.

Cheers-salesie.

"...Falkenhayn seriously misread the strategic situation..."

Salesie,

Yes and no. From the perspective of Germany, Falkenhayn had the clearest, maybe I should say most realistic, view of the strategic situation in late 1915/early 1916. He clearly saw what the war had become. He didn't believe Germany had the strength to win a military victory, and that a negotiated peace was the best option. This landed him in hot water with many of his contemporaries, and a whole generation of post war German writers.

He gauged the French reaction at Verdun well. They picked up the gauntlet as he had hoped, but the battle (as often happens) did not proceed as planned. The German Army found itself in a material/attritional battle it could not afford.

He did badly underestimate the French Army's resilience and the staying-power of the French nation. This is probably the most critical element in understanding his thinking before and during the battle. The French were always thought "to be on the verge of collapse." Not a unique delusion for any side during the Great War. For that matter he (and others) also badly misread the Russians.

I think the comments on Verdun as an attempt to seize the initiative are spot on. Falkenhayn knew a very large Allied offensive was on the way. His understanding of what was to come was largely shaped by the Allied breakthrough attempts of 1915. Falkenhayn stated repeatedly that massed offensives were not the way to break through the defensive system on the Western Front. It would be hard to argue with his logic in the 1915-1916 (or even later) timeframe.

Addressing your point about the operational planning for Verdun, I would agree, but for different reasons. The failure to allocate more resources to Verdun caused the failure of the initial attack. In anticipating dealing with Allied offensives at other points on the Western Front (they counted Russia out--a mistake) Falkenhayn held back too much in the OHL reserve. Comitting even 4-6 more divisions of the 25 in reserve at the beginning of 1916, as well as additional artillery, and extending the initial attack to the west bank of the Meuse may have led to the original objectives having been met (seziure of the northern forts on the east bank, and the Meuse heights) in a short amount of time.

To sum up, Falkenhayn had a clear and realistic understanding of Germany's strategic position at the beginning of 1916. He misread France's situation (but he was not unique in this failing) as well as Russian recuperative powers. He very astutely judged the French reaction at Verdun, but he can be held partially responsible for the failure of the attack from an operational standpoint in his decision to force the limiting of the attack to one bank by withholding reserves.

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Von Falkenhayn quickly came to the realisation that Germany could not win the war by rapid decisive military action. The failure of First Ypres, coming on the back of the failure of the 'Schlieffen Plan', convinced him. Von Falkenhayn picked up on a concept promoted by von Moltke the Elder, who had grappled with the problem raised by the Volkskrieg of the Franco-Prussian War. Although von Moltke was credited with the rapid destruction of the French regular army in 1870, he was deeply troubled by what happened after this and before the fall of Paris. The French rapidly reconstituted a significant military force, which forced the Germans to spend money and lives protecting lines of communication. Although the French forces failed in the field, they represented a major shift back to the threat posed by Napoleon's armies. Napoleon had demonstrated what could happen if a nation's manpower was mobilized for war, not just a professional cadre. Von Moltke recognised that the French might reconstitute a conscipted armed force for a future war with Germany. If this force was combined with similar moves by other nations, such as Russia, then Germany was unlikely to win a rapid decisive war of annihilation in the future. Von Moltke returned to the Bismarck approach of inflicting a rapid and signficant (but not total) defeat, followed by a political initiative that negotiated an end to the war.

Von Falkenhayn concluded that neither France nor Russia could be defeated by purely military actions. The latter conclusion was deeply at odds with von Hindenburg and Ludendorff. They felt that Russia could be knocked out if enough resources were given to OberOst. Von Falkenhayn refused, adding to the unpopularity of his appointment as Chief of the General Staff. This led to a campaign to oust von Falkenhayn. Irrespective, the success of the Russian offensive against the Austro-Hungarian forces in the Carpathians forced von Falkenhayn's hand. He had to transfer resources to the East. Von Mackensen was given command of these forces. In a stunning series of advances, von Mackensen inflicted a heavy series of defeats and forced the Russians to withdraw. Von Falkenhayn tried to exploit this military success by political means. He requested von Bethmann Hollweg start negotiations for a peace settlement. The goal was to detach the Russians from the Entente. Von Falkenhayn's request was seen as a sign of weakness, a major deviation from the generally held view (including von Bethmann Hollweg's) that a strategy of annihilation was possible. Von Falkenhayn then decided to cripple the Russians. Throughout 1915 he pursued von Mackensen's success, which led to the Russians loosing up to 2 million in casualties and prisoners, and to their ejection from Poland. Von Falkenhayn again tried to get a negotiated peace but the Russians refused any overtures. Von Falkenhayn concluded, however, that the Russians were no longer a valid military force in the near future. He did not think that Conrad was protecting his back. The success against the Russians had been master-minded by von Falkenhayn, who had had to force Conrad to support his strategy.

During the latter half of 1915, the French launched their campaign in the Champagne region. Although it was difficult, the Germans managed to hold the attacks. Von Falkenhayn knew that the French had sustained very heavy losses as a result. He misread France's resolve to continue. Von Falkenhayn felt that if the French could be stimulated to counter-attack then they could be bled white. This would cause France to collapse politically. Von Falkenhayn did not have enough resources to mount a major attack in the West, which is consistent with Paul's points. Verdun appeared to offer a small area of great strategic significance - a small enough area that the limited German resources could be effective.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Please clarify for me how Falkenhayn's appreciation of the battle's objectives differed from the Crown Prince's. How much importance was attached to capturing Verdun ? Paul indicates that the objective aspired to by Falkenhayn was limited to the seizure of the forts and heights on the northern sector of the right bank of the Meuse, and that this was attainable with another few divisions and commensurate increase in artillery. How did Falkenhayn envisage turning this to account ?

From a different perspective, did the French army improve its performance dramatically as a result of Verdun ?

On July 1 1916 the French contingent that attacked on the Somme was reduced to a small fraction of what had been envisaged at Chantilly. But those few divisions achieved a truly spectacular success. Without the experience of Verdun, would that degree of skill have been manifest in French tactics ?

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

Von Falkenhayn predicted several outcomes for the battle. These are listed in this post here.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Kronprinz Wilhelm's perspective is posted here. The subsequent posts in that thread are important as well. Paul made some additional observations that are worth reading.

Robert

[SteveMarsdin]

Robert/Paul,

Fascinating posts and thanks for the links to the previous threads. Linked to Christina's post on the logistical advantages of the "choice" of Verdun it gives me a far clearer understanding of the reasons/scenarios for the battle and its possible outcomes.

[salesie]

Paul, Robert, thanks for your replies.

I've never had much interest in this battle and had been following this thread in a rather cursory manner - my main interest is, as you already know, in the strategic and geo-political aspects of the war, and how these aspects affected operational/tactical considerations in the field. And, I never saw Verdun as falling within my main sphere of interest until last night. Last night, I was reading parts of Hew Strachan's The First World War, and had just put down this book after reading Strachan's brief strategic overview of 1914 and then of Verdun (coupled with the strategic implications of Falkenhayn's problems with Conrad), when I spotted the quote from Dec 1915 that Robert posted.

So, given the strategic necessity of the allies to attack in order to regain territory which was rightfully theirs, and the increasingly restrictive strategic straightjacket which Germany was in after its failures of 1914, I saw this quote as partial proof that Falkenhayn, despite being lauded by many as a strategic realist, was in fact a strategic/geo-political naivete just as many in the German General Staff/Government were i.e. operationally/tactically sound, but when in overall charge and needing to match operations to strategic reality then Falkenhayn's thought processes were flawed?

How on earth, given the strategic reality, did he think that a limited assault on Verdun would provoke the Allies into committing "suicide" when all he had to do was wait for them to assault his forces in their defensively superior positions? How on earth did he think that a limited assault on Verdun would regain Germany the military initiative? It seems to me that Falkenhayn typified, just as any other German commander or leader, an overall naivety as far as strategic/geo-political considerations were concerned - that whoever was in charge, they could never see clearly beyond pure military matters - and that this lack of strategic/geo-political nous is evident in the build up to, and Germany's prosecution of, the war?

Haven't had time to think this through fully, and I know very little detail about Verdun - but thought I'd "think aloud" on the forum, and see what turns up.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

It is very clear that the French learned from Verdun. The lessons were, however, a continuation of the learning process that started in August 1914. By July 1916, there was a significant difference in the style of the French infantry attacks, compared with the British. I would recommend caution, however, in correlating the difference with the levels of success. Despite the scale of the fighting around Verdun, the French had built enough heavy artillery to provide significant support for the attack. The differences in infantry tactics and the levels of artillery support are usually quoted as the reasons for the French successes. Both factors have been used to criticise the British planning and execution of the attack on July 1st.

In previous posts, I have noted that the British plans had a profound effect on the success of the French attacks. By extending the width of the attack and by threatening Gommecourt, the British forced the German commander to focus on the British sector. Von Falkenhayn did not believe that the Entente counter-attack would come in the Somme area. He refused to release reserves. The German commander had to take infantry and artillery from the French sector to counter the British. This played a significant role, IMHO, in the French successes.

Robert

[phil andrade]

they could never see clearly beyond pure military matters - and that this lack of strategic/geo-political nous is evident in the build up to, and Germany's prosecution of, the war?

Cheers-salesie.

Just thinking aloud too, salesie...maybe Bismark had possessed this faculty, and his successors made a bodge of things.

I'm wondering whether a nation ( or should I say a society, since German unification was not accomplished until 1871 ?) that made such a rapid military onslaught on its continental neighbours in the fifty years prior to the Great War, along with its commensurate development in industrial might, simply did not possess the political and diplomatic maturity to balance its exponential growth. Perhaps the same might be said of Japan in the fifty years prior to 1941. God forbid that we see another example of this today !

Verdun is a hard battle to asses, both in its genesis and in its effects. It is sometimes compared with Stalingrad. I can easily understand the importance of Stalingrad in the Second World War, especially in so far as it was a major turning point ; Verdun is harder - for me, at least - to appreciate in this regard.

Phil

[truthergw]

When considering Verdun we can do worse than take it at face value, as described by the main protagonists. Planned as a battle of attrition where attack would be followed by counterattack and this in turn, to be aggressively defended against. The aim, as in all WW1 battles, being to draw in the enemy reserves and when they had been used up, the stage would be set for a battle where the opposing forces would be destroyed. The battle failed in its intention because the Germans underestimated the opposition and overestimated their own strength. The details of the battle and its failure are plain to see whether we look at front lines before and after or count casualties. The interaction between Verdun and the Somme is complex but the overall effect is plain. The Germans were not able to pursue the attack at Verdun nor the defence on the Somme. The internecine political warfare carried on after the war in the higher echelons of the German military should not be allowed to distract us from analysing what happened at the time and in theatre. That was exactly its purpose and we ought not let ourselves be led astray.

[phil andrade]

When considering Verdun we can do worse than take it at face value

There's a sort of incongruity about the battle. It's viewed as a failure of German strategy, with Falkenhayn being the culprit. As an episode of attritional warfare, however, it's significant that, counting the killed and missing only - the hardcore or irreplaceable casualties - German losses against the French on the Western Front between February and June 1916 amounted to 72,289, compared with a French loss in those categories of 156,000 : a rate of exchange that might be cited as a form of vindication.

Phil

[truthergw]

Up to June, I think we must accept that the German aim succeeded in part at least. They had incurred roughly half the casualties of the French, captured a large fortress and occupied a large area of France with several villages. The failings from the German point of view would be the casualties they had sustained. Although relatively small, attackers in WW1 expected 2 to 1 casualties against the defenders and the Germans had reversed this, in absolute figures they were larger than the Germans could sustain. This is where the Somme comes in. The fighting there meant that French retaliation after June would allow the recapture of the fortress, and a recapture of some territory in the coming months. The situation at Verdun at the end of 1916 could be viewed in two ways. A victory for the Germans in terms of attrition albeit at a higher cost than they could afford to sustain, or a defensive victory for the French who had inflicted losses on the Germans which were too severe for them to maintain their attack and forced a limited withdrawal on them. Which of the two views adopted depended on the standpoint of the viewer of course.

I don't think any of the foregoing is very controversial, neither is it earthshatteringly novel. Where the controversy arises is when we start to question motives, intentions, strategic aims and related subjects. That leads us into a very dangerous minefield indeed. That of German politics as they affected the OHL and the German government during the war and in the decade or so following. All of the German commanders were accused of losing the war. All of their actions and Verdun was no exception, were criticised and pointed to as evidence to support these accusations. That is an extremely interesting subject but it is very difficult to disentangle truth from faulty memory and deliberate misinformation. The political battles which were fought through the war did not fall under the armistice of 1918 nor the treaty of 1919 and in fact, the echoes of those battles are still rolling around the academic battlefields to this day.

[Paul Hederer]

...attackers in WW1 expected 2 to 1 casualties against the defenders and the Germans had reversed this...

Tom,

Up to June, casualites were around:

German--174,215

French -- 190,000

or, 1.09 French casualty per 1 German.

The best ratio the Germans obtained was 1.33/1 in the period 1-10 April.

Ther Germans never came close, at any point of Verdun, to inflicting 2:1 casualties.

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Part of the problem is that von Falkenhayn overruled the plan to attack on both banks of the Meuse. This exposed the German attack to heavy artillery enfilade fire from the west bank, negating any potential advantage from their early territorial gains. It contibuted to (but was not the only cause of) the near equal casualty rate.

Robert

[truthergw]

...attackers in WW1 expected 2 to 1 casualties against the defenders and the Germans had reversed this...

Tom,

Up to June, casualites were around:

German--174,215

French -- 190,000

or, 1.09 French casualty per 1 German.

The best ratio the Germans obtained was 1.33/1 in the period 1-10 April.

Ther Germans never came close, at any point of Verdun, to inflicting 2:1 casualties.

Paul

I was basing my figures on PMJ's post. ( Very lazy I know )

[phil andrade]

The important aspect of the casualty statistics that I posted ( there are, of course, varying sets, but they all follow the same pattern) is that, while aggregate casualties were very nearly equal, the French loss in killed and missing was more than double that sustained by the Germans. Dead men and prisoners are permanent losses. The Germans reported more men wounded than the French - but three quarters of the wounded returned to some form of duty.

Phil

[Paul Hederer]

From my mobile, not sure if this willcome through OK, I'm having some problems with the page.

Some interesting points raised here:

The question on how Verdun was to change the strategic situation is very valid. It's important to remember that it was only part of the plan for 1916, not the end all. I've seen the statement made from the German side that the fate of the French army and France would be decided at Verdun. I think this was a later attempt to justify the losses that had been suffered uptil that point.

To see the attack as a means of pinning the French reserves, seizing the high ground and using that advantage to inflict heavy casualties on French counter-attacks is a realistic view of the battle's objectives.

I think some of the confusion concerning the objectives is due to later attempts at justification by various authors. The original stated obje

ctive, seizure of the heights, is clearly conveyed in the orders. The later failure, and continued attempts to take the original objectives were painted in the guise of the attemp at attrition.

[Christina Holstein]

I've seen the statement made from the German side that the fate of the French army and France would be decided at Verdun. I think this was a later attempt to justify the losses that had been suffered uptil that point.

To see the attack as a means of pinning the French reserves, seizing the high ground and using that advantage to inflict heavy casualties on French counter-attacks is a realistic view of the battle's objectives.

I think some of the confusion concerning the objectives is due to later attempts at justification by various authors. The original stated obje

ctive, seizure of the heights, is clearly conveyed in the orders. The later failure, and continued attempts to take the original objectives were painted in the guise of the attemp at attrition.

I'd agree with that entirely but I still wonder why Falkenhayn or any commander would assume that inflicting heavy casualties on French counter-attacks would not result in his own Army suffering them too?

Christina

[Paul Hederer]

I've seen the statement made from the German side that the fate of the French army and France would be decided at Verdun. I think this was a later attempt to justify the losses that had been suffered uptil that point.

To see the attack as a means of pinning the French reserves, seizing the high ground and using that advantage to inflict heavy casualties on French counter-attacks is a realistic view of the battle's objectives.

I think some of the confusion concerning the objectives is due to later attempts at justification by various authors. The original stated obje

ctive, seizure of the heights, is clearly conveyed in the orders. The later failure, and continued attempts to take the original objectives were painted in the guise of the attemp at attrition.

I'd agree with that entirely but I still wonder why Falkenhayn or any commander would assume that inflicting heavy casualties on French counter-attacks would not result in his own Army suffering them too?

Christina

Hello Christina!

Falkenhans's beliefs stemmed from the Allied offensives of 1915. I think he felt (with some justification) that if he could provoke a French counter-offensive on the German held Meuse heights there would follow a blood bath. I feel the conept was sound

But has been obscured by later examinations of Falkenhayn's "real reasons" for Verdun.

I think an examination of the battle from the tactical and operational level, divorced from the speculation of Falkenhayn's motivations (which I think will become self evident in the end) can shed new light on the battle.

I'm beginning to believe that was is clouding the matter were the later attempts by those involved to justify what happened. Looking at the orders and arrangements made lead more to the idea that the seizure of the heights was to be a quick affair. One of my favorite generals, Hans von Zwehl, who fought at Verdun as a corps commander expressed his views pretty clearly about Falkenhayn's later memorandum.

Paul

[phil andrade]

One of my favorite generals, Hans von Zwehl, who fought at Verdun as a corps commander expressed his views pretty clearly about Falkenhayn's later memorandum.

Paul

What did he say, Paul ?

Phil

[Christina Holstein]

Hello Christina!

Falkenhans's beliefs stemmed from the Allied offensives of 1915. I think he felt (with some justification) that if he could provoke a French counter-offensive on the German held Meuse heights there would follow a blood bath. I feel the conept was sound

Paul

A bloodbath, yes, but why did he suppose that the bloodbath would only be French? How could he believe that he could inflict massive casualties on the enemy without suffering them himself?

I can see him believing that if he thought that the French supply system into Verdun was so poor that they would only be able to bring up men and supplies in small packets that he could deal with as they came along. Perhaps that's another factor?

Nice to see you on the forum again, Paul.

Christina

[SteveMarsdin]

Good afternoon All,

Picking up on your "supply" point, Christina, given that the main road, rail, river/canal links were cut, just leaving the road and line to Bar-le-Duc would von Falkenhayn have expected the German air-force to have better suppressed this sole supply route ? As I understand it, because of French air-superiority in the theatre(a perhaps over-looked factor ?) the Voie Sacree was never attacked from the air.

[truthergw]

The German method of defence in 1915 had been to rely on a stop line of artillery. To fall back steadily until the attackers had outrun the artillery support that allowed them the break in in the first place. Then, as a weakened attack without artillery ground to a halt, so the German counter attack could take place with fresh troops and strong artillery support. This was successful until the very end of the war for both sides. I believe Falkenhayn's idea was to attack, fall back in face of the counterattack but then initiate a counterattack of his own. In other words to initiate an action that would induce the French to a costly attack and keep them doing so. That is why Verdun was chosen, the French could not or would not simply fall back and allow the Germans to take Verdun. The battle did not proceed along these lines. Both sides got bogged down in a slugging match with relatively heavier casualties for the Germans than planned. I believe that a fatal weakness in the mindset of the German high command is displayed here as it was in the original plan of invasion through Belgium and was displayed again in the Kaiserschlacht in 1918. Overestimate of their own strengths and abilities and underestimate of those of the enemy.

[Robert Dunlop]

Von Falkenhayn seems to have been impressed by the scale of French losses in the Champagne attacks. The first day of the offensive saw significant French gains in territory. Thereafter, however, the French could not make progress. The key to inflicting the losses was not just the artillery. The approach was much more sophisticated. The Herbsschlacht (autumn battle) in Champagne saw von Loßberg's appointment as replacement Chief of Staff for the German 3rd Army. He rapidly organised a new defensive line in the area of the French break-in. Von Loßberg made use of the reverse slopes. The French could not see over the ridge lines. Their artillery had to fire blind. Von Loßberg set up nests of machine guns on the sloping ground, with artillery observers placed well forward. As soon as the French assault forces crossed the ridge line, they could be engaged by German artillery and machine guns. The French artillery could not provide adequate suppression. Any French survivors could be mopped up by counter-attack troops, out of sight of French artillery observers.

It is not clear if von Falkenhayn expected the same defensive approach to be used at Verdun. It would make sense, however, in light of the requirement to capture the high ground and forts. This would have provided the Germans with reverse slopes, against which the French counter-attacks could be bled. Von Falkenhayn also expected to bleed the Entente via another mechanism as well. He believed the French and/or British would counter-attack elsewhere to relieve pressure on Verdun. Von Falkenhayn guessed wrongly, however, about the site of the the counter-attack. He did not believe it was going to be the Somme.

Robert

[phil andrade]

I believe that a fatal weakness in the mindset of the German high command is displayed here Overestimate of their own strengths and abilities and underestimate of those of the enemy.

One aspect of Falkenhayn's style of command - or so I have been led to believe - was his willingness and ability to countenance German weakness in material terms : there have been a few posters on this forum who have commented on Falkenhayn's "realism".

The principal feature of the German offensive at Verdun was its enormous and unprecedented array of artillery. Was there a commensurate qualitative superiority here ? By this, I mean to ask as to whether the terraine favoured the German gunners. Were their guns sited in a manner that gave them the advantage ? The slopes and ridges of those heights along the Meuse could be a gunner's dream.... or a nightmare. In the initial bombardment the Germans deployed 1200-1400 pieces : by the height of the battle I think there were about 2250 German guns engaged compared with 1750 French. Presumably the German fire converged, which would obviously entail a rather more lethal predicament for the Frenchmen than for the Germans...but then, the French flanking fire from the West Bank made havoc with advancing German units. Relating this question to the comments made by Tom about the Germans failure to appreciate their own vulnerabilities, and their tendency to underestimate the mettle of their foes, I wonder whether the German artillery deployment was sufficiently lavish and well sited to justify Falkenhayn's endeavour.

Phil