Importance of Verdun

[SteveMarsdin]

A big thank you Christina and Robert; when my wife and continental in-laws ask me what I want for Christmas, for once I'll be ready !!!

PS. I'll probably have to put off visiting the more southern forts until I've done a few more of Christina's Verdun walks - my wife likes Verdun as a place to visit (outside the WW1 interest),......... although thinking about it my mother-in-law might be persuaded to visit the Bergere de France factory shop in Bar-le-Duc !

[Robert Dunlop]

Christina, I totally agree with that sentiment!!

Robert

[Christina Holstein]

Steve - thinking of Christmas, sometimes a fort comes up for sale. If I hear of one, I'll let you know!

Christina

[Robert Dunlop]

Christina, I have just flicked through the relevant sections of Joffre's memoirs. Virtually no mention of what was happening around Verdun. The focus is on the French left wing and the events surrounding the lead up to and execution of the Battle of the Marne.

Robert

[SteveMarsdin]

Beats socks Christina ! Can't wait - perhaps my wife will wrap it in festive camouflage netting ?

Back to topic.... looking at the map and having some knowledge of the area (we looked at buying house in Seraucourt several years ago !) it is incredible how close the Germans came to cutting off Verdun in 1914, in the light of all the blood that was spilt there within 2 years. I know it's all "what ifs" and there are too many imponderables but I can't help wondering how long Verdun would have held out for (or the Germans been able to maintain their position) if it had been isolated in 1914 ?

[Robert Dunlop]

In 1914, you cannot consider the precarious situation around Verdun without taking into account the Marne. Every ounce of German effort that went into trying to pinch out the Verdun salient was less effort available to support the German right flank.

Robert

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning Robert,

For once I was been purely rhetorical ! I agree entirely with you and wouldn't want to divert this thread into discussing all the possible scenarios; from threads I have read so far there is sufficient reasoned disagreement between Forum members about what actually happened in WW1 let alone what might have !!!

[truthergw]

Beats socks Christina ! Can't wait - perhaps my wife will wrap it in festive camouflage netting ?

Back to topic.... looking at the map and having some knowledge of the area (we looked at buying house in Seraucourt several years ago !) it is incredible how close the Germans came to cutting off Verdun in 1914, in the light of all the blood that was spilt there within 2 years. I know it's all "what ifs" and there are too many imponderables but I can't help wondering how long Verdun would have held out for (or the Germans been able to maintain their position) if it had been isolated in 1914 ?

It doesn't hurt to indulge in a strictly limited spot of 'what if', now and then. If the German forces had surrounded Verdun, it would have been a sizeable mouthful and might have taken a bit of swallowing. There was a French Army to the south at Nancy and the majority of the French forces to the West. After all, that is what the fortresses were for, to break up the German advance not to halt it. Depending on the outcome at the Marne, the investing force might have found itself isolated very far into enemy territory. I have a question now for Christina and Robert. Joffre was criticised for stripping the heavy guns from Verdun. When did this actually take place? Am I correct to think that at the time of the Crown Prince's advance, most of the heavies were still in place?

[Christina Holstein]

Joffre changed the status of Verdun and the other fortress cities by decree of 9 August 1916. That enabled him to make use of the resources of the fortress cities and it was after that date that the guns were removed. The French guns in place until that date had been 75s, 120s and 155s. The latter were the heaviest. When the Germans attacked in February 1916, there were at Verdun 130 field guns (75s) and 140 'heavies', of which only 10 were modern and quick-firing. There were no heavy French guns comparable to the German heavies at Verdun until the new standard gauge railway was completed in June 1916, allowing the French to move them up by rail.

On the outbreak of war, the Verdun fortified sector consisted of 427 artillery pieces (placed in the forts and fieldworks, in the intervals between them and in the town), 268 MGs (58 in the forts), 86 smooth bore mortars and 203 revolver guns. In addition, there was a general reserve of 258 artillery pieces, 50 mortars and 8 MGs. Including everything, that makes 1300 available in August 1914.

Joffre was very worried by the idea of French fortress cities falling into enemy hands with their huge resources intact, as happened on the E. Front in the early weeks of the war. As a result, the govenors of fortress cities were ordered not to surrender or to withdraw unless it was absolutely vital to do so to prevent the garrison being captured. During the Battle of the Marne, the govenor of Verdun was in fact given permission to withdraw if it looked as if Verdun would be taken but he refused to do so. I suspect that if he had done and Verdun had fallen in September 1914, the French would have accepted the situation and not fought hard to retake it even though Verdun was the strongest fortress city in France. By the beginning of 1916, however, losing another city was another matter. Morale came into it by then and it just couldn't be allowed to happen.

Christina

[truthergw]

Thank you, Christina.

[Christina Holstein]

Oh dear, that should have been 9 August 1915, not 1916. I'll go and listen to Bob Dylan's new Christmas album as penance.

Robert - I think that the fact that Joffre concentrates on the French left wing in the part of his memoirs that deal with September 1914 shows his perspective, that is, it makes clear that he regarded the left wing as of greater importance than the what was happening on the right wing in the Verdun sector.

Christina

[Robert Dunlop]

...clear that Joffre regarded the left wing as of greater importance than the what was happening on the right wing in the Verdun sector.

Christina, the left wing was the key to delivering a decisive reverse on the Germans. If he had focused on stopping the attacks around Verdun, then the best that could have been hoped for was literally that - stopping them. Not defeating the German advance as a whole. Just as the Germans saw that the key to defeating the French army was to get around its open flank, so Joffre applied the same military axiom.

Robert

[Christina Holstein]

Robert,

I think I don't agree that in early Sept. 1914 the left wing was the key to delivering a 'decisive reverse' to the Germans. The left wing was more important because it protected Paris and that was vital. Verdun was small and far away and could be abandoned. Paris could not. Getting round the open flank came in after the Marne and the German withdrawal.

As to stopping the German army or delivering a decisive reverse, I think we're in imponderables again. Who knows what might have happened if the German army had been decisively defeated around Verdun in 1914? What blow to morale would that have been, what chaos and confusion caused, what decisions taken hurriedly in the aftermath? If the Germans had been decisively defeated there, it would have split the 7 German armies in the middle. Who can say what might have happened then? The left wing would certainly not have gone on calmly advancing.

Christina

[Robert Dunlop]

Christina, Paris complicates the situation somewhat. If we leave Paris and Verdun out for a moment (let's say that no such politically important cities existed anywhere along the battle lines), then Joffre as C-in-C would be seeking an open flank to manoeuvre around the enemy forces. This concept was central to any military plan for 'winning'. Attacking an enemy head-on, which is what would happen in the middle of the line, was considered highly unlikely to create a war-winning situation. This thinking was based on a clear understanding that defence was stronger than attack. Manoeuvring around the flank means that the enemy's routes of supply and communication can be cut. This is by far the best way to destroy an enemy.

The above represents the general thinking that Joffre will have used (it was similar to the thinking that underpinned his attempt to defeat the initial advance of the German. Joffre thought the German centre was weak and that his forces could penetrate through the Ardennes and into the rear of von Beulow and von Kluck's armies, cutting them off). Now bring Paris back into the equation. Joffre used a minimum of forces to try and hold Paris per se. As much as possible, he tried to concentrate his mass de manoeuvre to the north of the Paris defences, so that it could attack von Kluck's exposed tail. Maunoury's primary task was to attack, not defend Paris.

The history of the war indicates that it was highly unlikely that a French force could have split the German armies in the middle via a frontal attack. Von Kluck and von Beulow made the cardinal mistake of allowing their forces to get separated in a situation where they did not fully comprehend where the French and BEF forces were. Maunoury's attack opened up the gap still further, when he forced von Kluck to turn to protect his right flank. The French and BEF were then able to penetrate the huge gap between First and Second Armies. This type of mistake was most likely to happen on a flank, not in the centre. The reason is that all armies feared for their lines of supply and communication. As noted above, these are way more vulnerable on the flanks. Thus von Kluck had to take extreme action to counter Maunoury's threat. He could not rely on his neighbour to the right to protect him - he was the right.

There was an example of a French attack penetrating the German lines in 1914. This occurred soon after the Germans reached the Aisne, when Conneau's Corps created a salient. It was quickly snuffed out.

Robert

[truthergw]

I have only read Joffre's account of Charleroi and the Marne, not his complete memoirs. As Robert says, cursory mention of the Eastern frontier. I believe his belated concentration on the left wing was a result of having entirely misread the strategic situation during the opening battles of the frontiers. Once it was realised that the main invasion was being carried out to a German plan and not the French one, that they were in fact advancing through Belgium as all the world except the French intelligence had been taking for granted for years, it was imperative that all his efforts should be devoted to first, saving his forces then re-aligning them for a completely unplanned battle. The fact that he did so is to his very great credit. However, it required some very nice judgement as to just how much he could afford to strip from the right wing to bolster his left. The Crown Prince may have owed the depth of his advance as well as his subsequent recall to the Battle of the Marne and the movement of the French forces in its preparation.

[Paul Hederer]

Hello All,

Out of the woods for a bit to comment on some things here.

I don't think there is any evidence that Verdun was ever meant as a breakthrough battle. The resources were simply not available, nor does any of the planning suggest this. It may well have been Falkenhayn's plan was to "bleed the French white," but the 5th Army never really got to that point. I believe the idea was a quick bound forward, probably lasting 5-10 days, to seize the Meuse heights on the east bank and then fight off the French using the strong terrain and artillery and inflict as many losses as possible. This never occured. Too little attacking strength was allocated, and the attack stalled. The original plan was dead by 26 February. The original allocation of munitions and resources strongly support the "bound forward," theory.

All that happened later was an attempt to reach the original objective, the Meuse heights--I honestly think the later white-washing of it as the actual "bleeding white" experiment was an attempt at justifying what had happened--not an unsual thing in the annals of military history.

It's important to look through the conjecture and make an examination of what 5th Army was actually trying to do. Orders, logistics and resource allocation do not lie. Armies are very large organizations that leave extensive paper trails that can provide valuable clues. It may have been Falkenhayn's concept, but it was 5th Army's battle.

We can't look at the Verdun through the eyes of today, knowing what it became. Falkenhayn was already casting his eye about in April looking for another place to attack. Verdun was only a part of a larger plan.

These are only a few thoughts. There is a LOT more that can be said about Verdun. A very interesting and important battle--a battle of limited resources and objectives ultimately consumes 56 German divisions--fascinating stuff.

Paul

[LesCroft]

The memorial says it all for me.

http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?pid=1535...mp;id=598101730

[Robert Dunlop]

Paul, I have been re-reading Robert Foley's account of von Falkenhayn and the planning for Verdun. Foley supports your comments, apart from the issue of Verbluten - bleeding the French to death. Foley quoted a key diary entry from Plessen. It was a record of the conversation between Kaiser Wilhelm and von Falkenhayn on December 3 1915:

"General von Falkenhayn rolled out for His Majesty a serious picture of the situation with the conclusion that to carry the war to its end, an attack in the west, where all available strength has already been collected, must be conducted... it is to be then that the Entente will attack us in the west and thereby bleed themselves white [sich dabei verblutet]." (Plessen, "Tagebuch").

Robert

[phil andrade]

The implication of that is very significant - a german attack designed to provoke an Entente counter offensive. The bleeding white occasioned by tactical defense.

Phil

[Paul Hederer]

Paul, I have been re-reading Robert Foley's account of von Falkenhayn and the planning for Verdun. Foley supports your comments, apart from the issue of Verbluten - bleeding the French to death. Foley quoted a key diary entry from Plessen. It was a record of the conversation between Kaiser Wilhelm and von Falkenhayn on December 3 1915:

"General von Falkenhayn rolled out for His Majesty a serious picture of the situation with the conclusion that to carry the war to its end, an attack in the west, where all available strength has already been collected, must be conducted... it is to be then that the Entente will attack us in the west and thereby bleed themselves white [sich dabei verblutet]." (Plessen, "Tagebuch").

Robert

Hello Robert,

Good to be back in contact. I probably didn't express myself well. I'm not disputing that the concept was attrition, or "to bleed them white," but 5th Army was never in a position to put the concept into practice. They were to seize the Meuse heights and then defend, inflicting heavy casualties in doing so. What actually happened was a prolonged German offensive--that defintely was not the plan. Verdun went terribly wrong early on, and then Falkernhayn went "all in," for a myriad of reasons.

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Paul, thanks for the clarification. I agree with your point about 5th Army, FWIIW.

Robert

[salesie]

Paul, I have been re-reading Robert Foley's account of von Falkenhayn and the planning for Verdun. Foley supports your comments, apart from the issue of Verbluten - bleeding the French to death. Foley quoted a key diary entry from Plessen. It was a record of the conversation between Kaiser Wilhelm and von Falkenhayn on December 3 1915:

"General von Falkenhayn rolled out for His Majesty a serious picture of the situation with the conclusion that to carry the war to its end, an attack in the west, where all available strength has already been collected, must be conducted... it is to be then that the Entente will attack us in the west and thereby bleed themselves white [sich dabei verblutet]." (Plessen, "Tagebuch").

Robert

Could this quote be taken as evidence of Falkenhayn's misreading of the strategic situation, Robert? Did the German Army actually need to attack in the west in order to provoke an attack by the Entente?

The consequences of the Marne and 1st Ypres were strategic (the former perhaps more so than the latter?), meaning the quick victory that Germany not only desired but desperately needed was denied them; from then on Germany could not win the war but the Entente could lose it. Germany had, however, made two significant gains - it occupied almost all of Belgium as well as the industrial heartland of Northern France, and much of this occupied territory was so suited to defence that it could be argued, perversely, that Germany virtually retained the advantages of an offensive strategy. The Allies had no choice but to attack strong defensive positions in order to regain what was rightfully theirs - the Marne and 1st Ypres may have placed Germany in a strategic straightjacket but had also, for the time being, placed the allies in an equally restrictive operational straightjacket in the west.

Surely, the strategic situation was such in late 1915 that it was inevitable the Entente would continue to attack, with increasing aggression, without any provocation, thus giving him the "bleeding themselves white" effect he says he desired and actively sought? And when coupled with Falkenhayn's risky assumption that Conrad would "watch his back" in the East and maintain the pressure on a weakened Russia (which Conrad failed to do when diverting his focus and forces towards attacking Italy), why do you think that Falkenhayn felt the need to risk an attack at all in the west, never mind at Verdun?

Cheers-salesie.

[truthergw]

Could this quote be taken as evidence of Falkenhayn's misreading of the strategic situation, Robert? Did the German Army actually need to attack in the west in order to provoke an attack by the Entente?

................................

Cheers-salesie.

I think that Falkenhayn saw that he would be attacked in 1916 on the Western Front. Verdun was an attempt to keep the initiative, ensuring that the fighting was done when he wanted, where he wanted and where he had built up resources.

[phil andrade]

A pre-emptive move, I suppose. It would be interesting to find ot how much the Germans knew about Allied coalition strategy as formulated at Chantilly.

Phil

[salesie]

I think that Falkenhayn saw that he would be attacked in 1916 on the Western Front. Verdun was an attempt to keep the initiative, ensuring that the fighting was done when he wanted, where he wanted and where he had built up resources.

If following that line, Tom, I would say regain rather than "keep" the initiative - by arguing that direct German military initiative in the West was lost in 1914. But, it seems to me, for the reasons given in my previous post, that the quote which Robert gave is evidence that Falkenhayn seriously misread the strategic situation that prevailed in late 1915, which had highly negative implications for the operational planning of Verdun? In other words, was it simply an attempt to provoke the Allies, as per Robert's quote? If so, it backfired even more spectacularly if accepting that it was unneccesary in the first place.

Cheers-salesie.