Importance of Verdun

[castman]

I was watching a programme about the Somme which stated that the Germans made the attack on Verdun knowing it would draw the French who were commited to defending this important town.

It never explained why Verdun was deemed to be so important to France - does anyone have the answer?

[phil andrade]

Verdun was a citadel of immense national importance to France : it was a symbol, as well as an imposing fortified sector in its own right. It shared this symbolic importance with Metz and Toul ; Falkenhayn was correct in his belief that the French would defend it, cost what it might. The reason for this symbolic importance is attributable to its close proximity to the old Gallic - Teutonic frontiers, which had seen rivalry between the French and Germans for centuries. I think that Louis XIV had gained the citadel, and it was rather a jewel in the crown as far as France's national prestige was concerned. If I remember my history, it had played an imporant role in the Revolutionary War and again in the Franco-Prussian War. It had also proved a very effective defensive bastion in September 1914. Its capture by the Germans would have been calamitous for french morale.

Phil.

[truthergw]

As Phil says, a symbolic and historic importance. Lost and regained in the Revolutionary wars after the first victory for the revolutionary armies at Valmy. After the Franco Prussian war, the French built an impenetrable chain of defence along their common border with Germany. Verdun was the northernmost fortress of the chain. With Verdun gone, the road from Germany to Paris was wide open and the fortresses at Toul, Epinal and Belfort with their fortified camps at Nancy and elsewhere could be isolated and attacked from the rear. It was because of Verdun and her sister fortresses that Schlieffen had to go the long way round and into France through Belgium. In the end, as well as fixing the northern end of the East frontier, Verdun was the eastern end of the northern front. A pivotal point in fact as well as in importance.

[healdav]

Apart from that, one over the hills at Verdun it is a nice easy trot all the way to Paris.

The range of hills from the Moselle to the rgonne, backed by the Meuse is France's inner defence line.

[castman]

Thanks everyone for the explanation. The programme implied that there was something specidfically important about Verdun, a big omission in their script not taking 20 seconds to explain it!

[bob lembke]

If you are interested in this point, and in the importance of Verdun, a very interesting vignette can be obtained by studing the story of a Commandant Driant, the commander of two battalions of French Chaussers at Verdun. It is surprising, given the psychological and real importance of Verdun, how ill-prepared the French were to defend the area. Driant (I am going to fly on memory here, but will generally have it correct, I think) was not only a French officer (I think the equivilant rank was lieutenant colonel), but also I think a member of the French Assembly, and/or a newspaperman. He was very worried late 1915 about the state of the defenses, and wrote a number of embarrassing letters. When the fighting started his two battalions were driven back again and again (there were earthworks, but not a fully developed trench line), partially by a series of flame-thrower attacks. One factor in his being forced back, on the second day, from position to position, finally being pushed back about 2-3 km., was a half battery of 77 mm field guns being rolled thru the French lines by a company of pioneers, finally one gun was abandoned, but one rolled forward about 2-3 km., sometimes ahead of the French line, or the German infantry. At one point Driant and his men were holding a strong point, and were receiving light shells from the rear, which they first thought were French shorts, but then they spotted this lone 77 mm gun on a road behind and to the side of them, pumping shells into their position. Driant ordered a MG crew to take their gun out of the position and set up and cut down the gun crew, they were dubious, but one of Driant's officers grabbed the MG and carried it out some meters toward the gun; the crew scrambled after and were setting up the MG, and the gun fired and a shell directly hit the MG, totalling the MG and crew. Driant once again had to fall back.

Some time later Driant was in a concrete pill-box, his most rearward position, and they again began to receive shells, it was the same gun! And his men saw a flame-thrower crew working their way around to the rear of the pill-box. Once again Driant and his staff had to run, this time across an open area towards a French fortified village to the rear, but the attacking troops were Jaegers, the German equivilant of Chaussers, men largely taken from forresters and hunting guides, generally crack shots, and in seconds Driant and his staff were cut down.

Very dramatic and interesting fighting, and, combined with Driant's activism, which did prompt better French preparedness, was an important microcosim (sp?) of the opening phase of this interesting battle.

Bob Lembke

PS My father fought at Verdun, was wounded twice there; I have a piece of his left arm bone knocked out by a French 75 shell splinter there.

[Seadog]

Col Driants grave in the Bois de Caures. The Verdun battlefield is indeed a remarkable place and well deserving of a visit.

More photos here:

http://www.flickr.com/photos/glosters/sets...57602057021756/

Norman

Edited to add:

This is where the Colonel fell and not his last resting place - see post 12

[Ian Murphy]

All,

Forum pal Christina Holstein is a very good reference point regarding Verdun.

Christina gave me a personal recommendation to read The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916 by Alaistair Horne. It is available from Amazon (link below). I can now personally recommend it as both a fascinating and informative read (thanks Christina).

All the best,

Ian.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Price-Glory-Verdun...1344&sr=8-1

[phil andrade]

the attacking troops were Jaegers, the German equivilant of Chaussers, men largely taken from forresters and hunting guides, generally crack shots, and in seconds Driant and his staff were cut down.

According to what I've read somewhere, only about 100 Germans actually left their trenches and attacked Driant's position : such was the reliance on artillery doing the work...this was what AJP Taylor wrote about the German tactical plan for Verdun "...Falkenhayn preached economy and the slaughter of Frenchmen by artillery fire."

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

The significance of Verdun was further underlined in the opening weeks of the war. Part of Crown Prince Wilhelm's army swung around the defensive line of forts and came down through the Argonne Forest. It then began attacking towards the base of the salient held by the forts. Despite intense pressure, the French held onto the salient. Eventually, Wilhelm had to withdraw to the north again, in conformance with the retreat started by von Beulow's Second Army and confirmed by Hentsch.

Falkenhayn also believed that a direct threat to Verdun would eventually trigger an Anglo-French response elsewhere to relieve that pressure, which the German defenders would destroy. He failed to recognise that the Battle of the Somme was that response until after it had been launched, by which time the French and British successes had created a very significant problem.

Robert

[phil andrade]

The significance of Verdun was further underlined in the opening weeks of the war. Part of Crown Prince Wilhelm's army swung around the defensive line of forts and came down through the Argonne Forest. It then began attacking towards the base of the salient held by the forts. Despite intense pressure, the French held onto the salient. Eventually, Wilhelm had to withdraw to the north again, in conformance with the retreat started by von Beulow's Second Army and confirmed by Hentsch.

Falkenhayn also believed that a direct threat to Verdun would eventually trigger an Anglo-French response elsewhere to relieve that pressure, which the German defenders would destroy. He failed to recognise that the Battle of the Somme was that response until after it had been launched, by which time the French and British successes had created a very significant problem.

Robert

That's an interesting aspect, Robert....that Falkenhayn envisaged his Verdun endeavour as inducing the Entente to counter attack, so that the Germans could administer costly repulses. Attrition not only at the Verdun sector itself, but also along the entire front.

Phil.

[Christina Holstein]

Verdun was the most heavily fortified city in France in 1914 and it was also the fortress city closest to the Franco-German border. I believe that was why it was so important to the French. More money had been spent on fortifying Verdun than on any other fortified city in France and it had the most modern forts, particularly Fts Douaumont and Vaux, which were state of the art at the time. To lose any city after 15 months of war was unthinkable to the French government but to lose Verdun was absolutely out of the question. It was known the world over as impregnable. In 1914 the Germans tried to pinch it out rather than face the forts but by the end of 1915 the forts had been stripped and Verdun was just a shell. I can't believe the Germans didn't know that.

There is always the possibility that Joffre was baiting a trap by stripping Verdun in the way he did. Draw the Germans in there and let the waves break against the rock before the Allied counter-offensive of 1916. For the Germans to go from the defensive to the offensive at the beginning of 1916 was hard enough, without fighting uphill for months. Joffre may have gambled that the French would be successful in the end and that a battle there would tie up a lot of Germans, guns, etc, that couldn't be used elsewhere.

Seadog - your photo shows where Driant fell, not where he was buried. I'm sad to say that recent refurbishment of the site of his grave has given him a new, modern grave of the sort seen in any French cemetery and has completely removed all traces of the grave of Commandant Renouard, who was buried next to him.

Christina

[Seadog]

Thanks Christina, I will amend the description. There seems to be quite a few "renovations" taking place lately most of which appear to be worse than the originals. I do hope that this is not a trend for the future.

This is one:

 

Norman

[phil andrade]

There is always the possibility that Joffre was baiting a trap by stripping Verdun in the way he did. Draw the Germans in there and let the waves break against the rock before the Allied counter-offensive of 1916. For the Germans to go from the defensive to the offensive at the beginning of 1916 was hard enough, without fighting uphill for months. Joffre may have gambled that the French would be successful in the end and that a battle there would tie up a lot of Germans, guns, etc, that couldn't be used elsewhere.

Christina

What a controversial, exciting and interesting new take on this episode of the Great War, Christina !

Well...maybe it's not new : but I certainly haven't heard of it before. It's almost tantamount to a conspiracy theory, rather redolent of the suggestion that the Americans were encouraging the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor. It's rather hard to imagine, but it's terribly thought provoking !

An edit here, just thinking aloud...it's an awful thing to say, but the French were bitter about what they perceived as lack of effort by the British; they had borne too much of the brunt while Perfidious Albion held back. What better way of throwing the burden of the planned Somme offensive onto the British than being "otherwise engaged" at Verdun ? The reduction of the French contingent in the Picardy offensive from the envisaged number as planned at Chantilly to a mere five on the opening day was very drastic. Haig was being told by his French counterpart that the French army would "cease to exist" if the Mill on the Meuse continued to grind : in reality, the expenditure of France's lifeblood at Verdun was modest compared with the earlier ravages of 1914 and the vain offensives of 1915. An interesting argument in the making here....

Phil

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning All,

Interesting post Christina, I suppose we'll never know Joffre's real intent ? What may give further insight is where and exactly when the guns went ? (and If they were really needed elsewhere).

As you say Verdun was the strongest fortified city in France at the outset of WW1 but it's place in the French "psyche" was already important (it was the last fortress city to fall in the Franco-Prussian war, the citizens rode from Verdun to assist/complete the arrest of Marie-Antoinette at Varennes etc.). The French would certainly rally to its defence with or without its forts "gunned".

If Joffre's rationale was as you are perhaps suggesting, then both sides saw Verdun as a battle of attrition which would suck in enemy forces from elsewhere; on Joffre's part, to do so having deliberately denuded the fortresses of guns reflects again on his reputation (?)

Another thought:

If it is true, as I have read, that the French seemed to lose faith in fortress defences early in the conflict, the Germans seemed more in awe of their capabilities and devoted much resources to their capture/destruction (Longwy) or did their best to avoid them (Montmedy) in the early stages. Both were old smaller fortified towns not improved to the extent that Verdun was. (Almost paradoxically the French then built the Maginot Line and the Germans developed the "blitzkrieg")

[phil andrade]

Of all German generals, I would have thought that Falkenhayn was the least likely to be lured into any kind of trap. That is just my impression : I can claim nothing but the sketchiest of knowledge about him, but he does come over as a substantially thoughtful and realisitc warrior, not given to impulse, and always very circumspect about anything that smacked of the grandiose.

Phil.

[Christina Holstein]

Steve, I disagree with you on the importance of Verdun in the French psyche. I have personally never been taken with the idea that the French nation saw Verdun as important in any way other than as a frontier fortress. It had only been French since about 1648, being part of the Holy Roman Empire before then. I can't really believe that the man in the street in France cared about Charlemagne and the Treaty of Verdun in 800-and-something - any more than Brits would attach much importance to something that might have happened in, say, Mercia or Wessex at the same time. As regards cities besieged by the Germans after 1870, it is Belfort that plays a part in the national psyche rather than Verdun. Belfort is a name that everyone connects with the war of 1870 and the defence of it by Denfert-Rochereau is still regarded as a shining example of true French resistance to the enemy.

I don't think Joffre deliberately denuded the fortress cities, of which there were many - Verdun being the one nearest to the German border. By the middle of 1915 Joffre needed to get his hands urgently on more men, guns, equipment and general supplies, of which there were huge amounts tied up in the French fortress cities. The govenor of a fortress city (a 'Place Forte') had the right to dispose of them as he saw fit, without regard to the wishes of the C in C. The only way that Joffre could get his hands on those resources was by changing the status of the fortress cities - all of them, not just Verdun - and downgrading them from 'Places Fortes' to 'Régions Fortifiées', which he did by decree in August 1915. At the time Verdun had been 'quiet' for months and Joffre may have gambled that it would stay that way, as he expressed the view that, once stripped, the forts would have no interest for the Germans. But if they did choose to attack, that would tie them up and reduce the resources available to meet the Allied offensive of 1916. So in a sense he may have thought it was a Win-Win situation.

For Joffre the Allied offensive was more important than any ongoing French offensive, however bloody. When Gen. Mangin asked in May 1916 for 6 Divisions for the attempt to retake Fort Douaumont, the answer he got from Joffre, shocking as it may seem, was 'And what would I have left for the Somme if I gave you so many divisions for a little local offensive like Verdun?'

As regards forts, there were two conflicting schools of thought in the French Army before 1914: one in favour of fortresses and one in favour of a war of movement and 'la furia francese'. Joffre was not in favour of forts. The Germans were surprised at how long Longwy held out (so am I), while the garrison at Montmedy was ordered by Joffre to withdraw after destroying their supplies, which allowed the Germans to take it unopposed. I think that it's not surprising that the French went into fortress development after WWI, seeing the way that their forts - even the old ones - held out against bombardment, and their dreadful losses in men. But of course the Germans didn't want to be stuck in a siege in another war and developed fast moving armour and aircraft.

I really think that Falkenhayn thought that he would break through at Verdun and that the French would collapse and it was the French collapse that he wanted. He knew that their losses had been very substantial and that their best and most productive agricultural land was in German hands, as well as most of their mines and industrial production. I'm sure he knew that the Verdun fortress sytem was just a shell and very weakly defended. It is difficult to see why he only launched the offensive on one side of the river but if he believed, as he did, that the French guns were too old and too few to resist his artillery and that their transport and supply system into the city was too weak to supply a major battle, he had no reason to suppose that they would hold out for long. He may have taken the view that (a) if they did hold out at first, he would inflict such heavy casualties that they would not be able to do it for long and ( that if they lost Verdun, the government would fall and that would be the end of the France in the war. Looked at like that, it was a Win-Win situation for him too. And indeed it almost was.

Whether the French would have collapsed if Verdun had been lost is another matter. After all, Napoleon III surrendered in 1870 but determined Frenchmen raised a nation in arms that kept the Germans fighting for another year. And the Armistice of 1940 didn't stop other Frenchmen carrying on the fight either.

We need new biographies of all these generals. They've all been pretty badly served by historians and knowledge of what they thought and said would help us all.

Christina

[Christina Holstein]

Sorry about the smiley. It should have been a (!

Seadog, you're right about unfortunate restoration. Strangely enough, the places that really need restoration, like Forts Douaumont and Vaux, don't get it. All a question of money, I suppose.

Christina

[phil andrade]

For Joffre the Allied offensive was more important than any ongoing French offensive, however bloody. When Gen. Mangin asked in May 1916 for 6 Divisions for the attempt to retake Fort Douaumont, the answer he got from Joffre, shocking as it may seem, was 'And what would I have left for the Somme if I gave you so many divisions for a little local offensive like Verdun?'

Christina

That's astonishing, considering that on July 1st 1916 the French deployment on the Somme was reduced to five divisions. There must have been some resentment felt by Fayolle ( and Foch ?) who, presumably, felt that their own endeavours were compromised by the resources sent to Verdun.

Phil.

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning Christina,

I have always held the view of Joffre and the fortress guns that you affirmed in your most recent post. I was just trying to develop the point you made in your first post (second paragraph) about the "possibility" of Joffre baiting a trap. As you conclude we perhaps need new insights into these generals' histories.

With that "devil's advocate" hint in your first post I had hoped we would stimulate more of a discussion amongst Forum members !

How important Verdun was (is) in the French "psyche" was secondary in importance to the fact that, as you stated, it was the most heavily fortified city in France and known as such; I raised the point only to support the fact that for the French to see what they perceived as their most heavily fortified city fall would be a severe blow (but I too suspect not fatal for France - again another issue worthy of more debate).

Your suggestion that Falkenhayn probably thought he would breakthrough quickly at Verdun contrasts with the "bleed France white" position that is often put forward as a reason for Verdun's selection as a battle. Phil says that Falkenhayn was unlikely to be drawn into a trap but a "trap" that offered a "win-win" situation as you suggest might have been an exception. Running with the "trap" theory, would Joffre have had the confidence to do this ? With hindsight we know the Germans were driven back but .....

If, as you suggest in your second post, Joffre rather saw Verdun in its weakened state of been little interest to the Germans but if they did attack, a draw on their resources at the time of the 1916 Allied offensive, is perhaps rather ironic given that Verdun itself is often sited for the timing of the Somme offensive (back to the initial post of this thread).

I look forward to reading more contributions.

[truthergw]

I believe that the fate of the Belgian fortresses had a strong effect on how Joffre viewed the French fortresses. The French were much dismayed at the speed with which the new and very secret super heavy guns forced capitulation at Liege. In conjunction with the school of thought that saw the French military genius as one of l'audace, toujours l'audace, it made sense to take the heavy artillery of which there was a shortage and put it into the line and get the majority of the garrisons out into fortified outworks where they would not be trapped or killed when the fort was demolished about their ears. Unfortunately, those who put their faith in the doctrine of the strong fortress securing a defensive line thought the process was taken too far. The fact is, French artillery prior to the war had leant too far towards the 75 and left the artillery short of heavies. What guns there were had to be used as best they could and the CiC decided that was in the line, not in a fortress. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Verdun stood, the line held. The period of the Battles of the Frontiers saw Joffre left with no plans. Plan 17 had collapsed and he was forced to shift as best he could. He literally reformed the entire French defence on the hoof. Armies were formed, moved and moved again all the while defending as best they could against an advancing German force. This culminated in the successful Battle of the Marne but losses were dreadful and the war was still to be won. A war on an entirely unforeseen front must have helped to make the fortresses on the Eastern frontier lose almost all importance and the idea that precious heavy artillery and crews should be kept there seem a luxury Joffre could not afford. Let's hear it for Papa Joffre!

[SteveMarsdin]

Good afternoon All,

So from Christine's and Tom's post did the Germans "shoot themselves in the foot" (I know it's the wrong analogy for this forum !) by making such a point of levelling Longwy. So early in the conflict it was a potent example of what their siege guns could do to a French fortified city - hardly a building was left standing. It may have been a deliberate ploy to undermine morale and stress German superiority but if in reality it only served to help make Joffre's mind up re the best use of the heavy guns, was it not ultimately counter-productive in helping restore the artillery balance elsewhere ?

[truthergw]

It was not expected that the Belgian fortresses would withstand attack indefinitely but in the event, they fell very quickly. It was not realised that the Germans had such large siege guns which could be brought up as quickly as they were. If I remember correctly the armour and fortification was built to withstand 20 cm guns but the Germans were able to field 40 cms. That is almost certainly not correct but gives some idea of the problem.

There is no sense in having a weapon if it is not used. The Germans staked everything on a rapid movement through Belgium, intending to pin the French against their own fortified line from the rear. That was the Schlieffen plan. It required sudden attack and a rapid advance through Belgium. Using the guns was necessary, that is what they were for.

Once held, at the Marne, the Schlieffen plan had failed. It was necessary to make a new plan. The Germans decided to attack Verdun but with the intention of killing men, not occupying territory. They had to attack but it was in the hope of being able to inflict massive losses on the French when they counterattacked. The actual capture of Verdun was secondary. They underestimated the French capacity to absorb losses and to inflict losses on the Germans in return. They overestimated their own capabilities and were once again, held on a line.They very badly misjudged the response of the French nation to heavy losses. Far from causing them to lose the will to fight, it inspired a great desire for revenge.

Joffre had committed himself to a major attack in Picardy in summer. It was only very reluctantly that over the period, he had to re-assign resources from that attack to Verdun and reduce France's part in the Battle of the Somme from major partner to very much a minor partner.

[SteveMarsdin]

Tom,

That has always been my understanding of the German viewpoint on Verdun: to suck in the French Army and inflict massive losses, rather than a breakthrough. Similarly I am a "traditionalist" when it comes to why the fortress was denuded of guns - agreeing with yours and Christina's reasoning ("better used elsewhere"). Christina, however, raised two possible "alternative" theories: (1) Joffre may have baited a trap and (2) Falkenhayn really thought he could breakthrough (causing a French collapse) ?

As you state the Schlieffen Plan called for a sudden attack and rapid movement through Belgium/Northern France. I am less convinced that laying siege to Longwy (and Maubege) was necessary and it certainly didn't contribute to the speed of the advance. The siege of Longwy commenced 2 days before the main encounters of the Battle of the Frontiers in southern Belgium but more importantly lasted 4/5 days beyond them. I would suggest that perhaps their preoccupation with the fortress didn't permit the Germans to take full advantage of the outstanding victories wrought on 22 August and contributed ultimately to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, a lesson learnt by World War 2 (a point which I tried to make earlier and Christina put more clearly)

[Robert Dunlop]

In the overall context of the Western Front, Longwy was a tiny tiny dot. The artillery forces needed by the Germans to reduce the likes of Longwy were not of the type that could easily accompany a war of movement. It seems highly unlikely that the efforts to take Longwy made the slightest difference in affecting the overall outcome of the Schlieffen Plan. The plan depended on the performance of the German right wing, pivoting around the centre based on Metz. If it had worked, then any potential effect that the fall of Longwy had on Joffre's thinking to move the fortress guns would have been totally irrelevant.

Joffre did concede territory in an effort to trap von Kluck. This did not constitute 'baiting' von Kluck. Some commentators have suggested that the Joffre launched his counter-offensive too soon, thereby failing to trap the First Army. Assuming this is true, just for the purposes of discussion, then it is difficult to know if the continued loss of territory to von Kluck's advance precipitated Joffre's decision. Subsequently, however, once the Western Front had stabilised then Joffre wanted to regain territory, not run the risk of loosing territory. This approach was very clear in Joffre's plans for 1916, as elucidated prior to the launch of the Verdun offensive.

Robert