Retention of Ypres - Politically Important

[PhilB]

Any idea what they actually consisted of on the ground, Robert?

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, I have some idea but no precise details. As I mentioned before, the GHQ 2nd Line 'existed' before June 1916, as evidenced by information in the war diaries of Canadian units who were involved in the action around Mont Sorrel. I then discovered that the GHQ 1st Line also existed at that time too. I had to guess at the location of the latter in the 1st Canadian Division's sector, based on the map references of units that were moved to the part of the line that lay in their sector. What made things slightly confusing was that these same defensive lines were referred to as 'Old GHQ' and 'New GHQ' lines.

Just prior to the German attack on 2nd June, the Canadian pioneers and engineers had been focused on building new dugouts and the MG emplacements in the 'B' line. At least 12 such emplacements had been built in May, from what I have gleaned so far.

No work was done on the GHQ 2nd Line by the Canadians until 2nd June, though the location of the line was clearly known. I found one reference to the fact that the troops that took up position there found little on the ground. A lot of work had to be done to create a defensible line. This work then fell into disrepair during the offensives around Ypres in 1917.

When the two lines were re-used in 1918, they consisted mainly of MG emplacements and wire.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

In the map posted here, I estimated that the next major defensible line would be just east of Calais. The dotted line through St Omer to the coast was drawn along the line of ridges that runs northwest up to St Omer. Interestingly, Plumer planned to take up defensive positions along the line St Omer to Gravelines, if Ypres fell in 1918. Ten defensive lines were planned to the west of Aa River and canal, which runs from St Omer to Gravelines.

Foch refused permission for such a withdrawal.

It is possible that Plumer's suggestion was part of a ploy by the British to get more French reinforcements to the Ypres area, in light of the successes achieved by the Germans in Operation Georgette. Alternatively, taken at face value Plumer's recommendation demonstrates that the loss of lives in the salient did not override British military thinking when Ypres was threatened.

More on Kemmel and Scherpenberg to come.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Starting with Kemmel, it is important to place this attack in context. The capture of the high ground followed on from Operation Georgette, which was launched on 9th April. Georgette was a modified version of Operation Saint George, which was the brainchild of Kronprinz Rupprecht's Chief of Staff, General von Kuhl. The reasoning behind St George was to counter-attack the British if they tried to continue their advance from Passchendaele towards Roulers. As mentioned before, this was clear evidence of the strategic importance of the Passchendaele-Staden ridge to the Germans.

During January 1918, the planning for Operation St George was further elaborated into an attack between La Bassee and Armentieres (George I), and an attack on Ypres (George II, a pincer attack comprising Operation Hare Drive to the south of Ypres, focused on recapturing Messines/Wytschaete ridge then taking Mont Kemmel and Poperinghe, and Operation Wood Feast to the north). The strategic rationale for the revised plan was to pin the British with a frontal attack in the Messines area, while the centre of the attack swung round behind the British, capturing the high ground from Kemmel to Mont Noir and cutting off the salient. The southern flank of the attack would be anchored on the La Bassee Canal. It was envisaged that 25 divisions would be needed.

For various reasons, not least the ground conditions in the Lys valley, the first German Spring offensive took place in the area covered by the British Fifth Army. As we know, this operation was codenamed 'Michael', and it commenced on 21st March 1918. In keeping with his broad strategic plan, Ludendorff sought to keep up the pressure by initiating further attacks. On 24th March, a discussion took place in the German High Command. Ludendorff favoured an attack on the northern flank of the 'Michael' salient. Operations Mars and 'Ride of the Valkyries' were aimed, in part, at capturing Bolougne. A scaled down version of Operation St George was also requested by Ludendorff, to start in 8 days time. This version became known as Georgette (basically a combination of George I and Operation Hare Drive), and Rupprecht argued against the short timescale, which Ludendorff accepted. Operation Mars was a failure, Operation Valkyrie was cancelled, and the subsequent extension of Operation Michael to capture Amiens just exacerbated the problems of the salient.

There were lengthy discussions in the German High Command about the Flanders attack. The original Operation St George was reconsidered but discarded again in favour of the smaller Georgette. The final decision was taken on April 1, with the proposed 7 divisions being increased to 17 (many of which had been weakened in the earlier offensives). There were major problems getting the supplies in place, and the start date as pushed back to April 9. The Germans then focused their attack on the front between La Bassee and Armentieres. It started with an attack against a weak point in the Entente line and, like its predecessor Operation Michael, illustrated all of the problems of attacking weak points.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The orders for Operation Georgette were issued on 3rd April 1918. The attack by the Sixth Army was to be directed towards Hazebrouck, a vital centre whose capture would cut off Ypres from behind. The southern flank of the attack was to extend along the La Bassee canal to beyond Aire. The Fourth Army was to wait and then launch Operation Hare Drive against Messines. OHL subsequently countermanded this and on 8th April ordered that Fourth Army should start one day after Sixth Army, ie 10th April.

On 9th April, the divisions of Sixth Army smashed through the Portugese defences and advanced rapidly towards the Lys river, crossing it in several places. Although the Spring weather had been the driest in decades, the ground was still too wet for tanks to operate, and none were able to join the attack. The forward movement of artillery, especially the heavy guns, was also disrupted. Significantly, however, the Germans could not capture Givenchy, which remained in the hands of the British. This prevented the German Sixth Army from anchoring its southern flank properly, exposing the base of the salient to constant shellfire in the days and weeks to follow. Herein lies one of the major problems of attacking a weak front. Typically, a more weakly defended front is more weakly defended for a reason (General Duchene's handling of the defenses on Chemin des Dames is one example where an error caused the defense to be weaker than it should have been). In the case of Operation Georgette, the Lys valley was more weakly defended because it could be strongly defended on either side. In which case, the Germans would be funnelled up a salient that was bounded by stronger positions, thereby ultimately placing the Germans in the weaker position during the attack. Although early momentum was possible (as with Operation Michael), the longer term consequences were significantly more disadvantageous.

After the dramatic early success, the Germans pushed further up the Lys valley to the west, and pushed north towards the higher ground. When the attack from Fourth Army kicked in, Messines fell, as well as Armentieres. The drive up the Lys valley took Merville but then stopped short of Hazebrouck, partly because of the defence of the Foret de Nieppes - Strazeele sector, and partly because of the vulnerability of the exposed southern flank. Further north, smaller attacks managed to capture Wytschaete and Bailleul. Hazebrouck was threatened but not captured. Some high ground (most of the Messines - Wytschaete ridge) had been captured, but the Mont Kemmel - Mont des Cats line of hills remained in Entente hands. The Ypres salient was drawn back to almost to the GHQ 1st Line, protected by an outpost line to the east of Hooge.

Thus the stage was set on the 17th April for the Germans drive to capture the all-important Flanders 'alps'.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Robert, Thank you very much for this informative and interesting summary. It does help me to get a clearer view of what was actually a complex and confused series of battles. It also brings home to me what a bewildering array of options Ludendorff was confronted with : we are encouraged to think of him as tactically proficient and strategically inept, but, in fairness, he had rather a duanting multiplicity of choices to contend with, and I can understand why he might throw up his arms and say " let's just punch a hole somewhere and get stuck in as best we can!".

He had the counsel of Lossberg and Wetzell to turn to. IIRC, the latter had suggested that the French were the more skilled, the British the more tenacious. I'm intrigued as to why it was decided to deploy French divisions on Kemmel : was there a "political" dimension to that decision? I remember visiting that sector, and being impressed by the number and intricacy of British command and communication posts that are still very extant there. No doubt there was recrimination when the French lost it so quickly.

This aspect of French deployment on a significant defensive feature in what was, after all, principally a British battlefield is pertinent to our discussion on the political, as well as the strategic, importance of the Ypres Salient.

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is a map that I hope will further clarify the German plans for Flanders in 1918. Please note, however, that I have not covered all of the variations that were considered.

The Flanders high ground (excluding Messines and Wytschaete) has been indicated by the heavy red line.

The map highlights how insignificant Mont Kemmel was in the whole scheme of things. It was a very very small part of a much bigger strategic plan.

Robert

[PhilB]

I have the clear impression from your informative map, Robert, that the Salient, if retained, was indeed an invitation for nipping out. Would the German plans have been the same if the BEF had withdrawn from the Salient. (Choose your own new line!)

[Robert Dunlop]

I'm intrigued as to why it was decided to deploy French divisions on Kemmel : was there a "political" dimension to that decision? I remember visiting that sector, and being impressed by the number and intricacy of British command and communication posts that are still very extant there. No doubt there was recrimination when the French lost it so quickly.

This aspect of French deployment on a significant defensive feature in what was, after all, principally a British battlefield is pertinent to our discussion on the political, as well as the strategic, importance of the Ypres Salient.

I will touch on this in due course.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jul 11 2009, 10:51 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

...the Salient, if retained, was indeed an invitation for nipping out.

Phil, 'nipping out' can imply a neat and quick surgical intervention, clean easy. The Ypres salient did not offer this option, as further information will show.

Would the German plans have been the same if the BEF had withdrawn from the Salient. (Choose your own new line!)

No. I will give some thoughts on this, FWIIW, at the end of the next series of posts on the Kemmel and Scherpenberg actions.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The Ypres salient did not offer this option, as further information will show.

Actually the definitive evidence is that the Germans never nipped out Ypres.

Robert

[Crunchy]

Yes, of course an attack on a prepared position, but not on a prepared position above the attackers.

Hi Hugh,

Again, IMO you overestimate the strength of the high ground at Ypres. It isn't all that high and the slopes are gradual. It is certainly not the impregnable position you seem to suggest it is. Far stronger and steeper positions were taken successfully. The markedly steepest ground in the area is around the Messines village area and the British took the whole ridge in one morning on the 7th June 1917 all the way to Observatory Ridge north of Hill 60, getting astride the Ypres ridge for quite modest losses. It is regarded as one of the most successful actions of the war and a stunning success. How do you explain that as poor generalship?

I'm no expert, but Souchez area, or Ploegsteert-Armentieres, or north of the salient?

I'm sorry but your readiness to strongly criticise the Allies for remaining in the Ypres position, accusing them of poor generalship and offering tactical advice as to where the Allies should have withdrawn to suggests you do regard yourself as an expert. It also implies you believe you have a sounder knowledge of generalship than the Allied commanders at the time.

Your suggestion to attack north of the salient would place the attack across potentially waterlogged ground studded with ditches which was likely to turn into a quagmire from shelling or make the artillery preparation ineffective. Given the ground was flooded near the coast the attack would have produced a long narrow salient and as the Passchendaele Ridge curves around to the west and towards the coast, an attack in this area would ultimately be overlooked by this high ground. Any advance north of the Ypres high ground would have a strong German force poised along the high ground immediately on the south flank with the obvious disadvantages. It could have been attacked in that flank with a very real chance of forces at the head the salient being cut off. To repeat the phrase to describe Loos, it is "most unfavourable ground".

Attacking at Ploegsteert- Armentieres has the River Lys and a tributary across the line of advance within three kilometers of the Start Line, then it immediately goes into the industrial areas of Lille- Tourcoing; fighting in built up areas is a tough and bloody business and good generals seek to bypass and cut off such areas. Furthermore, both flanks of an advance into this area is overlooked by German positions on the high ground SE of Ypres to the north and Aubers Ridge to the south. One is simply putting one's forces into a salient with strong forces posted on higher ground on the flanks of the salient. What do you achieve by doing that? Again, it is not a solution that appears to offer much advantage.

Souchez is about 3 kms north of Vimy Ridge which the Canadians attacked and captured in less than half a day during the Arras offensive. Vimy Ridge is a far more sensible objective than attacking in low ground just north of it at Souchez to be overlooked by German artillery observation posts on Vimy Ridge on the southern flank. I am not sure what you achieve by doing this.

You seem to disregard the political difficulties from the French and Belgians in withdrawing to the line you suggest and the strategic importance of the Ypres high ground; it provided the only firm base from which the Allies had any chance of turning the left flank of the Western Front. Turning a flank offers considerable advantages to the attacking force.

The successes at Vimy Ridge and at Messines, and indeed at Mont St Quentin a year later, belies your view of the difficulties of attacking high ground.

You also seem to disregard, that for the Allies to win to war they had to attack. Sitting on the defensive and waiting for the Germans to attack them was politically unacceptable. It actually suited the Germans for the Allies to do that until they defeated the Russians and then turn their full weight against the Western Front. No war has ever been won by sitting on the defensive. The political imperative, particularly on the part of the French was the Allies had to defeat the Germans, and as quickly as possible, and this required offensive action.

I am intrigued as to why you feel so competent to criticise the generals so harshly when you admit you are no expert on the subject. It is very easy to criticise from the warmth of an armchair and especially when one is not required to test one's generalship by having to do so in reality or having the responsibility for winning a war or having to contend with political imperatives. When you have that responsibility with political constraints placed upon you and you are required to test your proposals by actually conducting a battle, perhaps you might not be so ready to criticise the men who had the awful problem overcoming the powerful defences all along the Western Front. They weren't the fools you make them out to be. It seems to me far more instructive to understand the difficulties they faced and the manner in which they developed their tactics and technology to win a war.

Regards

Chris

[bierlijn]

QUOTE

I'm no expert, but Souchez area, or Ploegsteert-Armentieres, or north of the salient?

I'm sorry but your readiness to strongly criticise the Allies for remaining in the Ypres position, accusing them of poor generalship and offering tactical advice as to where the Allies should have withdrawn to suggests you do regard yourself as an expert. It also implies you believe you have a sounder knowledge of generalship than the Allied commanders at the time.

If you read the thread, I was asked to do this. Where should I have nominated, then? Was the Passchendaele ridge the best available option for an attack?

Or is it that it is no longer acceptable to propose alternatives the tactics of the First World War? It was in previous decades, but perhaps the spirit of the times has changed.

[Crunchy]

If you read the thread, I was asked to do this. Where should I have nominated, then? Was the Passchendaele ridge the best available option for an attack?

Or is it that it is no longer acceptable to propose alternatives the tactics of the First World War? It was in previous decades, but perhaps the spirit of the times has changed.

Thank you Hugh,

Yes I did ask you to propose alternatives and it is acceptable to propose them, that is why I asked you; but one expects them to be sensible and tactically sound. If they are not, then one can hardly cry foul about them being criticised especially having so roundly condemned the men who actually had to deal with the problem - something about stones and glass houses rings a bell.

The alternatives you have proposed are neither sensible nor tactically sound, the very same criticism you level at the generals.

In that area, re-capturing the Messines - Passchendaele Ridge was the best available option for the reasons I have mentioned. To whit: The political imperatives on the generals were the Allies had to drive the Germans out of France and Belgium, they could not sit on the defensive. The Ypres area provided the only real chance of turning a flank on the Western Front. Success in turning the northern flank offered considerable advantages to the Allies and discomfort to the Germans. Key to making that attempt was securing the vital ground of the Messines - Passchendale Ridge. The fact the Germans fought so hard to retain it demonstrates they also recognised it was the vital ground to any such attempt. Any sensible debate on Ypres must take account of these issues.

In your criticism you argue against attacking Ypres because it was high ground when in fact it is only slightly higher when you actually get out and walk it. You seem to ignore that the most difficult piece of ground in the area (Messines) was taken in one morning in a highly successful attack, which hardly justifies the charge of poor generalship you have leveled against them. This actually secured them the southern half of the ridge all the way up to Observatory ridge north of Hill 60. Having got astride the ridge the principal effort of the British offensive was along the main ridge and across the spurs which in themselves are gently rolling countryside. I think you will find that the unseasonal rainfall that occurred in August and October 1917 (more than double the average) had more to do with the difficulties experienced than any issue of overlooking ground. When the ground dried out, Plumer made three highly successful advances along the ridge in the space of two weeks before the rains set in again. Whether they should have continued to attack after 5th October is a contentious issue. I believe they should have halted although I recognise the advantages of capturing the last bit of the ridge before the next campaigning season. War is very much about making hard decisions, all of which have disadvantages.

The Allies held a slightly lower position at Ypres, a situation that was common along many parts of the Western Front and by no means was Ypres the highest or most difficult. Are you suggesting the Allies should have withdrawn along the whole front until they found a continuous line of high ground. I doubt that was a practical solution and it would not have been acceptable to the French. So why single out Ypres to soundly round on the generals, especially when Ypres offered the only area to turn a flank?

I am suggesting that your overly harsh criticism of the generals is both unfair and unbalanced, the more so as your alternatives are unsound and you ignore the political and strategic realities of the situation.

Regards

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

This map illustrates what the first phase of Operation Georgette achieved. This is indicated by the blue dotted line, which follows the front line on the 17th April, 1918.

On the 17th, the German goal was to continue the offensive in Flanders. Operation Tannenberg was launched. The objective was not Mont Kemmel, or I should say not just Mont Kemmel. The southern part of Tannenberg was directed at capturing Mont Noir - Mont Rouge - Mont Kemmel. This objective corresponds to the heavy red line. Simultaneously an attack was launched north of Ypres, against the Belgians. In two days of fighting, the Belgian and British forces held firm. The blue dotted line remained unchanged essentially.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

On the 19th April, the Fourth and Sixth Armies stopped their attacks. Preparations began for a second phase of attacks. In the interim, the famous attack around Villers Bretonneux took place. This featured the first tank vs tank battle.

The northern attacks resumed on 25th April. A major assault was attempted. It aimed at taking the solid blue objective line marked on the map above. The only significant success from this attack was the capture of Mont Kemmel. Elsewhere, the British fell back slightly to the second defensive line. The German success on Mont Kemmel was not exploited for a variety of reasons. It is clear, however, that Mont Kemmel was only one objective in the attack on the 25th April. Because it was the only significant success on that day, it seems like Mont Kemmel was an end in itself. Ideally, the German attack should have reached Vlamertinghe, which would have cut the road from Poperinghe to Ypres.

The British and French forces attempted to recapture Mont Kemmel on the 26th, but failed. The counter-attack disrupted the German plans to reach Reninghelst - Vlamertinghe. After the fighting during the day, General von Lossberg ordered a postponement of the attempt to outflank Ypres.

After a pause, the Scherpenberg was attacked. The orders for this attack were issued on the 27th. The objective line was Ypres - Vlamertinghe - Reninghelst - Westoutre - Mont Rouge. The Scherpenberg was obviously important in achieving the broader objective line, but was not the end in itself. The Entente learned about the attack from prisoners captured on the 28th. Counter-preparatory fire had a significant impact in minimising the success. Not surprisingly, the Alpenkorps managed to break into the French line, but it took heavy casualties and was ejected.

Summarising the attacks in Flanders, General von Kuhl wrote:

"The storming of Kemmel was a great feat, but, on the whole, the objective had not been attained. The attack had not penetrated to the decisive heights of Cassel and Mont des Cats, the possession of which would have compelled the evacuation of the Ypres salient and the Yser position. No great strategic movement had become possible; the Channel ports had not been reached. Our troops on the left flank were in a very unfavourable situation, as they were strongly enfiladed by the enemy... The second great offensive had not brought the hoped-for decision."

Robert

[PhilB]

R, are you implying that the German attacks would have had more success if the BEF had withdrawn from the Salient?

[phil andrade]

The reasoning behind St George was to counter-attack the British if they tried to continue their advance from Passchendaele towards Roulers. As mentioned before, this was clear evidence of the strategic importance of the Passchendaele-Staden ridge to the Germans.

Robert

Does this mean, Robert, that the Germans were planning this offensive, not in terms of their grandiose plans for a decisive victory in 1918, but purely as a result of the British advances in Flanders in 1917 ?

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jul 11 2009, 10:09 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

R, are you implying that the German attacks would have had more success if the BEF had withdrawn from the Salient?

Phil, I hadn't been implying that in this most recent material. Earlier in the thread, however, I made the point that if the British had withdrawn from the Ypres salient because it was 'hard', then the Germans would have enjoyed great success. Everytime the fighting got 'hard', like being in the Ypres salient, then the British would have withdrawn again. And as soon as one 'Ypres' was abandoned then a new one would be formed.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

... the Germans were planning this offensive, not in terms of their grandiose plans for a decisive victory in 1918, but purely as a result of the British advances in Flanders in 1917 ?

All armies had multiple plans for various parts of the line. The British plans for the Ypres salient are a good example, evolving as they did from 1915 through 1917. One advantage of this process is that commanders become familiar with the terrain features of strategic significance, which makes it easier to appraise issues that arise during the heat of an offensive.

Kronprinz Rupprecht made plans to defeat a further British attack in 1917. These plans took into account the same strategic issues that were relevant to the needs of the Spring offensives.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Plumer planned to take up defensive positions along the line St Omer to Gravelines, if Ypres fell in 1918. Ten defensive lines were planned to the west of Aa River and canal, which runs from St Omer to Gravelines.

Here is some more information on the above. The British and French High Commands reviewed the situation in Flanders on 17th April. This date corresponded to the high water mark for the German attacks in the first phase of Georgette. The British Official History notes that Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (having replaced 'Wully' Robertson), met with General Foch at General Plumer's HQ. Wilson "proposed that the Allied Armies in Flanders should be withdrawn progressively to the line of inundations, Aire - St Omer - Furnes". Foch refused the proposal.

General Wilson formalised the proposal in a written "note addressed to General Foch" later the same day. Wilson put forward two choices:

"a. We can accept battle on our line today.

b. We can shorten our line by withdrawing altogether from where we now stand and gradually reach and hold a line with our left on the inundation of Aire - St Omer - the sea."

General Foch continued to hold out for the former, whereupon Wilson urged Foch "to bring up sufficient divisions to defeat all the enemy attacks..." Foch then arranged for the French reinforcements to proceed to Flanders, after meeting with the King of Belgium and with British GHQ to reinforce his view that no ground should be ceded to the Germans.

Wilson wrote to Plumer via GHQ. Although Wilson emphasized the importance of holding on, he recommended that lines be reconnoitred between Ypres and the St Omer - Gravelines line. These lines were to be used to temporarily hold the Germans during the retreat to the St Omer - Gravelines line. Ten such lines were set out, east of the St Omer - Gravelines line not west as I incorrectly stated above.

Foch's insistence on holding existing ground was not unique to the Ypres salient. His note to Plumer indicated that:

"The important things are:

1. To assure at all costs the occupation of the 'massif' Kemmel - Mont Noir - Mont des Cats, not forgetting to watch the direction Dickebusch - Ypres.

2. To extend the ground already occupied... [this invocation was similar to that given elsewhere too]

3. With this object in view, the proper course is to proceed to attacks each aimed at an objective relatively close, which should then be organized as a base for a fresh attack on a fresh objective. For this purpose: concentration of artillery, relatively little infantry."

4. These offensive actions should be begun without delay...

5. On principle, always keep in reserve one French division and one French cavalry division.

6. All British troops withdrawn from the battle should be reorganized close behind it, so as to be available to support or relieve the troops in front in case of need."

Robert

[Crunchy]

Here is a map that I hope will further clarify the German plans for Flanders in 1918. Please note, however, that I have not covered all of the variations that were considered.

The Flanders high ground (excluding Messines and Wytschaete) has been indicated by the heavy red line.

the obvious defensive line is behind Ieper: Kemmelberg-Scherpenberg-Mont Noir- Mont Rouge-Mont des Chats and north in front of Dunkirk.

Robert and Hugh,

Having looked at Robert's map above, I have pulled the old trench maps for this area to look at the relationship of the "Flanders Alps" to Hazebrouk, which as you know was a major rail communications centre on the British lines of communication. Looking at the railway lines that centred on the town, they came from the British ports in the west and then went east, north and south. Thus Hazebrouk was a strategically important town for the Allied effort. Hazebrouk is much closer to Mont des Chats than is evident on the above map.

Pulling the line back from Ypres to the line Hugh has suggested would seriously threaten the Hazebrouk rail communication centre and bring it within range of German heavy guns behind a new German line . Indeed the line running north to supply the Belgians would would either be very close to the front, and hence capable of being interdicted by German artillery along its length, or be cut by the front line to the north of Mont des Chats depending on where that line lay. Thus pulling the line back voluntarily would have serious strategic implications, despite the advantages of holding high ground. In fact the strategic implications would outweigh any tactical advantages of holding the "Flanders Alps" line, which is obviously another reason why they didn't do so.

Cheers

Chris

[phil andrade]

There was an actual Battle of Hazebrouk, wasn't there ? Quite a desperate business, apparently.

Phil.

[Crunchy]

HI Phil,

Yes. Fought in April 1918 a few miles east of Hazebrouk (around Merris) which halted George I.

Cheers

Chris

[bierlijn]

What I've been trying to find out about in this thread is whether capturing high ground was a particular driving force or learned imperative behind decisions taken by the British high command in the Ypres sector - in the sense of capturing the enemy's "strong points". From Clausewitz or some inherited principle?

For instance, from the British held Bluff, the front lines essentially meet at the top of the ridge line, both sides facing ground sloping downwards were they to attack. In trying to capture Hill 60, it seems logical to try to break through to either side of it rather than take it by frontal assault. Is there a difficulty with a thrust towards the Ypres-Comines canal and at Klein Zillebeke that I am not taking into account?

Sorry to everyone I've previously pissed off by this line of questioning, but it comes from a genuine spirit of enquiry.

Hugh