Retention of Ypres - Politically Important

[PhilB]

At post #100, thanks, gents, for your input through this thread - an excellent chance for us to question and learn from the Yprologists.

[Robert Dunlop]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jun 30 2009, 08:24 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

...whilst holding the line of the outer salient, did the BEF prepare a strong, fully wired defensive line through Ypres or elsewhere to fall back to? I mean a line prepared at leisure rather than one hastily dug in emergency.

Phil, yes and no. It has taken a little while to sort out an answer to this question. I still can't be sure of the exact details, but there were alternative positions. The clearest indication came from studying the Canadian war diaries surrounding the attack on Mont Sorrel in June 1916. As soon as the Canadians realised that their front line had been captured, the 1st Canadian Brigade was ordered to man the 'GHQ 2nd line'. During the subsequent days, other units were successively ordered to the GHQ 2nd Line. From the Canadian Corps General Staff down, it was very clear where the GHQ 2nd line was located, so clear that the location is not mentioned in the respective operation orders. The location of this line (or part thereof) only became apparent to me when I read the 4th Canadian Battalion's War Diary - Chateau Segard. The line was not completed in June 1916, so the infantry and pioneers had to work on making it defensible.

At the same time as the GHQ 2nd Line as occupied, the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade was ordered forward to occupy the 'B' Line. This consisted of a series of MG emplacements, which had been completed prior to June 1916. I don't know the locations of all the emplacements, but several were located in farm complexes. These have been indicated on the maps below, near Zillebeke.

On day two of the battle, the 3rd Canadian Battalion was ordered into the GHQ 2nd line. Interestingly, the war diary refers to the 'new' line and the 'old' line, both seemingly near Chateau Segard. At the same time, the 1st Canadian Battalion was moved forward to take up positions near the 2nd Canadian Brigade's HQ. I have marked the area as the GHQ New Line, but this is only my term.

Robert

[PhilB]

Thanks Robert. That has the look of a minimal tactical withdrawal rather than a selected optimum line?

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, what makes you say that the pre-built 'B' Line was not a 'selected optimum line'? You raised the issue of Moquet Farm previously. Each one of the red dots on the map represents a pre-existing MG emplacement, usually in a farm complex akin to Moquet Farm. Although the GHQ 2nd Line wasn't finished, it had been planned out. Why was that line not a 'selected optimum line'?

Bear in mind that we are only looking a horizontal segment of the front, along the line of H22 -> H23 -> I24. So we are looking at a classical defense-in-depth, pre-planned but not entirely completed. Not even the much vaunted Hindenburg Line was completed by the time the British attacked Cambrai in November 1917.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...I do suspect that the Germans might have regarded it as a position from which they could engage in some serious fighting which would yield them very positive attritional results. I wish I knew more about those battles around Mount Sorrel in 1916 : I reckon that the character of those local battles might bear out my suggestion.

Phil, it was the XIII (Württemberg) Corps that was involved in the action at Mont Sorrel. The Corps was commanded by General Freiherr von Watter. There should be considerable primary source material, and this was used to supplement the account in the British Official History.

The stated object of the German attack was 'to wrest from the enemy his last dominating observation posts over considerable areas immediately behind the chief fighting ground'. This objective is a reminder that General Farrer-Hockley was not correct in his comment about the British not retaining any tactically significant terrain. Furthermore, the objective was not directly related to "attriting" the Allies. There was no need to attack at Mont Sorrel in order to maintain observation over the British and Dominion forces in the salient.

I don't know what the attitude of von Watter's Army Commander thought about the attack, other than he obviously did not try to stop the attack going ahead. It seems that there was a significant debate between von Watter and one of his subordinate divisional commanders, Major-General von Pfiel und Klein Ellgut. The latter felt that the high ground could not be held if it was captured. He based this on his experience in attacking the Bluff. Von Watter disagreed, and the attack went ahead. No additional troops were allocated to the attack, but significant numbers of heavy guns were 'borrowed' from the neighbouring corps and from the Marinekorps Flandern. The Canadians detected signs of the build-up, but the actual attack on June 2nd took them by surprise. After a short but very heavy bombardment, the German assault troops poured over the ridge line and advanced down the slope to the final objective, a distance of only 500 yards. This was a bite-and-hold operation on a small scale. A gap opened up in front of the Germans, but the flanking Canadian defensive positions took a significant toll. The Germans began to consolidate the objective line. Then they ran into big problems.

Limited bite-and-hold operations are often held up as the ideal way to cause attrition. Certainly the early phase demonstrated how the resultant counter-attack can be punished. The first Canadian response was poorly co-ordinated in execution, for a variety of reasons. The Württembergers were able to beat off the first effort, inflicting significant casualties. The Canadians then paused, building up their heavy artillery assets before starting again. The German defenders suffered from the seemingly constant drum-fire. When the Canadians went in again, they stormed back up the slopes, drove out or captured the German defenders, and nearly the restored the original line. Overall, the British Official History noted 'the losses of the two sides were probably much the same'.

From all the information I have seen so far, the action around Mont Sorrel in early June 1916 did not support your suggestion, IMHO.

Robert

[PhilB]

Phil, what makes you say that the pre-built 'B' Line was not a 'selected optimum line'? You raised the issue of Moquet Farm previously. Each one of the red dots on the map represents a pre-existing MG emplacement, usually in a farm complex akin to Moquet Farm. Although the GHQ 2nd Line wasn't finished, it had been planned out. Why was that line not a 'selected optimum line'?

Robert

My only reason for suggesting that was that it seemed unlikely that the "selected optimum defence line" would be immediately behind the existing one - I imagine one could have linked up farm complexes almost anywhere around Flanders. I don`t doubt that it was itself as well planned as possible in the circumstances.

[Robert Dunlop]

If the German MG nests were placed on the map, you would see the mirror-image of the 'B' Line on the other side of the ridge. It was these very MG nests that halted the British II Corps' attack across the ridgeline on the 31st July 1917. This strongly suggests that the 'B' Line would have been well-placed to stop, or significantly disrupt, a German assault. Especially because the 'B' Line lay on the reverse slope, from the German perspective. My supposition was not tested on June 2nd 1917 because the German objective line stopped short of the 'B' Line.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...nearly the restored the original line.

Just as a minor side-note, Tim Harington was the Chief of Staff for the Canadian Corps at this time. Allegedly, Plumer had just offered Harington the job that would set his place in history, as Chief of Staff Second Army. The proviso was, however, that Harington had to ensure the success of the counter-attack

Robert

[Chris_Baker]

Indeed. As quoted on my page at http://www.1914-1918.net/bat14.htm#sorrel, for those interested.

[Robert Dunlop]

...the Allied commanders unable to make that leap of imagination... If you don't have the forces to win outright in the West, attrition is the answer. Hence Verdun, inspired in my view by the Allies dogged holding of Ypres. The Allies at Ypres aided the success of this strategy. The Germans almost seem to goad the allies into action at times, such as Mount Sorrel and the Bluff mines of 1916.

Hugh, let's examine this comment about Allied commanders a little further. The action at Mont Sorrel has just been covered. Seemingly no evidence of attrition as the primary motivation on the Germans part, and a successful delayed counter-attack by the Canadians that retook the high ground again, restoring observation over the German rear areas.

So to the Bluff. Württembergers were involved in this action too. The British Official History notes that when General Graf von Pfiel und Klein-Ellguth's 27th (Württemberg) Division took over this sector, the Bluff "overlooked our positions in a most unpleasant manner. Our predecessors had tried to make away with it by exploding a mine, but had achieved nothing. Mining on an increased scale was therefore begun."

The BOH also described the Bluff as "one of the finest observation posts on the Ypres front", another position of tactical significance that goes against Farrar-Hockley's sweeping statement.

The decision to attack the Bluff was part of a co-ordinated distraction to help with the Verdun offensive. From the British Official History:

"With a view to creating diversions just before and during the attack by the German Fifth Army on Verdun, the other enemy Armies received instructions to demonstrate from the 8th February onwards, at the same time taking the opportunity, if possible, to improve the line. They were also to endeavour by artillery fire, exhibition of captive balloons, and troop movements to give the impression that reinforcements had arrived. An attack on the Loos salient by two divisions was planned, but abandoned, and it was finally settled that the summit of Vimy ridge, then in French possession, should be recovered.

In the period 8th to 19th February, therefore, the Germans carried out a series of operations against various parts of the Ypres salient."

Most of these attacks failed outright. The attack on the Bluff was launched on the 14th February and succeeded in capturing it. An immediate counter-attack by the British failed. General Fanshawe, GOC Fifth Corps, required that the Bluff be re-taken in a carefully planned delayed counter-attack. He "deemed it best to entrust the operation to troops who knew the ground". When the attack went in, the Bluff was re-captured, along with the German re-entrant next to it known as the Bean. The British ended up improving their position, and the Germans described it as "an absolutely tragic event".

The attack on the Bluff does not support the idea that the Germans were seeking actions in the Ypres salient as a means of attrition.

The British response was well-planned and well-executed. I will leave others to decide if Fanshawe did or did not exercise a 'leap of imagination'.

In an interesting side-note, General von Pfiel had received approval to conduct the attack on the Bluff from his Corps Commander von Watter. The BOH mentions that 'his predecessor, General von Diemling, had come to the conclusion that although there was no doubt he could take the position he could not maintain himself there'. A reminder, perhaps, that Generals who allow a 'leap of imagination' to override professional judgement, and the experience of colleagues, are not always to be admired.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I would hazard a guess and suggest that British casualties in the Flanders salient in 1916 amounted to the best part of one hundred thousand.

Phil, I would like to examine this estimate in more detail. What would you regard as the lower boundary of the salient? I want to make sure that the analysis is like-for-like, and that the effort will not be negated by over- or under-estimating the length of front involved.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Phil, I would like to examine this estimate in more detail. What would you regard as the lower boundary of the salient? I want to make sure that the analysis is like-for-like, and that the effort will not be negated by over- or under-estimating the length of front involved.

Robert

Robert, Many thanks for providing that account of the Mount Sorrel fighting. You have certainly encouraged me to reconsider my suggestion that the episode be depicted as a purely attritional excercise by the Germans ....although I am intrigued at the scale of this attack, which, along with others in Artois and elsewhere on the front must have used up considerable German resources, especially at a time when the Verdun battle was raging very intensely. It makes me wonder how far the Germans were endeavouring to replicate the Verdun method in other sectors of the Western Front at that time. I note from the casualty tables used by Churchill in his World Crisis that the exchange rate in the period February to June 1916 was very much in Germany's favour: this although they were on the offensive.

Regarding my statement that British casualties in the Flanders salient in 1916 probably amounted to the best part of 100,000, this was a rough and ready guess on my part. My method is simple....there were 650,000 British casualties on the Western Front in 1916, just under two thirds of them incurred in the Battle of the Somme. Allowing for roughly half a million for Picardy for the entire year, I have assumed that the remaining 150,000 can be attributed to Flanders and Artois, and I would have thought that at least half of these would have been suffered in Flanders; there is of course the important question of how far "Flanders" can be equated with the Ypres salient...I admit that I am unclear on this; the Flanders salient might be extended into the Armentieres sector of French Flanders. Where does Flanders end and Artois begin ?

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

...although I am intrigued at the scale of this attack, which, along with others in Artois and elsewhere on the front must have used up considerable German resources, especially at a time when the Verdun battle was raging very intensely.

Phil, these were minor actions, not even remotely like the efforts at Verdun. No extra infantry were provided for the attack on the Bluff, nor was any extra artillery attached so far as I know. The ammunition usage would have been miniscule by comparison, probably not even an hours worth of the first day of the Verdun barrage.

It makes me wonder how far the Germans were endeavouring to replicate the Verdun method in other sectors of the Western Front at that time.

Not at all, IMHO. These were highly localised attacks. The evidence suggests that Falkenhayn was expecting/hoping for a major retaliatory counter-offensive somewhere other than Verdun, which his forces would bleed while on the defensive. Something like the attack on the Somme in terms of scale, though we know from Jack's previous posts on this Forum, that Falkenhayn did not believe that the Somme would be the location. The Bluff, the attack on Vimy ridge, and the various other minor actions were just distractions. Mont Sorrel did not use any extra infantry, and the main barrage was a few hours long. There were extra artillery attached. The extra ammunition was probably the explanation for the 'considerable railway activity' that was observed by II Brigade RFC on one day, June 1st. Nothing like Verdun. And an attack with 5 battalions was never going to be wide enough to encourage a Somme-like response from the British. There was a quantum difference in the scale of Falkenhayn's ambitions versus General von Watter's very limited goals, a quantum difference.

Jack's posts here and here help to put things into perspective.

Robert

[phil andrade]

A quick glance at Wickipedia tells me that the Germans deployed 17 battalions for this attack, 6 for the assault, 5 in support and 6 in reserve ; and that they suffered 5,765 casualties, inflicting 8,000 on the defenders in the first two weeks of June. Not on the scale of Verdun, of course, where the Germans recorded 25,000 casualties in the first nine days....but a significant affair, surely ?

Adding this as an edit, Robert, I'm reflecting that while they were on a much smaller scale than Verdun, the method used there was being replicated in these local attacks ...i.e.lavish firepower unleashed on small sectors, carefully deployed manpower, provocation and punishment of counter attacks : real bite and hold stuff, and very much an attritional policy. In this sense, the Verdun method of German warfare was becoming ubiquitous along the Western Front. At Verdun itself, there was something tentative and restrained in the German attack. Was this something uniquely "Falkenhaynian", or had it been common practice before his so called Christmas Memorandum ?

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

A quick glance at Wickipedia tells me that the Germans deployed 17 battalions for this attack, 6 for the assault, 5 in support and 6 in reserve

Phil, I was referring to the width of the attack. The support and reserve battalions constitute the depth of the attack. The British Official History quotes 5 battalions for the assault but I don't mind going with the Wikipedia number for assault battalions.

[the Germans] suffered 5,765 casualties, inflicting 8,000 on the defenders... Not on the scale of Verdun, of course.... but a significant affair, surely?

I don't have a problem with you defining the action as 'significant', provided that 'significant' does not mean that the action was remotely like Verdun, and that the action was not primarily for the purpose of attrition to end the war in 1916, as per the purpose of Verdun.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Yes, Robert, rest assured that I acknowledge and appreciate your comments. Reverting to my observations about casualties, I note that one third of all the casualties suffered by Germany on the Western Front in the period of February to June 1916 were suffered on sectors other than Verdun, and I'm wondering how many of these were suffered in small scale but vicious local attacks like the one we're discussing. In terms of the methods adopted by the Germans in these attacks, I imagine that they were inspired by tactics used at Verdun. I suppose that they were also, in themselves, useful diversionary efforts to enhance the effects of the Mill on the Meuse, and to detract from the Entente build up on the Somme. They also beg the question as to how far local German commanders were allowed to indulge in attacks in order to gain advantage in terms of terraine for observation etc. I remember reading Jack's book about the Germans at Vimy, and being aware of how disappointed Rupprecht of Bavaria was at being deprived of resources for his Operation Schleswig Holstein, another local attack against the British which he was planning in the early summer of 1916. The thing that arouses my interest principally is how far attacks such as these might demonstrate that the Germans were doing much more attacking in the positional warfare on the Western Front than is generaly acknowledged, or was this more the case in the first half of 1916, on account of the German offensive at Verdun encouraging lots of local "spin offs" ?

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

I'm reflecting that while they were on a much smaller scale than Verdun, the method used there was being replicated in these local attacks ...i.e.lavish firepower unleashed on small sectors, carefully deployed manpower, provocation and punishment of counter attacks : real bite and hold stuff, and very much an attritional policy.

Phil, clearly this is an important issue to discuss further. It is directly related to this discussion about the efforts to retain Ypres.

I would like to approach this from several directions. Firstly, let's leave aside any notion of an attritional policy. How would a Corps Commander plan an attack? Use as little firepower as possible? No. A commander would take and use as much firepower as possible. Attack a large sector? Well it depends on what we consider is a 'large' sector. At most, the sector can only be as large as the commander has responsibility for. Otherwise the attack would have to be co-ordinated by an Army or Army Group Commander. We know that General von Watter had a very specific reason for attacking Mont Sorrel. He wanted to stop the British/Canadians from having any observation of the German rear areas. Given that observation was only possible from the limited sector Mont Sorrel - Hill 61 - Hill 62 (Tor Top), then the attack only needed to be made on a 'small sector'.

Would the Commander not carefully deploy manpower? No, I don't think so.

Plan for counter-attacks? Absolutely. You used the terms 'provocation and punishment'. I will come back to this, but any good commander would ensure that the assaulting troops planned to protect themselves in the event of a counter-attack/s. One aspect of the planning would have been the depth of the attack. The deeper the attack, the harder it was to give adequate artillery protection against counter-attacks.

Without any consideration of attrition, a good battleplan for local objectives requires lavish firepower, a small sector, careful allocation of infantry resources, and defending against counter-attacks. An alternative name for this approach was an attack with limited objectives.

In this sense, the Verdun method of German warfare was becoming ubiquitous along the Western Front. At Verdun itself, there was something tentative and restrained in the German attack. Was this something uniquely "Falkenhaynian", or had it been common practice before his so called Christmas Memorandum ?

Leaving aside the notion of attrition, we find the same concepts applied to attacks with limited objectives from the beginning of the war. General von Watter's approach was not 'Falkenhaynian'. There seems to have been significant resistance within the German High Command to von Falkenhayn's strategy of attrition (Ermattungsstrategie). It is not clear whether von Watter even knew about von Falkenhayn's strategy or, if he did know about it, whether he agreed with it.

The upshot is that local tactical means should not be confused with broad strategic ends.

Part of the problem stems from the origins of the term "bite-and-hold", and the attributions that have been associated with this term in modern times. I will deal with this issue next.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...real bite and hold stuff, and very much an attritional policy.

Phil, the term 'bite and hold' is usually ascribed to Rawlinson. He was writing after the Battle of Neuve Chapelle:

"What we want to do now is what I call, 'bite and hold'. Bite off a piece of the enemy's line, like Neuve Chapelle, and hold it against counter-attack. The bite can be made without much loss, and, if we choose the right place and make every preparation to put it quickly in a state of defence there might be no difficulty in holding it against the enemy's counter attacks and inflicting on him at least twice the loss we have suffered in making the bite."

Rawlinson's approach has been contrasted with Haig's 'break-through' battles and long campaigns. Modern day historians have suggested that 'bite and hold' would have won the war with far fewer Allied casualties. There are many problems in making this leap of logic, which I have alluded to in other posts (see here for example). Far more significantly, not even Rawlinson made such a leap. He cautioned that:

"[bite and hold] does not of course result in any decisive victory which could affect the final issue of the war and it only very slowly forces the enemy's line back towards their own frontiers. The time for breaking up the trench line is still some distance away. Before we bring this about we shall have to... oblige [the Germans] to weaken their defensive power" (my emphasis).

How did Rawlinson anticipate that German defensive power would be weakened sufficiently to enable the resumption of open warfare? Using 'bite and hold' tactics? No. By making the Germans:

"...extend their front for another 500 or 600 miles across Austria."

In other words, local attacks with limited objectives might inflict more casualties to the attacker than the defender but they were not the route to final victory. This is the issue that von Falkenhayn was struggling with, and his approach was not 'bite and hold', as I will come onto next.

Robert

[PhilB]

In other words, local attacks with limited objectives might inflict more casualties to the attacker than the defender but they were not the route to final victory. This is the issue that von Falkenhayn was struggling with, and his approach was not 'bite and hold', as I will come onto next.

Robert

Just to clarify - local attacks might inflict more casualties on the COUNTER attacker rather than on the original attacker?

[Robert Dunlop]

"...extend their front for another 500 or 600 miles across Austria."

This is a fascinating quote. Coming from Rawlinson in the context of 'bite and hold', it places the action at Mont Sorrel into its proper place. More importantly, the essence of what Rawlinson was saying is that somehow the German forces on the Western Front had to be very significantly weakened. By inference, if the length of the front could not be increased then very serious losses would have to be inflicted on the Germans. For the Germans to win, they had to do the same thing to the Allies, but not using their much-loved strategy of rapid envelopment and Vernichtungs (destruction of the enemy).

Falkenhayn's strategy appears to have been based on an analysis of the French performance and casualties in the first two years of the war. The heavy losses in the Battle of the Frontiers were compounded by the losses in the offensives of 1915. German Intelligence had suggested that the French Army had reached its peak size. According to Foley, the "German Intelligence Section further estimated that, under everyday conditions, the French were loosing 70,000 men per month." They felt that the 1917 Class of recruits would be used up by September 1916, and that the 1918 Class would have to be called up in June 1916 to meet the shortfall thereafter. Foley also comments that Falkenhayn did not think highly of the French Army's capabilities, given the heavy losses for little territorial gain. He told the Kaiser in September 1915 that "the French are at the end of their strength and in no condition to attack".

Foley, in his book "German Strategy and the Path to Verdun", noted that Falkenhayn hoped that the French would send all their reserves to hold Verdun when it was threatened:

"In a meeting with the Chiefs of Staff of the Westheer, he outlined the likely Entente responses to the attack:

1. They [the French High Command] believe Verdun to be so well defended that they leave it alone. Very good for us, therefore unlikely.

2. They send all available forces to the fortress...

3. French counteroffensive on another point [of the line]. Possibly same points as before, Artois, Champagne, Woevre, Upper Alsace. To be greeted with joy. OHL believes it sure that all attacks would collapse with severe French casualties.

4. They attempt to hold Verdun with all available forces, while the English attempt an attack. Questionable whether it would succeed, especially as the English army is at the moment going through a great upheaval with the insertion of the Kitchener units, which are being mixed with the old units down to the battalion level.

According to the post-war testimony of both Tappen and Kaiser Wilhelm II, Falkenhayn believed the fourth possibility to be the most likely."

Falkenhayn expected the French reserve to be consumed at Verdun, then the British would launch a premature massive offensive that would wear them down too.

Foley suggests that "the basis features of Falkenhayn's operational ideas had filtered their way through the army long before the final plans for the offensive had been determined". British Intelligence received a memorandum from their Dutch counterparts in late 1915. The German General Staff were said to have made the following general statement:

"In order to carry through successfully a really energetic break-through, we lack unfortunately the necessary numbers... Therefore our one and only way of forcing a decision is to adopt an enormous Artillery offensive and thus destroy by our tremendous fire all the enemy's hopes."

An attritional strategy, yes. But not based on 'bite and hold' tactics, certainly not on the widespread use of small local attacks such as Mont Sorrel.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jul 5 2009, 04:34 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Just to clarify...

Correct. Thanks for picking up on that, Phil.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Thank you for this information, Robert. I do realise that I'm rather out of my depth in trying to draw conclusions from reading The World Crisis, by extrapolating from the casualty statistics presented by Churchill in his controversial chapter " The Blood Test ".

Those statistics in themselves do present a compelling case for the wisdom of Falkenhayn's strategy, and it's tempting to see battles like Mount Sorrel and Vimy (1916) as episodes which conform with the methods espoused in his policy.

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

...beg the question as to how far local German commanders were allowed to indulge in attacks in order to gain advantage in terms of terrain for observation etc.

Phil, I can't comment on the number of casualties, nor on the relation between that number and the incidence of local attacks launched by German commanders.

With respect to very minor actions, the BOH has this to say:

"To sum up the minor operations during Sir Douglas Haig's command before the Battles of the Somme, it may be stated that between the 19th December 1915 and and the 30th May 1916, there were 63 British raids of from ten to two hundred men, of which 47 were successful, and 33 German raids on the British front of which 20 were successful. The [total number of] battle casualties... to the end of June were [almost 125,000]."

I remember reading Jack's book about the Germans at Vimy, and being aware of how disappointed Rupprecht of Bavaria was at being deprived of resources for his Operation Schleswig Holstein... The thing that arouses my interest principally is how far attacks such as these might demonstrate that the Germans were doing much more attacking in the positional warfare on the Western Front than is generaly acknowledged, or was this more the case in the first half of 1916, on account of the German offensive at Verdun encouraging lots of local "spin offs" ?

Falkenhayn would not release significant manpower resources for other attacks. He was conscious of the limited number of reserves that the Germans had, and the need to conserve these for the anticipated major counter-offensive, as well as maintaining the pressure on Verdun. It is highly likely that many small local actions were so small, from a command perspective, that permission was not needed above corps- or army-level. I can't say for the Mont Sorrel action. General von Watter would have had to get permission from his Army Commander for sure, especially because he wanted more heavy artillery to cover the attack. I don't know about the requirement for more ammunition. It is possible that this was available from the Army or the Army Group. The action was very big, nor was it expected to last very long. As with the British, I imagine that the German High Command would not be averse to an action that did not require extra manpower. Von Watter's attempt on Mont Sorrel was not in the same league as Rupprecht's proposed operation.

Robert

[Crunchy]

There's got to be a weaker point to attack than this?

Thank you for the map Hugh.

My question was where do you believe that weaker point was? You have condemned the generals for attacking at Ypres, thus where, in your opinion, should they have attacked?

Regards

Chris

[bierlijn]

Thank you for the map Hugh.

My question was where do you believe that weaker point was? You have condemned the generals for attacking at Ypres, thus where, in your opinion, should they have attacked?

Regards

Chris

Somewhere where repeated attacks over the previous years hadn't left a strengthened, reinforced and long planned German defensive position behind it, and where the ground in front of the planned attack was flatter. I'm no expert, but Souchez area, or Ploegsteert-Armentieres, or north of the salient? Yes, of course an attack on a prepared position, but not on a prepared position above the attackers.

Having fought through the capture and loss of Hill 60 in 1915, Ernest Shephard (A Sergeant-Major's War - From Hill 60 to The Somme) says:-

"Enough to make men shed tears of blood to think human beings should be sacrificed as our troops have been here, there and all parts of our fighting front. After the war I hope these murderous blunders will be investigated and the responsible persons, if proved careless, should be shot without mercy".

This is a career soldier writing, and I think it is legitimate to examine whether there were other options open to the army command, in this case focusing on whether the Ypres salient should have been held.

Hugh