Retention of Ypres - Politically Important

[truthergw]

This was a Sergeant Major's view of the war. We would be less than fair to him if we were to expect him to adopt a strategic standpoint. To endlessly repeat that there must have been a better place to attack than Ypres and to question why the line was drawn where it was, does not credit GHQ with much ability. I turn the question around and ask you, assuming that such a place existed, why would GHQ not have used it? They launched attacks on a front of many miles at the Somme, at Arras and Vimy, From La Bassee to Loos, Aubers ridge, Richebourg and at Messines. Why would they ignore somewhere else which offered better hopes of success than Ypres?

[bierlijn]

assuming that such a place existed, why would GHQ not have used it

I'm asking whether there was a philosophy of attacking the enemy's best defensive positions, and as the early attempts to do this (Ypres, Aubers) were costly and unsuccessful, isn't it conceivable that a different strategy should have been pursued?

[truthergw]

The rationale for an attack would have had its foundation in strategic aims. For instance, to seize control of a major communication centre or capture a port. That strategic requirement would be given to the Staff at GHQ and they would then layout several broad plans for consideration by CiC. The strategy may even have been laid out by the WO or the Cabinet and been forwarded from IGS. CiC would consult with his staff and then assign the task to an Army commander for his staff to draw up operations plans for his consideration and so on, down the line. In other words, a major battle would be fought for a strategic purpose and would take place on the ground that best facilitated that purpose. Even Verdun which had attrition as its purpose had to choose an object and set out operational objectives and plans so that the troops on the ground coud carry out the task. A battle to capture Ostend and relieve the pressure of USW on Britain may well appear to a Sergeant Major as yet another bl**dy stupid frontal attack on a well defended German position.

[phil andrade]

assuming that such a place existed, why would GHQ not have used it

I'm asking whether there was a philosophy of attacking the enemy's best defensive positions, and as the early attempts to do this (Ypres, Aubers) were costly and unsuccessful, isn't it conceivable that a different strategy should have been pursued?

There are two things that spring to my mind in regard to this.

First and foremost, this was a coalition war, and if Papa Joffre wanted the British to aid his spring offensive in Artois in 1915, while the Russians were being overwhelmed at Gorlice Tarnow, and the Italians were beginning in earnest along the Isonzo, it rather behoved the British to do as requested.

" We have to make war as we must, not as we would wish" said Kitchener.

My second point is more subtle, but equally pertinent, and follows on from what I've been emphasising in other posts on this thread. Where the Germans occupied strong defensive positions, especially in Flanders and Artois, they were not content to remain passive, but combined defensive position with dangerous aggression, albeit on a local scale. To remain overlooked by these enemy positions was to suffer constant and severe loss : the fact that well over 100,000 British casualties were sustained on the Western Front in the first half of 1916 attests that. I suspect that some of these barren and costly British attacks were as much the result of unceasing attrition being inflicted on them by German harrassment as they were of over ambitious offensive plans. I have been surprised at how much heavier British losses were than those they inflicted in the so called "quiet periods". This suggests that, while attacking strong German positions was bound to be expensive, it was also very expensive, and extremely demoralising, to do nothing and endure bombardment from those positions. This was especially pertinent in the Ypres Salient

.

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

I suspect that some of these barren and costly British attacks were as much the result of unceasing attrition being inflicted on them by German harrassment as they were of over ambitious offensive plans. I have been surprised at how much heavier British losses were than those they inflicted in the so called "quiet periods". This suggests that, while attacking strong German positions was bound to be expensive, it was also very expensive, and extremely demoralising, to do nothing and endure bombardment from those positions.

Phil, I am not so sure about these points. There is an alternative explanation, based on a review of numerous war diaries of British units who took over sections of the Western Front from their French counterparts. It is common for the diaries to refer to a pre-existing live-and-let-live policy, tacitly agreed between the French and the Germans. It seems to have been uncommon for the British to allow such a policy to continue. So they would initiate offensive patrols, raids, and a variety of other measures designed to impose themselves on the Germans. Not surprisingly, this approach often stirred up retaliatory strikes.

In other words, doing nothing did not mean enduring bombardments, because more often the Germans would do nothing as well.

The quote from the BOH shows how much more 'active' the British were in launching raids during the first half of 1916.

This was especially pertinent in the Ypres Salient.

FWIIW, I think we should be cautious about making such generalisations.

Robert

[bierlijn]

It seems to have been uncommon for the British to allow such a policy to continue. So they would initiate offensive patrols, raids, and a variety of other measures designed to impose themselves on the Germans. Not surprisingly, this approach often stirred up retaliatory strikes.

In other words, doing nothing did not mean enduring bombardments, because more often the Germans would do nothing as well.

And was that a sensible strategy? Or "murderous blunders", to quote the previous quote?

[bierlijn]

To get back to the topic thread, and move on to the Passchendaele campaign, this was more than a localised positional attack, but a real attempt to force a breakthrough.

Why was this made from the Ypres salient, against reinforced positions, rather than in a "quiet" part of the line with the enemy in less of a definsible position? "The dirty, loathly, servile murder job", to quote Bates "To Ypres for a Haircut", diaries recently published. Did Ypres hold an additional political dimension? The German attacks of the following year, particularly the Lys offensive hit a thinly defended line and attempted to outflank Ypres on the way to the coast. Did the British not consider a more weakly held sector?

Hugh

[Robert Dunlop]

To get back to the topic thread, and move on to the Passchendaele campaign, this was more than a localised positional attack, but a real attempt to force a breakthrough.

Hugh, the Passchendaele campaign of 1917 was not primarily about a breakthrough. The strategic intent of the campaign was an indication of why Ypres was important. The strategic intent had first been outlined in 1915 by Sir Archibald Murray. His memorandum is quoted here. The goal was to 'deprive the enemy of his submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge, because the use of these ports by the Germans constituted a growing danger to the transport of troops and supplies across the Channel.' In June 1917, Haig explained the method for achieving the strategic goal. This is quoted here. On July 31st, when the Battle of Pilckem Ridge was launched, the furthest objective for the day was the Red Line. This objective is illustrated on the map here. The advance to the Red Line was, however, contingent on the Germans collapsing and withdrawing from the salient. Otherwise, the attackers were to capture and consolidate the Green Line. The Red Line was not through the German defences, but in the midst of the series of defensive lines. So the furthest objective on day one was not a breakthrough.

Why was this made from the Ypres salient, against reinforced positions, rather than in a "quiet" part of the line with the enemy in less of a definsible position?

There were two key reasons. The first related to the specific strategic goal. an attack from the Ypres salient offered the best way to outflank the coastal ports, threatening them from the rear. This would have led to the early withdrawal of the German forces occupying the ports. The map here shows a green line that illustrates the breakpoint described by Kronprinz Rupprecht. If the British had reached this point, then the German plans were to withdraw from Ostend.

The second reason for attacking out of the Ypres salient was to engage the Germans in a battle of attrition. Haig's quote about this is here. Haig rightly assumed that the Germans would attempt to resist the British advance because the area was so strategically important to them.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The German attacks of the following year, particularly the Lys offensive hit a thinly defended line and attempted to outflank Ypres on the way to the coast. Did the British not consider a more weakly held sector?

Hugh, what do you think would have been gained by attacking a weakly held sector?

Robert

[bierlijn]

Hugh, what do you think would have been gained by attacking a weakly held sector?

Robert

Momentum, is what I had in mind. Of a sort that might have been achieved in the northern sector of the successful Messines attack ie having actually got over the ridge barring the way in the first thrust. Why then attack another part of the same ridge further up?

What I'm trying find out is whether there was in 1917 other factors which might have lead to choosing Ypres as the battlefield for what surely must be termed a 'breakout', seeing as Ostend is miles away.

Regarding the Lys offensive, the same question might be asked - why expend forces capturing Mt Kemmel, when the offensive could have been concentrated on thrusting from Ballieul and in the gap between Ypres and Kemmel, thus outflanking the dominating feature (and Ypres). The battle for the Kemmelberg surely lost the impetus of the advance - was there an irresistible temptation to 'capture the strongpoint' or maybe an instinct to do this or an older inherited belief that was hard to resist?

Hugh

[phil andrade]

The battle for the Kemmelberg surely lost the impetus of the advance - was there an irresistible temptation to 'capture the strongpoint' or maybe an instinct to do this or an older inherited belief that was hard to resist?

Hugh

Mount Kemmel is a fantastic place, isn't it ? The views across Falnders/Artois from it are breathtaking. I visited the place a couple of years ago and was much struck by what I can only describe as a "teutonic" flavour to the atmosphere there. It was almost as if it were a shrine to the alpenkorp and all the trappings of german militarism that the capture of that place by elite troops represented. Come to think of it, might it be that the German nation was making its own political statement by capturing it?

Phil.

[bierlijn]

I should declare an interest here as my grandfather Claude was 2nd Lieutenant with the 19th MGC in the retreat to Kemmel, so I look on that view towards Mesen with particular interest. I have his field message book from this period.

8.4.18 Please send more ammo for the guns – 4” & 2” (Left group)

9.4.18 – 6.00AM Dug emplacements firing down WAMBEKE Valley – visibility very bad.

6.00AM 8.4 – 6.00am 9.4 Active light shell all day. Slight gas shell 5AM. Work being done on all emplacements. CASUALTIES NIL

7.00AM 9.4 – 7.00AM 10.4 – Nothing to report but heavy barrage all day.

10.4.18 7.00AM Casualty report NIL

13.4.18

– Spanbroekmolen 5.50AM

"I find that the crater is getting very heavily shelled and it is impossible to reconnoitre at the moment. It is impossible to relieve by day as we are sniped from our right. The Boche have very good observation from the front. The front line is about 50 yards ahead of here so you can see the difficulty. Will send back runner of my own as soon as possible. There are already 5 guns in the crater 3 of ours and 2 of the 49th Div. Which am I relieving? If none are coming out would it not be better to choose a more suitable spot?"

14.4.18 – (CS) To Captain S. Warren: My guns are dug in as your suggestion.I have measured their exact position and find it to be N28 a40. There is plenty of Boche observation by day. I have told them not to expose themselves too much. RE: Rations I will send my men with Mr. Coates when his go up.When the Gold Flake arrives you won’t forget to send me some will you?

To Sergt. Linnell: As you are under direct obeservation please keep your men down as much as possible & do not allow stragglers to keep passing over the gun positions. 12.30pm

1PM – To Capt. Warren: The cooks at your end have stolen half of my loaf of bread. I am awfully short. Would you ask them to return it please. Also if you have any butter of mine will you send some up.

COPY OF LETTER JUST RECEIVED: 4000 Rds. At each emplacement. Camoflage all emplacements. Aiming sticks to be laid for each field of fire. All gun tripods mounted. All proper sentry duties to be carried out. Collect sandbags and strengther emplacements.

Rations: Men for rations report here at 6.30pm.

14.4.18 6.25PM - (Lists command and gun crews 1st and second teams). Pte Scruton has not been seen since last night & no-one knows where he is. This is the second time.

9.15pm To 2nd LT Mallet: Parcel & 5 letters h/w which please acknowledge. PS Have you a refill for a field message book?

15.4.18

dispatch (CS): 5.05AM I am sending you h/w a charge by an officer RE against one of my men. Is there any information handy that you have heard? A SWB officer has told us the Boche objective this morning was SPY FARM. Mr. Coates has gone up to reconnoitre. I am with the guns.

18.4.18 8.55am

"I have shifted my HQ up with my men as we are getting so many barrages…..It is my birthday today what a day! When you are writing down would you say that I have not got a cigarette or any of my teams. Will they send some up at once. The barrages are pretty heavy up here but I have been lucky up to now."

19.4.18Dispatch (CS) 1.50am 'relief complete guns 11 & 12. ’

This doesn't give the impression that the retreat was carried out in any disarray.

Hugh

[Robert Dunlop]

Momentum, is what I had in mind. Of a sort that might have been achieved in the northern sector of the successful Messines attack ie having actually got over the ridge barring the way in the first thrust.

Thanks, Hugh. It is helpful to get your clarification on this. Interestingly, the successful attack on Messines was not an attack on a weak sector. The Wytschaete/Messines ridge was regarded as one of the most difficult sectors in the British area.

Why then attack another part of the same ridge further up? What I'm trying find out is whether there was in 1917 other factors which might have lead to choosing Ypres as the battlefield for what surely must be termed a 'breakout', seeing as Ostend is miles away.

A 'breakout' was not needed in order to capture Ostend. If the British had kept pushing the Germans back after November 1917, then the Germans would have had to abandon Ostend. This would have happened even if the German line had never been broken. The same process occurred with all of the major advances in the last 100 days. Take the Ostend example. By 3rd October 1918, the combined British and Belgian advance in the Ypres sector had not broken out into the German rear areas. The German front was still intact, just falling back. The British and Belgian forces had not reached Ostend, but the Germans abandoned it on 3rd October.

There was no equivalent of Megiddo on the Western Front, but that did not prevent the Entente forces from creating sufficient pressure along the Western Front to cause the Germans to abandon many sectors without a fight.

The Battle of Messines was always considered to be part of the Northern Operations. It was not a one-off battle but part of the campaign to cause German casualties and to free the Belgian coast, in that order of strategic priority. I have posted the evidence for the strategic intent behind the British Northern Operations. When you say "what I'm trying find out is whether there was in 1917 other factors which might have lead to choosing Ypres as the battlefield...", do you mean factors other than those that I have detailed?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Come to think of it, might it be that the German nation was making its own political statement by capturing it?

Phil, we should be careful not to over-emphasize the importance of certain geographic features to 'the German nation'. Although Ypres looms large in the British view of the war, it was not the focus of the German nation. Far far more important would have been the advances towards Paris.

There were major tactical reasons for capturing Kemmel. I will publish these when I get home.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The views across Flanders/Artois from [Kemmel] are breathtaking.

This was the most important tactical reason.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Phil, we should be careful not to over-emphasize the importance of certain geographic features to 'the German nation'. Although Ypres looms large in the British view of the war, it was not the focus of the German nation. Far far more important would have been the advances towards Paris.

There were major tactical reasons for capturing Kemmel. I will publish these when I get home.

Robert

Fully understood, Robert...my point being that if you can combine tactical advantage with delivering a significant pyschological blow, then so much the better. Surely Mount Kemmel had much prestigious value; it was especially galling for the British to see the French lose it so quickly, and this probably caused some resentment. I have to say that the size of the ossuary there gives a chilling reminder of the violence and intensity of the German onslaught. The French must have been far too closely packed on that position: there are several thousand cadavers in that ossuary, the vast majority of them killed in that single action. The French were to suffer a similar fate on the Chemin Des Dames the following month. It surprises me - I am just reading Philpott's excellent new book on the Somme, which emphasises how tactically skilled the French had become in 1916 - how badly shattered they were in these two actions. Then again, we must not forget that the Germans were adapting and improving too.

Phil.

[bierlijn]

Did the hill contain artillery positions which would have made outflanking it too difficult? Would these have still been British units, as I imagine the French infantry could have relieved the British in short order, but not artillery pieces?

[Robert Dunlop]

The French were to suffer a similar fate on the Chemin Des Dames the following month.

Phil, I don't want to get off track with this thread. You can find a post on a French appreciation of the reason here.

Robert

[bierlijn]

Surely Mount Kemmel had much prestigious value; it was especially galling for the British to see the French lose it so quickly,

Phil.

The Germans wouldn't have known that when they launched the assault, so it must have been a significant risk. The attack did finally stall in front of the Scherpenberg, which is much smaller, solitary and could have been outflanked. Although Robert will now tell me why that is not so. (It was probably again the view, particularly beautiful in the spring).

[phil andrade]

The Germans wouldn't have known that when they launched the assault, so it must have been a significant risk. The attack did finally stall in front of the Scherpenberg, which is much smaller, solitary and could have been outflanked. Although Robert will now tell me why that is not so. (It was probably again the view, particularly beautiful in the spring).

There is something redolent of the Round Tops at Gettysburg here

Phil.

[bierlijn]

Oi! That's off track with the thead too. You've a loose cannon.

[PhilB]

Oi! That's off track with the thead too.

Maybe not - the Ypres commanders would all have studied Gettysburg in depth and the significance of the Round Tops would not be lost on them?

[phil andrade]

Be assured, please, that I was not mischief making or diverting when I alluded to the Round Tops at Gettysburg.

A year or so ago, I took a battlefield tour round the "forgotten front" in the Givenchy Armentieres sectors, and engaged the help of a Flemish enthusiast, Jan Vancoillie, because I had heard that he had a wealth of knowledge on German regimental histories, and I was especially keen to learn more about the German perspective on the Lys battles of 1918.

It was a very rewarding trip. I especially remember stopping somewhere near Bailleul and looking North East towards the Flemish Alps, and being impressed by how imposing the heights of Kemmel and the Sherpenberg were, and, My Goodness, they really did make me think of the Round Tops at Gettysburg.

Huge differences, of course, in terms of size of armies and prolongation of combat, etc., but the impression of importance of ground for observation and the significant dilemna of whether to assault or outflank make the analogy a compeling one.

Phil.

[Chris_Baker]

As an aside, Jan Vancoillie (member AOK4) was one of the earliest moderators of this forum. A great fellow.

[Robert Dunlop]

This map has the GHQ 1st Line (dotted white) and 2nd Line (continuous white) indicated:

Robert