Retention of Ypres - Politically Important

[PhilB]

Yes, that`s an important distinction - withdrawal from the Salient doesn`t necessarily mean abandoning Ypres. Did French/Haig consider withdrawing to a line virtually through Ypres or to some line to the east? Which is militarily the best defence line?

[Clio]

I believe Plumer was reluctantly eying a withdrawal to the St Omer/Aire line on 14 April 1918 but it was made clear to Foch at the Abbeville Conference that this was not considered very defensible. The Yser canal, Ypres itself but not the salient around it, was a key point in the Lys defence. Only an outpost line was to be maintained to the east, with the Belgians extending down from the north (and facing sharp exchanges around Kippe).

Interestingly, the 41st Division was defending Ypres Town during 14-18 April. This Division had not done too well defending the first Villers Bretonneaux assault, so Plumer was hardly deploying his toughest units.

[bierlijn]

I don't really agree with some previous posts on this subject. Ypres has little or no strategic significance. In fact, once the Germans seized the ridges overlooking the town, it was a death trap. Ypres was held for the political reason that Britain had entered the war to defend the neutrality of Belgium, and withdrawal to the hill line inside the French border would have made it seem at home that we were just fighting for France.

Because the obvious defensive line is behind Ieper: Kemmelberg-Scherpenberg-Mont Noir- Mont Rouge-Mont des Chats and north in front of Dunkirk. Because there were no operational Channel Ports to loose to the East of Dunkirk. This is the shortest, straightest line, and the most difficult for the Germans to penetrate. The Allies could have withdrawn to prepared positions and challenged the Germans to assault them, rather than trying to break out of the low lying land up slopes towards the German prepared positions. Given the impregnable nature of the hill line, forces would have been released to stop any break through to the North.

Furthermore, surely the sight of the allies wasting their resources away in defense of a strategically meaningless but symbolic town must have inspired the German High Command to look down the line for similar salients that might appeal to national pride, and light upon Verdun.

That's my two penn'th.

Hugh

[phil andrade]

That's my two penn'th.

Hugh

Tuppence well spent, I'd say, Hugh !

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

Ypres has little or no strategic significance. In fact, once the Germans seized the ridges overlooking the town, it was a death trap. Ypres was held for the political reason that Britain had entered the war to defend the neutrality of Belgium, and withdrawal to the hill line inside the French border would have made it seem at home that we were just fighting for France.

Hugh, if Ypres had little or no strategic significance then why did the Germans launch two major attacks against it in 1914 and 1915?

What evidence do you have that Ypres was any more of a death trap than other parts of the front? I am reading the British 23rd Division's history. The division spent late 1916 and early 1917 defending the Ypres salient. It mentions how unpleasant it was when the shells came in from different directions. The division's losses, however, were significantly less in the time it spent in the salient, compared with the equivalent time just north of Vimy Ridge in the previous year.

What evidence you have that such a political reason was given to British generals, who were then forced to defend the salient against their military best judgement?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Because the obvious defensive line is behind Ieper: Kemmelberg-Scherpenberg-Mont Noir- Mont Rouge-Mont des Chats and north in front of Dunkirk. Because there were no operational Channel Ports to loose to the East of Dunkirk. This is the shortest, straightest line, and the most difficult for the Germans to penetrate. The Allies could have withdrawn to prepared positions and challenged the Germans to assault them, rather than trying to break out of the low lying land up slopes towards the German prepared positions. Given the impregnable nature of the hill line, forces would have been released to stop any break through to the North.

Hugh, thanks for posing this alternative. It is a concrete suggestion that we can discuss.

Just a couple of extra questions, if I may. First, do you feel it was important to keep Dunkirk? If yes, then why would Dunkirk have been important?

Second, given that you have the choice of locating the northernmost location where the line meets the sea, where would you have choosen 'north in front of Dunkirk'? I have added a map that includes Dunkirk and Nieuport.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Hugh, if Ypres had little or no strategic significance then why did the Germans launch two major attacks against it in 1914 and 1915?

Robert

Was it Ypres itself that the Germans were seeking to capture, or was it the destruction of the Allied armies there and a subsequent outflanking of the Entente line ?

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, FWIIW I doubt if the Germans were just seeking to capture Ypres itself. If it was the destruction of the Allied armies and a subsequent outflanking of the Entente line, then this simply reinforces the notion that Ypres (and its immediate locale) was strategically significant.

Robert

[Piorun]

Hugh, if Ypres had little or no strategic significance then why did the Germans launch two major attacks against it in 1914 and 1915?

What evidence do you have that Ypres was any more of a death trap than other parts of the front?

I would say for the same reason that Hugh gave - its political and psychological significance.

The evidence is purely tactical. When one can be fired upon from, in effect, from all sides, it is generally considered from a tactical perspective that one is in a death trap. Whether one will die in it or escape from it or remain unscathed is a purely unknown factor at the time. The death rate during holding periods would naturally be lower due to the relatively lower concentration of enemy fire than during periods of assault.

Antony.

[Robert Dunlop]

I would say for the same reason that Hugh gave - its political and psychological significance.

Antony, can I just check exactly what you mean please. If I understand correctly, are you saying that Ypres had political and psychological significance for the Germans?

Robert

[salesie]

Perhaps the opinion of an expert-witness may be of value in this debate:

Anthony Farrar-Hockley (Farrar the Para), enlisted as a private soldier in WW2 and fought with the newly formed British Airborne forces in that war. Became an officer and was a Company Commander when captured on the Imjin in Korea. But this alone does not make him an expert-witness - he was also a skilled historian and rose to the rank General; his academic and military qualifications are beyond reproach, and therefore his opinion cannot be described as anything other than valuable.

From his book, Death of an Army, subtitled, the first battle of Ypres in which the British Regular Army was destroyed, published 1967, the last two pages.

"...That ended the business of the night (the death in action of Brigadier-General FitzClarence) and, to all intents and purposes, the battle.

O! that a man might know

The end of this day's business ere it come;

But it sufficeth that the day will end,

And then the end is known.

For a little while the attacks dragged on. Attempts were made by the Germans to secure positions of advantage for the trench warfare of the gathering winter. They did not succeed. The line settled. German units began to move back from Flanders en route to Poland. The British handed over to the French their sector of the line between Zonnebeke and the Ypres-Comines railway. I Corps went back for a short spell of rest and refitting. The 8th Division arrived and, with the 7th, reconstituted IV Corps under Rawlinson. Soon the whole Expeditionary Force was settled in and behind the line from Ploegsteert Wood to La Bassee.

No; not the whole Expeditionary Force. It would never be whole in the original sense again. Typical of its battalions, 2nd Highland Light Infantry was relieved on 16th November by the French to set off'... marching through Ypres to Bailleul and losing an officer and four men by shellfire on the way. Out of all the officers and men mobilized at Aldershot a bare three months before, there were now scarcely thirty left.'

The tale of losses is too continuous to sustain an impact; the mind becomes saturated with figures. It is true, too, that the total number of their casualties is insignificant in comparison with those suffered on the Somme or in the attempt to clear the Ypres ridge again in 1917. But it is not for the number fallen, much as they were mourned, that they deserve to be remembered; or for their courage and patriotism - they were, after all, doing their duty as professional soldiers, holding the ring while their countrymen took up arms. What marks them is the standard they set as fighting men, holding for weeks a wide sector of attack against an enemy four to seven times their strength.

Falkenhayn might write after the war, 'That which had to be attained under any circumstances, if the war was to be carried on with any hopeful prospects, was attained' - that is, stabiliza-tion of the western front from the Alps to the sea. But that was not what he had aimed at. He had aimed to break through to Calais.

It is only fair to say that the allies too had hoped to envelop the enemy line or to break through, but the point is that while it was most desirable for them to do so it was not essential. It was essential for the Germans. Time was not on their side, notwithstanding the errors of their adversaries.

One of these errors, often remarked upon, was the retention of the Ypres salient long after all the ground of tactical signifi-cance had been captured by the Germans. The soldiers who came later could not understand the policy. Historians surmise that its retention was due to an obsession by the senior commanders for holding ground - any ground - rather than release it to the enemy gratuitously. But some at least, however mis-guidedly, felt that the army should hold on to what it could because they had fought for the ground; they had hallowed it with the blood and bodies of comrades with whom they had soldiered all over the world through a lifetime. The old British Army with its venial faults and marvellous quality had died there in its defence. They could never forget that. Neither should we."

In the last paragraph, General Farrah-Hockley seems to be clearly saying that in pure military terms the retention of the salient was a mistake, but a wholly understandable and forgivable one.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, I would respectfully suggest a modification to your summary of Farrer-Hockley's quote. He made his comments with respect to 'ground of tactical significance'. This is one aspect of the 'pure military terms' that were relevant. There were strategic issues, which have been highlighted in previous posts. The British were concerned to prevent any more of the coast falling into German hands, and then to eject the Germans from the Belgian ports. These were military, not political, objectives of strategic, not tactical, significance.

Robert

[Alan Tucker]

Farrar-Hockley...

One of these errors, often remarked upon, was the retention of the Ypres salient long after all the ground of tactical signifi-cance had been captured by the Germans. The soldiers who came later could not understand the policy. Historians surmise that its retention was due to an obsession by the senior commanders for holding ground - any ground - rather than release it to the enemy gratuitously. But some at least, however mis-guidedly, felt that the army should hold on to what it could because they had fought for the ground; they had hallowed it with the blood and bodies of comrades with whom they had soldiered all over the world through a lifetime. The old British Army with its venial faults and marvellous quality had died there in its defence. They could never forget that. Neither should we."

In the last paragraph, General Farrah-Hockley seems to be clearly saying that in pure military terms the retention of the salient was a mistake, but a wholly understandable and forgivable one.

Cheers-salesie.

I would be intrigued to know who 'often' remarked upon keeping the salient was an error? Who were the soldiers who disagree with keeping a Salient presence?

Which historians (of old) thought it was a senior commander commander obsession with holding ground as the reason it was kept? Who felt we should keep the Salient because of the blood shed there?

For a start some of these reasons did not apply to French, Smith-Dorrien and Plumer post-2nd Ypres who retreated to a new line and gave up a chunk of the salient. So Farrar-Hockley is only asserting an opinion.

[bierlijn]

QUOTE (Robert Dunlop @ Jun 28 2009, 03:12 PM) Hugh, if Ypres had little or no strategic significance then why did the Germans launch two major attacks against it in 1914 and 1915?

Was it Ypres itself that the Germans were seeking to capture, or was it the destruction of the Allied armies there and a subsequent outflanking of the Entente line ?

Phil.

Ypres did have significance to the Germans in 1915. Verdun later had a similar significance. The significance was that the Allies appeared intent on holding it inspite of being in a pocket and fighting up hill. Would the possession of the ruins of Ypres been of any real use to the Germans, when the British could pull back to the hill line behind? No, it was better to batter the defenders, as at Verdun.

Neither side chose Ypres as the battleground, it became so when both sides probed forward in 1914, and following the initial engagement, the French and British were pushed back by superior numbers, until the Germans had arrived at what they judged to be the best position to halt for the winter. It just happened that that position was a high ridge which overlooked and semi-encircled a major town. They would have stopped on that ridge whether the town was there or not.

What I am suggesting is that a good general would choose their own battleground, and this withdrawal option should have been taken by the Allies probably after 2nd Ypres.

Hugh

Robert: I have to admit suggesting defending Dunkirk as I was pretty sure that was being used as a port at the time, but I was not sure that Nieuwpoort was open to shipping.

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is one British interpretation of the military significance of the town of Ypres:

"As the meeting-point of many roads, the town [of Ypres]... had a special military significance in a country where traffic, after heavy rain, was restricted to the highways. To this latter cause was the ceaseless shelling of the ruined town mainly attributable. It was not for the destruction of observation-posts, nor, except to a limited extent, for the harassing of the troops in billets, that the German guns made Ypres at the close of 1916 still a place in which it was unwise to tarry. The towers of the Cathedral and Cloth Hall had fallen to artillery fire in 1914; the houses where troops found billets in the first winter lay in ruins after the second battle of Ypres; but the British communications still led through the town as inevitably as they had in earlier days." (From: 'The 23rd Division' by Lt-Col Sandilands, 1925)

Robert

[truthergw]

Hi Hugh. The High Command is not entirely free to fight according to tactical logic. Strategy will always override that in case of need. Strategy is dictated by politics. I believe that no general would ever stop short of capturing a city where that was possible. The morale factor is too big. Even if he is prepared to abandon it without serious losses, he will capture it if he can. As it happens, I believe that it was easier to hold the Germans above Ypres than allow them to take the city and then try to hold them.

[Robert Dunlop]

...defending Dunkirk ...being used as a port at the time

Thanks Hugh. I am not sure about Nieuport either. Assuming that Dunkirk was in use, then there was a serious problem allowing the Germans to get too near. Long range guns would have meant that the harbour could be brought under fire. Based on this assumption, I have mapped the line of defence that you suggested. A map of the high ground was laid onto Google map. The heavy red line represents the line of the high ground Kemmel to Mont des Cats. The dotted blue line shows the problem of defending this high ground. Another salient is formed.

The black line suggests the line of high ground that would be more defensible. Not only is Dunkirk lost with this line, but Calais is then under direct threat.

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, I would respectfully suggest a modification to your summary of Farrer-Hockley's quote. He made his comments with respect to 'ground of tactical significance'. This is one aspect of the 'pure military terms' that were relevant. There were strategic issues, which have been highlighted in previous posts. The British were concerned to prevent any more of the coast falling into German hands, and then to eject the Germans from the Belgian ports. These were military, not political, objectives of strategic, not tactical, significance.

Robert

It seems to me, Robert, that he clearly believed the retention of the salient was an error, and, from the way he worded the last paragraph, that the only reasons for retaining it would have been tactical if the Germans had not already captured all the ground of tactical significance. If a respected historian who also happened to be a fighting soldier who rose to be a General of the British Army could see no strategic significance when studying the subject then I for one place much value on his considered opinion.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

I would be intrigued to know who 'often' remarked upon keeping the salient was an error? Who were the soldiers who disagree with keeping a Salient presence?

Which historians (of old) thought it was a senior commander commander obsession with holding ground as the reason it was kept? Who felt we should keep the Salient because of the blood shed there?

For a start some of these reasons did not apply to French, Smith-Dorrien and Plumer post-2nd Ypres who retreated to a new line and gave up a chunk of the salient. So Farrar-Hockley is only asserting an opinion.

Of course he's only asserting an opinion, as is everyone in this forum - but what an opinion! Are you seriously suggesting that the considerations of a respected historian who rose to be a General of the British Army should be ignored simply because he's offering an opinion?

How do you imagine he arrived at such an opinion, by guessing? In any court of law, his qualifications and experience would make him an expert-witness i.e. on matters within his field of expertise he would be allowed to offer weighty opinion on events when the evidence of those not so qualified would be inadmissible. If a man of such academic and military experience is to be dismissed so easily then I would suggest that the opinion of every contributor in this thread becomes totally inadmissible.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, nice to see you getting into some tactical and operational issues . Seriously, if a General of the British Army was the only person who needed to have a military perspective on Ypres, then Farrer-Hockley's perspective is worth noting. I question Farrer-Hockley's assumption that the Germans had captured all of the ground of tactical significance, but this is a minor issue in this context. More significant is that the C-in-C of the British Expeditionary Force (a Field Marshal of the British Army) was requested by an Admiral in the British Navy to help mitigate the presence of their German counterparts on the Belgian coast. Said Field Marshal was FM French, who received the request prior to October 1915. French's replacement, FM Haig, received the same request, which was reinforced by the political representatives on the War Council.

Robert

[bierlijn]

Hi Robert,

Thanks for putting in the time to make that map. I'll do a bit of work myself and see if I can improve this line. I've got my eye on a canal running south west from Dixmuide, to connect up the Belgian front.... More later.

Hugh

[salesie]

salesie, nice to see you getting into some tactical and operational issues . Seriously, if a General of the British Army was the only person who needed to have a military perspective on Ypres, then Farrer-Hockley's perspective is worth noting. I question Farrer-Hockley's assumption that the Germans had captured all of the ground of tactical significance, but this is a minor issue in this context. More significant is that the C-in-C of the British Expeditionary Force (a Field Marshal of the British Army) was requested by an Admiral in the British Navy to help mitigate the presence of their German counterparts on the Belgian coast. Said Field Marshal was FM French, who received the request prior to October 1915. French's replacement, FM Haig, received the same request, which was reinforced by the political representatives on the War Council.

Robert

A slight correction, Robert - I don't think Farrah the Para "assumed" that the Germans had captured all the ground of tactical significance, more likely he cast an expert eye over the situation as it stood after 1st Ypres.

That said, I'm happy to accept the real general's opinion that the retention of the salient was an error, but a wholly understandable and forgivable one. That way, you armchair types can get on with your deliberations in peace.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Great, Hugh. Let me know if it would help to draw your proposed line on a map. It won't take me long to do it for you. Meanwhile, this map illustrates the increasing threat on the British coast, as the defensive line rolls further west. The purple line is the original (approximately).

Robert

[Piorun]

Antony, can I just check exactly what you mean please. If I understand correctly, are you saying that Ypres had political and psychological significance for the Germans?

Robert

Yes - in the "reverse" sense that, knowing it did for the Allies, winning it would prove a psychological and political victory as well as a purely military victory. This moves the taking or losing of Ieper into the field of a strategic rather than purely a tactical operation.

Of course, especially given the high water table in the area and the resulting wetness of ground, the confluence of paved roads was also an attractive prize which, in its turn, allowed the holder some strategic advantage over the broader battlefield, especially if it was to the west.

I thank you chaps for starting into this discussion. Made me think about intelligent stuff

Antony

[bierlijn]

I've been thinking, and Robert, I think your point about the inundation is sound.

Ypres was never 'The last major town" in Belgium. There is the equally historic headquarters of the Belgian Army, Veurne (Furnes), similar in size. After lavishing praise on 'brave little Belgium', I don't think anyone would have the gaul to ask King Albert to withdraw his forces over the French border. Veurne has to be defended, for similar 'honour' rather than strategic reasons.

So, any withdrawal line has to link in some place to the Ijzer line.

Robert, thanks for the offer of map help. Can you zoom closer in on the hill line, with view to examining the ground to the North-East? With the above admission, I can see my argument for the retreat to the hills unravelling.

It would also be worth considering that realistically, as people have sensibly suggested previously, that a logical withdrawal would have been to shorten the line to the eastern ramparts of Ypres itself, straightening the north-south line of the Ijzer canal with the north south line of the Messines ridge ((Although with the qualification that in 1915 the Allies were not on it). In fact that sounds so sensible, I can't imagine why it wasn't done.

I don't think this withdrawal debate could be conducted after 1915, as the Allies had been defending Ypres for too long, and at too greater cost. So I'm just applying this suggestion to mid 1915, when the French Army had been conducting the defense for the previous months, and the British were re-taking over. The emotional commitment couldn't have been so great at that time, and if the generals had pointed out that they were incurring great loss of life defending an arena with the enemy around the edges, I can't see their political masters standing in the way of withdrawing a short distance to leave the enemy at a strategic disadvantage.

Hugh

ps When the 19th Division was pushed back towards Kemmel in 1918, they withdrew to "The Army Line", which is somewhat beyond the foot of the hill. What sort of fortification, if any, was that?

H