Was the German army defeated before 8th August 1918?

[Jonathan Saunders]

It wasn't just the British army that lost men defeating the Germans.

Absolutely and that is why in my reply to Jon Miller I said:

"afterall the prevailing answer has been supportive of the Allied achievement." No disrepect was meant to Foch or France by my original question - it just that my concentration automatically thinks in terms of the British.

Its about time Philpott bought out a reasonably priced book on the French army - I think the English language sector needs one desperately to fully understand the French contribution.

Regards,

Jon S

[6th Shropshires]

Hi David

I don't think we can be Anglo-centric about the concluding months of the war and credit should also be given to Foch.

I know Foch was in overall command but how much did he control the situation, I am asking because I do not know, did Foch tell Haig were to stike or did Haig suggest where to attack & Fock OK it (or not) or did Foch give Haig a free hand so he attacked where and when he wanted ?

Annette

[owilki1984]

Hi,

I would also be interested in the reply to Annette's query. I get the impression that Haig followed Foch, although I dont know for sure.

Regards

Oli

[Jonathan Saunders]

did Foch tell Haig were to stike or did Haig suggest where to attack & Fock OK it (or not) or did Foch give Haig a free hand so he attacked where and when he wanted ?

In the absence of any other replies I think, but i am not totally sure, that Foch was content with Haig acting independently to a large extent. The French offensive had commenced in May with the Mangin offensive and so Foch would have given Haig a broad outline but I assume he would then have left Haig to arrange the Amiens offensive, whilst Foch was concerning himself with the French offensive.

I am also not clear to what extent Haig involved himself in the planning of Amiens or the push forward as he had on the Somme and at Third Ypres for example - some accounts say Haig was heavily involved, others say Haig was remote from the tactical level (and the strategic?), leaving it to Rawlinson, Monash, Currie etc (I cant give you references but this is the impression I have taken from my own reading).

The British adopted the limited objective - after the initial success of 8 aug they took the 4 months to move 60 miles or so before the Germans were in freefall in the last week of the war. The limited objective approach was favoured by Rawlinson (and over-ruled by Haig at the opening of the Somme battle) who was commanding Fourth Army but also this was the strategy utilised by the French with whom the British army were conducting the offensive.

I am happy to be corrected on this assessment.

Regards,

Jon S

[armourersergeant]

I have always had the impression that Foch was just that one rank higher, so as Haig would tell Rawly and he Monash etc down where to attack, Foch would say "we are to attack along the line, you organise your sector please". That sort of thing. I do not see Haig letting him tinker with the way he ran his command.

regards

Arm

[armourersergeant]

Hi Arm,

It certainly is an interesting twist, and I had not come across anything like it. But when I read it certainly could add a new perspective.

“After my capture I was marched to German H.Q. in Fort Brimont about 8km W of Couroy where I was asked the usual questions none of which I answered. I might state here that the German General informed me through the German interpreter that they knew we were 21st Division and that we were a worn out Div after the March 21st Offensive and that we had come from Kemel to the Champagne front for a rest” (Captain F.A. Marsden, 9th KOYLI)

Marsden was an experienced soldier, joined in Sep 1914 as a private and had risen to Captain by 1918. Also won the MM. To be frank he was no ‘duck egg’ so I think his testimony is very credible. Moreover he has no reason to lie in his account. This is to account for himself on the day of capture – this piece of information does nothing to clear or condemn him. It is simply some additional knowledge he picked up and recounts to the authorities.

Sorry but I am a History student so I always try to validate sources.

I think this is credible and as you say could put a new twist of the ‘Blucher’ offensive.

Regards

Oli

Sorry Oli I missed the reply until now, thanks for that. It a interesting statement, however I wonder if it is more one mans impression, what he felt rather than could prove. As mentioned above the attack must have been prepared well in advance and poss before the British units moved in to the area.

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

I do not see Haig letting him tinker with the way he ran his command.

Absolutely - thats why Foch was content for Haig to act independently. I think their relationship from Doullens conference to when things improved in August was often stretched to the limit, and mostly by Haig I have to say.

[armourersergeant]

I think their relationship from Doullens conference to when things improved in August was often stretched to the limit, and mostly by Haig I have to say.

I have always thought that it must have stuck in Haigs throat to have been subordinate to a French General, when he probably felt, rightly or wrongly, that they should have been beholden in some ways to how he and the BEF picked up the slack during 1917. Perhaps it is a measure of him that he was able to do that for the good of the war?

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

Perhaps it is a measure of him that he was able to do that for the good of the war?

I think it was more damage limitation. They were fighting on French soil - Haig knew he could never be Generalisimo in those circumstances. Rather that damn Foch than Petain ...

I would suggest to a large extent Haig only paid lip-service to the arrangement. Foch could deal with that, but if it had been Petain it would have been interesting.

Obviously, my opinion only.

Jon

[armourersergeant]

What would be the reasoning that Haig would prefer Foch to Petain?

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

What would be the reasoning that Haig would prefer Foch to Petain?

Arm

Well in my opinion Petain had a very poor opinion of the British army and what they had achieved up to April 1918 - an opinion mirrored by Haig. I think Petain was far more obstinate than Foch but not as fiery. Petain would have been demanding British units taking over more of the Line and pulling their weight in his opinion (and as he did request under Foch). I think Haig viewed Foch more easier to ... I'll say "manipulate" but thats more than what I man ... cant think of the right word ... whilst I also think Haig thought Foch would be strong against Petain. Basically Haig thought he could control the situation with Foch and Foch could control Petain. Does that make sense?

[armourersergeant]

Thanks for that Jon.

regards

Arm

[owilki1984]

Sorry Oli I missed the reply until now, thanks for that. It a interesting statement, however I wonder if it is more one mans impression, what he felt rather than could prove. As mentioned above the attack must have been prepared well in advance and poss before the British units moved in to the area.

regards

Arm

Hi Arm,

As we have already discussed this could be a new twist to the May offensive. But I think your assesment of above is probably fair.

Agreement is made!!! Form some of the threads I have seen over the past few days this seems like a breakthrough so I add an extra smile.

Regards

Oli

[Jonathan Saunders]

some of the threads I have seen over the past few days this seems like a breakthrough

Maybe you're the link. It never used to be like this

[Robert Dunlop]

Ludendorff made several comments about the rationale behind and the planning for the 1918 Spring offensives:

'The [German] army had come victoriously through 1917; but it had become apparent that the holding of the Western front purely by a defensive could no longer be counted on, in view of the enormous quantity of material of all kinds which the Entente had now at its disposal. Even where tactical conditions had been absolutely normal, and by no means so unfavourable as in the struggle for the Wytschaete salient [the German name for the Battle of Messines] or Laffaux corner [refering to Petain's Battle of Malmaison in October 1917], we had lost ground and suffered heavily. These losses had indeed been greater than we had incurred in well-conducted attacks. The enormous material resources of the enemy had given his attack a considerable preponderance over our defence, and this condition would become more and more apparent as our infantry approximated more nearly in character to a militia, as our best men became casualties, and as discipline declined.

The troops had borne the continuous defensive with uncommon difficulty. Skulkers were already numerous. They reappeared as soon as the battle was over, and it became quite common for divisions which came out of action with desperately low effectives to be considerably stronger after only a few days. There had been incidents, too, which indicated that their cohesion was no longer the same. As they were depressed in defence, their spirits rose in the offensive; in defensive it was bound gradually to succumb to the ever-increasing hostile superiority in men and material. This feeling was shared by everybody [see, for example, Crown Prince Wilhelms' quote above]. [The feeling of the troops about attack and defence] amounted to a definite conviction which possessed them completely that nothing but an attack could win the war. Many generals, among them the most distinguished, spoke in the same strain. Naturally, I did not allow myself to be influenced by this feeling; my sense of responsibility was far too great. I alone had to make the decision regarding that, of that I remained conscious throughout. The wishes of the troops and commanders merely indicated what the army felt regarding its own strength and weakness.

The condition of our allies and of ourselves and that of the army all called for an attack that would bring about an early decision. This was possible only on the Western Front. All that had gone before was merely a means to the one end of creating a situation that would make it a feasible operation. All that mattered was to get together enough troops for an attack in the West.

For this we needed enormous material resources and strong troops who, with their leaders, had been trained for the attack. If this could be effected in time we could - indeed, we must, attack. The attack is the strongest form of combat; it alone is decisive; military history proves it on every page. It is the symbol of superiority. Delay will only serve the enemy, since he was expecting reinforcements.

That the attack in the West would be one of the most difficult operations in history I was perfectly sure, and I did not hide the fact.

It was difficult to decide where to attack, but it was necessary to do so early. It took weeks, and required considerable foresight and the most detailed preliminary work...

I discussed the selection of the front of the attack with the chiefs of staff of the army groups, and with the officers of my staff, and heard their opinions. Three sectors were considered - Flanders between Ypres and Lens, between Arras and St Quentin or La Fère, and on both sides of Verdun, leaving out the fortress. As is always the case, there was a great deal to be said for and against each proposal.

The enemy was in great strength about Ypres and Arras, in front of the Ailette position, and farther to the east, as far as Verdun; the weakest part was on both sides of St Quentin; north of that town the enemy line had been denser since the battles of Cambrai.

In the north the ground was difficult. The condition of the Lys valley, west of Lille, across which the main force of the attack would pass, depended to an extraordinary degree upon the season and the weather; before the middle of April its passability away from the roads was doubtful. That was very late, in view of the Americans.

In the centre the ground itself caused no difficulties, but further progress would be hampered by the crater-areas of the Somme battle.

The attack at Verdun would lead us into very hilly country.

These two attacks could take place at any time of year.

Tactical conditions, therefore, favoured the center sector; here the attack would strike the enemy's weakest point, the ground offered no difficulties, and it was feasible at all seasons.

Strategically the northern attack had the advantage of a great, though limited, objective. It might enable us to shorten our line if we succeeded in capturing Calais and Boulogne. The attack on Verdun might also lead to an improvement in our front, though more of a tactical nature. The centre attack seemed to lack any definite limit. This could be remedied by directing the main effort on the area between Arras and Péronne, toward the coast. If this blow succeeded the strategic result might indeed be enormous, as we should cut the bulk of the English Army from the French, and crowd it up with its back to the sea.

I favoured the centre attack; but I was influenced by the time factor and by tactical considerations, first among them being the [point of maximum] weakness of the enemy. Whether this weakness would continue I could not know. Tactics had to be considered before purely strategical objects, which it is futile to pursue unless tactical success is possible. A strategical plan which ignores the tactical factor is foredoomed to failure. Of this the Entente's attacks during the first three years of the war afford numerous examples.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

He continued:

'The Imperial Chancellor was perfectly acquainted with our intention of attacking in the West. Further, I had informed him of the date it was to begin. Germany could make the enemy inclined to peace only by fighting. It was first of all necessary to shake the position of Lloyd George and Clemenceau by a military victory. Before that was done peace was not to be thought of. All the world, including the Entente, knew we were going to attack in the West. Clemenceau declared himself decisively in favour of continuing the war, in spite of events in the East and in spite of our imminent attack.'

Robert

[David_Blanchard]

I am also under the impression that Haig was given a reasonably free hand to direct operations along the British sector. I will have to dig out my Philpott and see what he says.

Regards

David

PS Jonathan, I think you were at the Kent University talk given by Philpott. Did you ever get an email about notes from Mark C of the conferences lectures?

[Jonathan Saunders]

PS Jonathan, I think you were at the Kent University talk given by Philpott. Did you ever get an email about notes from Mark C of the conferences lectures?

David - you are right I was - did we meet? And no I havent. I'll contact Mark and see what the position is.

Regards,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

The limited objective approach was favoured by Rawlinson (and over-ruled by Haig at the opening of the Somme battle)

Jon, I am sorry but your comment about Haig overruling Rawlinson's limited objective approach is not correct. The infantry objectives for July 1st were very clear, were limited, and corresponded to Rawlinson's original plan, except in those areas described below. All subsequent infantry operations were fought with limited objectives, just as Rawlinson planned. Haig ensured that the attack frontage was wider, but the depth of the infantry advances in these new areas was very clearly stated and was not unlimited. Haig also ensured that contingencies were in place to exploit a collapse of the German army. This is not the same as 'overruling' Rawlinson.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I discussed the selection of the front of the attack with the chiefs of staff of the army groups, and with the officers of my staff, and heard their opinions. Three sectors were considered - Flanders between Ypres and Lens, between Arras and St Quentin or La Fère, and on both sides of Verdun, leaving out the fortress. As is always the case, there was a great deal to be said for and against each proposal.

Crownprince Rupprecht provides some insight into how/what the army groups provided Ludendorff. Rupprecht's diary contains several pages of the preliminary thoughts for 'Operations for 1918 within the sector of Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht - [code-named] Operation “St George”.' Rupprecht presented two options: a decisive attack (entscheidenden Angriff); and a diversionary operation. He described the latter as a sortie (ausfallartigen), which gives a clear message about which operation he and his Staff favoured. With respect to the decisive operation, Rupprecht was clearly anticipating that the British would continue their Flanders offensive. He pointed to the furthest limit that a British advance could reach without threatening the U-Boat bases (this is line was highlighted on the maps that Mart kindly uploaded to the thread on the planning for Third Ypres). Rupprecht noted that the ground would not permit the resumption of an offensive until April, which is the date that Ludendorff then quotes in his comments above. Rupprecht's idea was that the British should be allowed to start their attack and then his Army Group would pounce by attacking via Armentières-Estaires towards Hazebrouck. He mentions that the point of weakness is based on the sector covered by the Portugese. From these, and other details, you can see the basis for Operation Georgette, which became the Battle of the Lys. Ludendorff, however, felt that the German army could not wait until April, which is why he looked to attack elsewhere earlier in 1918.

It is interesting that Rupprecht appears to have wanted to fall back in front of the British attack. It is rather similar to Hoehn's concept mentioned in another recent thread.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, I am sorry but your comment about Haig overruling Rawlinson's limited objective approach is not correct. The infantry objectives for July 1st were very clear, were limited, and corresponded to Rawlinson's original plan, except in those areas described below. All subsequent infantry operations were fought with limited objectives, just as Rawlinson planned. Haig ensured that the attack frontage was wider, but the depth of the infantry advances in these new areas was very clearly stated and was not unlimited. Haig also ensured that contingencies were in place to exploit a collapse of the German army. This is not the same as 'overruling' Rawlinson.

Robert

Hi Robert - obviously this is a subject we have discussed at length before in the other thread. I did suggest towards the end of our previous discussion that you should put forward your comprehensive argument to academic historians familiar with the original sources. Have you done this? And if you haven't I think you should because I think your argument raises a grey area concerning Rawlinson and Haig's primary first day objectives, which needs clarification.

For the present I continue with the accepted version as I interprete it and that is Rawlinson's plan outlined first day objectives somewhere between the first and second German lines on the line running from Serre through Pozieres and on to Montauban and that Haig's correction was to take in the entire German second position along this line. As I recall from comments or diary entries made by Rawlinson at the time, he was certainly under the impression that Haig was extending his first day objectives - Prior & Wilson note these comments but I do not have my copy at hand.

Irrespective of this point, Haig wanted to change the spirit of Rawlinson's plan which was bite and hold ie. the limited objective. This was (meaning limited objective), to my mind anyway, in accordance with the strategy favoured by the French army attacking in the south. As you know, Haig wanted the first wave to keep moving forward and thrusting through the German defences with the following waves mopping up - and this occurred on 1st and 3rd July with disastrous results as following waves were obliterated by the intact Germany artillery whilst those that had managed to get beyond the first German line found themselves in isolated pockets and effectively surrounded. This was a fundamental over-ruling (interference, call it what you will) of Rawlinson's battle plan by Haig and was to pursue a "breakthrough" rather than "bite and hold".

As we have discussed this at length before I don't really want to repeat the exercise again but I would be interested in the results of how you carry your findings forward.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

Crown Prince Wilhelm thought the decisive battle should be against the French

but I do not have the details, other than the previous comments Wilhelm made about the importance of the Verdun forts in unlocking the French centre-right. These comments were made in the context of the Battles of the Frontiers and Verdun. I do not have details from the other army groups that would have contributed to Ludendorff's information-gathering process.

Von Kuhl provides more insights in 'Der Weltkrieg'. He notes that Crown Prince Wilhelm sent a memorandum to Ludendorff on 12 November 1917 that argued for an attack against the French. Wilhelm's Chief of Staff, Oberst Graf von der Schulenburg, was of the opinion that by a partial defeat of British army would not induce the English to sue for peace. He felt that the French army could be broken by a heavy defeat. He suggested an attack either side of Verdun, on the one flank attacking southeast from the Argonne , on the other westward from St Mihiel. If this attack was successful, Count von der Schulenburg expected a profound turnaround (tiefgehenden Umschwung ) in the mood of the French people and army.

Von Kuhl mentions that the head of the Operations Department in OHL, Oberstleutnant Wetzell, also favoured an attack against the French, as recorded in a memorandum dated 9 November 1917. He hoped to destroy or capture eleven French divisions by encircling Verdun, as well as smashing other divisions thrown into the fight. He argued that the French army would not recover from this. The German army could turn its whole force, if necessary, against the British.

On 11 November 1917 Crown Prince Rupprecht hosted a meeting in Mons, which was attended by General Ludendorff, Crown Prince William, and their respective Staff. The Flanders offensive toward Bailleul-Hazebrouck was discussed. The intention was to cut off the British but the difficulties of the terrain in early Spring were noted. Colonel Graf von der Schulenburg presented his plan of an attack on Verdun, which was supported by Lieutenant-Colonel Wetzell. Rupprecht's memorandum cited in a previous post will have derived from this meeting.

At this meeting, General Ludendorff decided that the British would be the focus. They would be struck/pummelled (geschlagen ). It was then that Ludendorff mentioned the need to attack as early as possible, at the end of of February or in March, before the Americans could become a factor. The German forces had to be sufficient for a major attack, without a simultaneous diverting secondary attack in some other place. General Ludendorff considered an attack around St Quentin in order to roll the English front up further north. That was the basis for the operation in March 1918 code-named “Michael”.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I want to turn now to another significant aspect that casts light on the subsequent decision-making process. Ludendorff recognised that the German forces would need training for the forthcoming offensives. He was under no illusions as to what this would entail:

'The training of the army for the offensive was another tremendous task. For this we had to utilize the winter of 1917-18, as the previous one had been devoted to training in defense.

In the same way in which tactical theories had then been summarized in the "Defensive Battle," so now the "Offensive Battle in Position Warfare" came into being. We had to revive in the minds of the fighting forces all those excellent offensive principles which inspired our pre-war regulations. They had to be supplemented by more recent experience in actual battle. Without checking the vigor of the attack we had to keep down losses as much as possible. The whole line of thought of the army had to be diverted from trench warfare back to the offensive.

While in the defense the forces in a given sector were more evenly distributed, in the attack the problem was to discover some decisive point and arrange the distribution accordingly. In defense, commanding ground had lost much of its value. The battle of Arras had once more demonstrated it. Positions were held which were completely open to the enemy's view. Often the troops had thought they could not exist without the possession of some height or other, but if they did not get it they managed to continue the fight. In the attack in the war of movement the capture of some high ground brought about the tactical decision. Its possession must therefore be striven for as a matter of principle.

It was necessary to create anew a thorough understanding of the extent of front to be allotted in attack and to emphasize the principle that men must do the work not with their bodies alone, but with their weapons. The fighting line must be kept thin, but must be constantly fed from behind. As in the defense, it was necessary in the attack to adopt loose formations [NB: contrast with what actually happened] and work out infantry group tactics clearly. We must not copy the enemy's mass tactics, which offer advantages only in the case of untrained troops [NB: again, contrast this wish with what British and French forces observed in many instances].'

Now comes the really important parts. After describing in great detail how machine guns, tanks, artillery, aircraft, logistics, etc would be co-ordinated for offensive actions, Ludendorff then said:

'The further the attack advanced, the more clearly its character approximated to that of open warfare. In defensive fighting the senior commanders had to keep far behind, in order really to conduct the battle; but now their place was nearer the front; the more open the fighting the closer up they must get. The leader now had to make rapid decisions, and, if necessary, carry others away by his personal example'

This expectation, if fulfilled, would provide greater tactical flexibility on the battlefield but, as the Battles of the Frontiers demonstrated, would exact a high price in NCO and officer casualties. Even more important, however, is Ludendorff's next paragraph:

'Finally, as our operations progressed, we would come up against a new front, which for the time we would be not be able to overcome, as had happened in Rumania, eastern Gallicia, and Italy. Then we should have to return to the defensive, and distribute our forces in depth. The right moment for this change was difficult to recognize [my emphasis]; only too often we became involved in unnecessary fighting.'

I cannot stress Ludendorff's point too strongly. It comes back to a discussion that Phil and I had recently, which touched on the fog of war. Basically, it was very very difficult to know when an enemy had stopped retreating and had formed a 'here-we-stand-come-what-may' defensive line. This theme recurs throughout the war, and it is vital to grasp its significance when trying to make sense of the battles in 1918, including the last 100 days. It relates to the fact that temporary rear guards could put up serious resistance, sufficient to stop an entire army from advancing until the rear guards were killed or, more usually, chose to retreat back through the next line of rear guards, until reaching the ground chosen and then, during the time brought by the rear guard actions, prepared for the next major line of defense.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

In summary, leading up to March 1918 Ludendorff wanted to:

1. Force the Entente to sue for peace.

2. Focus on the British Army.

3. Take the initiative by going onto the offensive.

4. Stay on the offensive.

5. Focus effort on making one attack at a time

6. Strike at a point of weakness

7. Keep going until the defence hardens, then stop.

8. Stay on the offensive

9. Focus all effort on the next attack

10 Strike at a point of weakness

11. Keep going until the defence hardens, then stop.

12. Stay on the offensive

[Repeat steps 9-12 until the Entente sue for peace]

I don't want to go into more details about the how these steps unfolded. Rather, I would like to move on and tackle some of the other issues raised in this thread.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Touching on the issue of recruits, it is possible that some Pals may have gained the impression that the British Army was made up almost entirely of raw recruits who came over to France after March 1918. Clearly this was not the case, and this was not the point being made when this issue has been discussed in this thread. It may be helpful to note that several British units were not significantly involved in defending against the German attacks. By significantly, I mean that these units suffered very few casualties. In some cases, this is because their sector was not attacked. In some cases, they were attacked but beat off the Germans with relative ease. In some cases, the units were overseas or in Italy when the Spring offensives started, and came back to the Western Front.

There were some British divisions that were very very severely affected. When you read the British Official History volumes relating to this period, these divisions and their composite units, you will come across a convention adopted the authors. Due to the severe losses, a division will be renamed divn; a brigade becomes bde. It is a very powerful reminder of what these units suffered. Some units, such as the South African Brigade 'ceased to be.' In their magnificent last stand at Marrières Wood, the brigade 'surrendered. Less than 100 unwounded prisoners [from the whole brigade] fell to the enemy; the rest were killed or crippled or lost, all but the little group of details and stragglers now in transport lines.' Like most units, however, this was not the whole picture. 'Two companies of the South Africans had gone astray on the night of the 22nd and had since been fighting with other brigades. There were also the parties left behind in the Brown Line on that date, which had been unable to rejoin their units, and there were the posts which Dawson had flung out on his right flank on the 23rd, and which had lost their road in the last withdrawal. These oddments, along with the details and the transport of the Brigade, collected that evening half-way between Bray and Maricourt, and on the following day were formed into a composite battalion of three companies... The fighting strength was some 450 rifles.'

By April 2, the South African Brigade was out of the line. The unit history takes up the account:

'It detrained at Abeele and moved into the Ridgewood area. Every man who could be found was brought from England, and during the next few days drafts to the number of 17 officers and 945 other ranks arrived. The reorganization of the Brigade was immediately begun. Presently, the Brigade had a strength of 39 officers and 1,472 other ranks.'

'Drafts' should not be taken to mean raw recruits. The example of the South African Brigade cannot be seen as a template for what happened to British units, though many of these did have some men who were back in England on leave or in training when Operation Michael started. Thus, some experienced men re-entered their parent units or were drafted into other units that had been depleted. These included men who had recovered from wounds.

Like the South African Brigade, there were whole divisions that virtually ceased to exist. The 9th (Scottish) Division is one such. It ended up fighting in the Somme and Lys battles of 1918. The divisional history details the terrible hammering. Finally, at the end of April, the division could begin to recover. It was an example of a unit that was almost entirely rebuilt with new recruits. The author wrote:

'During the greater part of May, the Ninth after leaving Poperinghe was resting and reorganising near St Omer. DHQ [Divisional Headquarters] were at Blaringhem, and the brigades were in neighbouring villages except the 27th, which was in camp at Lumbres. After three weeks of constant training and good weather, the Division, now largely composed of youths little more than eighteen years of age, was ready to return to the line, and on the night of the 25th May the 26th Brigade with the 9th Scottish Rifles attached, relieved the Thirty-first division near Meteren.

As the summer started, 'the attitude of the Division was one of active defence. Patrolling was assiduous; screened by the tall corn, small parties left our lines every day to examine the enemy's positions. Raids for the purpose of securing identifications were constantly carried out, and as the youngsters of the Division gained experience and learned the lie of the country they became adepts in the art of surprising posts.'

As time went by, the size of the raids increased but it was not until 19th July that a relatively major attack was undertaken - the capture of the village of Meteren, which had been lost in the Battle of the Lys. The account bears repeating because it illustrates how learning occurred, and how the nature of warfare had changed with respect to infantry involvement:

'The commanding ground on which the village stood and its proximity to the line rendered it desirable that our front should be advanced beyond the village. Our experience at Longueval [in the Battle of the Somme 1916] suggested the necessity of thoroughly demolishing Meteren; it was therefore systematically bombarded to prevent the consolidation of the position by the enemy and to level the walls and so allow the creeping barrage to go through the village without danger to the assailants. For a fortnight previous to the attack, "heavies", field-guns, and trench mortars poured a never-ending stream of missiles into Meteren and completely flattened it.

As it had been decided that the infantry would attack under a smoke-barrage, bombardments with HE and smoke, accompanied by the discharge of gas from projectors took place with a view to leading the enemy to associate our use of smoke with gas.

The operation of the 19th July was a brilliant triumph, and increased immensely the enthusiasm and confidence of the young soldiers, to whose dashing fearlessness the victory was mainly due. Our losses, with the exception of the Black Watch, were small compared to our gains.'

The divisional history also notes another key aspect of training at this time, which is supported by Lord Moyne's account in 'Staff Officer: The Diaries of Lord Moyne 1914-1918'. This is the widespread training of American troops. Thus, not only were the new British recruits being actively trained, but so were the newly arrived Americans.

In early May, Lord Moyne was a Staff Officer with a brigade in 25th Division. This division was also involved in multiple battles, including the Chemin des Dames offensive. Like other British divisions in this quiet area, it was meant to be recovering in safety. 'As usual on arriving in a new area, we at once got to work to construct rifle ranges...', which points to the ongoing importance attached to training. 'The attack prophesied by Bethell took place shortly after I left the Division and so little was left that the old 25th Division, as I knew it, was finally broken up.' The remnants of the division will have been posted to other divisions, making up some of the drafts into those divisions.

Lord Moyne took up a new Staff post in the 66th Division. 'We were one of the four Divisions who had been sent south on account of their exceptionally heavy casualties in the recent fighting. The other Divisions had arrived a few days ahead of us and it was thus probable that we should have a week or two of quiet during which to receive our drafts and to get reorganized. The 66th Division had now been organized on a Cadre basis (ie a nucleus to which miscellaneous units would be drafted)'. Lord Moyne details how the Cadres were then involved in training up two American divisions. Then, on 2 August, he noted in this diary 'during this time GHQ had apparently made up their minds to make us up into a permanent new Division with the troops from the East whom we were training, and the original cadres of the 66th Division were gradually broken up and dispersed.' On the troops from Palestine, Lord Moyne commented 'the officers certainly seem much more civilized than those which one finds in Battalions who have been long in France. The men, too, are better educated and far finer physically than the new levies to fill the cadres of the BEF.'

I hope these snippets give a broader picture of what was happening to new recruits and to depleted units. The final point to emphasize is that there was a considerable period of time in which training could take place in the field, bearing in mind that the first major attacks involving significant numbers of British units in the last 100 days did not take place until August.

Robert