The Road to a Revisionist Damascus

[David Filsell]

I think that Cambrai was just part - a high part - of the wobbly curve. My point was that the 100 days, during which not everything went perfectly for the British, brought it all together. That said, the German army was on its very own, if rather different, wobble. But a great army with a great commander overcomes its wobbles (ie Spring 1918). But the dire German situation in 1918 too was due, in large part, to the effectiveness of British arms. We really got it together. Not least we often ignore the effect of the British naval blockade, which I have heard argued (by a sailor) was in itself a war winning strategy. That can be argued obviously, but it certainly reduced Germany to the point that front line soldiers were sending food back to the folks at home. In turn they were receiving 'comb-outs' as replacements and dire news of starvation and shortages in the homeland.

[Ron Clifton]

Not least we often ignore the effect of the British naval blockade, which I have heard argued (by a sailor) was in itself a war winning strategy.

A strategy directed and implemented by the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914: Winston. One of his better decisions, I think.

Ron

[salesie]

Sorry to interrupt, gentlemen, but I feel a need to introduce the concept of total-war once more i.e.

1) The fact that the British bent but did not break under the weight of the German March offensive is not in itself evidence of "lessons learnt". In 1914 the allies also bent but did not break before any real learning curve began (especially the magnificent stand of the BEF at 1st Ypres when outnumbered and out-resourced). Surely, this bending but not breaking is only evidence that in total-war military tactics alone are not war-winning?

2) The learning curve was not one-sided on the western front; both sides learnt valuable lessons from each other - one side tried something new and the other side quickly learnt how to counter it. Surely, it is this dual learning curve that caused the stalemate on the western front to last so long?

3) The war was not won on the western front alone - the Naval blockade, the preventing of the U-boats from succeeding, the subversion/propaganda war waged by British Military Intelligence, and the economic nous and industrial power of the Empire all played equally vital parts in the defeat of Germany.

4) Haig was not the architect of victory, but an important member of the top-team that did secure final victory. The Admiralty as well as the Army, Industrial/Union leaders, and, dare I say it, the politicians were all vital members of the winning team. Indeed, if any has to, the war cabinet has to take the credit as the true architect of victory - for successfully co-ordinating the whole bloody show.

5) Total-war is not won, whatever the tactics in the field, until one side loses the ability, and/or the collective will, to wage war - this is the real lesson that comes out of 1914-1918, as is clearly shown by the Spring offensive followed by the 100 days.

Cheers-salesie.

[truthergw]

I think this modern notion of a ' learning curve ' and its application to the evolution of tactics in WW1 is liable to mislead. It implies a slow and steady evolution which culminated in the victory of the 100 days. I think there were commanders at different levels and different times, who were years ahead of the game and others who never got past Balaklava. At any given time, the level of tactical ability was extremely variable. Attrition in the field and blockade at home finally forced the Germans to try for a decision. This went against them, particularly when the allies were able to wage the kind of open warfare which Haig and his staff had striven for throughout the fighting. All of this was forecast by Haig and the war ended as he always said it would, with a victory for the allies when they finally made the breakthrough which Haig alone foresaw in August / September. Churchill, the military genius was planning campaigns for 1919 with an eye to victory in 1920. Two days after the Armistice, Haig said to his padre, " I always knew it would come to this. I never doubted the outcome". I think its time we started to render the homage to this great soldier which is his due.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Haig was certainly aware of the British Army's vital and central role in the 'Hundred Days,' and the politicking of Foch caused him to spell this out; Haig's diary entry for 24 October 1918 notes:

Foch declines to return the Second Army to me because of the political value of having the King of the Belgians in command of an allied Army, when he re-enters his capital, Brussels! His real object is to use the British Second Army to open the way for the 'dud' [French] Divisions....and ensure they get to Brussels. France would then get the credit for clearing Belgium and putting the King back in his capital......I am disgusted at the underhand way in which the French are trying to get hold of a part of the British Army [second Army, seconded to the King of the Belgians at French behest largely for political reasons] - and so ungenerous too, because in the first instance, I handed over all the troops of that Army at once to operate under the French Staff of the King of the Belgians, without raising the smallest difficulty. I felt annoyed at the attitude of Foch and Weygand over this question. I told them a few 'home truths' for, when all is said and done, the British Army defeated the Germans this year, and I am responsible to the British Government for the handling of the British troops not Foch.

Haig's foresight, alluded to in other contexts by Tom, extended to the consequences of the French desire to inflict the maximum humiliation upon Germany at the peace table, and though he criticised Foch for allowing political considerations to take precedence over military ones, he himself was acutely alert to the possible long-term political consequences of the peace terms hammered out following the Armistice. The key difference between the British and French commanders was that the former had no desire for immediate revenge arising from the French humiliation of 1871, and was therefore capable of taking a long-term political view. As early as 25 October, in a meeing with Foch, Petain and Pershing, Haig pointed out that harsh terms could cause unpredictable consequences in Germany since "We don't know very much about the internal state of Germany." Haig feared that law and order in Germany could disintegrate and/or political extremism arise as a consequence of harsh terms. On 1 November 1918, Haig wrote to his wife in the following terms:

The Peace of the World, for the next 50 years at least, may depend upon the decisions taken! So it is important that our Statesmen should think over the situation carefully and not attempt to so humiliate Germany as to produce the desire for revenge in years to come.

As so often before since August 1914, Haig's was, in the words of Gerard De Groot, "a lonely voice of reason."

There was no triumphalist smugness in Haig's appreciation of the British Army's victory in 1918. With the collapse of the German home front and army and the abdication of the Kaiser, Haig's realistically sober assessment in his diary on the 11th November 1918 of how high the stakes fought for had been was as follows:

"If the war had gone against us, no doubt our King would have had to go, and probably our Army would have become insubordinate like the German Army. cf, John Bunyan's remark on seeing a man on his way to be hanged. "But for the Grace of God, John Bunyan would have been in that man's place."

I concur entirely with Tom's concluding observation.

ciao,

GAC

[squirrel]

I'm really enjoying the contributions to this thread - FWIW my own take on Haig is that when he was able to fight a battle on ground of his own choosing, to his own plan, in his own time and finally having the resources available to do so,

the result was the "100 days".

I agree with Tom's and George's observations.

[salesie]

I think this modern notion of a ' learning curve ' and its application to the evolution of tactics in WW1 is liable to mislead. It implies a slow and steady evolution which culminated in the victory of the 100 days. I think there were commanders at different levels and different times, who were years ahead of the game and others who never got past Balaklava. At any given time, the level of tactical ability was extremely variable. Attrition in the field and blockade at home finally forced the Germans to try for a decision. This went against them, particularly when the allies were able to wage the kind of open warfare which Haig and his staff had striven for throughout the fighting. All of this was forecast by Haig and the war ended as he always said it would, with a victory for the allies when they finally made the breakthrough which Haig alone foresaw in August / September. Churchill, the military genius was planning campaigns for 1919 with an eye to victory in 1920. Two days after the Armistice, Haig said to his padre, " I always knew it would come to this. I never doubted the outcome". I think its time we started to render the homage to this great soldier which is his due.

I'm afraid, I'm not in the homage business, Tom - not when such homage tends to blinker one's eyes.

Haig was a great soldier, there is no doubt about that in my mind, but he did not exist in a vacuum. Whatever he did, whatever he achieved in WW1 was as a result of other great factors at play as well as the BEF's supreme efforts on the western front.

How much harder would the BEF's war have been without such a powerful and effective Royal Navy and Merchant Marine? How much more difficult without the manpower and financial and industrial might of the Empire? How much more difficult without the highly effective subversive/propaganda war being waged for the first time alongside the conventional means of waging war? How much more difficult without an effective political system back home, that, despite all its flaws and mistakes (just as Haig had flaws and made mistakes), managed to harness Great Britain Ltd on to a truly awesome total-war footing?

Haig controlled the BEF; he did not control the Navy, nor industry, nor British Military Intelligence, nor our political system. By paying too much homage to just one element of victory then surely we become as guilty of painting as false an image of WW1 as the "ee-aw brigade" do? Surely, we become as guilty as the "donkey merchants" of diverting due homage away from where it rightly belongs?

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

I agree, Salesie, that it would be a mistake to suppose that the Great War was other than a collaborative effort by the Nation and the Empire. As Janet Watson put it in her study of Britain's collective war experience, "In 1914-1918, you were recognized as a worthy (if not necessarily equal) participant in the war - whether you were a soldier, a VAD, a munitions worker, or a bandage roller." That was a view that held for the best part of a decade after the victory of 1918 - as did the respect with which the reputation of Douglas Haig was held in by the nation whose main armies he had led to victory on the main battlefront of the war. This collaborative aspect is equally true of the arms of the State - government, the army, the navy and nationalised as well as private industry. There is no doubt either that the BEF could not have held the line on the Western Front had the Royal Navy not commanded the Channel, or prevented the German High Seas Fleet from accessing the sealanes of Empire. Leading on from that, the Royal Navy's blockade of Germany was a critical (though not, perhaps, decisive) element in the eventual collapse of Germany's war effort. However, there is no doubt in my mind that, given that it was able to do so, the focal point of the British military effort had to be directed onto the Western Front. Strategically and politically this was a given. Churchill's Dardanelles sideshow of 1915 was nothing more than a costly diversion of resources from confronting the German war effort in France. The war was won by the modern combination of a total national war effort being behind all branches of the armed services - but the cutting edge of that effort was largely provided by the BEF in France. Having stated all of that, and accepted your proposition that this must be the big picture of how the war was won, I would also say that it is quite possible for discussion of each of these constituent parts of the war effort to be discussed in particular. Leading on from that, it is therefore quite legitimate to examine the role of individuals within these constituent parts. Which brings us back to the topic of this thread, the role of Douglas Haig and the strange career of his reputation since his death in 1928.

As you say, Haig was a great soldier - don't let anybody tell you different. I'm constantly amazed at how prescient he was of events to come, which is a faculty which can be discerned throughout his career. Did he get all his predictions right? No, of course not. But to paraphrase Max Beerbohm, only mediocrity is consistent. Genius contains the latitude for failures proportionate to its triumphs. Douglas Haig's military genius in the Great War didn't comprise of a sudden masterstroke personally directed upon the field of battle - he was operating at an altogether higher level and in the wrong era for such things. I've not seen Douglas Haig's brand of genius better summed up than in a recent post by our own Tom Rutherford:

There were many self proclaimed military geniuses on the side he defeated. I suspect he was clever enough to never let being a genius get in the way of what he had to do. He won the war and outsmarted a political genius who swept all before him, from before the war untill well after it. A Prime Minister who could and did defy the king and the high command but could not get the better of the Field Marshal. If that is not genius, I do not know what is. And so good at it that people thought he was nothing special. The hallmark of true genius I believe. His tragedy was to be outlived by the politician, now himself yesterday's man and who sought to justify his mishandling of the war in 1918 by demeaning and traducing the memories and reputations of the Generals he had let down.

What you say about the roles of the Navy, the Merchant Marine, Industry, Government and propaganda is all indubitably correct, and I don't argue with you on any of these well made points. Our purpose here, however, is to consider the performance of Douglas Haig within that bigger picture of the British Empire's war effort, and whether his reputation since his death has accurately reflected his innate abilities, professionalism and performance. Does the big picture of National and Imperial war effort deserve homage? Yes. Does Haig's role within that overview also deserve homage? Yes - more so, perhaps, because it was unfairly tarnished by lesser men for nearly sixty years after his death. As much of this thread has demonstrated, I hope, that prejudicial and unfounded 'Donkeys' view has been comprehensively replaced in the historiography - if not yet the popular imagination - of the past quarter century - its last gasp, perhaps, being Denis Winter's grotesque caricature in his iconoclasic 1991 polemic Haig's Command.

ciao,

GAC

[salesie]

Well said, George - I can't argue with most of your assertions. But, as you know from previous threads, I regard the revisionist position on Haig, particularly on this forum, as being close to religious fervour and just as blinkered, in its own way, as the opposing ee-aw brigade's stance. That's to say, as in Tom's post which you describe, the revisionists here constantly refer to him "winning the war" - he didn't, not alone. But when I point this out there is passing acknowledgement to the truth of this, then quickly back to Haig winning the war. I personally find this as irritating as the donkey brigade's uttering.

I would also take issue with Tom's, and your implied, thoughts on David Lloyd George. I agree that Lloyd George's attack on Haig after his death was self-serving and despicable - but I would not agree that DLG was a lesser man in the context of genius and ability. After all, Lloyd George had a far bigger brief than even Haig; his stewardship of munitions produced a near miraculous turnaround, and as Prime Minister he lead the team that successfully co-ordinated the whole show - without the success of which, as we seem to agree, Haig would not have been able to "win" even the revisionist war.

I'm not having a go - simply trying to redress the balance between what I see as two equally false images.

Cheers-salesie.

[PhilB]

but I would not agree that DLG was a lesser man in the context of genius and ability. After all, Lloyd George had a far bigger brief than even Haig;I'm not having a go - simply trying to redress the balance between what I see as two equally false images.

Cheers-salesie.

I think I`m with Salesie on this. Is there a name for the people in the middle?

I would add that neither can Churchill be considered a lesser man - he was certainly equal to an even bigger task in an even bigger war.

[armourersergeant]

Haig was neither a God/genius, nor an idiot. He was human, made mistakes, learnt not always quickly, sometimes stupidly. He was tenacious, dour and able to draw up a strong face and deal with the job, hardnosed and confident of his own ability.

Churchill (whom I adore) was many of the above, but could be almost childish on occassions, especially in his approach to the war. However in the end he still deffered to the military (well almost) during WW2 when it really mattered. Perhaps he learnt from 1914-18.

Both men I would be glad to have at my table for dinner.

regards

Arm

[sjustice]

The evidence is probably weighing against you in the question of LG, salesie.

LG's attacks on Haig after his death were, indeed, self-serving and despicable.

LG's attacks on Haig during the war were, to my mind, worse in their possible disastrous consequences. Douglas Haig certainly didn't win the war by himself but LG came close to losing it.

With regard to his stewardship of the Ministry of Munitions, in my opinion everything LG took credit for was already in hand by the Master General of the Ordnance when he wrested control and had von Donop removed.

LG was a clever, calculating and ruthless schemer. Certainly not unusual in past and current politics.

Genius to the top of his bed-sheets.

Kind Regards,

SMJ

<snip>

I would also take issue with Tom's, and your implied, thoughts on David Lloyd George. I agree that Lloyd George's attack on Haig after his death was self-serving and despicable - but I would not agree that DLG was a lesser man in the context of genius and ability. After all, Lloyd George had a far bigger brief than even Haig; his stewardship of munitions produced a near miraculous turnaround, and as Prime Minister he lead the team that successfully co-ordinated the whole show - without the success of which, as we seem to agree, Haig would not have been able to "win" even the revisionist war.

I'm not having a go - simply trying to redress the balance between what I see as two equally false images.

Cheers-salesie.

[PhilB]

I wouldn`t argue with that, Arm. I think that, as young men, we tend to believe that there are/were men who have/had all the virtues. As we get older we realize that it`s not like that. We don`t have supermen, just men who have more than their share of virtues/talents but not without a leavening of peccadilloes. Let`s admire their virtues and be not too harsh about their shortcomings. I`d hate to see what a gaggle of historians would make of my life. I make all these WW1 characters look wonderful!

[truthergw]

I also was trying to redress a balance where for far too many years, authors intent on selling their book and people who have read it queued up to heap derision and calumny on the high command and Haig in particular. We have reached the position where, on a WW1 forum people type H**g as if his name was an obscenity. This despite the last two or three decades producing ample evidence to demonstrate that Haig was the better leader who led the better army to victory. How Haig managed to fight the Germans and the politicians led by Lloyd George at the same time is one of the miracles of the Great War. The constant attacks on Haig and his staff by Lloyd George, culminating in the starving of the army of men, almost led to defeat in March 1918. I could not praise Foch too highly on this forum. No one would demur, no matter how loud I sang his praises. That all started during the war and particularly at the end. To read of how LL G deliberately made much of Foch while slighting Haig makes one 's stomach churn. Sent into political exile a few years later, after a scandal, Lloyd George waited years before publishing his memoirs. After Haig and several other of the main participants were dead, he rewrote history and tried desperately to revive his political fortunes by making out that he had won the the war by triumphing over a high command consisting of butchers and bunglers. He was unsuccessful and even when WW2 broke out, his great friend of long standing, WS Churchill, did not use him in any capacity. A base betrayal, we might think, since Lloyd George had helped WSC in the aftermath of the inquiry into the Dardanelles. LL G was a silver tongued orator, and totally ruthless. He was deeply distrusted by many other politicians and left a trail of betrayed friends and colleagues behind him as he pursued his career.

[David Filsell]

I don't disagree with any of the points that Selesie (Hi Lee!) or Truthergw made, they were, if you read my reply, actually part of my arguement. Let me reiterate, the curve wobbled, quite severely, but there was constant learning and, consequently, application of better techniques on the defensive as well as the offensive through better staff work and tactics at virtually all levels and in virtually all arms which created a more capable and better led army. Was the war won on the Western Front? Another question but the fact remains that it was there that the main army of the main enemy was defeated. That is generally counted as a victorious strategy (and one completed by only three armies led by Brits - Marlborough, Wellingtom and Haig). Did that defeat do it alone? Of course not and I indicated the significance of the naval blockade. Equally lest it be though otherwise I am not blinded by the view that Haig was perfect.

[Crunchy]

Well said, George - I can't argue with most of your assertions.

George, I agree – excellent post. I think you have encapsulated more eloquently than I could a "revisionist" reply to Salesie’s reminder for us to see the war in its entirety and to acknowledge all of the components that contribute to victory and the nature of total war.

I would think many of us agree with Salesie's views that no one factor or person alone was responsible for victory. It was a collaborative effort as both of he and George have said. Nonetheless, within the limitations of a forum post any discussion on a particular person or a consideration of tactics is bound to focus on the subject matter to the exclusion of the wider issues. I think for many of us those issues are a given and it would be tiresome to have a pre-amble of them on every thread. Having said that, the reminder is not unwarranted as we often see posts that state Haig "won the war" and the importance of the learning curve. Most wars display learning curves for the combatants - as seen with the Coalitions forces in the Napoleonic Wars, both sides in the American Civil War and the Allies in World War Two but in the end, as Salesie points out, "[t]otal-war is not won, whatever the tactics in the field, until one side loses the ability, and/or the collective will, to wage war".

Salesie’s subsequent post raises two interesting points. Firstly, that we need to bring balance into our discussions on Haig, with which I heartily concur. Secondly, that “the revisionist position on Haig, particularly on this forum, as being close to religious fervour”. Is this so? As George has said in an earlier post, I haven't detected a sense of anyone regarding Haig as God like on the forum. Perhaps the “revisionists” can be accused of making stout hearted rejoinders to those who see no good in the man and blame him for everything; as if Haig should have been omnipresent on the battlefields and been capable of forestalling the actions of every person who contributed to a disaster, including the enemy? Thus the rejoinders, in seeking to repudiate these unrealistic perceptions, naturally focus on Haig’s positive contributions and, in some instances, overstate his contribution to the final victory and ignore some of his more doubtful decisions. That is the nature of such debates. Notwithstanding this, the views of the likes of Clark, Laffin and Winter still hold sway over much of the popular perception, despite their works being poorly researched and/or deliberately distorting the facts. Thus those historians who seek to redress this lopsided assessment of Haig perhaps go too far the other way - but nowhere near to the same extent as the "donkey" school from what I have read.

Where does the correct balance lie in the assessment of Haig? I suspect that most reasonable people, after considering all of the facts and having a general understanding of the complexity, difficulty and enormity of the task confronting him, would set the mark more on the “revisionist’ side of centre than on the “donkey” side. Would I be wide of the mark in suggesting that many "revisionists" on this forum actually have a view similar to Salesie's, both on Haig and the collaborative effort that won the war?

Cheers

Chris

[Ron Clifton]

Hello again all

Of course Haig made mistakes, and had faults as we all do. But those who persist in regarding him as a donkey should read "Role of the British Army should Russia fall oout of the War" written by Haig to the CIGS on 8 October 1917. It can be found as Appendix I to the Official History, "1918 Volume I".

It is a closely argued analysis of the position and remarkably accurate in its predictions. It also throws useful light on his strategy during 1918.

Ron

[PhilB]

Would I be wide of the mark in suggesting that many "revisionists" on this forum actually have a view similar to Salesie's, both on Haig and the collaborative effort that won the war?

Cheers

Chris

I think we may be all singing from the same basic hymn sheet!

[Greenwoodman]

I don't think there is much controversy over salesie's view, that in the total war which was the Great War, victory was obtained through a collaborative effort from several sources. The controversy occurs in a part of the collaboration, namely whether Haig had a part in victory. Haig was the C-in-C of the BEF on the Western Front when the Armistice was signed on the Western Front. Its my belief that his input, in many areas, enabled the BEF to apply the pressure during the 100 Days, which, coupled with the situation in Germany (caused by other parts of the collaborative effort) led to the Armistice. However, rather than produce something like the paragraph above in response to a "Haig was a butcher" post, many members use the shorthand response that "Haig won the war". He did too, with more than a little help from his friends.

Just to re-assure those who may think otherwise, I do not cling to a revisionist point of view with a religious fervour, and I also believe that Haig made a number of mistakes.

But I would take issue with remarks about LG. His interference at the heart of the military effort during the war outweighs any perceived value in the political sphere. His behaviour at the Calais conference was nothing short of malign, and he was described as a gangster, and his machinations as underhand, unsavoury and stupid. His attempts at destabilising the military high command could easily have led to something much worse.

[truthergw]

Research into newly available material and analysis from a new stance of all available sources is showing that the historians and biographers of the Twenties were correct in their judgements of Haig and the British Army. The accolades bestowed then were much closer to a correct judgement than the self serving character assassination of the Thirties by an embittered politician and a few old soldiers trying to capitalise on the desperate longing for peace which had gripped a Britain struggling with economic depression. The Sixties re-run of the B&B view was very quickly criticised by the military historians of the day and all the new evidence gives the lie to The Donkeys and it's supporters. After 30 years of this history, based on archival evidence instead of prejudice, I think it is perverse to describe any book or historian who does not agree with Clark et al as ' revisionist'. That view is the accepted view and has been for decades. To continue to describe it as a revision is to damn Haig and his command with faint praise. Any other man in that position would be acclaimed as the victor, as were Foch, Petain, Pershing... add your own names to the list.

[Pete1052]

Let me see if I've got this straight: first there was the conventional school of thought (lions), then there were the revisionists (donkeys), and then the anti-revisionists (lions). This could get complicated as the pendulum of historical interpretation continues to swing back and forth. I propose that in the future if the number of "antis" in the prefix is an odd number it denotes the lions school, and if it's even, the donkeys. Who knows, perhaps there are those we might call the "shades of gray" school who regard the above concept as being too binary to be useful.

[Roxy]

What an excellent thread. One of the reasons that I joined this Forum!

Notwithstanding the valuable contribution of Royal Navy bloackade and Mercantile Marine; I am of the opinion that you need boots and bayonets on the ground to win a war (despite my profession/Service!) and, in 1918, Haig was in charge of the Armies.

Roxy

[Greenwoodman]

Sacrilege, Roxy! You'll be drummed out!

[salesie]

Well, it seems that we're all in broad agreement about Haig (should such an event not be on news at ten?)

Crunchy, you're right - I do bang the total-war drum a little too often, perhaps religious fervour has taken me over?

Greenwoodman, it's not quite correct to say that the other collaborators in victory brought about the internal mess that was Germany in 1918 and that the BEF only applied effective pressure on this situation in the last 100 days - all the collaborative efforts worked in concert (most of the time), and the result was certainly far greater than the sum of its constituent parts. To this end, read the report from the Director of British Military Intelligence, autumn 1917, here: http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=928512

I also have to point out that we did not operate the German model of politics (thank goodness) and, as Prime Minister, it was Lloyd George's job to "interfere" in what ever area he saw fit, military or otherwise. Also, Haig himself was not behind the door when it came to a few machinations of his own - did he rise to such heights, and gather a circle of extremely powerful friends, by being a political innocent?

Cheers-salesie

[salesie]

What an excellent thread. One of the reasons that I joined this Forum!

Notwithstanding the valuable contribution of Royal Navy bloackade and Mercantile Marine; I am of the opinion that you need boots and bayonets on the ground to win a war (despite my profession/Service!) and, in 1918, Haig was in charge of the Armies.

Roxy

You certainly do need boots and bayonets on the ground to win a war, Roxy - but in total-war you also need much, much more. If boots and bayonets on the ground were all it took then the Russians would have had a virtual walkover.

Cheers-salesie.