The Road to a Revisionist Damascus

[charlesmessenger]

What an excellent thread this is turning out to be, with some very thoughtful postings. I especially appreciate Salesie's very balanced comments. Yes, Haig was certainly not the sole winner of the war, but it was not won 'in spite of him'. The naval blockade indeed played a significant part, as did the need for Germany to constantly have to prop up its allies. On the other hand, in contrast to WW2, when Germany's main effort was concentrated on the Eastern Front, the major theatre was in the West and it was here that the final decision was reached.

Charles M

[salesie]

When using the terms "Devil" and "God", George, I was thinking more about the views displayed by some members of this forum - knee-jerk, blinkered reactions from both camps seem to be the order of the day for some members whenever Haig's name is mentioned.

But, OK, perhaps these terms are a little over the top (but only a little mind), so I'll withdraw them. However, this does not diminish the validity of the main point of my post i.e. both camps portray a false image of WW1.

Cheers-salesie.

[George Armstrong Custer]

OK, thanks for that clarification, Salesie! I'd like to think, though, that discussion of Haig's role has moved on from the point where any positive assessments of Haig are seen as putting those who utter them into a cohesive 'camp' which is the polar opposite of the 'Donkeys' 'camp.' I'd argue in support of that that scholarship over the last quarter century has pretty much discredited the 'Donkeys' school. The corollary of that is that I see continuing the idea that there are still two such 'camps' putting forward sustainable arguments to be unhelpful in moving discussion on. Debate as to the degree of Haig's flaws will most certainly continue, but I just see the idea that there are two 'camps' which everyone must either belong to or sit on the fence between them to be a redundant one.

ciao,

GAC

[Gibbo]

The author of the forthcoming biography of Haig mentioned by David Filsell above, whose name is Paul, not John, Harris has written, along with Sanders Marble, an article in the latest edition of War in History (vol. 15, no. 1, January 2008) called 'The 'Step-by-Step' Approach: British Military Thought and Operational Method on the Western Front, 1915-1917.' The article criticises Haig for over optimism &, until mid 1917, looking to achieve a break through whilst other British generals such as Robertson & Rawlinson favoured a more methodical approach. It argues that Robertson & Haig agreed on grand strategy (i.e. were 'Westerners') but disagreed on operations & tactics. According to Harris, Robertson agreed with some of Lloyd George's criticisms of Haig but also thought that politicians should interfere with military operations as little as possible.

Below is a synopsis of the article, which can also be found at the Journal's website.. It is available online, but at a cost of $15 for one day's access to the website.

War in History, Vol. 15, No. 1, 17-42 (2008)

DOI: 10.1177/09683445080150010101

© 2008 SAGE Publications

The `Step-by-Step' Approach: British Military Thought and Operational Method on the Western Front, 1915—1917

Paul Harris

Sanders Marble

The British Expeditionary Force of the First World War did not fight a deliberately attritional war, despite the heavy casualties and slow gains it experienced. Before the BEF launched a single trench-warfare attack, senior officers argued for a methodical and clearly attritional operational approach, accepting limited gains and slow overall progress to get a favourable casualty exchange rate. The idea quickly had senior adherents, especially Sir William Robertson. Sir Douglas Haig, however, was consistently optimistic, thinking breakthroughs were possible; this prejudiced him against lesser, attritional, attacks. Not until mid-1917 did the BEF substantially adopt methodical step-by-step attacks.

[salesie]

OK, thanks ... clip ... ciao, GAC

I too dislike pigeon holes, George, but, I'm afraid, these camps do still exist and both sides still hold strong views, plus a good few books are still being published or planned for the future, and school literature/history lessons are still heavily biased to the ee-aw point of view, mainly because of the poetry of Owen and Sassoon (of great literary merit but hardly representative of those who actually fought). So, moving the debate on is easier said than done - and the obvious question springs to mind of move-on to what?

Consequently, in my little way I hope that I am moving the debate on - when saying that Haig was not THE Architect of Victory, that he was an important member of the team that did win the war, but he didn't actually win the war in the way that many revisionists portray, that this image does grave disservice to other members of the team that won the war. Call it post-revisionism if you like - call it bo***cks if you like - but it is an honestly held view.

Cheers-salesie.

[armourersergeant]

whilst other British generals such as Robertson & Rawlinson favoured a more methodical approach. It argues that Robertson & Haig agreed on grand strategy (i.e. were 'Westerners') but disagreed on operations & tactics. According to Harris, Robertson agreed with some of Lloyd George's criticisms of Haig but also thought that politicians should interfere with military operations as little as possible.

This is how I have always understood Robertson to be, a westerner at heart but a bite and hold by principle.

regards

Arm

[Clive Maier]

... The first thing that gave me pause for thought was the plain fact that Haig led the army that won the war. Can't get away from it, whatever is said about his conduct of the Somme, of Passchendaele, of early battles, he led the army to victory on the Western Front. In spite of vehement political opposition, he led the army to victory on the Western Front.

The second thing that is seemingly obvious but is often discounted by those interested, is that there is no comparable evidence that another man, any other man, would have carried out the duties of CinC with less casualties than Haig did. ...

... And with these two revelations my whole attitude to Haig changed. ...

Without taking a position on Haig, I nevertheless do not myself find either of your two revelations compelling.

In the first of these, I don’t think that to be present and in office at a successful conclusion is cast iron evidence of a sterling performance, nor do I think it of itself absolves any shortcomings along the way, nor do I think it establishes that a favourable outcome could not have been achieved in a more satisfactory way. Haig may have been good, bad or indifferent; the outcome alone cannot establish which.

And in the second instance, a lack of evidence about an alternative commander is a given; it would have required a parallel war with a different commander to provide such evidence. Again, to my mind, the lack of this can’t establish anything about Haig. And in its absence, analysis, conjecture and opinion is not unreasonable. It is a process commonly applied to historical figures and is not usually dismissed as the work of modern-day I-know-betters.

I don’t know whether anyone else could have made any difference. But I do look at the numbers and think if this was a good performance, what would a bad one have looked like. That is an argument that applies to most of the major participants of course.

[John Gilinsky]

The fact that there is discussion and disagreement along with acknowledgements that most posters' views of Haig changed as they grew older only confirms that history changes itself: it is constantly being reinvented by most generations. In short as I have said when I first joined GWF: history is a never ending argument. I sense simply "discussion fatigue" at the mere mention of Haig! So be it. Per Chris's interest in the 100 days: keep in mind that some of the highest casualties of the war came during this slow advance and German retreat rather than the pumelling battles of Passchendale and even the Somme (at least for the Canadians who were in the forefront of the British advance). I also doubt if Currie despite his succeses and his abilities could have done any better than Haig imho of course!

John

Toronto

[armourersergeant]

I have mentioned before on many threads that I too came to WW1 with a Charley's war conceived and media driven idea of the war where the poor Tommy was led by idiots! This change over a period of time and one or two books changed that along the way. I am still in many respects a fence sitter on Haig, it gets mighty uncomfortable, though less hot than having selected a garden to plant my roots.

I see in many respects no relevance to the fact that 'we' and Haig won the war, unless of course and its a big UNLESS, he is going to be blamed for all the casualties and mistakes made. If we are to lump a million casualties on his head then he must also get the kudos for the win.

I am sure that whilst the win is the important factor, ask Brian Ashton that one, there has to be a certain aspect of consideration to how and with the least possible casualties.

I do think though that given that Haig dissolved command in the 100 days and took less 'control' of the fighting and that we still sustained high casualties raises two questions.

1..The ability of the other Army commanders to claim better status over Haig as less butcherous.

2..Would anyone have done a better job as GOC?

But the biggest question/ponderance I have about all this is the constant way we lay any claim of glory or infamy at the feet of individuals. Commanders do and did rely heavily on the men around them and those staff officers of varying qualities had effects on the way battles were conducted and the advice they laid before their commanders. Having studied General Snow, I have noticed how he seems to have preformed better dependent on the chief staff officer he had. (note I said better not well)

Is there any reason to think that Plummer was blessed with Harrington?

Did Haig improve for the better in 1918, he certainly changed his style, when he had Lawrence as his COS?

Poor or incorrect advice leaves a commander with little help in formulating a plan. That does not of course absolve him from choosing to ignore their advice or those of his lower commanders and selecting a poor alternative, as did on occasions.

But where he listens to those around and below him and accepts the advice of those, even if he is against the plan (Haig did this on the Bazentin attacks on 14th July 1916) then we should at least acknowledge that he did accept advice from those around him. I wonder if the attacks had not worked during the 14th July, if it would have been Haig who was lambasted again by history, or if Rawlinson and those staff that advocated it would have accepted the blame? I think we can all guess the answer to that one.

Too much has been written of Haig for anyone to get an objective view of the man. With every new book it just fuels the fire for both sides. With the armies of revisionists and Bunglers once more lining up to fight over the bones of the Field Marshall. We need to look elsewhere for answers, IMO.

That of course will not stop me entering the debate frequently though given the venom in recent threads about Haig, even my tough skinned bottom kept out of those blood baths that on occasions did some participants on both sides of the argument no honour!

regards

Arm

[George Armstrong Custer]

. But I do look at the numbers and think if this was a good performance, what would a bad one have looked like. That is an argument that applies to most of the major participants of course.

Indeed. But we never see that proposition hammered home ad nauseum in quite the same dogged way in the case of other commanders, do we? It's been remarked by several contributors here that going to war entails casualties. Stating the obvious, one might think. As is the fact that the unique circumstances of the Great War meant that its casualty figures - for all combatants - were appallingly high. The German high command, for instance, deliberately instituted a policy of attrition at Verdun to bleed the French dry, and the commanders of both sides committed huge numbers of troops to the struggle as the casualties on both sides rose. This was the nature of the Great War on the Western Front for a large part of that conflict. Yet I'm not aware of a German equivalent of 'British Butchers and Bunglers' or 'Oh What A Lovely War!' Only the unique blend of British class warfare, coupled with the anti-war, anti-authoritarian zeitgeist of the 1950's and '60's in Britain created the circumstances which led to the 'Donkeys' view punching above its weight in terms of changing the British general public's perception of the Great War over the past four or five decades.

ciao,

GAC

[Alan Tucker]

It would be more accurate to call AJP Taylor a socialist historian rather than a Marxist one and even that is stretching things a little. Together with many Labour supporters of the period he wanted closer ties with Soviet Russia but he was fiercely critical of Stalinism many years earlier than the British Marxist historians with which you compare his.

I can think of no aspects of his philosophy of history which coincide with any element of Marxist historiography. There is no evidence that he believed in dialectical materialism, class struggle or economic determinism; all of which may be found in the writings of the British Marxist historians, Hobsbawm, Thompson and Hill. On the contrary his work on German history was based on the Germanophobic view that Nazism was the inevitable culmination of German social and cultural tradition - hardly a Marxist position.

It would be more accurate to see Taylor as an individualist, tilting at orthodoxies (as he saw them). I'm not a fan of his work, much of which seems to me to be controversially populist for the sake of it. It's said that he wished to popularise history amongst the general public but its always seemed to me he was more keen on popularising Alan Taylor than anything else.

Mike you have neatly put into words what I wanted say in responding to Custer's response to my original point. I have nearly all of A.J.P.Taylor's books on my shelves. None conform to the Marxist interpretation of history. Taylor was on the left but was too good an historian to let any dogma get in the way of his serious historical writing. I would also go so far to say that this also applies to Eric Hobsbawn's historical output.

[squirrel]

Superb thread and thoroughly enjoyed reading it - have to say that I am tending to agree with post one though. And nobody seems to have mentioned (apologies if I've missed it) his experience and achievement prior to WW1 and what shaped the man.

[Steven Broomfield]

I'm always interested to compare Haig with Montgomery. I've always believed that Monty, having seen the carnage caused in the Great War, determined to ensure 'his' troops suffered far less. Yet I believe losses of British and Canadian troops in Normandy was as bad as, if not worse than, many offensives in the GW. (I stress I have no evidence to hand to back this up - I am at work and cannot reference anything).

So, if I am right, does that make Monty a 'butcher', or merely another general doing his best?

Incidentally, my old dad acted as Monty's driver in Cairo in '42 and detested the man

[armourersergeant]

Sqirrel,

I mentioned in another thread that a good book to read is 'Douglas Haig: 'The Preparatory Prologue' 1861-1914

by Scott Douglas' This does show, through Haig's own words how he advanced and changed as a man and a soldier. We our all creations of are past.

regards

Arm

[armourersergeant]

I'm always interested to compare Haig with Montgomery. I've always believed that Monty, having seen the carnage caused in the Great War, determined to ensure 'his' troops suffered far less. Yet I believe losses of British and Canadian troops in Normandy was as bad as, if not worse than, many offensives in the GW. (I stress I have no evidence to hand to back this up - I am at work and cannot reference anything).

So, if I am right, does that make Monty a 'butcher', or merely another general doing his best?

If there is one thing that Monty learnt then it has to be that of being seen by the troops, or atleast getting the impression that he was always amongst the troops. This is one thing that Monty felt Haig did not do. However Haig was not blessed with the media that Monty had, nor the hindsight with which to see how this one thing would have changed some perceptions, if not then, by many today.

I too seem to recall that the casualties in Normandy were on a comparable level with WW1, though I too have no evidence to back this up. lets hope someone comes along who can.

Monty liked to say and I guess did in many of his battles that he would not use mens lives for nothing. Though at Arnheim he ignored intelligence and over estimated the moral status of his enemy, thinking only of either glory or finishing the war quickly.....sound familiar.

regards

Arm

[stevem49]

A number of years ago as part of a WW1 study, I was given the opportunity to refight the first day of the Somme.

The computer program allowed me to do just about anything. Although I could only use the armaments of the day.

Easy - Thought I. Knowing all the 'mistakes' that were made and being able to use modern techniques etc.

I set out my troops and sat back smugly.

At the end of the First day I had managed to lose nearly 50,000 men wounded and killed. I had though moved the line at least 100 yards further forward than in 1916.

The computer printout concluded that with the terrain, volunteer soldiers and the weaponry available, it would have been better to have done nothing. Of course with Politicians and Allies breathing down your neck, you do not have that luxury

sm

[PhilB]

The following quote is one which has hung around Haig`s neck for a long time:-

‘The machine gun is a much overrated weapon; two per battalion is more than sufficient.’

— General Douglas Haig, 1915

It`s easy to make a link between a bad prediction and low intellect. However, I came across the following:-

‘I have not the smallest molecule of faith in aerial navigation other than ballooning.’

— Lord Kelvin, President of Royal Society, 1890

‘X-Rays will prove to be a hoax.’

— Lord Kelvin, President of Royal Society, 1895

‘Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible.’

— Lord Kelvin, President of Royal Society, 1896

‘Radio has no future.’

— Lord Kelvin, President of Royal Society, 1898

As Kelvin was one of the cleverest men in history, these rather changed my attitude. However, I`m still left with something that rankles. Lloyd George`s assessment *Brilliant to the top of his riding boots". I can`t believe that LlG got it totally wrong but did Haig really lack brilliance (ie was he not smart?) or was LlG perhaps referring to some kind of flashy debating brilliance that DH may not have had but which wasn`t necessary for him to have anyway?

[squirrel]

Does anyone have the entire passage that the remark made by Haig in 1915 about 2 machine guns per battalion being sufficient is from so that we can see the quote in context?

[George Armstrong Custer]

Does anyone have the entire passage that the remark made by Haig in 1915 about 2 machine guns per battalion being sufficient is from so that we can see the quote in context?

I'm afraid no-one will be able to quote that remark in the context of anything said by Haig, Squirrel, and for the most basic of reasons: he never said it. The myth that Haig made that remark has been traced back to an assertion by Liddell Hart who provided no source for it. Haig's most recent biographer, Gary Meade, has demonstrated, however, that Liddell Hart's source was almost certainly the memoirs of Brigadier General C.D. Baker Carr, who had formed the first machinegun school in France in late 1914. Baker Carr wrote of an unnamed Army Commander who gave the opinion which Liddell Hart - without citation - chose to put in the mouth of Haig. Coming from such an (undeservedly) 'respected' authority as Liddell Hart, the culumny has stuck and been repeated ever since. In order to nail it - at least as far as this forum is concerned - I think it's worth quoting Mead's endnote on the subject extensively. I will then move on to quote some verifiable facts regarding Haig and his true attitude to machineguns - which make it impossible that he could ever have uttered the remark in 1915 which Liddell Hart, without foundation, attributed to him in 1930.

There is an entrenched myth that Haig was a congenital opponent of the

machine-gun. It is - along with some other myths about Haig - deeply unfair.

Its origination can be traced to the military historian and mischief-maker

Basil Liddell Hart, whose early admiration of Haig expired in the 1930's, when

it became fashionable to disparage the reputation of Britain's (long-dead)

gener¬als. Liddell Hart wrote in 1930 (The Real War, Faber & Faber, page 143)

that Haig 'declared that it [the machine-gun] was "a much overrated weapon" and

that this scale [two per battalion] "was more than sufficient".' Liddell Hart

irri-tatingly did not provide a source for this allegation. John Terraine

(History Today, August and November 1958) suggested the source was James

Edmonds, and that Edmonds's original source was Brigadier-General C. D.

Baker-Carr, who formed the first Machine-Gun School in France in late 1914.

Baker-Carr had a grudge against Haig, who, he alleged, twice refused to give

him command of the newly formed Tank Corps (Haig promoted another Old

Cliftonian, Hugh Elles, to the role), on the grounds that Baker-Carr was not a

Staff College graduate and was not a regular soldier (From Chauffeur to

Brigadier. Brigadier-General C. D. Baker-Carr [Ernest Benn, 1930] page 202).

Baker-Carr in his memoir does not attribute the anti-machine-gun comment to any

named individual, although he criticized Haig on other grounds. In early 1915

Baker-Carr 'tentatively' put forward the proposal to GHQ that battalions should

have four machine-guns, doubling the original number, and 'had been promptly

told to mind my own business' (page 85). Baker-Carr then added: 'In the front

line my suggestion was received with enthusiastic acclama¬tion, but, as I

progressed in a westerly direction towards St Omer French's GHQ, the enthusiasm

gradually wilted until, at last, at GHQ, it expired completely and was replaced

by a cold hostility' (page 86). Baker-Carr then wrote a memo on why he wanted

to double the number of machine-guns per battalion and sent this to GHQ. The

memo was eventually returned to him with the comments of army and corps

commanders: 'Not a single individual had had the courage openly to support our

suggestion, not even those who had privately given it their cordial

approbation; many had "hedged" badly; others were frankly hostile. One Army

Commander gave his opinion that "the machine-gun was a much over-rated weapon

and two per battalion were more than sufficient."

source: Gary Meade, The Good Soldier, p. 438.

There we have it - Baker Carr's 'one Army Commander gave his opinion....' became - for his own purposes - Liddell Hart's 'Haig gave his opinion....' So, having laid that one to rest, what were Haig's thoughts regarding the machinegun? Some may be surprised to find that they were very positive - and, moreover, had been so for many years prior to the outbreak of the Great War, starting with Haig having himself completed a machinegun course at Enfield as early as the beginning of 1898. Here's a few examples, with sources:

1/ "On Wednesday 19 January [1898] Haig travelled to Enfield, where he was instructed in the use of the Maxim automatic machinegun. ........Haig did not record his first impression of the Maxim gun, but it is absurd to imagine that such an enthusiastic professional army officer would fail to be persuaded of the potential battlefield usefulness of a robust, relatively lightweight single-barelled machinegun which could fire more than 600 rounds a minute." Meade, Ibid. p. 84.

2/ Evidence that Haig had indeed taken on board the possibilities of the machinegun was not long in coming. Three months later in the Sudan in March 1898, following the ambush of a Cavalry Brigade reconnaisance by Dervishes, Haig included the following in his report: "The Horse Artillery against enemy of this sort is no use. We felt the want of machineguns when working alongside of scrub for searching some of the tracks." source: Reid, Architect of Victory, p. 82. Reid goes on to emphasise that this aspect of Haig's report is interesting "in light of the frequently expressed view that Haig did not understand the importance of the machinegun: indeed, just before going to the Sudan, he had visited Enfield to study the Maxim gun, on which he frequently commented favourably during his time in the Sudan." source: Ibid.

3/ Haig is often castigated for his - undeniable - affection for the cavalry arm which, it is asserted, was at the expense of neglecting new arms such as the machinegun. However, a report written by him in 1912 expressly points out the need for the cavalry to embrace the machinegun in a combined role of cavalry/mounted infantry: For example, in his Review of the Work done during the Training Season 1912, Haig sensibly requested that more senior cavalry officers attend the musketry training course at Hythe, to learn 'the practical application of rifle fire to suit various tactical conditions.' He also exhorted that the cavalry should learn how to use machineguns more effectively: 'More attention should be paid to the handling of cavalry machineguns when brigaded. Their drill and manoeuvre should, before departure to practice camp, attain a high standard of efficiency.' source: Meade, op. cit. p. 172.

4/ Following First Ypres, 'Haig took away the lesson that in future there was a need for massed machinegun batteries and much more high explosive [expressed in a letter to Sir Evelyn Wood of 6 November 1914, and quoted in Wood, Winnowed Memories.'] source: Reid, op. cit. pp. 198 & 520.

5/ Machineguns were evidently much on his mind, for on the same day, 6 November 1914, Haig wrote to his nephew Oliver: "You must not fret because you are not out here. There will be a great want of troops, and numbers are wanted. So I expect you will all soon be in the field. Meantime train your machineguns. It will repay you." source: Meade, op. cit. p. 439.

6/ At a meeting with the Assistant to the Minister of Munitions (Lloyd George) on 25 June 1915, Haig stressed the new types of armament the war was showing to be necessary, including: "A lighter machinegun, with tripod and gun in one part, is a necessity. Mobility is most important." source: Reid, op. cit. p. 234.

7/ 'Equally false is the idea that Haig did not understand or appreciate the values of the machinegun. As Director of Staff Duties, he had argued for more of them in the Expeditionary Force, and now [1916] he not only pressed for the destruction of enemy machineguns by artillery fire but also tried to stimulate the use of machineguns in the ofensive. "I think units have hardly begun to realise yet the great addition which they have recently received to their fire power by the provision of Lewis machineguns and machinegun batteries." At one of the army commanders' meetings in the middle of March he returned to the subject: "After considering the situation in the front of each army in turn, we discussed the use of Lewis machineguns in an advance. A few of these guns can develop as great a volume of fire as a considerable number of infantry. They are far less vulnerable and can find cover more easily. I emphasised the necessity for Company and Platoon Commanders being trained in the use of these guns in tactical situations. At present only a comparatively few officers of infantry realise the great addition of fire power given them by the formation of machinegun companies and Lewis gun detachments." source: Ibid. pp. 292-3.

8/ In early August 1917 Haig sent a memorandum requiring Corps and Divisional comanders to be sure that the tactics which had evolved at the machinegun schools were being applied. Indeed, within a few days he was at the main machinegun school, studying a demonstration of these new tactics.' source: Ibid. p. 379.

Liddell Hart's attempt to pin on Haig the remark of an unnamed army commander in 1915 which was quoted by Baker Carr in his memoirs is not just demonstrably false but, given Haig's long established positive interest in the possibilities of the machinegun dating from the 1890's, downright laughable. Yet as a post on this thread has shown, it is one of the myths perpetrated after Haig's death which continues to be repeated as 'fact' to this day.

ciao,

GAC

[Alan Tucker]

Liddell Hart's attempt to pin on Haig the remark of an unnamed army commander in 1915 which was quoted by Baker Carr in his memoirs is not just demonstrably false but, given Haig's long established positive interest in the possibilities of the machinegun dating from the 1890's, downright laughable. Yet as a post on this thread has shown, it is one of the myths perpetrated after Haig's death which continues to be repeated as 'fact' to this day.

ciao,

GAC

Excellent post this because it refers to judgements based upon EVIDENCE. The problem with the Arnie approach is that assertion is deemed good enough

[PhilB]

It is quite possible that Baker-Carr told Liddell Hart which Army Commander it was?

[George Armstrong Custer]

It is quite possible that Baker-Carr told Liddell Hart which Army Commander it was?

That's always possible - but unless you have documentation to support it, just a supposition. And if your suggestion was correct, why didn't Liddell Hart cite his source im order to lend the quote credibility? After all, Haig was over two years dead by then.

More importantly, though, how likely to you think the possibility is that Haig could have uttered such a remark in 1915 given what he had written about the advantages of machineguns since 1898 - and in particular in the context of the Great War, his two letters quoted from 6 November 1914?

ciao,

GAC

[armourersergeant]

GAC,

Good to see all those bits together, they make a creditable reference pool. I seem to recall seeing something of similar elk in 'The Preparatory Prologue'.

regards

Arm

[PhilB]

That's always possible - but unless you have documentation to support it, just a supposition.

ciao,

GAC

Well, if it was divulged in a private conversation, L-H may not have felt that the source was one he could quote. Quite possible, but, as you say, just a supposition. I would add, though, that item #1 in the list of Haig`s pro-MG quotes, is also supposition - Meade`s?

[George Armstrong Custer]

Well, if it was divulged in a private conversation, L-H may not have felt that the source was one he could quote. Quite possible, but, as you say, just a supposition. I would add, though, that item #1 in the list of Haig`s pro-MG quotes, is also supposition - Meade`s?

I'd have to say 'quite possible' puts too strong a spin on it in my view - and there remains the question posed in my last post: Given what he was writing about the machinegun from 1898 on, and in particular in November 1914, how likely is it that Haig was the commander referenced by Baker Carr as making the remark dismissing machineguns in 1915 do you think?

As to point #1 - yes, Meade extrapolates from Haig's completion of the Maxim course at Enfield that Haig was unlikely to have failed to be impressed by its 'potential battlefield usefulness' - but given what Haig went on to write about machineguns after attending Enfield in points # 2,3,4,5,6,7,8, Meade's conclusion is hardly 'supposition' but is based on solid primary evidence.

ciao,

GAC