The Road to a Revisionist Damascus

[1st east yorks]

Chris,

Thanks for your PM.My returned PM should be in your inbox.

Thanks,

Anthony.

[Pete1052]

From The Times

August 7, 2008

The Butcher of the Somme has been greatly underestimated

His reputation of a bungler takes no account of his part in the great Hundred Days Offensive and ultimate victory in the Great War

Dwin Bramall

Even today, the names of a Flanders village, Passchendaele, and a French river, the Somme, summon up in most minds the terrible waste of war, not just of precious lives but of national aspirations, resources and, above all, talent. The war poets such as Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon brought home the horrors of the Western Front, while R.C.Sherriff's play Journey's End and the satirical film Oh! What a Lovely War gave the public an almost indelible perception of futile frontal infantry attacks and of generals who were “butchers or bunglers”.

Yet in the so-called Hundred Days Offensive of 1918, which began 90 years ago tomorrow, and which ultimately brought the Great War to an end, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), including many fine divisions from the Dominions, won, under Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the greatest succession of victories in the history of the British Army. During those 100 days, they engaged 99 German divisions and by the Armistice in November had taken 188,700 prisoners, captured 2,840 artillery pieces and defeated the Imperial German Army. This was no mean achievement.

This performance cannot, of course, be seen in isolation. The Germans had prepared the ground for their defeat, in that in his final offensive of March 1918, intended to drive Britain out of the war before the Americans could arrive in sufficient strength to tip the manpower balance, Ludendorff, commander of the German forces in the West, had exhausted the German Army's resources, leaving it vulnerable to counter-attacks over country more conducive to manoeuvre and exploitation. On the allied side, the Americans, Belgians, Portuguese and of course the French Army, nursed back to discipline and full effectiveness by the humanity and leadership of General or Marshal Pétain, all made key contributions.

There was also the part played by Foch, named, at Haig's insistence at the crisis meeting at Doullens in March, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies in France. It was he who, with Haig, shaped the winning strategy of attacks at different points along the whole front, from the Argonne Forest in the south to Ypres in the north, to be followed by the coup de grâce on September 29, when the BEF, supported by the American First Army, stormed the Hindenburg Line. In the following week, the German High Command could only advise the Kaiser to seek an armistice.

Here it is important to dismiss the myth of the German Army being “stabbed in the back” by failure of its manufacturing base and supply organisation. In March and April 1918 irreparable damage had been inflicted on it by first the blunting and then the halting of Ludendorff's offensive in Picardy and Flanders. The British 5th Army, although retreating, managed to maintain a generally unbroken front, so denying the enemy opportunity to divide the BEF from the French in an advance to the coast.

Moreover, much of the German Army was still fighting in that autumn with all the tactical skill and tenacity that characterised the German soldier in both world wars. But by November 1918 there was no doubt that the enemy was being defeated in the field. As Haig put it, they were capable neither of accepting nor refusing battle.

Victory was a product of a steep learning curve under Haig, from December 1916, that raised his British and Dominion divisions to the tactical and technical cutting edge of the Allied armies on the Western Front. It could be seen in the reorganisation of infantry platoons and in small unit tactics, using new infantry weapons; in the greater use of wireless, motor machinegun units, armoured cars and of aircraft in the ground-attack role - disrupting enemy troop concentrations and movement. In particular, tanks were used tactically in co-operation with the infantry, as well as in mass for the initial shock action. “Silent registration” by the artillery, obviating the need for compromising preliminary bombardments and new fire control techniques, now allowed creeping barrages of great weight to lead the advance on to the very edge of its objectives.

Even the maligned staff officers made a vital contribution. Sustaining an army of nearly two million men in the field was a colossal commitment, not least in the final weeks of the war when Haig's divisions were almost constantly on the move.

Even if Haig and his army commanders may never escape criticism for their mistakes and the horrendous casualties of 1916 and 1917, they do deserve credit, which they have never properly received, for the successes they achieved in 1918. Haig himself, having displayed the character and fortitude needed to bear the burden of C-in-C over three hard-fought years, had been proved right in his unswerving conviction that the war could be won only on the Western Front. Some outstanding corps and divisional commanders also merit special recognition - John Monash and Arthur Currie, commanding the Australian and Canadian Corps, and Andrew Russell commanding the New Zealand Division, for example.

Essentially, however, the Allied victory was won by the courage of the soldiers from Britain, France, Belgium, Australia, Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa and the United States. The greatest disservice we can do to their memory, 90 years on, is to allow their final victory to be submerged by recriminations; to forget that in 1918 they achieved what they had been fighting for; and to fail to acknowledge the part that not only their endurance but also the foresight and perseverance of Haig and his senior commanders had played in that victory.

Field Marshal Lord Bramall was Chief of the General Staff 1979-82 and Chief of the Defence Staff 1982-85

[geraint]

When you said the thread was the one you most disagreed with ever I was interested to learn why. As to the post in question - no arguments with you there!

I need to clarify this. Haig - "a tin god with feet of clay" (my original last words on the post referred to above).

First, my family commitments in the Great War are vast. On my father's side (born 1920) three of his uncles killed, another five survived, one MiD. Two of his aunts were VAD nurses. At least two maiden aunts were attached to young lads who were killed and they never married. On my mother's side - a very similar story. Family history has never really taken Haig on as a 'hero'. The British Legion played a big part in the survivors' lives, but they never took to the Haig poppy, preferring the rosmary on Rememberance Day. Lloyd George, however, was revered by them, well after his death. So; I spoke to them as a family member, and later as a historian, and as far as I can make out, their thoughts fell into a situation whereas the general feeling of the country held Haig in esteem, but their own personal feelings were completely different, and blamed his strategies for the deaths of that generation. I am on their side of the fence, and my own personal studies into 1917 regarding Haig's attributes (see past threads) cristalises this. It's very derogative for a person who disagrees vehemently, to ask for precise evidence in witness of a statement made, to vindicate or to prejudice that fact or opinion. I give you family testament.

Please don't quote from Haig's Diaries or Memoires as a vindication on his behalf, nor from any other Government (including Lloyd George) or high echelon military persons as justification. They should be read for what they are - period documents airbrushed into their concept of the truth.

My last conversations with sons of three individual veterans took place this month, and I asked specifically for their understanding of Haig, as spoken by their fathers and uncles. The replies concurred with my family replies. Not rocket science; but enough to make me carry the flag!

[salesie]

So; I spoke to them as a family member, and later as a historian, and as far as I can make out, their thoughts fell into a situation whereas the general feeling of the country held Haig in esteem, but their own personal feelings were completely different, and blamed his strategies for the deaths of that generation. I am on their side of the fence, and my own personal studies into 1917 regarding Haig's attributes (see past threads) cristalises this.

I'm no historian, nor an out-and-out supporter of Haig, but even I can see that the German Army may just have had something to do with the deaths in that generation - did your family believe that if Haig (or someone else) had adopted different strategies then the Germans would not have fought back?

Cheers-salesie.

[andiS]

I'm committing the cardinal sin here of not having read all the replies in detail, so pardon me if this book has been mentioned and I missed it - I recently read 'The Great War: Myth and Memory' by Dan Todman in which he explores not so much the history of the great war but the historiography of the great war - and includes naturally a fair bit about Haig and the way he has been viewed over the years.

Similarly to a lot of other people, I was bought up on the mud, blood and futility view of WW1, but the more I study it the less convinced I become of this view - and I speak as somebody who came into WW1 studies via research on my grandfather who died at 2nd Ypres so I started as so many do with a death! I also think it's too easy to focus on Haig as CinC and miss the big picture of the war. I was chatting about this to our head of history and her personally reckons that the Russian front in the second war, or indeed parts of the Russian revolution, would have been every bit (if not more) ghastly.

One thing I do however find, is that any conversation which includes an attempt to suggest that the mud, blood and futility school of WW1 viewing may be flawed is unlikely to be a productive one: the idea is both too entrenched and too seductively attractive to a large number of people. Thousands of young men sent off to die in a 4 year mud-filled blood-bath at the hands of a few incompetent leaders is a nice, simple way to view a complex piece of history.

[truthergw]

Please don't quote from Haig's Diaries or Memoires as a vindication on his behalf, nor from any other Government (including Lloyd George) or high echelon military persons as justification. They should be read for what they are - period documents airbrushed into their concept of the truth.

That brings me to a grinding halt. No historical document regardless of its origin will change your mind. Do you seriously suggest that the son or grandson of a former soldier has some unique insight into the Great War and how it was fought ? That he is in possession of the real truth and all else has been twisted to fit some secret purpose?

[Desdichado]

From what I've read and heard, I have concluded that Haig was by far the best man for the job. He cared about the men he commanded and after the war, he did much to improve the lot of the returning soldier, especially the maimed. A similar case can be made for Sir Arthur Harris in WWII. Despite the horrendous casualties sustained by Bomber Command, the crews were proud to serve under "Butch" as he was known.

Everything I have read about Haig was written by British historians. Has any Frenchman or German commented on Haig's abilities? How was he viewed by the German General Staff? By the French?

[truthergw]

................

Everything I have read about Haig was written by British historians. Has any Frenchman or German commented on Haig's abilities? How was he viewed by the German General Staff? By the French?

That got me thinking. I read a bit of French but had never thought about that. I popped over to Amazon France and found that mainly they offered books in English or a few translations. That is very far from a comprehensive inquiry but I cannot recall seeing a biography of Haig in French or German when trawling through Amazon or the respective ABE branches. I know that one of the French staff officers who clashed with Sir John French was scathing in his estimation of British leaders but, a) I do not recall his name offhand and b ) do not know if that extended to Haig. In the two or three biographies of Foch I have read, he seems to have always thought highly of Haig. Hard for the French to be particularly critical of the English or their leaders. The German OH's seem to quote great hunks of our OH. We need some of our German and French pals here. It may well deserve its own thread.

[Desdichado]

I know that one of the French staff officers who clashed with Sir John French was scathing in his estimation of British leaders but, a) I do not recall his name offhand and b ) do not know if that extended to Haig. In the two or three biographies of Foch I have read, he seems to have always thought highly of Haig. Hard for the French to be particularly critical of the English or their leaders. The German OH's seem to quote great hunks of our OH. We need some of our German and French pals here. It may well deserve its own thread.

Wasn't Joffre less than complimentary about the British General Staff?

[George Armstrong Custer]

Everything I have read about Haig was written by British historians. Has any Frenchman or German commented on Haig's abilities? How was he viewed by the German General Staff? By the French?

Haig's Despatches were published simultaneously in Britain, the US and France in November 1919. For the French edition an Introduction was written by Marshal Foch, and this was also included in English translation, and as an appendix in the original French, in the British and US editions. Foch uses his Introduction to note the absence of any self-aggrandizement in Haig's Despatches from 1915-1919 - Foch writes: "All mention of the hand which guided the instrument is omitted. We may be allowed to make good this deficiency, in which the all-important part played by the British Higher Command is lost to sight." Foch then uses his 5-page Introduction to sing the praises of Haig's command - "At every stage, both Higher Command and Staffs proved more than equal to their tasks. Thanks to the activity they were to display after the German attacks in the spring of 1918, and in spite of the losses suffered, more than 60 British divisions, ten times the number in 1914, were to be kept in fighting order until the end of the year; and their moral was to be better than ever." [........] "Thus it was that, thanks in particular to the activities of the British Higher Command and to their grasp of the needs of the situation, more than 200 German divisions were stopped short in their offensive by a smaller number of Allied divisions, and our defensive proved to be victorious. The same must be said for the support lent by the British troops to other armies during our actual offensive." [............] "Never at any time in history has the British Army achieved greater results in attack than in this unbroken offensive lasting 116 days, from the 18th of July to the 11th of November. The victory gained was indeed complete, thanks to the excellence of the Commanders of Armies, Corps and Divisions, thanks above all to the unselfishness, to the wise, loyal and energetic policy of their Commander-in-Chief, who made easy a great combination, and sanctioned a prolonged and gigantic effort. Was it not the insight of an experienced and enlightened Commander which led him to intervene as he did, with his own Government on the 24th of March, 1918, and with the Allied Governments assembled at Doullens on the 26th, to the end that the French and British Armies might at once be placed under a single command, even though his personal position would thereby suffer? In the events that followed, did he not prove that he was above all anxious to anticipate and move in perfect harmony with the general Allied plan, framed by the new Supreme Command? On this point the Despatches contain gaps which prevent the reader from grasping all the reasons for our victory; truth compelled me to complete their account."

Post-war Germany too provided assessments of Haig from sources as well qualified to judge as Foch had been for the French. In his Preface to the British Official History, 'Military Operations France and Belgium, Vol. II 1917', Sir James Edmonds quotes in English translation from 'Heerfuhrer des Weltkrieges' (Great Commanders of the World War). This was produced by the Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Weltpolitik und Wehrwissenschaften, the equivalent of the British Royal United Services Institution. The German conclusion was that Haig qualified under the criteria of Clauswitz as a Great Commander and 'Master of the Field'. Introducing the quote, Edmonds notes that "The following truly represents German military opinion:"

"The circumstance that Haig never could act really independently but always had to make his decisions subject to conditions imposed on him, is no reason to deny him the position of a commander-in-chief. Dependence on others was often the fate of great commanders. What is more important is whether his actions were conducted with strategic ability, firm will, strength of character, acceptance of responsibility and political insight. Haig possessed all these qualities and used them in 'harmonious combination' as Clausewitz requires of a great commander. By means of these powers he saved France in 1916 and 1917, and pre-eminently on that historic day, the 26th March 1918. Finally: if the ultimate victory over the Central Powers was not accomplished on the battlefield, but was gained on quiote another plane, yet in the last three years of the war Haig contributed the most to prevent a German victory. Thus he really remained "master of the field".

It's worth noting here that the late John Laffin's lamentable 'British Butcher's and Bunglers of World War One' tried to rubbish General Sir John 'Tavish' Davidson's use of the term 'Master of the Field' for the title of his 1952 book on Haig in 1917. Laffin wrote: "For the title of his book Davidson chose Haig - Master of the Field. This was a comment by Ludendorff that at the end of the war Haig 'and he alone, stood master of the field.' Ever since then Haig's supporters have assumed, or pretended, that this is an unqualified compliment. But Ludendorff did not mean that Haig had won the field by strategic and tactical brilliance and sheer leadership." So, we might ask, what did Ludendorff mean? According to Laffin: "He meant that of all the senior commanders who were in place early in the war only Haig remained at the end." This simplistic reduction of Ludendorff's meaning woud be laughable if Laffin (Laffing?) weren't passing himself off as a serious military historian (and being taken for one by many of his readers). I'll make two points on this. Firstly, Ludendorff's meaning in calling Haig the 'Master of the Field' is clearly the same as that which was expanded upon by the Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Weltpolitik und Wehrwissenschaften volume on the Great Commanders of the war - ie 'Master of the Field' is an accolade for a great commander. Secondly, Laffin seems utterly unaware of the fact that Tavish Davidson explicitly states that the title of his book - 'Haig - Master of the Field' - is drawn from German military opinion as expressed in the Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Weltpolitik und Wehrwissenschaften 'Great Commanders of the World War' volume. Indeed, Davidson goes so far as to reprint in its entirety as an appendix the Edmonds' Preface to the Official History which references the Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Weltpolitik und Wehrwissenschaften book's quote as representing informed German post-war military opinion on Haig as a Great Commander.

ciao,

GAC

[Terry_Reeves]

From a moderators point of view, this thread is being conducted in a exemplary fashion - well done to all participants.

TR

[truthergw]

Wasn't Joffre less than complimentary about the British General Staff?

The only book by Joffre that I have read was of Charleroi and the Marne which predated Haig becoming CiC. There was an uneasy relationship between the two staffs as there was between individual officers on each of the staffs. Nothing like the daggers drawn setup in the German army of course. Joffre was very complimentary to Haig in his farewell letter after he got punted for Nivelle. I doubt if two great armies could fight side by side under their own commanders without each thinking that the other was a right load of plonkers.

[PhilB]

As a brief sideline, are there any egregious examples of WW1 commanders being highly critical of allied commanders?

[truthergw]

Professional courtesy would militate against that Phil. I dare say they had their opinions but they would be reserved for the dining table. The only open and repeated criticism that springs to mind is that by Lloyd-George who criticised the British Army on more than one occasion and openly canvassed for criticism of Haig from Nivelle at the notorious Calais Conference

[geraint]

Not being flipant, but of course I know that the German army had something to do with their deaths. I'm presuming that the topic is about Haig's strategic overview of the war, not the daily bang bang that physically killed men!

Staying on that strategic level, Haig came from a ninteenth century cavalry background, with minor Empire wars as his metier. Pitted against a twentieth century colossus of a German Army was something that he failed to do in 1916 and 1917. Though - and I readily admit, by 1918 British strategy had managed to hold it's own and win against Germany. Its those two years of waste that ires me, and Haig's failure to immediately remedy those failures; and worse, to continue utilising those strategies again in 1917 despite the losses (and lessons) of 1916.

The opinions of those who served, and their immediate family do concern me. They are verbal evidence of an intensity of feelings simmering amongst the communities of 1916-8 as to the conduct of war.

[truthergw]

Geraint, there is so much I could say but will not. What I will recommend,is a book by a veteran of the war. he served from 1914 when he was commissioned as a subaltern and ended the war as a Captain. No top brass this, his war was in the trenches. He served again in WW2 and wrote his book in the 60's. The author was Charles Carrington and the title is " Soldier from the War Returning". About the sanest and most balanced account of the War as one man saw it, as I can think of. Incidentally, the war left my grannies as widows. I need no coaching in the Haig was a butcher chorus. I was brought up on it.

[geraint]

Tom

Thanks for your referrence to Carrington. I shall re-read it. I'm not a straightforward Haig basher. As with you, I grew up with the Oh What a Lovely War, lions and donkeys scenario, but having been intensly interested in the Great War for forty years, considerably well-read on the subject, and with inmmediate family involvement; you will understand that perceptions are created and that all tangiable evidence reinforces' one's views. The beauty of this forum is that likeminded individuals can discuss such ethereal points; mull and synthesise their views.

My problem with Haig is 1917 - specifically Third Ypres - which was a repeat of the Somme 1916. Lessons were not learned, strategy was not revised. That to me makes him culpable of unnecessary losses.

Regards

Geraint

[salesie]

Not being flipant, but of course I know that the German army had something to do with their deaths. I'm presuming that the topic is about Haig's strategic overview of the war, not the daily bang bang that physically killed men!

Staying on that strategic level, Haig came from a ninteenth century cavalry background, with minor Empire wars as his metier. Pitted against a twentieth century colossus of a German Army was something that he failed to do in 1916 and 1917. Though - and I readily admit, by 1918 British strategy had managed to hold it's own and win against Germany. Its those two years of waste that ires me, and Haig's failure to immediately remedy those failures; and worse, to continue utilising those strategies again in 1917 despite the losses (and lessons) of 1916.

The opinions of those who served, and their immediate family do concern me. They are verbal evidence of an intensity of feelings simmering amongst the communities of 1916-8 as to the conduct of war.

I'm sorry, Geraint, but I have to say that leaving out thoughts of the German Army when considering any strategic overview of WW1 is akin to leaving out any mention of the iceberg when discussing the loss of the Titanic i.e. anyone listening to the tale of the White Star line's loss would quite reasonably ask why did it sink then? Do you think that the Germans had no strategic overview of their own, and that it didn't run counter to any allied strategy? Indeed, the German Army is more vital to the tale of WW1 than the iceberg is to the Titanic's i.e. the iceberg was inanimate, non-sentient and therefore passive, the German Army was none of those things.

How can you leave out German strategy when considering Haig's - what kind of historical overview is it that ignores one side of the equation?

Cheers-salesie

[squirrel]

Have been reading this thread again with much interest and thanks to all contributors for their lucid, well mannered and informative posts.

While I can understand the reasoning behind everybody's point of view and indeed have my own on Haig, I always come back to the point that faced with the first mass, industrialised war on a scale that most could only have been foreseen in a nightmare, what would anybody have done differently given the locations that the war was fought in, the enemy, our allies and the resources available?

Haig may have been a cavalryman but he would not have achieved the rank he did nor the appopintments he held had he not appreciated the role that the infantry, artillery, engineers, support Corps and RFC would play in a European war.

He also wrote the Infantry and Cavalry training manuals; the latter, with the foreword by Lord Roberts, emphasises the role of cavalry used as mounted infantry.

Nothing that I have seen in print refers to FM French as a "butcher" but the battles fought under his command; Mons, Marne, Aisne, 1st Ypres, 2nd Ypres, Aubers Ridge, Neuve Chapelle, Festubert and Loos had casualty rates in relation to the number of troops involved at least as heavy and in some cases heavier than the Somme or 3rd Ypres.

Given the Army that he took over from French in 1915 and what he was required to do by our allies and the politicians, the lack of artillery and ammunition, the New Armies and the need to train them and the wait for industry to catch up with the vast amounts of everything needed as well as fighting battles at the behest of the French, what more could he have done?

[truthergw]

..............................

My problem with Haig is 1917 - specifically Third Ypres - which was a repeat of the Somme 1916. ...........................

Regards

Geraint

This is completely untrue. Even the most sensational of the Butchers and Bunglers brigade have known better than this. To go from a blanket condemnation of Haig and everything written about him to a single battle out of 3 in that year and to display such a lack of understanding of that battle and the one you compare it with, tells me that we have very little in common on which to base a useful discussion. There is no point in reading widely if nothing you read affects your previous opinion.

[Desdichado]

The only book by Joffre that I have read was of Charleroi and the Marne which predated Haig becoming CiC. There was an uneasy relationship between the two staffs as there was between individual officers on each of the staffs. Nothing like the daggers drawn setup in the German army of course. Joffre was very complimentary to Haig in his farewell letter after he got punted for Nivelle. I doubt if two great armies could fight side by side under their own commanders without each thinking that the other was a right load of plonkers.

I'll try and find the actual quote but I believe Joffre made one or two scathing remarks about Sir John French. I'm in the process of moving house and I don't have access to my books.

[Jonathan Saunders]

My problem with Haig is 1917 - specifically Third Ypres

Im sorry but by specifiying Third Ypres you are forgetting the "missed" opportunity at Arras and the mis-management and neglect at Cambrai.

[ShirlD]

Thank you for a very interesting thread, hard to get my head around all the different arguments - my simple question regarding the compiling and writing of military history is how much of a difference is made when the 70 years is up and official secrets (or some of them) are out in the open?

Does the information usually corroborate official histories and well-respected authors? Did they generally know of classified information, and therefore wrote as close to these as possible?

Cheers

Shirley

[geraint]

Shirley

Your last posting may well open up another Pandora's Box of opinions!

Sticking to this thread Jonathan, I would agree, but am sticking to Third Ypres as a single example of Haig's ineptness.

Tom

We must agree to disagree. I've neither the time nor inclination to dig out old research, notes, book references etc on this one. One day perhaps!

[ShirlD]

Geraint, yes, I see that! Sorry

I will try and get George Carrington's 'Soldier from the war returning' to read next

Cheers

Shirley