Jellicoe or Beatty?

[Jonathan Saunders]

GAC

In reply to your para:

1 - can you substantiate this comment with fact such as when the HSF threatened Britain again in any serious form otherwise I think your point is mute. I think you will also find that most Naval historians now accept that Jellicoe won a great strategic victory at Jutland.

2 - I apologise if i confused you. I assumed you would be fully aware of the circumstances as to how Jellicoe took over Command in 1914. The point I wanted to make was as set out in post 22.

3 - Of course they all had an agenda of sorts. L-G's memoirs have been soundly condemned as a pack of lies. Geddes owed his political career to L-G. One of my earlier posts confirms that L-G lied about Jellicoe. You can draw your own conclusions. Thank God for undergraduates hey.

4 - I believe this book has been roundly slated or certainly that is the impression I have been left with from various conversations. Feel free to post on the book thread if you like.

5 - I didnt realise it was necessary to quote from them but i posted the link for everyone's enjoyment and reading.

Shall we try and continue this in a friendly manner in the spirit of the Forum or not at all.

Regards,

Jon S

[George Armstrong Custer]

Shall we try to continue this in a friendly manner in the spirit of the Forum or not at all?

Dear Jon,

Given that your first post directed at me quoted two words from my own post, followed by the peremptory 'Can you elaborate on what you mean by this,' the above is a bit rich, and smacks of a get-out when things haven't gone quite the way you'd hoped. My responses have had no more of an edge to them than your own to me. But sure, if you want to call a halt then fine - but to suggest that we should do so because I've 'gone against the spirit of the Forum' in my responses to you seems, frankly, pretty bloody precious.

But before we end, I'll respond to your points:

1/ My point never was that the HSF seriously threatened Britain after Jutland. My point was rather the fact hat this was more due to German failure to attempt further strategic initiatives than to any spurious idea that Jellicoe had inflicted a decisive military defeat upon their HSF.

2/ You didn't confuse me, and fear you're being a tad disingenuous. I know what you said originally, and what you said you meant in your later post.

3/ You agree everyone had an agenda, but from this you conclude that we must entirely reject Geddes' and Lloyd George's views, as well dismissing as not worth mentioning LG's unholy alliance with Haig in preference to Jellicoe. The beauty of this, of course, is that you can similarly dismiss critics of Jellicoe from outside of the LG-Haig-Geddes triumvirate on the grounds that they too 'had an agenda'. But what about the 'agenda' of Jellicoe and his acolytes? Thank god for undergraduates, hey indeed............

4/ If the Reid book has been 'roundly slated' it hasn't been on this forum - nor, conveniently, anywhere else we can check - but only from 'impressions from various conversations' you've had.

5/ I didn't say it was 'necessary' to quote from your supporting links, but only suggested that it might have been better for your own argument to have framed and bolstered it with such support - as I did mine with quotes from Reid and Terraine. Feel free to ignore any suggestions from me!

Finally, I don't think I've been offensive to you, but merely presented my responses in as robust a manner as your own. If you're going to pick someone up on a point from a post, you ought to be able to deal with them putting their case in kind, without invoking some imagined breach of the 'spirit of the Forum'! (Is there a printable version of the 'Spirit of the Forum'? )

Ciao,

GAC

[Jonathan Saunders]

Dear Jon,

Given that your first post directed at me quoted two words from my own post, followed by the peremptory 'Can you elaborate on what you mean by this,' the above is a bit rich, and smacks of a get-out when things haven't gone quite the way you'd hoped. My responses have had no more of an edge to them than your own to me. But sure, if you want to call a halt then fine - but to suggest that we should do so because I've 'gone against the spirit of the Forum' in my responses to you seems, frankly, pretty bloody precious.

Finally, I don't think I've been offensive to you, but merely presented my responses in as robust a manner as your own. If you're going to pick someone up on a point from a post, you ought to be able to deal with them putting their case in kind, without invoking some imagined breach of the 'spirit of the Forum'! (Is there a printable version of the 'Spirit of the Forum'? )

Ciao,

GAC

But I still dont think you have answered my original request - what temperamental failings? What evidence is there that Jellicoe acted with stress and timidity, particular during the Battle of Jutland? You quoted Geddes on Jellicoe's character, who I believe had a strong agenda to discredit Jellicoe. As you will be aware Geddes as good as sacked Jellicoe over the issue of convoys but I provided a paper (my post 20) clearly stating that L-G had completely lied over this issue and that Jellicoe had already approved the idea of convoys 5 days prior to the meeting that L-G states HE decided the RN would employ convoys. The author refers to a paper trail that proves this finding. Geddes would have been aware of this yet he still used the convoy issue to sack Jellicoe. Jellicoe's prior acceptance of convoys was also supported by Hankey and Carson who were both in a position to know the truth, the latter releasing a rebuttal in which he said L-G stating Jellicoe was against convoys and that it was forced on Jellicoe by L-G was "the biggest lie ever told". You ignored this and later criticised me for not quoting sources! Just on Jellicoe and his agenda - take out Beatty and a couple of untrustworthy politicians and I think you will find most of his contemporaries will have said that Jellicoe was the epitome of honesty and personal integrity and you need look no further for evidence of this than in how Jellicoe went as far as possible to refuse Command of the Fleet in 1914 because he was appalled how Churchill and Fisher (I think) had treated Callaghan, to get a feeling for the man.

I am sorry if you thought there was an edge to my original request to elaborate on these temperamental failings - there wasnt. I do admit I thought your comment somewhat unjust on a very much maligned Commander and also your earlier comment that Jellicoe "was [not] suited to the position [he] held". I do think "Of course, your dislike of any positive comment about Haig is well documented, so maybe your jibe about Haig 'coveting' C-in-C France is just that" was unnecessary - I think it a valid point when criticising Jellicoe to remember that he was pressed into his position. You then refer to "undergraduate stuff" and "Finally (Sigh)" and I think that is not in the friendly spirit of the Forum, but life is too short so lets forget any perceived edge. I'm quite happy to admit a misunderstanding on my part.

But to conclude, its not a case of looking for a "get-out" or not being able to deal with someone putting their case, but that I still havent, to my mind, seen anything from you that smacks of Jellicoe's temperamental failings or why he was not suited to the position he held. This is not meant facetiously in any way but I thought the paper by Lt-Cdr Chessum, and to which I added the link (my post 24) was pretty fair, should you be inclined to read it.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

I didn't say it was 'necessary' to quote from your supporting links, but only suggested that it might have been better for your own argument to have framed and bolstered it with such support

I searched through several books last night trying to identify references to Jellicoe's "temperamental failings" as I remain unclear what you mean by this. The following quotes may be of interest to you.

I will provide full source details in order you may check I am not quoting out of context. My further emphasis or comments in italics.

p674/5 Massie, Robert K., (2004) Castles of Steel, Jonathan Cape, London

John Jellicoe, who defeated Scheer and the German Fleet at Jutland, was the most unassuming of the four principal admirals who fought the battle. A quiet, methodical man, he was a consummate professional whose success in the navy had been based on discipline, foresight, loyalty, self-confidence, and impertuable calm at moments of crisis. In his long career afloat and ashore, he had gathered immense technical knowledge, and he commanded the fleet with a soberly realistic understanding of the material strengths and weaknesses of his ships and guns. His organizational abilities ha reached a peak in the months at Scapa Flow where he had rigourously drilled the Grand Fleet in tactics and gunnery. ...Jellicoe's principal weakness as a commander was his inflexibility. He was a perfectionist. Everything was centralised in the flagship; he had difficulty delegating and often became immersed in detail. Wishing to leave nothing to chance, he had drawn up the Grand Fleet Battle Orders, 70 pages of detailed instruction, intended to control the fleet under every imaginable circumstance.

I would add that a reference I found elsewhere that supported this view of attention to detail also said that Jellicoe tried at every stage to involve his subordinates in his thinking and to build a Nelsonian "Band of Brothers" ethos, but did not have the same benefit of talented subordinates as did Nelson.

Although during the battle, [Jellicoe] was never fully aware of the strength of composition of the German Fleet, he managed twice to cross Scheer's "T", to pound the HSF and drive it into retreat. His deployment to port, the complex, massive movement of 24 battleships from 6 columns into a single line, which enabled him to cross Scheer's "T", was brilliantly conceived and executed. Jellicoe's critics maintain that by deploying away from the enemy, he surrendered 4000 yds at a time when every yard and minute counted, but the greater weight of professional opinion supports his decision. This includes the official German naval history, that declared had Jellicoe deployed to starboard rather than port, "he would have led is ships into a position which would have been only too welcome for the German fleet." Half a century later, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Britain's naval hero of WW2, wrote, "I hope I would have been given enough sense to make the same deployment".

Critics also blamed Jellicoe for not plunging forward, Beatty style, in pursuit of Scheer. But this was exactly the situation Jellicoe had foreseen in October 1914, when he warned the Admiralty that because of he danger of torpedoes, he would not pursue a retreating enemy.

This caution for which Jellicoe was harshly criticised at the time for lacking that Nelsonian spirit is now generally accepted as being the correct procedure. It is also worth noting that other sources refer to reports going back to Jellicoe of German submarines as well as torpedo-destroyers supporting the HSF at this time. Massie continues "this tactic was standard and in all navies and Hipper, Beatty, Hood, Evan-Thomas and Sturdee all used it at Jutland. Beatty had employed it at the Dogger Bank, too, when he turned away from a supposed periscope."

Criticism of Jellicoe for not being another Nelson and hurling himself at the enemy is unfair. Tactics are governed by strategy and Jellicoe's strategic purpose was to retain command of the sea. The destruction of the HSF was a secondary object - highly desirable but not essential. In the words of the historian Cyril Falls, "[Jellicoe] fought to make a German victory impossible rather than to make a British victory certain." Ultimately Jellicoe achieved both.

As I am sure you are aware, this second of Massie's two volume history of the Royal Navy during this period is highly regarded by professional and amateur historians alike. It identifies failings in Jellicoe but unless I have missed something fundamental, there is no inference of temperamental failings, certainly not serious enough to impact his handling of the Fleet at Jutland, n or anything to suggest Jellicoe was not suited to the position he attained. In fact Massie, IMHO, proves the opposite.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

p 163 Barnett, Correlli, (1963, reprinted 2001), The Swordbearers, Cassel Military Paperbacks,London.

Jellicoe's refusal to be drawn was in no way a failure of nerve; it was nearly 2 yrs since [Jellicoe] had told the Admiralty that he would ot pursue a retiring fleet because of the risk of mines and torpedoes.

In terms of Jellicoe's knowledge at the time, a chase into the mists might reasonably have found him firstly losing ships to torpedos and then coming suddenly on Scheer's battle line, drawn across his course - he might have been in the same kind of trap as Scheer had been at 6:30pm. Neither Jellicoe, with his orderly, methodical mind, or his subordinate admirals, nor his 7 mile line, nor British training, doctrine and command methods were suited to a loose, fast, fluid scramble. Once again Jellicoe was realistic enough to face the truth.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

p 434/5 Steel, N., and Hart, P., (2003), Jutland 1916, Cassel Military Paperbacks,London.

The issue is surely more complex than this. Jellicoe may have been hamstrung by caution, but his country had good reason to be grateful for his cool detachment. When the crucial moment came, despite the lack of sighting reports from his subordinates , he made the perfect decision on how to deploy the Grand Fleet. He crossed the German's "T" - that most desirable and difficult of manoeuvres - not once but twice in teh ensuing engagement. [Jellicoe] did make mistakes; it would be impossible not to in that confused battle. Most radical solutions proffered to the myriad problems he faced involve a reliance on substantial leaps of faith and a large amount of luck. That was not Jellicoe's way.

Jellicoe was a brilliant man saddled by a poor system of command and control in conditions of appalling visibility. As C-in-C he must bear responsibility for the failures in the command structure and night-fighting techniques endemic in the Grand Fleet. Nevertheless, [Jellicoe's] natural calmness, intelligence and clear thinking allowed him to transcend these handicaps to achieve his overriding aim safely; to retain for Britain command of the world's ocean beyond the narrow confines of the North Sea.

As I would like to think you would agree, three compelling cases by Massie, Barnett and Steel & Hart, that identify failings in Jellicoe but also converge on the conclusion that Jellicoe was by far the right man for the job and he executed his duty to a satisfactory conclusion.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

Back to Massie's Castles of Steel to deal with Geddes - pp 744/5

When told of Jellicoe's dismissal "the admirals (meaning the Sea Lords I assume excluding Wemyss who had agreed to replace Jellicoe) protested to Geddes: "We had full confidence in Sir John Jellicoe's ability and fitness to perform his responsible duties and were most gravely concerned and disturbed by this sudden dismissal ... We therefore decided to request you ... to inform us of the reasons which caused this step to be taken." Geddes informed them that, 2 months earlier, he had spoken to the two previous First Lords, Carson and Balfour, in the presence of L-G, and that both former First Lords had told [Geddes] that they did not consider Jellicoe the best man to lead the Admiralty. Carson vehemently denied ever having said this; Balfour was vague. Geddes then reversed himself and denied that he had ever quoted Carson against Jellicoe. Carson, now enraged, declared that not only had he never declared that Jellicoe was not the best man for the post, but indeed he had said that Jellicoe "was the only man for First Sea Lord". Entangled in this briar patch, Geddes turned back to the Sea Lords and huffed "I would remind you that the appropriate appointment and removal is entirely a matter for HM and HM Government. The Sea Lords, who had considered collective resignation, told Jellicoe that as "we have realised that we cannot possibly bring you back and we may do great harm to the country," they had decided to remain.

[Admiral] Goodenough said, "Never a man [Jellicoe] stood higher in the estimatation of his friends, his brother officers and every man and boy in the Service". Asquith wrote to Jellicoe "No one knows better - perhaps no one as well as I - what the state and the Allied cause owe you. When history comes to be written, you have no reason to fear the verdict." The plaudits go on.

Massie finishes with a pretty damning verdict of Geddes and L-G:

Britain's senior admiral had been dismissed by a costumed railway man, acting on behalf of a PM whose attitude to the "High Admirals" was "Sack the lot!". The man who had trained the Grand Fleet for battle, who had issued the crucial deployment command at Jutland and sent the German navy fleeing into harbour, whose fleet had enforced the blockade that destroyed Germany's will to fight, and who, before departing, had broken the back of the U-boat campaign, was gone. Three months later, Sir Edward Carson told the House of commons what had happened: "The whole time that I was First Lord of the Admiralty, one of the greatest difficulties I had was the constant persecution - for I can call it nothing else - of certain high officials in the Admiralty, who could not speak for themselves - constant persecution which, I have no doubt, could [have] been traced to reasons and motives of the most malignant character. Over and over again while I was at the Admiralty, I had the most constant pressure put upon me to remove officials, among them Sir John Jellicoe".

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

as Geddes, who actually knew him put it, (though rather more harshly) "feeble to a degree and vacillating."

Finally Commander Matthew Best quoted in Steel & Hart (p 431) and who had no agenda other than his own admiration of Jellicoe:

No one outside the service can or ever will know what the world owes J.R.J. for producing it [in Best's words meaning "the most efficient fighting machine the world has ever seen" I think we can forgive him any exaggeration]. No other man could possibly have done it. He equals, if not excels, Nelson professionally, and has not the latter's weaknesses. [Jellicoe] is a man whose heart is wrapped up in his country. I was privileged to get a glimpse of his feelings, and think it the bitterest day of his life, and yet I know he did not hesitate for a moment to take the step which he felt was for the country's good. The confidence the Fleet had in him was unbounded, and every single officer and man in the Iron Duke loved him, of that I am certain".

Best served on the Iron Duke with Jellicoe at Jutland and whilst his testimony can be peceived emotional I would suggest it was also an honest appraisal. I have to say in the course of the last 24 hours I have found myself concluding that Jellicoe was much closer to Nelson in genius than I had previously given him credit for.

Regards,

Jon S

[ATM]

Jonathan, well argued.

[owilki1984]

Jonathan,

Just to lighten the mood (although I do like the discourse and passions on this subject), would I be right in thinking you are a Jellicoe man?

Kind Regards

Oli

[3rdID]

Jellicoe

[Adrian Roberts]

Beatty screwed up at Dogger Bank and Heligoland Bight as well - opportunities lost by poor signalling and gunnery; total disregard for the possible presence of mines in those areas - irresponsible rather than brave.

As for Fisher's opinion - given that he virtually had a nervous breakdown over Gallipoli, the first time that he had been in charge of a major wartime operation, he can hardly be relied on as a judge of other's performance.

Jellicoe was both a nicer man and a more effective officer than Beatty, though of course the "nice" part was a weakness as well.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Jellicoe was by far the better commander. His failings had been when at the Admiralty – in particular with his failure over improving the shells

Beatty should have been court-martialled; Byng was shot for his fleet letting the enemy get away! Even better he shouldn’t have been in command in the first place: he had the temperament to be a brilliant Captain (D) or admiral whose prime force was destroyers; if he had trained and commanded the destroyers at Jutland then he would have had a brilliant legacy. As it was he was a superb example of the ‘Peter Principle’ being promoted way beyond his competence!

The above is based on their actions. Beatty and the men under his command also failed in their inaction: they failed in their basic duty as scouts to tell Jellicoe where they and the enemy were!

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Charges that Jellicoe was an old woman are rich coming from Haig! On the First Day of the Battle of the Somme he was nice and safe; at Jutland, Jellicoe would have lost his life if the Iron Duke had gone up. I think he (and his mentor Fisher) over rated torpedoes at that time, but it is rarely mentioned that his skin was on the line when he decided to turn away.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

'I don't understand the British politics which allowed him to get so high up.'

There is an English expression “money talks.” Beatty’s wife’s money shouted! It also helps if the First Lord of the Admiralty favours you and offers you the job! It was not confined to the British political system that people got jobs for who they knew rather than what they knew and it still isn't.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

‘Lose the war in an afternoon’ If the Grand Fleet had been severely weakened then the High Seas Fleet could have disrupted the cross channel traffic, which would have had a devastating impact on the Western Front.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

'Lose the war in an afternoon' If the Grand Fleet was severely weakened then the High Seas Fleet could have disrupted the cross channel traffic, which would have had a devastating impact on the Western Front.

'I don't think either Jellicoe or Beatty were the men for the moment at Jutland' But they were the men there in reality and this is not a fantasy question it is asking who did the better job, not who was potentially better. I also happen to think neither was suited for the positions, but they actually held them at the time and Jellicoe did the better job.

'German failure to attempt further strategic initiatives' The HSF was dealt a blow that it/ the higher command did not want to repeat. The failure was that it was not a battle fleet (in the sense of going out to engage in battle); their greatest manoeuvre was to turn tail and run away as fast as possible.

[MikB]

Hah! Not this one again.

Look, it'd be gin-clear to a baby that Beatty was a cad. You only need to look at the angle of his hat.

Jellicoe got his ships to where they needed to be, deployed them sensibly and would have done great execution to the HSF had they not used their cheating Hun manoeuvre .

Can you imagine a large fleet deployment managed by Beatty? How many ships would've been lost in collisions? Or steamed off into the wide blue yonder through signalling cockups?

Doesn't bear thinking about, old chap. If ever an officer should've retired to his cabin with rum, revolver and writing case...

Regards,

MikB

[owilki1984]

Charges that Jellicoe was an old woman are rich coming from Haig! On the First Day of the Battle of the Somme he was nice and safe; at Jutland, Jellicoe would have lost his life if the Iron Duke had gone up. I think he (and his mentor Fisher) over rated torpedoes at that time, but it is rarely mentioned that his skin was on the line when he decided to turn away.

Steady!!!!!!!

I think that Haig had alot to loose on the Somme dispite the fact he didnt 'go over the top' as you suggest Jellicoe did.

Just look at the critics. The Somme and Passchendaele are often cited as his unravelling.

I agree with you that Jellicoe was an able and sucessful C-in-C but unlike you I am afraid I think Haig was one as well.

Personal saftey in my opinion was not the issue. However, I do take your point on board.

Regards

Oli

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Please do not leap to conclusions about my views on Haig as a C-inC.

I was contrasting (not suggesting) their experiences of physical danger in WWI. At Jutland: Rear Admirals Arbuthnot and Hood went went down with their ships. The other admirals were all present and just like Jellecoe they were, as I recall, on open bridges, exposed to the elements, shell splinters, fire and the other hazards of war. Any decision they made that endangered their ships endangered them personally. I'm probably not permitted to give an out of period example, but watch 'The Battle of the River Plate' that was fought when British ships still had an open bridge and will begin to give you an idea of how exposed they were.

I'm not sure that I would go as far as to say that Jellecoe was successful, its just we are comparing him with Beatty! In this context say what I like about Beatty, I still admire him for leading from the front, especially as Lion had been hit at Dogger Bank and was close to exploding at Jutland.

An able C-in-C would have said repeatedly "you know that problem with the shells, have you sorted it yet?" And would not have ships in his fleet armed with shells that had been tested and found not to be the best, even of the ones they had. That's before we even think about gun control!

[per ardua per mare per terram]

I'd go for a third option! I think Evan-Thomas was better at his job. He had the ships with the newest technology (15" guns & oil being the major ones), was kept in the dark and then fed confusing orders in the midst of a raging battle completely different from his experience. Despite that his ships hit the targets more often than Beatty's did, with fewer ships (so his captains and crews had got to know their weopans systems too); he reacted to the mess he was put in (he didn't unravel) and extricated his ships withous loosing any, despite being severely outnumbered.

[MikB]

I'd go for a third option! I think Evan-Thomas was better at his job.

Yes, he did do well. Bit of a sticky time when Warspite's steering jammed, though.

But he was acting in local support of Beatty - he didn't have the whole Grand Fleet to deploy.

Regards,

MikB

[per ardua per mare per terram]

I know admirals were supposed to be godlike, but I didn't realise that Warspite's steering was his responsibility. It was sticky, but the captain extricated her and she wasn't lost. If his squadron had reacted as Beatty's did at Dogger Bank they could have lost 1 or more of the ships.

'I think Evan-Thomas was better at his job' I made no claim other than he was a subordinate admiral. He fought his squadron well, but I did not try to make out that he was the C-in-C. In my opinion he was the best British admiral in terms of fulfilling his role on the day. He provided the support even though Beatty had kept him out of the loop. He had ensured that his captains made best use of their guns, as did Jellicoe, but in contrast with either principle admiral and he had least time to adjust to the gun control system aboard. These were the 1st ships with 15" guns and he entered a navy that was still using black powder and capital guns fought at ranges about half the maximum range of the Lee-Enfield. Whilst Warspite was to score hit on Giuglio Cesare at 26,400 yards (14+ miles) in the Calabria action admittedly in 1940, but that was the system he had adapted to. Valiant and Malaya were not even comissioned until Feb 1916! Their crews had less than 4 months to work up and learn to fight these ships, their performance deserves all the credit going.

Beatty was the most experienced with his ships. He flew his flag from 1913 and had been in action with her and his fleet twice already. They had the least excuse for not getting the best from their ships.

[MikB]

I know admirals were supposed to be godlike, but I didn't realise that Warspite's steering was his responsibility.

OK, OK! I wasn't trying to do E-T down. He did do well! But his role was limited and his ships were the best there, in fact some of the best ever, so that despite being effectively dropped in the cacky by Beatty, he extricated himself with honour, and damage to the enemy.

But the intended role (IIRC) was to act as heavy fire support to Beatty in engagement with Hipper. Had Beatty held back long enough to allow E-T to do that, the result of the battlecruiser action might've been somewhat different, and the shambolic abandonment of him would've been less likely.

Problem with Beatty was, he not only cobbled damn near everything he did, but also put others in a position where they couldn't deliver their best. He may've had plenty of personal bravado, but he was the Antinelson as far as Naval history goes.

Regards,

MikB

[Gyrene]

Jellicoe was like Ray Spruance while Beatty was like Bill Halsey. I came away with a new appreciation for Jellicoe after reading Castles of Steel.