Jellicoe or Beatty?

[Jonathan Saunders]

As it turned out the Battle of Jutland was a defining moment in the Naval surface war with Germany. Also it became a defining moment in the careers of Jellicoe and Beatty, with Jellicoe generally being criticised for how he handled the Fleet whilst Beatty took the plaudits for his Nelsonian aggression.

A simple question – Jellicoe or Beatty?

[Jack Sheldon]

Bearing in mind that Jellicoe 'crossed the T' of the German fleet not once, but twice, in the course of this action, I have always felt that there was nothing much wrong with his fleet handling and that better shooting, better ship design, better ammunition and better initiative at lower levels would have led to him departing the scene with the German fleet in bits and his reputation unassailable. Yes he turned his battleships away because of an exaggerated view of the potency of the German submarine threat - but point out to me a senior naval officer of that time with a different view. Overcautious? possibly; but do not forget that he was widely acknowledged to be the one man who could 'lose the war in an afternoon' if he got it wrong.

Jack

[Gibbo]

I'd say that Jellicoe did much the better of the pair. He made mistakes, but they were mostly beforehand when he stifled initiative by issung excessively detailed fleet orders. During the battle, he was let down by lack of sighting reports from subordinates, including Beatty. He was cautious but this was justified by the fact that a defeat would've lost Britain the war but a victory wouldn't have won it immediately. He managed to achieve the ideal position of crossing the enemy's T twice.

I'm very unimpressed by Beatty's performance. He had 6 battle cruisers, 4 with 13.5 inch & 2 with 12 inch guns plus 4 15 inch gunned fast battleships against 5 battle cruisers, 2 with 12 inch & 3 with 11 inch guns but lost 2 battle cruisers without any German losses at that stage, although 1 German battle cruiser sank later. He allowed the battleships to become detached from the battle cruisers & then failed to exploit the range advantage of the 13.5 inch gun ships. Perhaps the gunnery of the British battle cruisers was poor at long range but that was Beatty's fault for not training them enough. The Queen Elizabeth class battleships were with the Battle Cruiser Force to temporarily replace Hood's 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which Jellicoe had transferred to Scapa Flow in order to train under his eye. One of these vessels, Hood's flagship Invincible, was also lost.

The Queen Elizabeths, by the use of oil fired engines, combined fast speed with battleship protection & the world's most powerful armament; 8 15 inch guns each. Had they been in their intended position in the van of the Grand Fleet, then the Germans may have found it harder to escape with all their dreadnought battleships afloat.

[owilki1984]

Hi,

Interesting thread. I am no expert in naval warfare but form the limited ammount I have read I always feel that Jellicoe gets a bit of a rough deal (although in the comments so far on the forum he has not it has to be said)

On the other hand Beatty is set up as the hero, who saved the day.

Simple answer to the question Jonathan I would say Jellico. The German navy came out of jail and assualted its jailer, Jellico (with his subordinated help, i.e. Beatty) put them back again!!!

Just as a query I seem to remember that either Haig or Lloyd George refered to Jellicoe as 'The Old Woman'. Have I got this right or am I thinking of someone else

Regards

Oli

[Borys]

Ahoj!

Someone said said about Beatty that to light up his eyes you have to point a flashlight at his ear.

Beatty screwed up Doggers Bank, screwed up Jutland ...

His ships were poor shooters, his communications abysmal. I don't understand the British politics which allowed him to get so high up.

Jellico as an officer and commander is light years ahead of Beatty.

Borys

[Jonathan Saunders]

All - thanks for the replies. Interesting that we all favour Jellicoe - a much maligned and misused man after Jutland. My own opinion is that he did little wrong in that battle. His caution against the German destroyers/GTB was reasonable and sensible. He was fully justified in turning the Fleet away. Previously his career had been one of innovation, understanding, progress and humility - perhaps what made him different to, say, a Nelson, was that he lacked that self-confidence in his own ability.

What kindled the question was not Jellicoe himself but reading the obituary of his son who died last week. There is a link on the Forum soemwhere - well worth reading.

Regards,

Jon S

[David Seymour]

Jellicoe.

Best wishes,

David

[MartinWills]

Bearing in mind that Jellicoe 'crossed the T' of the German fleet not once, but twice, in the course of this action, I have always felt that there was nothing much wrong with his fleet handling and that better shooting, better ship design, better ammunition and better initiative at lower levels would have led to him departing the scene with the German fleet in bits and his reputation unassailable. Yes he turned his battleships away because of an exaggerated view of the potency of the German submarine threat - but point out to me a senior naval officer of that time with a different view. Overcautious? possibly; but do not forget that he was widely acknowledged to be the one man who could 'lose the war in an afternoon' if he got it wrong.

Jack

I think the "crossing of the T" underlines Jellicoe's strengths. Just doing it once must be as good as wining the lottery outright. The more I read of the actions the more it is clear that the German fleet were remarkable able at gunnery - unlike the British. They were able to fire in poor conditions just as well as in gunnery practice on a millpond with unlimited visibility. The confusion over targetting that lead to the loss of theh Queen Mary sums up much of the Britsh problems at Jutland. Nevertheless Scheer slipped away successfully but the action was effective in leaving the Germans tied up in port for the remainder of the war.

[Borys]

Ahoj!

Gunnery of British Battleships was good to excellent. Jellico had them practice and practice and ...

It was the gunnery of the Battlecruisers which was awful - and it was Beatty's fault. The explosions of British battlecruisers are in part explained by sloppy charge handling and keeping practices - again, blame it on their boss ...

Borys

[Borys]

Ahoj!

From another board, on the same gentlemen:

http://p216.ezboard.com/fwarships1discussi...icID=8216.topic

[Gibbo]

Just as a query I seem to remember that either Haig or Lloyd George refered to Jellicoe as 'The Old Woman'. Have I got this right or am I thinking of someone else

Regards

Oli

It was Haig, according to note 3 on p. 219 of the edition of his diaries edited by Gary Sheffield & John Bourne. This is a footnote by the editors rather than a diary entry & they don't say when or where he expressed this opinion. The only opinion of Jellicoe given in the diary entries contained in the book is from 15 December 1916 (p. 261), where Haig says that 'I liked very much what I saw of Jellicoe though I should not look on him as a man of great power or decision of character.' The diaries are so long that the book can contain only selected entries.

[MartH]

Hi

You should read, "The Rules of the Game" by Andrew Gordon, IMHO the best book on Jutland, Beatty does not come out well, and the description of the QE's at Jutland is great

My farther worked for Jellicoe's son in the 1980's, my farther was a technical director of a specialist steel works and inquired how much scrap they made, responded the percentage, and was suprised that Jellicoe junior understood and knew that all steel works made scrap, the trick was to keep it low...normally the COE wanted it to be zero, which of course is impossible.

He menitioned to him my interest in Jelliocoe senior and the fact that I had some important Jellioce letters (to do with the Official History and vol 3), to which Jeliocoe junior replied along the lines "best place for them, where they are appreciated and cared for, if we'd got any substanital papers left, the family would have torn itself apart wondering how much there worth and debating should they sell, or give to the nation, thank god my farther sorted that out". and he sent his best regards to me.

Regards

Mart

[George Armstrong Custer]

It was Haig, according to note 3 on p. 219 of the edition of his diaries edited by Gary Sheffield & John Bourne. This is a footnote by the editors rather than a diary entry & they don't say when or where he expressed this opinion. The only opinion of Jellicoe given in the diary entries contained in the book is from 15 December 1916 (p. 261), where Haig says that 'I liked very much what I saw of Jellicoe though I should not look on him as a man of great power or decision of character.' The diaries are so long that the book can contain only selected entries.

Although there appears to be little evidence of overt antipathy on a personal level, Haig and Jellicoe certainly could not be accused of conducting a mutual admiration society! In Walter Reid's recent Douglas Haig: Architect of Victory, there is a reference to Jellicoe's feelings regarding Haig's long-term strategy at Third Ypres. Referencing the requirement for the Royal Navy to conduct raiding operations along the Flanders coastline as well as supplying convoys to bring food from the neutral Netherlands, Reid writes:

The Admiralty argued that unless the Belgian coast were occupied, the strength of the Dover flotillas would require to be increased at the expense of other units. Jellicoe said that unless Haig's plan were executed successfully, Britain would be unable to continue the war into 1918 because of lack of shipping. The naval imperative was, however, exaggerated. despite his dramatic language at the War Policy Committee meeting on 20 June 1917 ("There is no good discussing plans for next spring. We cannot go on."), Jellicoe's assertion had no real impact on planning. Even Haig, who could have used it to support a project which he had long hankered after, dismissed it: "No one present shared Jellicoe's view, and all seemed satisfied that the food reserves of Great Britain are adequate."

Although I can find no corroboration for this, it was possibly in the context of Jellicoe's alarmist statements at this WPC meeting of 20 June 1917 that Haig made the 'Old Woman' jibe. John Terraine (pp. 333-335) discusses fully the 'bombshell' dropped by Jellicoe on 20 June 1917, and goes on to contend that Jellicoe had achieved the near impossible in that 'The alarm which Haig and Lloyd George shared over Jellicoe's views drew them together, despite their own strategic disagreements.' Terraine also quotes Haig's notes on what he was told by Sir Eric Geddes, a member of the Board of the Admiralty, no less. It provides a damning view from an insider of the upper echelons of the Senior Service, and would seem to be at least partly the basis for Haig's 'Old Woman' view of a weak Jellicoe :

'The First Lord (Carson) has recently married, is very tired, and leaves everything to a number of incompetent sailors! Jellicoe, [Geddes] says, is feeble to a degree and vacillating. Only one Admiral (Halsey) is fit for his post. There is no fixed policy......'

Terraine continues: 'On the day after the [June 1917] discussions on Army policy had ended, Haig and Geddes breakfasted with Lloyd George to talk about naval matters. It was at this meeting that Haig urged that Geddes should replace Carson [as First Lord of the Admiralty], and that a sweeping reconstitution of the Board of Admiralty should take place - a conversation which, Lloyd George tells us, 'finally decided me'. It is one more curiosity of those strange and complex times that Lloyd George should attach such weight to Haig's recommendations on naval affairs, and so little to his views on the work of his own Service.'

As to the question 'Jellicoe or Beatty?', in my view neither was suited to the position they held.

Ciao,

GAC

[AndyHollinger]

I'm with the Majority (me?) ... Jellicoe is the hero. He could not only lose the war in an hour and a half, he salvaged Beatty's issues and defeated the German High Seas Fleet. Because he didn't leave the fleet in the same condition as Nelson did at Trafalgar, he is criticized ... but remember, the result was the same ... neither the Kaiser nor Napoleon had any fleet alternatives for the duration.

[Borys]

Ahoj!

Lose the war in an afternoon is a nice soundbite. But not true.

Brittain losing HALF of the dreadnaughts present at Jutland would not had changed a thing militarily. There would be political and porpaganda cost, that's true, but the blokade would continue. And that's what it was all about.

Borys

[George Armstrong Custer]

I'm with the Majority (me?) ... Jellicoe is the hero. He could not only lose the war in an hour and a half, he salvaged Beatty's issues and defeated the German High Seas Fleet. Because he didn't leave the fleet in the same condition as Nelson did at Trafalgar, he is criticized ... but remember, the result was the same ... neither the Kaiser nor Napoleon had any fleet alternatives for the duration.

Ah, but the crucial difference is that Nelson would not have allowed the stress of knowing he could 'lose the war in an afternoon' to lead him into erring on the side of caution! A slight man physically, Nelson was temperamentally strong. As I said, I don't think either Jellicoe or Beatty were the men for the moment at Jutland - because of temperamental failings in the one and incompetence in the other.

Ciao,

GAC

[Jonathan Saunders]

temperamental failings

Can you elaborate on what you mean by this.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Can you elaborate on what you mean by this.

In the case of a commander in chief in the position of Jellicoe at Jutland, reacting to stress with timidity; or, as Geddes, who actually knew him put it, (though rather more harshly) "feeble to a degree and vacillating."

Ciao,

GAC

[Jonathan Saunders]

In the case of a commander in chief in the position of Jellicoe at Jutland, reacting to stress with timidity; or, as Geddes, who actually knew him put it, (though rather more harshly) "feeble to a degree and vacillating."

Ciao,

GAC

Obviously that is one viewpoint. Others, and I assume including those that knew him - as this is an argument that has been discussed since Jutland - have said Jellicoe rightly acted with due caution and care. Do you know Jacky Fisher's views on Jellicoe and Jutland?

If Jellicoe acted cautiously but wisely, which seems to be the general conscensus, then I dont see that as a temperamental failing. It should probably also be remembered that Jellicoe did not want command of the Fleet in 1914 in the same way as Haig coveted C-in-C in France.

[Jonathan Saunders]

or, as Geddes, who actually knew him put it, (though rather more harshly) "feeble to a degree and vacillating."

It appears LLoyd-George and Geddes (Geddes owed much to L-G) conspired against Jellicoe and therefore you would have to question the validity of any comment by Geddes. Following is something that appeared on the WW1-L discussion forum by Andrew Weist.

Quote:

As regards convoy, the traditional picture of its acceptance is dead wrong. Lloyd George visited the Admiralty on April 30, 1917. His War Memoirs give the indication that he "forced" the idea of convoy on an unwilling Admiralty. As we all know DLG's War Memoirs are nearly as reliable as the Official History. DLG has a vested interest in making himself seem the savior of Britain. The remainder of the traditional view comes from AJP Taylor. His view of the April 30 meeting runs like this. DLG "took his seat at the head of the Admiralty Board. He gave the formal order that convoys must be instituted. The admirals belatedly discovered that they had been in favour of convoys all along." Dramatic but wrong.

The truth is rather different. The Admiralty, under the much maligned and underrated Jellicoe, had been considering convoy for quite some time. They had numerous objections to it, but the severity of the submarine war had forced them to change their minds. It is true, as stated earlier on the list, that the ADM had vastly overrated the number of ships that would need convoy due to counting the many visits of coastal ships. Jellicoe had the revised, correct numbers for shipping in hand in time for a cabinet meeting on April 23. The War Cabined debated the convoy issue with Jellicoe's new numbers on April 25. On the same day Jellicoe approved the idea of convoy in the form of a report from Rear Admiral Alexander Duff, Director of the Anti-submarine Division of the ADM.

Thus convoy had been debated and accepted, with some discussion by the War Cabinet, long before DLG made his"dramatic I am going to save Britain yet again" visit to the ADM. Supporting evidence that DLG fudged his story comes from Hankey. He was with DLG on the ADM visit and stated that DLG discussed convoy but already found it to have been accepted by Jellicoe. DLG then had a plesant lunch with Jellicoe and his four daughters, "Lloyd George having a great flirtation with a little girl of three." Hardly the dramatic visit that DLG painted.

More evidence comes from Lord Carson, the First Lord during most of 1917. He would not put up with DLG's fabrication published in his War Memoir. Carson felt compelled to publish a rebuttal in the Morning Post. Carson stated that the argument that Jellicoe was against convoy and that it was forced upon him by DLG was "the biggest lie ever told."

Here we have a good case for reading the memoirs of persons involved in history with a grain of salt. DLG simply lied in this case. A quick check of the documents would have saved AJP Taylor from making a lasting historical mistake. The paper trail that shows tha DLG is off the mark is strong. For documentation regarding the above material see my book entitled Passchendaele and the Royal Navy published by Greenwood Press in 1995. The material is in chapter 4 entitled "submarine menace and Flanders planning" p 85-88.

Unquote.

Regards,

Jon S

[George Armstrong Custer]

If Jellicoe acted cautiously but wisely, which seems to be the general conscensus, then I dont see that as a temperamental failing. It should probably also be remembered that Jellicoe did not want command of the Fleet in 1914 in the same way as Haig coveted C-in-C in France.

Obviously that is one viewpoint. As to Jackie Fisher, he also had views on many things - some of them downright weird. However, the point of my post in response to Andy was the temperamental differences between Nelson and Jellicoe in their respective responses to having the weight of great national responsibility resting on their shoulders (though, incidentally, I think Borys is correct in saying that the idea that Jellicoe was 'the only man who could have lost the war in a day' is overegging the pudding somewhat). You yourself, of course, defined 'Nelsonian aggression' in your opening post. Andy Hollinger defined what a difference not having such a temperament could have in practical terms when he noted that "[Jellicoe] didn't leave the [German] fleet in the same condition as Nelson did [the Combined Fleet] at Trafalgar". As Andy goes on to say, of course, "the result was the same ... neither the Kaiser nor Napoleon had any fleet alternatives for the duration." If that's a victory, then it's a default one, and I'd argue that this had as much to do with German decisions than anything Jellicoe did at Jutland - he certainly did not, as Andy asserts, "defeat the German High Seas Fleet". But a Nelsonian temperament could have.

I'm not sure of what point you're trying to make when you write "It should probably also be remembered that Jellicoe did not want command of the Fleet in 1914 in the same way as Haig coveted C-in-C in France." Are you implying that a lack of professional ambition in Jellicoe is something to applaud, whilst Haig's possession of such professional ambition should be denigrated? If so, it could be equally argued that the diinclination you ascribe to Jellicoe to rise to the top of the profession he spent his life in is not what one would automatically look for in a battle-winning commander - again, take Nelson as an alternative example: ambition incarnate, but also a battle winner. Which brings me back to my original point - that Jellicoe was not temperamentally suited to the position he held. There are several contemporary references to him being a nervous, hesitant man - and as you say, he didn't really want command of the fleet anyway - a combination which doesn't really sound like the cv of Admiral of the Fleet. Of course, your dislike of any positive comment about Haig is well documented, so maybe your jibe about Haig 'coveting' C-in-C France is just that.

Ciao,

GAC

[Jonathan Saunders]

Which brings me back to my original point - that Jellicoe was not temperamentally suited to the position he held. There are several contemporary references to him being a nervous, hesitant man - and as you say, he didn't really want command of the fleet anyway - a combination which doesn't really sound like the cv of Admiral of the Fleet. Of course, your dislike of any positive comment about Haig is well documented, so maybe your jibe about Haig 'coveting' C-in-C France is just that.

It was a victory because the German fleet went back to anchorage and did not come out again. Jellicoe achieved his aim – from 1914 (and probably before) he had identified the necessity of blockading the German fleet, then when it came out, he gave it such a bloody nose that it didn’t come out again. 1914 – 1917 Jellicoe fulfilled his aims.

On the case of Jellicoe’s “temperamental failings”, I thought your conclusion was based on Geddes but Geddes cannot be trusted as an impartial witness, in fact all his interests were related to blackening Jellicoe’s reputation. Are you now saying because Jellicoe was able to act with thoughtful consideration and caution in the heat of battle, that that is a weakness or a failing? On reflection I would view that as a strength. And a strength that contradicts any reference to hesitancy.

The point about Jellicoe not wanting command of the Fleet in 1914 had nothing to do with his lack of personal ambition but from his perspective everything to do with honour. He was quite frankly disgusted with the treatment of his predecessor Admiral Callaghan. However the fact remains, command was pressed upon him and if he then acted in such a way as to protect his ships and more importantly his men and still achieve his objectives, who are we to criticise? If however he had coveted command and he had been reckless in that command, then I feel we would be right to criticise him.

One final point as you mentioned my “dislike of any positive comment about Haig”. As you are so informed about my comments on Haig I am sure you will be aware that I have said several times on this Forum that he would have been my choice for C.I.G.S. in 1914, which I consider far from a negative.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

For anyone wishing to read up on Jellicoe and Jutland there appear to be many interesting and positive papers available on this website:

http://www.gwpda.org/naval/n0000000.htm

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

For anyone wishing to read up on Jellicoe and Jutland there appear to be many interesting and positive papers available on this website:

http://www.gwpda.org/naval/n0000000.htm

Regards,

Jon S

Particularly this link http://www.gwpda.org/naval/jellicol.htm

which deal with Jellicoe in Command and Leadership.

[George Armstrong Custer]

It was a victory because the German fleet went back to anchorage and did not come out again. Jellicoe achieved his aim – from 1914 (and probably before) he had identified the necessity of blockading the German fleet, then when it came out, he gave it such a bloody nose that it didn’t come out again.

Well, my post pretty much said that when I agreed with Andy that "of course, "the result was the same ... neither the Kaiser nor Napoleon had any fleet alternatives for the duration." However I then qualified this use of the term 'victory' by going on to note - quite correctly in my view - that 'If that's a victory, then it's a default one, and I'd argue that this had as much to do with German decisions than anything Jellicoe did at Jutland - he certainly did not, as Andy asserts, "defeat the German High Seas Fleet". But a Nelsonian temperament could have.' The failure of the German High Seas Fleet to put to sea again had little to do with actual damage and loss iinflicted at Jutland, and is arguably one of the greatest strategic errors made by Imperial Germany.

You also write that 'The point about Jellicoe not wanting command of the Fleet in 1914 had nothing to do with his lack of personal ambition.' Yet your original statement reads: 'It should probably also be remembered that Jellicoe did not want command of the Fleet in 1914 in the same way as Haig coveted C-in-C in France.' My reading of that is that you are casting Haig's 'coveting' the post pf C-in-C unfavourably with Jellicoe's attitude. That's the context you raised the comparison in - you weren't making any point about Jellicoe being 'disgusted with the treatment of his predecessor Admiral Callaghan.'

You say that 'I thought your conclusion was based on Geddes but Geddes cannot be trusted as an impartial witness, in fact all his interests were related to blackening Jellicoe’s reputation.' Really, this is undergraduate stuff - you set out with a point of view, (in this case a defence of Jellicoe), but then proceed to dismiss any evidence which doesn't fit! Of course Geddes had an agenda, which we need to take into account when reading his statements - but so did everyone, including Jellicoe. What adds some substantial credence to Geddes' and Haig's views is that Lloyd George went along with them in preference to Jellicoe. I don't need to tell you that L-G was not famous for following the Haig line on anything unless the evidence for not doing so was unassailable.

Finally (sigh), you write: 'One final point as you mentioned my “dislike of any positive comment about Haig”. As you are so informed about my comments on Haig I am sure you will be aware that I have said several times on this Forum that he would have been my choice for C.I.G.S. in 1914, which I consider far from a negative.' On this I direct you to your comments and preconceptions in the thread in 'Book Reviews' Life of Douglas Haig, Due 2006, which discusses Walter Reid's Douglas Haig: Architect of Victory (which I quoted from in this thread regarding Haig and Jellicoe). Having read the (largely positive) editorial review of this book (but not the book itself) you stated: 'The review doesn't strike me that this will be a book offering a balanced view.' Apparently because it's review didn't hype the book as critical enough of its subject for your taste. In the same thread you write that you checked the book without reading it through to see if it had critical comments of how Haig employed the faint at Gommencourt - as such criticism would 'give some confidence in the rest of the book bearing in mind we know the conclusion is 'Architect of Victory'. Obviously you have a problem with Haig being given this appellation, and your criteria of what constitutes a 'balanced' biography of Haig seems to be that it be a critical one (ie Gerard de Groot's) Having failed to find the specific criticism of Haig you were looking for, you comment (still without having read the Reid book through) that 'I no longer feel this is the book to pin our hopes on for a balanced biography of Haig.' As I said, 'balanced' to you seems to be a book which will confirm your own criticisms of Haig. If you'd like to continue further discussion of Haig outside of the context of his views on Jellicoe, perhaps this could be done on the old book reviews thread, so as to retain the integrity of this one.

BTW - adding posts with links to bolster your pro-Jellicoe case is all very intersting, but far better would be to quote from them in the context of what you have to say yourself in your posts.

Ciao,

GAC