New Army untried on the Somme.

[Robert Dunlop]

Or are you saying if the French had been attacking to the north ie. Thiepval for example, that their artillery would have virtually ignored the German guns behind Pozieres and so on? I don’t believe that is what you are inferring but if it is then it does not fit with the French counter-battery policy as I know it to have been.

Jon, you are quite right that I was not inferring this. There are, however, fundamental differences in the terrain to the north and south of the Somme. To the south, it is no surprise that the French captive balloons could easily spot many German batteries and then direct accurate counter-battery fire onto them. I think it highly likely that if the British had few batteries to engage and that these batteries were easy to spot, then the artillery would have been just as accurate.

North of the Somme, it would not have been a question of 'ignoring' the guns 'behind Pozieres'. The question is whether the counter-battery fire could have been as accurate and as effective as south of the river. Please note that I have not stated 'as accurate and as effective' as the British counter-battery fire in the same area. We are agreed on this issue.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Irrepsective of where the guns were located previously I cannot see the point of attracting greater German strength to an already significantly fortified area that you plan to send two infantry divisions to attack in the near future.

It prevents the Germans from reinforcing the defences against the attack to the south.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I note your emphasis but I don’t think this has any bearing.

Jon, I apologise for not making it clearer. Colonel Renouard was the Chief of the Operations Department at GQG. De Pierrefeu noted 'Colonel Renouard's great services must not be underestimated. Petain's temerity had the credit of having brought off a defensive victory at Verdun, but it is to Colonel Renouard's stubborn energy that we owe the completion of it by an offensive victory which finally relieved the town.

The Chief of the Operations Department never abandoned his scheme, even at the most critical moments when it seemed that all was lost at Verdun. At these times he was submitted to considerable pressure to secure the launching of the offensive at once without waiting for the English, or before they were sufficiently ready. Everywhere it was said that this butchery [at Verdun] could not be indefinitely prolonged.

Colonel Renouard meant to develop a continued battle and not attempt a diversion which must be short-lived.'

This was the Colonel Renouard who had also hoped for a breakthrough. As I have said before, a 'continued battle' and a 'break-through' can be held in juxtaposition. They need not be mutually exclusive in planning a battle.

I believe at one stage (possibly not 1 July) there was an opportunity for the French to push through their cavalry as a wide gap materialised in the German line but they resisted this opportunity. Why would they do that if they had intended a break-through?

The fundamental reason is the same as for the British. The detailed operational orders limited the advances in both the British and French sectors to very clearly defined objectives that did not extend to the second line of defences. Rawlinson's Fourth Army Operational Order was not vague, at least with respect to the British commanders who planned the infantry advances.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

If Foch had had any confidence in the British then surely he would have left the German batteries in this sector to the guns of XV Corps.

Jon, you cannot assume this. The lie of the land is such that enfilade artillery fire could be more effectively applied from outside a division or corps boundary. British XV Corps' attack was supported by XIII Corps (which was next to the French XX Corps) with 60-pounder enfilade fire along Pommiers Trench. XV Corps positioned an 8" howitzer battery in Carnoy Valley, which was in XIII Corps' boundaries, to enfilade German positions in XV Corps' boundaries. Furthermore, French artillery would attack German heavy guns to ensure that their own attack was not scuppered by enfilade fire.

Fraser-Tytler noted the presence of 424 French guns and howitzers in the small sector between Maricourt and the Somme. Some guns (75mm) fired from positions 'just behind us'. It is not clear what direction they were firing in. What is interesting is Fraser-Tytler's observation on July 1 that 'until 7.15 am observation was practically impossible owing to the eddies of mist, rising smoke, flashes of bursting shells...'. The mention of 'mist' is significant I think, but does not exclude the presence of gas. The gas cloud attacks that were launched in this area took place (as usual) on days prior to July 1. Each gas cloud attack was masked with artillery fire at the time.

It is also interesting to note Fraser-Tytler's comment that 'after dinner I went round to "swop lies" with the Brigade Commander of the 75mm batteries just behind us. He said he had been twice at Verdun, but even there he had never seen such an intense bombardment'.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, your comments about infantry attacks do not accord with the Artois campaign, which was launched by Foch on May 9th, 1915. Nor do they fit with Foch's original plans for the combined Franco-British offensive in 1916, prior to the battle of Verdun.

I am afraid I do not know what the original artillery and counter-battery plans to support a French infantry offensive were for the Somme prior to the launch of the Verdun offensive. However, that Foch believed the use of heavy artillery was the key to battlefield success by, say April 1916, and not massed infantry attacks (which suggests he had learnt from the Artois campain of a year previously), is the opinion of historians specialising in France and the Great War such as William Philpot and Elizabeth Greenhalgh. These are both academic historians, which does not necessarly mean they are correct, but their lectures and presentations have impressed me enough to give credence to their views.

It is not questionable. There were variations in British practice at corps level. There was, however, no difference between the French and the British 'at high command level'.

I appreciate your reply and the benefit of your opinion. Obviously mine differs. I dont think we can say anything else on this specific topic.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, you are quite right that I was not inferring this. There are, however, fundamental differences in the terrain to the north and south of the Somme. To the south, it is no surprise that the French captive balloons could easily spot many German batteries and then direct accurate counter-battery fire onto them. I think it highly likely that if the British had few batteries to engage and that these batteries were easy to spot, then the artillery would have been just as accurate.

I am not sure I follow you - obviously at this time the RFC had control of the skies over the Somme and were able to provide the observation and photographic reconnaisance for the guns. I accept the batteries may have been more difficult to observe in the north but that does not mean they should be practically ignored.

North of the Somme, it would not have been a question of 'ignoring' the guns 'behind Pozieres'. The question is whether the counter-battery fire could have been as accurate and as effective as south of the river. Please note that I have not stated 'as accurate and as effective' as the British counter-battery fire in the same area. We are agreed on this issue.

And I agree that the French counter-battery work, if carried out north of the Somme, might not have been as successful as it was south of the river.

However, in general, we will continue to differ on the British and French fundamental principles and attitudes towards counter-battery policy in June 1916.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

It prevents the Germans from reinforcing the defences against the attack to the south.

Robert

Robert I am obviously being extremely thick. We create a feint at Gommecourt and you say this stops the Germans reinforcing the resistence in the southern sector of the Somme. We create a feint, say at Vimy, and I say this stops the Germans reinforcing the resistence in both the northern and the southern sectors of the Somme. I am sorry but you are going to have to do this on a painting by numbers basis for me. What am I missing?

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, I apologise for not making it clearer. Colonel Renouard was the Chief of the Operations Department at GQG. De Pierrefeu noted 'Colonel Renouard's great services must not be underestimated. Petain's temerity had the credit of having brought off a defensive victory at Verdun, but it is to Colonel Renouard's stubborn energy that we owe the completion of it by an offensive victory which finally relieved the town.

The Chief of the Operations Department never abandoned his scheme, even at the most critical moments when it seemed that all was lost at Verdun. At these times he was submitted to considerable pressure to secure the launching of the offensive at once without waiting for the English, or before they were sufficiently ready. Everywhere it was said that this butchery [at Verdun] could not be indefinitely prolonged.

Colonel Renouard meant to develop a continued battle and not attempt a diversion which must be short-lived.'

This was the Colonel Renouard who had also hoped for a breakthrough. As I have said before, a 'continued battle' and a 'break-through' can be held in juxtaposition. They need not be mutually exclusive in planning a battle.

Robert - Colonel Renouard may well have hoped for a break-through at some point and you might be right with the juxtaposition - I just cannot say. Although to my mind a continued battle does not have to mean break-through.

With regard to a break-through then for the reasons I have already given, I do not believe a break-through on the Somme was expected by Foch after the revision of the French involvement following the German offensive against Verdun. Nor do I believe the French seriously had the resources to exploit a break-through, nor do I believe they had the confidence in the British army to make any significant break-through against the German lines of defence.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, you cannot assume this. The lie of the land is such that enfilade artillery fire could be more effectively applied from outside a division or corps boundary. British XV Corps' attack was supported by XIII Corps (which was next to the French XX Corps) with 60-pounder enfilade fire along Pommiers Trench. XV Corps positioned an 8" howitzer battery in Carnoy Valley, which was in XIII Corps' boundaries, to enfilade German positions in XV Corps' boundaries. Furthermore, French artillery would attack German heavy guns to ensure that their own attack was not scuppered by enfilade fire.

I understand your point and I am sorry if I gave a very bad example to try and support my point. However, without wanting to repeat myself, Foch had no great expectations of the British military machine in 1916. In response to your original point I simply do not think Foch was concerned by the possibility of an English break-through.

Regards,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

Jonathan Saunders said:

Robert I am obviously being extremely thick. We create a feint at Gommecourt and you say this stops the Germans reinforcing the resistence in the southern sector of the Somme. We create a feint, say at Vimy, and I say this stops the Germans reinforcing the resistence in both the northern and the southern sectors of the Somme. I am sorry but you are going to have to do this on a painting by numbers basis for me. What am I missing?

Jon, you appear to be raising two issues. The general issue is that a feint should have taken place somewhere else. The specific issue is that a top candidate would have been Vimy Ridge.

With respect to the general issue, a feint elsewhere would have had to be credible to get the Germans to shift reserves. As I indicated in the Attrition thread, there were different types of reserves. Basically, reserves would be held at most levels of command: within battalions/regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, etc, depending on the situation. The release of reserves from one level down to the next depended on the significance of the perceived or actual threat. Unless the threat was very very significant, it would be unusual to transfer reserves between armies. With the situation at Verdun, it was probably even less likely, as evidenced by Falkenhayn's relative lack of response to calls for reinforcements on the Somme. In general, therefore, a feint would have to be really significant to achieve anything other than local movements of reserves. By extending the frontage of a major attack, Gommecourt served to increase the significance of the threat. So much so that it galvanised the attention of the German command, not just resulted in transfer of artillery to the area. Taken in the context of the Somme, Fromelles illustrates exactly how a relatively narrow frontage attack fared. It ended up being subjected to the defensive response illustrated in this post:

 

, without requiring the Germans to do anything other than locally. Contrast this with the potential effect of Gommecourt as part of a larger attack:

 

From a general perspective, the other problem facing the BEF was the extension of its lines to accommodate the Somme attack. The offensive on the Somme was expected to be a significant campaign lasting for some time and covering a wide frontage. The lessons of 1915 had taught the need for a wide frontage. Given the infrastructure and logistics needs, for example, it did not make sense to spare significant effort elsewhere.

Turning to Vimy in particular. The German offensive on Vimy Ridge (21st May, 1916) had already placed the BEF in a more difficult position there. The capture of the forward lines, the destruction accompanying the attack, and the paucity of observation meant that a feint in the Vimy sector would have been extremely difficult - much worse that Gommecourt. Given that the German army in this sector had been prepared for a British counter-attack, no need to play into the hands of the defenders. A narrow frontage attack in this area would not, IMHO, have caused the Germans to move any reserves, other than getting those local reserves closest to the line to be ready for a counter-attack, if needed.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

However, in general, we will continue to differ on the British and French fundamental principles and attitudes towards counter-battery policy in June 1916.

Jon, I would like to move on now to examine the counter-battery work by both French and British contingents in the remainder of the Somme battles. Before doing so, it would be helpful to summarize our current respective positions:

I believe we both agree that British counter-battery fire was extremely patchy on July 1st. The German batteries were mastered on the right flank of the British attack.

We both agree that the French countery-battery fire was very effective.

You have mentioned that Foch believed that the use of heavy artillery was the key to battlefield success. It is my impression, correct me if I am wrong, that you believe the effectiveness of the French counter-battery fire is attributable to Foch's belief.

I have produced written evidence of the British High Command's awareness of the importance of counter-battery fire, as contained in Fourth Army's Artillery Programme of Preliminary Bombardment. It is my impression, again correct me if I am wrong, that you do not agree that the British High Command believed in the importance of counter-battery fire leading up to July 1.

Robert

[Desmond7]

Sorry to interject in what is a highly detailed, well argued and evidence based thread. Been reading it - out of my depth boys. But well done.

However. Jon Saunders has made a point which, I think, deserves further examination ...

I.E. Foch (paraphrasing here) did not think there was a British breakthrough on the cards ....

So if Somme was 1. Battle to relieve pressure on French army ; 2, French were sceptical about British success ...

Why then, in the 'British' psyche .. do we blame British generals? All the desire for momentum comes from French quarters, in essence?

THus - French say waste your men ... in blunt terms.

[Jonathan Saunders]

You have mentioned that Foch believed that the use of heavy artillery was the key to battlefield success. It is my impression, correct me if I am wrong, that you believe the effectiveness of the French counter-battery fire is attributable to Foch's belief.

I believe for the Somme battle both Joffre and Foch viewed successful counter-battery work as key and essential preparation prior to the infantry assualt.

It is my impression, again correct me if I am wrong, that you do not agree that the British High Command believed in the importance of counter-battery fire leading up to July 1.

Certainly at Corps level that does sometimes appear to be the case, Maxse being the obvious exception. I wouldnt say that the British High Command did not understand the importance of counter-battery work but what I have been saying is that Haig is at fault for not ensuring the Third and Fourth Armies had 1) adequate resource to conduct an effective counter-battery programme along the 17+km front (and northern flank) to be attacked on 1 July; and 2) whilst Haig was clearly involving himself in the progress of the Somme preparation he was either disinterested in the counter-battery programme or, aware of the lack of resource for effective counter-battery, ignored it.

You mentioned you want to move on to the remainder of the Somme battles. Whilst interesting, our debates can be pretty labour intensive - I am happy to continue our debate, as long as we can avoid repeating ourselves, but only regarding the preparation for 1 July. Unfortunately time is the premium and there are other aspects of the Great War that I am eager to spend sometime looking at. I trust you understand my position. I will however be interested to read your thoughts on the artillery campaign and the remainder of the Somme battles - your comments are always stimulating.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Sorry to interject in what is a highly detailed, well argued and evidence based thread. Been reading it - out of my depth boys. But well done.

However. Jon Saunders has made a point which, I think, deserves further examination ...

I.E. Foch (paraphrasing here) did not think there was a British breakthrough on the cards ....

So if Somme was 1. Battle to relieve pressure on French army ; 2, French were sceptical about British success ...

Why then, in the 'British' psyche .. do we blame British generals? All the desire for momentum comes from French quarters, in essence?

THus - French say waste your men ... in blunt terms.

Two responses quickly spring to mind.

The first is that the French had an increasing manpower problem. Demographically France had been in freefall for sometime prior to 1914. I dont know the figures but, say, France had suffered in excess of 1.5m casualties by June 1916 and the BEF, say 150,000. France desperately needed the British to take some of the pressure off them.

The second is that Foch viewed the level of British casualties on the Somme unnecessary. Yes, France was asking Britian to take over more of the actual fighting, but they were not asking Britain to "waste your men".

Regards,

Jon

[Desmond7]

BUT - and this is a big but .. if we can agree that there was nothing in terms of relevant (or perhaps truly achievable ground) significance to be gained on the Somme front ... it truly was purely sacrificial. And the French high command knew it, the British High Command played ball ... which begs the question:-

Somme offensive .. nothing less than a subsidiary of Verdun?

[Jonathan Saunders]

BUT - and this is a big but .. if we can agree that there was nothing in terms of relevant (or perhaps truly achievable ground) significance to be gained on the Somme front ... it truly was purely sacrificial. And the French high command knew it, the British High Command played ball ... which begs the question:-

Somme offensive .. nothing less than a subsidiary of Verdun?

I have written out twice why a battle had to be fought to relieve the pressure on Verdun and the reasons why a battle on the Somme originated. And twice I have somehow lost it.

So I am just going to give you the concluding comment.

Britain had to attack Germany away from Verdun to divert German resources. France was all too well aware that battles mean casualties. However France did not expect Britain to make a sacrificial slaughter - but rather a bite and hold battle in which Britain would kill proportionately more Germans than they would take casualties. The sacrifical slaughter that took place in parts of the offensive line were, IMHO, the result of Haig's contribution to the Somme planning.

I dont think it can be really questioned that Britain had to attack to relieve Verdun unless Britain wanted to risk a German dominated peace with France.

Regards,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

However France did not expect Britain to make a sacrificial slaughter - but rather a bite and hold battle in which Britain would kill proportionately more Germans than they would take casualties.

Jon, I have not read anything to suggest that 'France' expected Britain would fight in the way you describe, but I will be on the lookout for material. The notion of a 'bite and hold' battle is one that I have given a lot of thought to. The assumption behind this type of battle is that the Germans would counter-attack a 'bite' that was being firmly 'held'. Multiple counter-attacks would bleed the Germans, and make up for the losses incurred by the British is making the 'bite'.

There are three requirements, at least, to make such a strategy work in the way you describe:

1. The initial attack had to be successful.

2. The 'bite' had to be large enough to evoke a significant response and to prevent heavy losses in a small salient.

3. The Germans had to keep counter-attacking until they have lost more men.

I just want to comment on the latter. The Germans recognised two main types of counter-attack. The immediate counter-attack implied a rapid response to the initial attack, hitting the attackers when they had become disorganised during the attack. Sometimes, this would involve very local reserves. Sometimes, larger numbers of reserves would come up from further back. The second type of counter-attack was a deliberate, well-planned counter-strike, typically executed days or weeks later. In the event of a single 'bite and hold' operation, it was not uncommon to see both types of counter-attack used. It was not common, however, to see the Germans persistently attack if either type of counter-attack failed. Neuve Chapelle was a good example. Once the deliberate counter-attack failed, the Germans then cut their losses and consolidated a new line further back. Repeated counter-attacks, such that the Germans incurred significant losses, occurred in campaigns where multiple battles were fought back-to-back and relentless forward pressure was applied.

All I have read suggests that the French wanted prolonged pressure on the Germans. A single 'bite and hold' operation was not going to achieve this, even if the Serre-Thiepval-Pozieres area had been successfully captured. Once the initial counter-attacks had failed, the Germans would have consolidated. Within a couple of weeks at most, the action would have died down. Provided the Germans felt that the bite was small enough to be contained, then it is unlikely that resources would have been shifted from Verdun.

If the French wanted prolonged pressure applied to the Germans, then this meant significant British casualties. If Foch and/or other French commanders implied that the former could happen without the latter, then I would respectively submit that Des' point becomes highly pertinent.

As it happens, I do not think that any major attack, no matter where it took place, would have captured significant ground. Vimy Ridge and Messines are examples of highly spectacular successful attacks of great psychological value. In the overall scheme of things, however, the amount of ground captured was miniscule compared with what was needed to retake all of occupied France. In the latter half of 1916, it was vital that the Entente wrested the initiative from the Germans.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

However France did not expect Britain to make a sacrificial slaughter - but rather a bite and hold battle in which Britain would kill proportionately more Germans than they would take casualties.

Jon, the following quotes from Charteris are relevant:

'January 9 [1916]. Joffre has written suggesting that the Germans may attack the French near the Somme, and wants proposals for a counter-attack by our troops near than front, or alternatively a scheme to move British troops to help the French in resisting the attack.

January 20. Joffre was here this morning to discuss details and date of the great offensive. Apparently the idea that Germany would attack on the Somme has petered out - if it ever really existed except as a reason to get us to submit a scheme for a counter-attack. Joffre... wants us to make a preliminary attack in April with a limited objective north of the Somme. He thinks the Germans are very depressed.

February 8. DH has sent an official reply to Joffre, that he does not agree to our doing a series of preparatory attacks in April and May, if the big offensive is not coming off until late in the summer, and saying that preparatory attacks should be within one or two weeks of the main attack. Meantime we go on with preparations for one big preparatory attack at Arras, which become the big attack, if required to relieve pressure on Russia, where the Germans are reported to by massing their troops. Joffre is coming to discuss this, presumably to try to get DH to change his view. He will not succeed. I am sure Flanders is the right place to hit. I think DH agrees, but the Operations section (or some of them) are all for the Somme, on account of it being much easier ground to attack over.

There are beginning to be signs that the Germans may forestall our attack by themselves attacking in France.

February 11. There are definite reports showing that the Germans are going to attack on the Western Front, and GQG say it will be at Verdun. Meanwhile, Joffre's plans have reached us. The main attack, French and British, is to be astride the Somme, us to the north, they to the south, only a preparatory attack in Flanders, just before the big one in July. The Arras show to go on in April.

February 15. At the Conference the date of the big offensive was fixed for July 1, the Flanders attack a week or two earlier. But it now seems certain that the Germans are going to attack in France, probably at Verdun...

February 23. The Germans have attacked at Verdun. The French are not sure whether it is a big attack or only preparatory to a big attack elsewhere, but want us both to take over the line from them and to attack.

March 4. Joffre writes hopefully of Verdun. The Germans are attacking more vigorously, but the French have still 10 divisions available in reserve. Joffre wants us to attack all out, as soon as possible. That would be in six weeks' time at the earliest.

March 30. A long and very important communication from the French, giving details of Joffre's proposal for the big attack. He wants no preparatory effort, but everything available devoted to one big effort. There are many further details to be fixed up, the chief being that both infantry attacks must be simultaneous and not like Loos.

May 1. Verdun has still further reduced French divisions available for the big attack. Probably not more than 10 will be available... DH looks on it as a "wearing out" battle, with just the off-chance that it may wear the Germans right out. But this is improbable. Joffre still thinks a break-through just possible.'

There is no other relevant information about the French view of the Somme offensive in the remaining entries leading up to July 1.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

However France did not expect Britain to make a sacrificial slaughter - but rather a bite and hold battle in which Britain would kill proportionately more Germans than they would take casualties.

What eviedence do you have for this?

I would think that France did not care what Britian did in regard to casualties so long as they took away pressure from the Verdun slaughter. They had seen enough of their own blood spilt to care how others spilt theres IMO.

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, I have not read anything to suggest that 'France' expected Britain would fight in the way you describe, but I will be on the lookout for material. The notion of a 'bite and hold' battle is one that I have given a lot of thought to. The assumption behind this type of battle is that the Germans would counter-attack a 'bite' that was being firmly 'held'. Multiple counter-attacks would bleed the Germans, and make up for the losses incurred by the British is making the 'bite'.

Certainly my interpretation is that neither Foch nor Joffre expected Haig to attack in the manner he did. As you are no doubt aware both men visited Haig in late June and remonstrated with him when they became aware of his broader strategy to breakthrough and roll up to Arras . Haig refused to change his strategy, Joffre went off in a huff and Foch appears to have reconciled himself to limiting his anger to comments to Dillon.

Can I suggest you look out for articles by Dr. William Philpott – or even better if you get the chance, hear him lecture/present. He is widely acknowledged in the academic fraternity as the leading British historian on France and the Great War – ot at least he is invited to talk on the French army at most “primarily for academics” lectures I get the opportunity to attend. My particular reference for the attrition (which I know Armourer-Sergeant has asked me for below) are the notes I took from Philpot's lecture at the "Kent University & Defence Studies, King's College, London at JSCSC" 3-day presentation entitled "The Somme: 90 Years On" held 17-19 July 2006.

All I have read suggests that the French wanted prolonged pressure on the Germans. A single 'bite and hold' operation was not going to achieve this, even if the Serre-Thiepval-Pozieres area had been successfully captured. Once the initial counter-attacks had failed, the Germans would have consolidated. Within a couple of weeks at most, the action would have died down. Provided the Germans felt that the bite was small enough to be contained, then it is unlikely that resources would have been shifted from Verdun.

Absolutely right to say the French wanted to inflict prolonged pressure. I believe that in the successful French sector, that with the odd exception, the French army did not go beyond its day objectives (contrast this with the British army order to exploit opportunities that may arise - I am not sure of exact quote). As I understand it the French took their objectives in stages and then repelled German counter attacks if forthcoming, before bringing up their guns to bear on the newly targeted German positions and then push on to their next objective. Foch had been particularly damning of Haig’s insistence that his first wave were to push on to the next objective. A feature of the French success was that their first wave also mopped up behind them. In the British example, if men got in to the first German line, they were pushing on to the second without the first line being secured, and with disasterous results.

If the French wanted prolonged pressure applied to the Germans, then this meant significant British casualties. If Foch and/or other French commanders implied that the former could happen without the latter, then I would respectively submit that Des' point becomes highly pertinent.

That may well be the case but I stand by my comment that the French expected a scenario where the British would inflict proportionately higher losses on the enemy. As I said earlier, or in another thread, Foch in his summing up of the British operation said "Lots of them, clunsy, huge losses".

As it happens, I do not think that any major attack, no matter where it took place, would have captured significant ground. Vimy Ridge and Messines are examples of highly spectacular successful attacks of great psychological value. In the overall scheme of things, however, the amount of ground captured was miniscule compared with what was needed to retake all of occupied France. In the latter half of 1916, it was vital that the Entente wrested the initiative from the Germans.

But that’s just it – it wasn’t neccessarily about capturing significant ground. If I remember rightly that was not even a major consideration in Rawlinson’s original plan. The intention was to draw the Germans in so as to kill or incapacitate as many of them as possible for as little loss to your own side.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

What eviedence do you have for this?

I would think that France did not care what Britian did in regard to casualties so long as they took away pressure from the Verdun slaughter. They had seen enough of their own blood spilt to care how others spilt theres IMO.

Arm

Arm - please see relevant comment in my post at 9:49pm.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

May 1. Verdun has still further reduced French divisions available for the big attack. Probably not more than 10 will be available... DH looks on it as a "wearing out" battle, with just the off-chance that it may wear the Germans right out. But this is improbable. Joffre still thinks a break-through just possible.'

There is no other relevant information about the French view of the Somme offensive in the remaining entries leading up to July 1.

Robert - I'll try and look at these quotes tomorrow if I get time. Not sure how relevant they all are as they are prior to April 1916 when the French plan was being revised, so I have only concentrated on the May 1 quote.

If this is an accurate statement by Charteris then around this time I cannot say to what extent Foch had discussed with Joffre the post-Verdun change of tactics for the French participation in the Somme. I believe around this date Joffre certainly had two more pressing issues - Verdun being the obvious, and I believe Joffre had some direct responsibility in the negotiation of Rumania's entry into the war.

To be honest I just dont see how Joffre expected a breakthrough when the French participation had been so diluted due to Verdun. Possibly higher politics were being played out.

Regards,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

More from Charteris:

'July 4. Joffre and Foch were here yesterday. DH tells me the purpose of this visit was to get him to change his plans, and attack again on our left flank. It is difficult to see why they should wish to interfere. Anyhow, no change is being made.

September 25. The French on our right are disappointing. I am afraid they are played out for this year. It is not to be wondered at, for they had almost all of their fighting in 1915, and a tremendous doing at Verdun. DH tells me that Foch quite realises this and used the expression, "L'infanterie francaise n'existe plus". This is an exaggeration, of course, for it means only at this period and this portion of the line.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The British Official History records the meeting between Haig, Joffre and Foch thus:

'The outcome of General Rawlinson's meeting with General Foch on the morning of the 3rd was the arrival of the latter with General Joffre himself at advanced GHQ about 3pm for the first personal interchange of views since the start of the offensive. The French commanders objected to the weight of the attack being directed against the Longueval - Contalmaison front: they wanted the main effort to be a renewed assault farther north - Pozieres to Thiepval - where it had already failed. General Joffre went so far as to order the British Commander-in-Chief to carry out this operation.

Sir Douglas Haig showed that his supply of gun ammunition was insufficient to enable him to press his attack with equal strength on the whole front: he was obliged to concentrate his efforts upon one portion. As General Joffre still persisted in his view, although his only argument was that Sir Douglas Haig proposed to depart from the original plan, the British C-in-C felt obliged to point out that he was responsible solely to his own Government, and must decline to pursue a tactical plan of which he did not approve.'

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

More from Charteris:

'July 4. Joffre and Foch were here yesterday. DH tells me the purpose of this visit was to get him to change his plans, and attack again on our left flank. It is difficult to see why they should wish to interfere. Anyhow, no change is being made.

September 25. The French on our right are disappointing. I am afraid they are played out for this year. It is not to be wondered at, for they had almost all of their fighting in 1915, and a tremendous doing at Verdun. DH tells me that Foch quite realises this and used the expression, "L'infanterie francaise n'existe plus". This is an exaggeration, of course, for it means only at this period and this portion of the line.'

Robert

Robert - I'm not a great fan of Charteris.

The July 4 comment is well known. With good reason the French wanted the British to attack in the northern sector, which the Germans would be forced to defend but if captured was also the key for progressing the offensive.

With regard to the September 25 quote then from what I understand Foch knew, even before 1 July, that there was only so much he could expect his army to do on the Somme.

Regards,

Jon