New Army untried on the Somme.

[armourersergeant]

"A GHQ note, issued by Chief of the General Staff Sir Launcelot Kiggell, on 8 May 1916 reminded the Divisions that the officers and men of the New Armies were as yet untried, and that the general quality of the army was not what it had been a year ago. The army could now only react to fixed orders and could not be expected to take appropriate tactical action at a local level. When attacking, infantry must do so in lines or waves, at least four lines deep." Taken from Chris Bakers The Long Long Trail

Looking at this statment it seems to be not accurate. Yes the new army units were generally inexpereinced however some were not without blooding 9th, 12th, 19th,21st had seen action at Loos the previous year and many had taken part in smaller actions, which whilst defensive in nature or small were still 'action'.

Whilst I admit that the regular divisions had been out since 1914 in many instances, if we take the Somme in isolation and as an attacking offensive, surely the new army divsions used had a certain amount of experience from Loos?

Did the structure of the regular and territorial divisions have more experienced soldiers in them come July 1916? Any division out since 1914 would have suffered high casualties surely?

comments please.

Arm

Edited 1 February , 2015 by SPOF

[PhilB]

Perhaps Kiggell thought the plans for the advance should be standardized to suit those divisions he considered the slowest, least experienced. Though how they have been so inexperienced after 2 years training makes me wonder about the efficacy of that training. Certainly, members of 31 division considered themselves to have been largely unprepared for what they encountered on 1/7/16. Phil B

[armourersergeant]

Phil,

I think he/it refers to want of shell and shot experience and in particualr moving in the advance under battle conditions. my arguement is that those that fought at Loos certainly had that!

Arm

[the gunners dream]

I think the evidence is there to suggest that most had not seen any major offensive action, e.g. major battles. I also feel that the statement is talking about the troops in the line for the 1st July 1916. Yes certain Divisions had been around, for instance the 29th had been at Gallipoli, but most were untried and untested in major battles.

Look at what Rawlinson was considering with the 30th Division. He'd actually considered pulling them out of the line and replacing them with more experienced troops.

The divisions you mention didn't see any major offensive action on the 1st.

The 9th didn't see action on the first day and relieved the 30th Division on the 2nd.

The 19th were also in reserve on the first day awaiting to move towards Bapaume with the cavalry. They only moved up to the line in the afternoon.

The 12th relieved the battered 8th Division and attacked Ovillers on the 3rd July.

The 21st was also in reserve and did not take up positions around Fricourt until the 2nd.

Evidence also suggests that casualties were not high before the 1st july. Most war diaries will list maybe one or two per day, sometimes that was higher, but in the great scheme of things that was considered light.

My own Great Grandfathers battalion, the 8th Buffs also saw action at Loos on the 26th Sep 15. They were part of the ill fated 24th Division. Their casualties were so high that day that they did not see any offensive action until 1916. They spent most of their time around Ploegsteert Wood and only saw one trench raid in June of 1916, they then moved to the Somme.

On the 18th August 1916 they saw action around Guillemont and Delville Wood. Their experience there was better than Sep 15, but they still took heavy casualties and in the words of my own relative, he stated.

'Been in a carry on on the Guillemont Front. Never seen anything like it, it didn't last any more than half an hour, but the boys held on. Have been wounded in the foot and thigh...'

None of the divisions you mention have an easy time that summer, nor did any for that matter. Experience did count in certain cases, but then in most it didn't. The Somme just became a charnal house for all, German and Commonwealth.

Steve

[Desmond7]

I think the note reflects more on the mindset of many senior officers with Kigell being the example here.

Certainly a number of new army formations had 'offensive battle experience' for want of a better catch-all phrase. But probably should be remembered that these formations would have suffered fairly stiff casualties in their actions around Loos and the daily grind of warfare on the Western Front. Therefore, the need to train up drafts etc would, in all probability, have been given second place to the demands on their (i.e. the unit's) time for the essential but mundane/non infantry work of battle area preparation (logistics/road building/digging etc).

Having said that - it is my firm belief that the senior commanders did under-estimate the fighting qualities/level of intelligence of the new army formations (wide statement).

FINALLY - and this has been debated before.

In reading many unit accounts of battle, in-depth histories and (in WW2 period) the reports of psychologists, I would put forward the following relevant argument.

ON many occasions (not all by any means) soldiers/units who have experienced the true face of battle in all its horror are not necessarily the right men to launch into an all out assault. Both 51st Highland and 7th Armoured came to Normandy with (rightfully) high reputations.

However, their men felt disgruntled about being tossed into the fray again and were ALL TOO AWARE of what lay before them.

Is their merit to this argument in WW1 terms/evidence is surely out there to dismiss/reinforce this theory.

Des

[Bernardlewis]

The 38th (Welsh) Division went over to France early December 1915. Did a few trench raids etc. and suffered the usual front line attrition in its early days.

First big 'show' was the attack on Mametz Wood in early July 1916. In a few days fighting the Division suffered 14% (4000) of its entire casualty list for the whole of the war. It was not committed as an entire unit again until 31 July 1917 - first day of Third Ypres...so hardly a gentle reintroduction.

Bernard

[the gunners dream]

Des has a big point here. Without trying not to detract that this is a WWI site and not WWII, but the 7th Armoured in Normandy also had what I consider a blase attitude. You only have to look at what happened on the 13th June 1944 at Villers Bocage to see this.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Villers-Bocage

Steve

[Justin Moretti]

Without trying not to detract that this is a WWI site and not WWII

I think if you're trying to draw a valid comparison, mentioning other wars is quite acceptable (especially when you are talking about the same nation's army).

Somewhat off topic: When I saw in the thread title column "New Army untried on the Somme" and in the adjacent last post author column "The Gunner's Dream", I could not suppress a grim smile. They go together so well...

[armourersergeant]

The 21st was also in reserve and did not take up positions around Fricourt until the 2nd.

Evidence also suggests that casualties were not high before the 1st july. Most war diaries will list maybe one or two per day, sometimes that was higher, but in the great scheme of things that was considered light.

Steve

Steve,

I did not feel the comments were directed for day one but in general for the battle, so I included those involved in the first few days.

Secondly, certainly you are right in most instances of deployment however 21st Division was in the line on 1st july, by 8.25am 64th brigade reported being across the German front line and near the Sunken road! and 50th brigade whilst not a 21st div bge was under command and in the line. 63rd and 62nd were also involved from day one.

regards

Arm

[the gunners dream]

Arm,

Yep, missed that! It's my age! Although I thought they attacked from Fricourt, or are talking of another Sunken Road?

Steve

[armourersergeant]

At July 1916 the men of 9th, 12th, 19th and 21st division would have felt their experiences at Loos may have qualified them as blooded. They were new army units but would have felt themselves more expereinced from Loos than other newer new army units who would go over the top with them. Whilst understanding they would not have seen as much service as the regulars.

My main point is that the phrase/comments seems to imply that the new army had not been used as yet in the war and gives an unfair representation IMO of the New army.

regards

Arm

[armourersergeant]

Arm,

Yep, missed that! It's my age! Although I thought they attacked from Fricourt, or are talking of another Sunken Road?

Steve

oops , me this time, not reading the notes correctly! 9th KOYLI was in sunken road, obviously the reserve battn.

regards

Arm

[the gunners dream]

I think if you're trying to draw a valid comparison, mentioning other wars is quite acceptable (especially when you are talking about the same nation's army).

Somewhat off topic: When I saw in the thread title column "New Army untried on the Somme" and in the adjacent last post author column "The Gunner's Dream", I could not suppress a grim smile. They go together so well...

Justin,

Thanks for that, again trying not to detract from the topic, The Gunners Dream, as you may know comes from this album by Pink Floyd:

The Gunner's Dream (Waters)

Floating down through the clouds

Memories come rushing up to meet me now.

In the space between the heavens

and in the corner of some foreign field

I had a dream.

I had a dream.

Good-bye Max.

Good-bye Ma.

After the service when you're walking slowly to the car

And the silver in her hair shines in the cold November air

You hear the tolling bell

And touch the silk in your lapel

And as the tear drops rise to meet the comfort of the band

You take her frail hand

And hold on to the dream.

A place to stay

"Oi! A real one ..."

Enough to eat

Somewhere old heroes shuffle safely down the street

Where you can speak out loud

About your doubts and fears

And what's more no-one ever disappears

You never hear their standard issue kicking in your door.

You can relax on both sides of the tracks

And maniacs don't blow holes in bandsmen by remote control

And everyone has recourse to the law

And no-one kills the children anymore.

And no one kills the children anymore.

Night after night

Going round and round my brain

His dream is driving me insane.

In the corner of some foreign field

The gunner sleeps tonight.

What's done is done.

We cannot just write off his final scene.

Take heed of his dream.

Take heed.

It's quite apt when you're talking about their experiences.

Steve

[Jonathan Saunders]

Yes the new army units were generally inexpereinced however some were not without blooding 9th, 12th, 19th,21st had seen action at Loos the previous year

A small point to consider. You are right that the first service battalions took part at Loos but several of these battalions lost many officers and men, including the regular officers and NCOs that had been assigned to the battalion on its formation, not only at Loos but in the course of the attritional warfare that followed up to 1 July 1916.

Even a so-called "blooded" new army unit could be full of officers just arrived from the OTC and newly arrived reinforcements, untested and IMHO, in many cases, ill-prepared and ill-trained.

[the gunners dream]

oops , me this time, not reading the notes correctly! 9th KOYLI was in sunken road, obviously the reserve battn.

regards

Arm

I was only going by the Official History which lists the 21st as being in reserve, but then that'll teach me to not look at other sources before posting!

I still think this was a general concern by the powers that be before the 1st July, but as Bernard points out units such as the 38th Welsh Division had a hell of a time and I feel experience meant nothing on the Somme.

Ernst Junger's own regiment was an experienced unit on the German side and his experiences at Guillemont in August of 1916 effectively saw his regiment wiped out.

http://www.juenger.org/biography_3.php

How can the best trained unit expect to operate as a cohesive unit if its been hit hard by artillery and machine gun fire?

Steve

[armourersergeant]

A small point to consider. You are right that the first service battalions took part at Loos but several of these battalions lost many officers and men, including the regular officers and NCOs that had been assigned to the battalion on its formation, not only at Loos but in the course of the attritional warfare that followed up to 1 July 1916.

Even a so-called "blooded" new army unit could be full of officers just arrived from the OTC and newly arrived reinforcements, untested and IMHO, in many cases, ill-prepared and ill-trained.

But then surely the same could be said of the regular divisions, esp if they have seen more action, after all where did the new recruits for the regular battalions come from.

In what context do you say "ill-prepared and ill-trained". As formations or individuals. If so do you feel the training camps at home before 1916 were inadequate? Given the success of 36th, 18th, 21st and others (comparetivley) on 1st July 1916, and allowing for the positions they stromed etc, this would not bear this out, would it?

regards

Tubby

[Desmond7]

Arm - it has to be said that even Kigell makes that very point 'the quality of the army is not what it was etc'

Perhaps his quote/reference should be looked at in the overall context of the Battle itself.

It was to be (85% of it anyway) an all-British affair. Drawn up, implemented and purely in the hands of the British staff. Obviously they wanted success .. but does that sneaking feeling of 'back covering' grow in your mind the more you read such statements?

After all, the British 'new army' was officered by men who had never in their wildest dreams expected to command such awesome forces.

Perhaps the 'regualr' military mind feared the responsibility of command more than is thought?

End result - for the most part - a slow, drawnnnn outttt methodical, plodding, obvious, tedious battle plan.

Perhaps they should have given the citizen soldiers their 'head' - at least they would have stood a chance of beating the Germans in the race to the parapet?

I find myself sitting on the fence in respect to training - I've already stated that it is my belief that even with their basic training, the new armies could have been trusted to accomplish more in military terms than they were ...

But, as already stated, how much of that basic training had faded during the time when the demands on their time were more focussed on providing labour for the war machine's engineers and logisticians?

[Ken Lees]

Wasn't the inexperience most marked in the Artillery, as opposed to the infantry? Due to lack of time on the front, lack of previous experience in 'big battles' and the lack of shells throughout 1915, many artillery units had yet to develop the skills required to be effective.

They failed to subdue the enemy artillery, machine guns, etc. and therefore the best trained infantry were doomed to failure.

Was the lack of effective, experienced leadership at the higher levels in the divisions also a contributory factor in forming Kiggell's view? Perhaps he thought that the senior divisional officers lacked the experience to command and control their forces effectively.

As always, more questions than answers.

[squirrel]

I would be inclined to agree that he was making the point about inexperienced junior officers in the battalions and some inexperienced staff officers at most levels.

No matter how much training you have, nothing properly equips you for your first battle.

There is a point made in the Book, Somme The Death of a Generation, name of the author escaped me, about some of the artillery units being "amateurs" as they had little experience of firing their weapons and discipline was not all that it should have been.

[Old Tom]

Hello,

Wielding a very broad brush, its my opinion that the whole BEF, at that time, was 'untried'. The C in C had not been in post very long, Commander 4th Army had not commanded an army before and, I have read, none of the Corps Commanders had commanded their Corps in action. I don't know how much experience the CGS had at that time. Another broad brush - his time might have been better spent ensuring that his boss was better briefed when deciding the objectives for all the major stages of the campaign on the Somme in 1916.

Old Tom

At the divisional level and below there was a considerable variation of experience and, I suspect, some commanders were better than others.

[Old Tom]

Hello again,

Always was a careless typist, sorry! Old Tom should have been at the end.

Old, but not wiser, Tom

[Jonathan Saunders]

But then surely the same could be said of the regular divisions, esp if they have seen more action, after all where did the new recruits for the regular battalions come from.

In what context do you say "ill-prepared and ill-trained". As formations or individuals. If so do you feel the training camps at home before 1916 were inadequate? Given the success of 36th, 18th, 21st and others (comparetivley) on 1st July 1916, and allowing for the positions they stromed etc, this would not bear this out, would it?

regards

Tubby

Tubby,

Noted your reply and I will respond in kind soonest.

All the best,

Knobbly

[PhilB]

The army could now only react to fixed orders and could not be expected to take appropriate tactical action at a local level. When attacking, infantry must do so in lines or waves, at least four lines deep." [/i] Taken from Chris Bakers The Long Long Trail

And yet, at the same time, giving assurance that "You`ll be able to light your pipes and stroll over - there won`t be a rat alive in the German trenches"? Phil B

[Jonathan Saunders]

But then surely the same could be said of the regular divisions, esp if they have seen more action, after all where did the new recruits for the regular battalions come from.

In what context do you say "ill-prepared and ill-trained". As formations or individuals. If so do you feel the training camps at home before 1916 were inadequate? Given the success of 36th, 18th, 21st and others (comparetivley) on 1st July 1916, and allowing for the positions they stromed etc, this would not bear this out, would it?

regards

Tubby

Tubby - reply as promised. Sorry short lunch hour today and just finished writing, so apologise now for any errors.

But then surely the same could be said of the regular divisions, esp if they have seen more action, after all where did the new recruits for the regular battalions come from. Absolutely correct although I expect the regular army units may have had a moderately higher ratio of experienced regulars/reservists (officers and ORs) to volunteers compared to the new Service battalions and the slightest experience did count.

In what context do you say "ill-trained". If so do you feel the training camps at home before 1916 were inadequate? As individuals my general reflection on the position is that the men were ill-prepared and ill-trained at an individual level and at the formation level. There were of course exceptions. Looking at the training then my first observation is that their were not enough experienced instructors for the volumes of men joining the army, neither were their enough senior NCOs at battalion level to develop the training. I am sure they all spent their allotted week or three weeks etc at Musketry school, were instructed in bomb throwing etc but these were probably the only instances when recruits saw rifles or Mills grenades. I am sure we have all read of instances where men were given their own rifle virtually as they were boarding a boat for F&F. So I would conclude that there is argument that the men were ill-trained although they were very good at route marching or sticking hanging sandbags.

In what context do you say “ill-prepared”. As formations and individuals then yes the men were instructed with out-door dioramas of the location of German trenches, forward saps, wire, strong-points etc. Much good use was made of the RFC observation and photography. Yet I remain unconvinced that the men were given practical tactical instruction/exercise. We all know Rawly thought the men would be inadequate to comprehend battle tactics. (He was of course quite wrong. The ORs volunteers of these Service battalions were often extremely bright working class men, with occupations such as accountants, architects, school-masters etc.) Whether it is truth or myth concerning subalterns shot in the back by their own men, well I guess it is impossible to say it didn’t happen, but I am sure, whilst believing that many of these new subalterns were of the required standard to be officers leading men, that some were not and that some should not have been put in that position in the first place. So ill-prepared formations – I think it depended on many factors. Sometimes the answer will be “yes” and other times “not”.

As has already been mentioned – the training of the new artillery was woefully inadequate. Often with subalterns completely out of their depth leading gun crews and gunners who simply did not have the experience or the hours under their belts to be competent.

Given the success of 36th, 18th, 21st and others (comparativley) on 1st July 1916, and allowing for the positions they stormed etc, this would not bear this out, would it? I think I disagree. First of all what success? Lets take the 36th Ulster Dvn. Although this sounds harsh, it is not meant to be, but they did fail in all their objectives. The Division had in fact been poorly trained until Nugent took them over I think (and I would be happy for any 36 Div man to correct me). I believe they had high rates of various dismeanours whilst training in the UK. I do not know enough about Nugent but he was obviously some leader of men. I believe he was also lucky to have at least two very competent battalion COs amongst the first wave but I forget their names. The initial successes at the Schwaben and Thiepval were I believe, in large part due to the fact that the men had started off from a lying down position in NMLs. This meant they got to the German first line before the Germans had retaken their positions. It gave them a fighting chance and the men of the 36 Dvn showed just what could be achieved. Regrettably, due to the fact that counter-battery work had been minimal in this sector (ill-prepared by the Corps Commander and his MGRA!) the German guns behind Pozieres pounded NML so that the first wave could not be reinforced. As we know, after holding out for considerable time, the men of the 36 Div had to retire after enduring enfilade fire and heavy shelling. All in all, I would say the attack failed due to poor preparation at a formation level.

18 Div were very fortunate for two reasons. Firstly, they had Maxse, secondly, they had the benefit of the French 75s. The French 75s reduced German artillery work in this sector to virtually nil. Was it Maxse that dug the tunnels or pits out into NML so that as with the 36 Ulster Dvn the men were able to be in the German trenches before the Germans could react once the shelling stopped. Also Maxse was able to send his second wave immediately on the heels of the first wave, adding weight and momentum to his offensive. Despite this early success the 18 Div obtained no more than their first objective. I would say any successes were owed largely to Maxse understanding how to conduct an offensive on the WF and of course, the accurate counter-battery and preparation work of the experienced gun crews on the French 75s. To be honest, I doubt training back in Blighty had little to do with any successes the 18 Div are perceived to have had.

21st at Fricourt. Wasnt that decimated 10/West Yorks part of 21 Div? I don’t know much about 21 Div I am afraid. The troops did have the benefit of a creeping barrage so they only had 50 or 100 yds to move to the German first line when the barrage lifted. Also, I think again, the counter-battery preparation had silenced the German guns. There were also diversionary mines to confuse the Germans. I guess this is one example of where the division were blessed with artillery preparation from experienced gun teams rather than any training back in Blighty, which I assume would have been the same training conducted by the men at Gommecourt, Serre, Beaumont Hamel etc.

Apart from perceived success on the opening day of the Somme battle, the 36, 18 and 21 Divs also shared one other similarity. They all sustained high casualties. And this brings me on to my new thoughts concerning the learning curve or learning process. Learning for whom? This so-called blooding of the new battalions at the Somme didn’t, as far as I can see, do much for the learning process of the men of the Newfoundland Regiment at Beaumont Hamel, the 10 West Yorks etc. Not many of the men of those battalions learnt much on 1st July, neither did there training back in Blighty do them much good.

[Desmond7]

Nugent did kick out a number of officers who he regarded as over-age, unreliable and a few 'political appointees'.

With regards to high rates of misdemeanours ... aside from some issues with the Belfast Brigade which was sent 'on attachment' to, I think, ?4th Division? to 'tighten them up' , I would honestly say that I have read of very few misdemeanours. B the way, it is said that the Belfast boys would have been quite happy to stay with their new comrades but it was decided to bring them back into the Divisional family. Others may view this transfer as just a training exercise but I do believe it was a 'sort 'em out' episode.

There is a book out there on the subject of discipline in the irish divisions in WW1 ... which may either blow me out of the water (entirely possible!) or roughly agree with my view.

With regard to training - I think it would be fair to say that the 36th (as did all formations) did the best with what they had to hand. Former UVF men who 'could shoot the eye out of a crow with a Mauser or steyr' had to retrain with the SMLE and at first disliked the weapon.

However, I do think Kitchener's remark that they were the 'best new army formation' he had seen when he reviewed them at Seaforde should not be dismissed as mere hype.

Nugent was a very tough leader. The CO of 108 Brigade had to re-assure regulars of the 2nd Rifles when they were transferred into the Division about Nugent's personality.

It was explained that Nugent was not a man for extravagant praise in any circumstances - and was not up for chat for chat's sake.

He is said to have peeved quite a few of the 1st July survivors by telling them: "The Division has done well .. but it could have done better."

At least one soldier rememebered those words until his death: "Many of us thought him anything but a gentleman," he is recorded as saying.

Having said all that, there is no doubt that it was efficient, businesslike Nugent who truly moulded the formation into a (IMHO) one of the best Divs on Western Front.

Aside from that, the synopsis of the 36th's attack is perfectly accurate in my view. They simply won the race to the parapet. Top class essay. Have a gold star.