New Army untried on the Somme.

[Old Tom]

Hello,

Many thanks Robert for your response. I marvel at how you find the time.

Old Tom

[Robert Dunlop]

Its a pleasure, Old Tom. As you can probably tell, this is an issue that I am very interested in.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Annoyingly I have found it difficult in the past to find a great deal in English text on the French part of the battle. However I have always understood that the French successes were due in part to thorough preparation, including good counter-battery work and also surprise tactics ie staggered jumping off times. In many ways the French attack on 1 July was a model of what could be achieved although I assume no where near as difficult a task as capturing the high ground from Serre to Thiepval.

No problem at all, Jon. You are right. There is very little written in English about the French involvement on the Somme. This is in keeping with the literature generally, not just the Somme in particular.

With respect to counter-battery work, it should be recalled that the French had considerably more experience. This is brought home in Fraser-Tytler's book 'Field Guns in France'. He was stationed next to the French, and spent some time with his opposite numbers. He describes some of the lessons that he learned. Spears gives insights into this as well, but his book 'Prelude to Victory' post-dates the Somme offensive, even though he was the Liaison Officer at that time for the French Sixth Army. The difference in experience extended to the infantry as well. By this time in the war, French forces had lost huge numbers of men by comparison to the BEF.

The counter-battery work of the French was greatly aided by a significant factor. Across the more than 10 miles of front covered by the French, they were faced with only eight heavy batteries, as best I can tell. Oh, if only the BEF had so few to deal with. Why so few, so very few on the French front? All the attention of the German command was drawn to the north, especially Gommecourt, Serre and Thiepval. The artillery reinforcements all went to these areas. The deliberately visible British preparations drew the expected response. This played into the hands of the French.

The BEF's preparations were so compelling that despite the German command detecting the influx of French divisions to the south, they did nothing significant to prevent what happened there on July 1.

The different timing of the attack would have had a minimal influence, IMHO.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I am talking from prior to 7:30 on 1 July, that is to say when it was still perceived by some to be a break-through battle that might turn into attrition if things goes really badly, as they did.

Jon, the perception that July 1 was a breakthrough battle, as opposed to a battle where a breakthrough might occur so let's be ready for this, is a modern (mis)interpretation. General Rawlinson's formal Fourth Army Operation Order, dated 14th June, 1916, clearly stated:

"1. The Fourth Army will take part in a general offensive with a view to breaking up the enemy's defensive system, and of exploiting to the full all opportunities opened up for defeating his forces within reach.

2. The Third, First and Second Armies are undertaking offensive operations at various points along their fronts in conformity with the attack of the Fourth Army.

The objectives of the Third Army will include an attack on Gommecourt, which will be simultaneous with the attack of the Fourth Army.

3. The French will assume the offensive on both banks of the Somme...

4. The three successive (my emphasis) tasks of the Fourth Army are:-

i) To capture the enemy's defenses on the line Montauban - Pozieres - Serre, forming a strong defensive flank on the Grandcourt - Serre ridge.

ii) To extend the defensive flank from Grandcourt to Martinpuich (3 miles north of Montauban), and, at the same time, advance our line eastward to the line Montauban - Martinpuich.

iii) To attack eastward from the line Montauban - Martinpuich, and then secure the Bazentin le Grand - Ginchy plateau.

The operations of the Fourth Army will be divided into phases as outlined above.

5. The first day's operations will include the capture and consolidation of Montauban, Contalmaison, Pozieres, and Serre.

As soon as this line has been gained and consolidated, preparations will immediately be undertaken to commence the second phase of operations."

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

No problem at all, Jon. You are right. There is very little written in English about the French involvement on the Somme. This is in keeping with the literature generally, not just the Somme in particular.

With respect to counter-battery work, it should be recalled that the French had considerably more experience. This is brought home in Fraser-Tytler's book 'Field Guns in France'. He was stationed next to the French, and spent some time with his opposite numbers. He describes some of the lessons that he learned. Spears gives insights into this as well, but his book 'Prelude to Victory' post-dates the Somme offensive, even though he was the Liaison Officer at that time for the French Sixth Army. The difference in experience extended to the infantry as well. By this time in the war, French forces had lost huge numbers of men by comparison to the BEF.

The counter-battery work of the French was greatly aided by a significant factor. Across the more than 10 miles of front covered by the French, they were faced with only eight heavy batteries, as best I can tell. Oh, if only the BEF had so few to deal with. Why so few, so very few on the French front? All the attention of the German command was drawn to the north, especially Gommecourt, Serre and Thiepval. The artillery reinforcements all went to these areas. The deliberately visible British preparations drew the expected response. This played into the hands of the French.

The BEF's preparations were so compelling that despite the German command detecting the influx of French divisions to the south, they did nothing significant to prevent what happened there on July 1.

The different timing of the attack would have had a minimal influence, IMHO.

Robert

Robert,

I think it is often thought that the French only attacked a small front somewhere south of the British when in fact the French attacked with about as many divisions on a slightly smaller frontage – I thought larger than 10m but you may be right. One area where the French preparation did surpass the British was artillery – the number and weight of guns and shells available per yardage etc. Of course there was nothing in the French sector of attack that measured against the significant and extremely well fortified German positions between Serre and Thiepval and beyond to Pozieres. In this regard the French were somewhat more fortunate. Yet this does not mean that generally speaking the French didn’t use their artillery resource to much better effect than the British – they did, and they really maximised the damage to German guns and trench systems as much as possible.

Switching back to the British sector and the increased difficulties of capturing the significant German defensive positions in the northern sector; this was not unknown to the British command. Yet they completely failed in their 1 July objective and could not come up with a plan to secure this ground (Haig had only had six months to prepare afterall) and in truth it wasn’t even a close call – more of an annihilation. Haig also scored another own goal in his very visible feint for Gommecourt for reasons that have already been pointed out in the Attrition thread. Instead of diverting men and guns away from the high ground by feinting an attack around Arras as was suggested by Allenby, Haig’s decided to feint at Gommecourt and thereby encouraged the Germans to reinforce the area around Serre. For the infantry attack there were forward saps at Serre, similar to those used in the south by 21 and 18 Div and the concept used by 36 Div at Thiepval, that would have allowed the Pals attack around Serre to jump-off 100 yards or so closer to the German line. These saps were not employed and this despite the fact that Smith-Dorrien had encouraged such tactics in the circumstances of trench warfare when he commanded at Aldershot a few years previously.

The other issue that springs to mind is we are told that the 1914 British army was, man for man, the best in the world, or certainly no worse than the men of the German army. In 1914 the French army doesn’t even appear in the discussion of elite fighting forces. Admittedly the British had lost most regular troops, as had the French, in the 2 years of warfare that had elapsed, but the command structure was still basically the same between the British and the French. We didn’t have Smith-Dorrien (sadly) but Haig, Rawlinson, Horne etc were still there and in the ascendancy and the French still had Joffre, Foch etc. So if the French Somme attack to the south was a success is that inferring that the French command was better than the British command? Had the French command actually learnt from the experience of the 1914 and 1915 battles whilst the British stood still in terms of tactics and operations?

It is not acceptable, IMHO, to use inexperience or quality of resource as an excuse for the debacle of 1 July. If anyone was aware of the resources available and if anyone knew what it took in terms of men and hardware required to win a battle then it was Haig. Probably at that time no one knew soldiering like Haig but that does not mean that Haig was the best man to command in the field – he certainly was not as was borne out by the Somme, Cambrai, Passchendale etc. Haig may have known what it took but IMHO he just didn’t have that operational know-how or instinct to win a battle successfully. It would have been much better for all if Haig had been appointed CIGS in 1914, not least for him, where his obvious ability as an administrator and his nuance to play the political game, together with the influential circle of which he was part, would have reaped benefits for the BEF. Instead we had Haig over-seeing, meddling, call it what you will, on the Somme, thus our attack was both broadened and lengthened and with emphasis as a breakthrough battle and by doing so, Haig further compromised the resources available. I think in a very recent thread someone made the point that there was no one else other than Haig but I think there was – for all his lack of moral fibre in standing up for what he believed right, I do think Rawlinson was capable and did generally improve and knew how to learn from his past experiences. Rawlinson’s bite and hold tactics, as outlined in his original strategy for 1 July, were spot on and were how the battle was continued after Haig finally got out of his head this idea of winning by pushing weight of infantry numbers against virtually impregnable German defensive lines/guns.

Another point re staggered timing of attacks in the French sector. I believe one of the French Corps attacked at 10:30 or 11am on 1 July ie. 2+ hours after the main offensive had been launched. I believe (but would be happy to be proved wrong) that the Germans that faced them had become so complacent with the passing of time since the main attack had been launched, that they were taken completely by surprise and the French achieved their objective quite comfortably. (Were they also weakened by being taken from that part of the line to support neighbouring areas)? Despite this you are quite right to suggest the difference in jumping off time may have had only minimal influence as the French generally achieved all their 1 July objectives irrespective of the timing of the attack – still an inspired and novel approach for the day in question.

Just about to read your next message but I am mindful that we are about to go around in circles and also I want to avoid repeating myself from the Attrition thread.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, just to delay the circling, there was another British Liaison Officer serving with the French Sixth Army. Viscount Dillon provided transcripts of his diary entries for the period leading up to July 1. These were published in his book 'Memories of Three Wars'. Dillon's assignment began on May 17, after he was briefed at Montreuil.

On May 18th, he had 'a most interesting talk with Weygand', who was one of Foch's Staff Officers. 'He said he had given orders that I should be shown all orders and instructions issued to armies'. Dillon therefore had access to all the published materials. That evening, 'looking through the French documents, I find... he [Foch] has asked for ammunition on the assumption that the operations [ie the Somme offensive] will last thirty days. My present impression of the French Staff work is not entirely favourable. There is a great deal that is excellent but it is rather of the eye-washy order. However, it is easy to crab and every nationality has its own weak and strong points.

May 23

Got back by lunch time and afterwards Weygand sent for me and showed me Joffre's letter to Douglas Haig saying that only twenty-two divisions would be available for the attack and that the plan must be modified.

May 28

I had a talk with Tavish and told him that General Fayolle had received instructions to carry out an attack which was subsidiary to the British attack; that Weygand considered nineteen the maximum of divisions that Foch would get and that Foch would give Fayolle fourteen.

May 29

Eventually I went in to see the C-in-C [Haig], who looked very well and was very charming. I told him what I gathered from Weygand, that the French aim south of the Somme was to seize the high ground in the angle.

June 12

Everyone disliked the idea of our putting forward our offensive for a week. I talked to Weygand about it, who gives his private opinion that Petain is growing tired which seems probable and not surprising. I don't believe that the French artillery will be ready by the 20th although they say they will, ie all except Weygand who says "more or less ready".

June 16

Rawly, Montgomery[-Massingberd], Fayolle and Duval his Chief of Staff came here for a pow-wow and lunch. Everything appears to have gone off satisfactorily.

June 19

Before going to Montreuil I asked Weygand if I could do anything for him and he wants the date put off. I mentioned it but it is quite out of the question for reasons given elsewhere.

June 20

I had a most interesting talk with General Micheler, commanding the 10th Army. He says Petain won't let anything go and has still one-third of all the French heavy artillery in Champagne where he expects to be attacked.

June 21

Weygand keeps saying that 20th Corps isn't ready. Everybody else says it is the most advanced! I rather feel that the Frenchmen want pushing up to their bit and that they will be ready.

June 27

Went with de Mierry to see the officer commanding the 2nd Colonial Division. After lunch we went to a pylon in Bertonval Wood where we had a wonderful view of the bombardment. Dompierre was fast disappearing.

June 28

Foch sent for me after breakfast and showed me Sir Douglas Haig's letter to General Joffre outlining the former's conception of the battle. He then asked me to show him on a map what it meant. General Foch said he didn't like the plan. He suggested an alternative, and will ask me to see Sir Douglas Haig this afternoon about it.

I went over and saw Sir Douglas Haig, taking with me a paper from Foch embodying his plans. Douglas Haig will have nothing whatever to do with it and says Foch is a wily old devil.

June 29

This evening Foch had another go at me about his plan. He rather got the idea that he thinks DH wants to beat the Boche off his own bat.

July 1

Called at Querrieu at 9.25, where we learned we had got all the front line and the XX Corps had got all its objectives.'

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, just to delay the circling, there was another British Liaison Officer serving with the French Sixth Army. Viscount Dillon provided transcripts of his diary entries for the period leading up to July 1. These were published in his book 'Memories of Three Wars'. Dillon's assignment began on May 17, after he was briefed at Montreuil ...

Hi Robert,

Interesting and important document from Dillon – obviously there are certain provisos with these type of documents but still important all the same.

How unprepared were the French, I don’t know? In fact a bit of an indictment of the British achievement if the French turn up late so to speak, carry off all their objectives and spend the rest of the day clapping each other on the back. I just had a quick google for French losses on Day One and exact French guns and shells available but couldnt find anything to help. I know I have seen in the past number of French guns and shells broken down by calibre I think. I expect this is Prior & Wilson work but I am not going to get a chance to look tonight. However my memory firmly believes that the French had more heavy calibre guns and greater shells of all calibres per yardage of trench. I have to conclude that any lack of interest or commitment on the part of the French didn’t stop them having a good first day.

Interesting that Dillon notes Foch believed Haig wanted to beat the Boche on his own on the Somme, nor was Foch impressed with the British plan.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, the perception that July 1 was a breakthrough battle, as opposed to a battle where a breakthrough might occur so let's be ready for this, is a modern (mis)interpretation. General Rawlinson's formal Fourth Army Operation Order, dated 14th June, 1916, clearly stated ...

Robert – OK I think we are now drifting to the stage of repeating our Attrition exchange, which I was hoping to avoid. Did we ever get to the bottom of the proposed time lag between the First and Second phases?

Thank you for presenting Rawlinson’s Fourth Army Operation Order, dated 14th June, 1916. I do not believe there is anything in Haig’s actions or words leading up and immediately following 1 July that make me believe Haig did not ultimately view the battle as a break-through battle. You will recall men going into battle weighed down with 80 pounds of kit or whatever it was and not to stop but allow the following waves to consolidate ground gained - a nod towards the emphasis in point 1) of the Fourth Army Order “… and of exploiting to the full all opportunities opened up for defeating his forces within reach.” I am in no doubt that Haig fully expected the British army to go beyond the inclusion of capturing and consolidating Montauban, Contalmaison, Pozieres, and Serre on Day One.

Haig fully expected the break-through with his misplaced trust in God and his misplaced trust in the artillery – that is the artillery preparation of the German trenches and the breaking of the German morale, (obviously not the counter-battery work, which as you know I consider to have been pretty poor to non-existent in most sectors).

Haig’s reaction to the disaster of 1 July was to repeat the whole thing again on 3 July. By this time Haig knew the break-through was impossible but there was no change of tactics, no time to reflect and move towards a traditional attritional battle where the British forces might actually kill more Germans than Germans kill them. I see no evidence of fighting a wearing-out battle until much later. I do not see the misconception either – you can basically read into the loosely worded Order of 14 June 1916 what you want. I think the key is not the Order but the actions of Haig and for me his actions indicate a firm belief in a break-through.

Best,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

Yet this does not mean that generally speaking the French didn’t use their artillery resource to much better effect than the British – they did, and they really maximised the damage to German guns and trench systems as much as possible.

Jon, I don't know the extent to which this is true. I have only examined some French sources in detail. I do know that there were significantly fewer German guns facing the French, so that made counter-battery work more likely to be effective. The evidence of the effect is evident in the French infantry regimental histories that I have read. There is very little mention of German artillery fire, similar to the situation reported in the British sector around Montauban. Your comment about trench systems is more difficult to assess. There were definitely situations where advancing French infantry were able to occupy recogniseable trenches. Also, there were examples where German resistance had not been destroyed or suppressed by artillery. The 37th Infantry Regiment struck German machine gun nests in Curlu, which caused severe casualties by "mowing down" the attacking infantry. The village of Frise was not captured easily.

It is very apparent from all of the records that I have examined that, apart from isolated areas such as Curlu & Frise, as well as the resistance from the southern flank, the German defenders were very thinly spread. In many places, the advance appears to have been extremely rapid and met no resistance of any note. This is not associated with descriptions of masses of dead Germans lying around. All of this fits with the report sent by the German Second Army to OHL on 6th June, which stated:

"South of the Somme also the enemy has been reinforced, actually by three French divisions. To oppose them the XVII Corps is too weak, both in infantry and guns. Even against an enemy attack on a narrow front made as a diversion the Guards Corps is also too thin: it is holding 36 kilometres with twelve regiments, and there are no reserves of any kind behind it."

...Haig’s decided to feint at Gommecourt and thereby encouraged the Germans to reinforce the area around Serre.

which meant the Germans did not reinforce the area attacked by the French.

Another point re staggered timing of attacks in the French sector. I believe one of the French Corps attacked at 10:30 or 11am on 1 July ie. 2+ hours after the main offensive had been launched. I believe (but would be happy to be proved wrong) that the Germans that faced them had become so complacent with the passing of time since the main attack had been launched, that they were taken completely by surprise and the French achieved their objective quite comfortably. (Were they also weakened by being taken from that part of the line to support neighbouring areas)? Despite this you are quite right to suggest the difference in jumping off time may have had only minimal influence as the French generally achieved all their 1 July objectives irrespective of the timing of the attack – still an inspired and novel approach for the day in question.

Most of the French units attacked at around 9.30 am, around two hours after the British. Surprise appears to have been achieved but this is interpreted by most French authors as being due to the mist. This protection was not uniformly present. One of the colonial infantry regiments that attacked in the centre recorded that the day was bright in their sector.

I have no information about the German units and their experiences. It would be highly unlikely that any front line units would have been moved north. I would suggest two reasons: firstly, this was not standard operating practice from what I have read; second, the line was already held too thinly.

The later attack would not have been 'inspired and novel', I would respectively submit, if the Germans had been present in strength.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Interesting that Dillon notes Foch believed Haig wanted to beat the Boche on his own on the Somme, nor was Foch impressed with the British plan.

Jon, I would be very cautious about what you read into this. I have a sneaking suspicion that Foch may have had a twinkle in his eye as he asked Dillon to 'show him on a map what it meant'. An experienced general like Foch not knowing what the attack plan meant ? And then Foch sends a note to Haig suggesting a change in plan?? Foch would have known that a change was not possible at such late notice. 'Wily old devil' - and what a lovely way to do it. I chuckled when I read Dillon's description. Which is not to say that Foch's plan was better or worse than Haig's. It must be considered in context .

Just for interest, I have checked my sources on Foch and can find no mention of the incident or what the alternative might have been. No surprise there.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Most of the French units attacked at around 9.30 am, around two hours after the British.

I should have pointed out that the French XX Corps attacked at 7.30 am, simultaneously with the British. They achieved the same degree of success, though Curlu was a problem and did not fall until late in the day. This is why Dillon mentioned that XX Corps had reached its objectives at the time when the attack south of the river was just about to go in.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, I don't know the extent to which this is true. I have only examined some French sources in detail. I do know that there were significantly fewer German guns facing the French, so that made counter-battery work more likely to be effective. The evidence of the effect is evident in the French infantry regimental histories that I have read. There is very little mention of German artillery fire, similar to the situation reported in the British sector around Montauban. Your comment about trench systems is more difficult to assess. There were definitely situations where advancing French infantry were able to occupy recogniseable trenches. Also, there were examples where German resistance had not been destroyed or suppressed by artillery. The 37th Infantry Regiment struck German machine gun nests in Curlu, which caused severe casualties by "mowing down" the attacking infantry. The village of Frise was not captured easily.

Obviously in addition to the 8 German batteries mentioned, the French artillery also played a very significant role in destroying the German guns that would otherwise have faced the British XV Corps. One area that did cause the French problems was south of the southern-most sector they attacked. To what degree they attempted or succeeded in destroying German guns in that “next-door” sector I do not know, but in the same way the French brought their guns to bear over their northern boundary (British XV Corps) they would surely have done the same in the south, yet their southern-most attack was hampered by German guns from the neighbouring sector. My references to destroyed trench systems, communication lines etc is from general reading where most of the German defences facing the French have been described as having been thoroughly destroyed. I don’t think there is any question that on an overall assessment in the Somme debate that the French artillery can be considered as anything other than professional, accurate and up to the task. Unfortunately the performance of the British artillery does not compare well, IMHO.

It is very apparent from all of the records that I have examined that, apart from isolated areas such as Curlu & Frise, as well as the resistance from the southern flank, the German defenders were very thinly spread. In many places, the advance appears to have been extremely rapid and met no resistance of any note. This is not associated with descriptions of masses of dead Germans lying around. All of this fits with the report sent by the German Second Army to OHL on 6th June, which stated...

I think in British history and consciousness, it has been far too easy to take ownership of the Somme and play down the French contribution. I quickly flicked through Hart yesterday and in his very brief comments on the French involvement he made references to “stiff fighting” before German positions were over-run and that the French repelled German counter-attacks. I also looked at Sheldon’s very good book on the German army on the Somme and the German first-hand accounts that described the accuracy and destruction caused by French guns together with the heavy and often hand-to-hand fighting that followed the French advance. I certainly have not been left with a general impression that the French sauntered over to weakly held German positions but rather that the French preparation was thorough and that they used their infantry resource extremely well.

Something I am not clear about is whether the French also assisted their attack with gas shells at all? I wonder if gas could be the mist to which you refer later on. The British used smoke shells but with intelligence reporting German dug-outs anything between 30ft and 40ft deep under the high ground it is surprising that gas was not used as the only penetration possible to subdue the Germans that far below ground.

which meant the Germans did not reinforce the area attacked by the French.

No you’re right, the Germans just reinforced the all important high ground to the north, which was the key to the Somme battle, and where the strength and depth of their existing fortifications would have proved most difficult to overcome without further reinforcement. Should Haig have feinted to the north, somewhere around Arras or Vimy as was suggested to him, then the Germans would have reinforced away from the Somme. This would have been a simple ruse for Haig to pull off as not until something like the end of the first week did the Germans realise that the Somme was the concentration of the attack – up until that time they had still been expecting a second British thrust from Arras.

Most of the French units attacked at around 9.30 am, around two hours after the British. Surprise appears to have been achieved but this is interpreted by most French authors as being due to the mist. This protection was not uniformly present. One of the colonial infantry regiments that attacked in the centre recorded that the day was bright in their sector.

You are quite right that most of the French forces below the Somme attacked at 9:30am – those attacking north of the Somme commencing at 7:30am in line with the neighbouring British offensive. I am sure in one area the French started their attack later still but I have been able to find no reference and must conclude, for now, that my memory is at fault and all of the French attacks in the south took place at 9:30am. However, when searching the bookcase last night I did find references to, and I do recall from past lectures, that at 9:30am the Germans no longer expected that part of the line to be attacked and were thus surprised.

I have no information about the German units and their experiences. It would be highly unlikely that any front line units would have been moved north. I would suggest two reasons: firstly, this was not standard operating practice from what I have read; second, the line was already held too thinly.

I agree – by this comment I meant neighbouring parts of the line (ie. units moving 500/1000 yrds to right or left to reinforce an area under attack (remember my belief was that one area had not come under attack until 10:30 or 11am, whilst neighbouring parts of the line were under attack from 9:30am). Think of this comment as just me thinking aloud - I didnt know either way.

The later attack would not have been 'inspired and novel', I would respectively submit, if the Germans had been present in strength.

You might be right but certainly I consider this more innovative than blowing a mine 10 minutes before launching the attack.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, I would be very cautious about what you read into this. I have a sneaking suspicion that Foch may have had a twinkle in his eye as he asked Dillon to 'show him on a map what it meant'. An experienced general like Foch not knowing what the attack plan meant ? And then Foch sends a note to Haig suggesting a change in plan?? Foch would have known that a change was not possible at such late notice. 'Wily old devil' - and what a lovely way to do it. I chuckled when I read Dillon's description. Which is not to say that Foch's plan was better or worse than Haig's. It must be considered in context .

Just for interest, I have checked my sources on Foch and can find no mention of the incident or what the alternative might have been. No surprise there.

Robert

Robert,

“Wily old devil” is totally correct. My interest in the comment is that the French viewed the Somme, certainly from around end of Feb onwards, as attritional, that is to say a way of i) redirecting German resources away from Verdun and ii) incapacitating more Germans on the Somme than the Allies would sustain casualties. They obviously knew Haig saw the Somme in the first instance as an opportunity for a breakthrough and the exchange between Foch and Dillon is Foch making his point.

Regards,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

My references to destroyed trench systems, communication lines etc is from general reading where most of the German defences facing the French have been described as having been thoroughly destroyed. I don’t think there is any question that on an overall assessment in the Somme debate that the French artillery can be considered as anything other than professional, accurate and up to the task. Unfortunately the performance of the British artillery does not compare well, IMHO.

Jon, I wasn't implying that the French artillery was not 'professional, accurate and up to the task' - your comment didn't necessarily mean that I was implying this, but I just want to be sure. I don't know whether 'most' of the German defences were thoroughly destroyed. It appears that some defences were definitely not destroyed but I simply don't have enough information to know the extent to which this was true - and from what I have read so far, most non-French writers do not either.

I am sure that destroyed trenches and communications did not a victory assure. Number of guns, weight of shells and destruction of trenches are not sufficient to understand why a victory might occur in one situation and not in another. Basically, an infantry attack will succeed if enough attackers reach the enemy positions, destroy the enemy in those positions, and then hold what has been captured. To reach the positions, there should be no obstructions (namely wire) and no return fire from the enemy. Enemy artillery fire was not necessarily a problem for the first wave of an attack (though it could be). German artillery often barraged the attacker's front line and communication trenches to cut off the first wave from reinforcements and resupply. For the first wave, the key was to prevent rifle and machine gun fire from decimating the attackers. Destruction of trenches was not needed to achieve this. Conversely, destruction of trenches did not achieve this if there was no suppression of defenders. I don't know what form of barrage was used to suppress the German defenders. Jack Sheldon mentions that some areas were 'drenched with gas throughout the morning'. The French artillery regimental histories that I have read make no mention of gas, but this neither rules in or rules out the possibility. There is no mention in the detailed infantry regimental histories of the need for the infantry to attack with gas masks. Again, this does not rule out the possibility.

As you know, I agree that there were major problems with the use of British artillery in some sectors. This does not mean that all British artillery should be viewed the same way. It is not appropriate to draw direct comparisons with the French artillery. If the number of German defenders was already relatively low, then the effectiveness of the artillery might be overrated. Too few defenders is another way to achieve low levels of rifle and machine gun fire.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I quickly flicked through Hart yesterday and in his very brief comments on the French involvement he made references to “stiff fighting” before German positions were over-run and that the French repelled German counter-attacks. I also looked at Sheldon’s very good book on the German army on the Somme and the German first-hand accounts that described the accuracy and destruction caused by French guns together with the heavy and often hand-to-hand fighting that followed the French advance. I certainly have not been left with a general impression that the French sauntered over to weakly held German positions but rather that the French preparation was thorough and that they used their infantry resource extremely well.

Jon, Hart's analysis is too cursory to say one way or the other. I did note that French sources mention stiff resistance in some areas.

Jack has quoted a limited number of anecdotes related to the attacks in the French sector. He mentions that 'south of the river a day of almost unrelieved disaster for the German army was unfolding. Here the Army High Command had misread the situation and had discounted the possibility of any significant French assault. The defending formations had been forced to hold over-extended frontages, in positions which had been subject to extremely effective fire by the French artillery. Losses in men and equipment had been severe.' Later, there is mention of Infantry Regiment 60, whose 'remnants of their over-extended forward companies were simply overrun in the wreckage of their trenches. Here and there pockets of resistance held out throughout the day, before being overwhelmed'. In another location 'the forward positions had been overwhelmed so swiftly that no information reached the command posts to the rear.'

I have already mentioned the defense of Curlu, which Jack provides more details on. The other two anecdotal infantry accounts relate to Assevillers, which was well beyond the German first line, and to the German reinforcement of the second line. Several French regimental histories refer to the virtual absence of casualties during the attack. Unlike the thorough details of the British attacks in their sector, the details of the French attacks across the breadth of the attack are not as clear to me. My current impression, however, based on what I have read is that it was much easier for the French than the British.

Following on from my comments about British artillery, the more interesting question is whether the British artillery could have matched the performance of the French artillery if the sectors had been reversed. We will never know, but the question bears posing because what I am getting at is the quantitative and qualitative differences in the number of defenders and the lay of the land in the two sectors.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

No you’re right, the Germans just reinforced the all important high ground to the north, which was the key to the Somme battle, and where the strength and depth of their existing fortifications would have proved most difficult to overcome without further reinforcement. Should Haig have feinted to the north, somewhere around Arras or Vimy as was suggested to him, then the Germans would have reinforced away from the Somme. This would have been a simple ruse for Haig to pull off as not until something like the end of the first week did the Germans realise that the Somme was the concentration of the attack – up until that time they had still been expecting a second British thrust from Arras.

Jon, I don't know the extent to which the Germans were expecting an attack around Arras. If the Germans were expecting an attack around Arras, and had stationed reinforcements in the area in case, then all the more reason to stage the diversion at Gommecourt. Why not pull even more reinforcements in this direction? I can see the military logic in staging the additional diversion, rather than playing to a sector that was already reinforced.

The real question is whether the attack at Gommecourt, and north of the Ancre, made a significant difference. We will never know if the attacks had not taken place whether the same success would have occurred in the south. All I am doing is pointing to the military rationale for making a prominent demonstration to the north and illustrating how it cannot be isolated from the success of the attack south of Fricourt.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

My interest in the comment is that the French viewed the Somme, certainly from around end of Feb onwards, as attritional... They obviously knew Haig saw the Somme in the first instance as an opportunity for a breakthrough and the exchange between Foch and Dillon is Foch making his point.

Jon, I would be more cautious about interpreting what 'the French' thought. Jean de Pierrefeu offers some interesting insights in his book 'French Headquarters':

'While the battle of Verdun dragged on, the Operations Department of GQG, with a perserverance which merits praise, continued the preparations for the Somme offensive. Colonel Renouard had from the earliest days held that the only way of relieving Verdun was to attack the Germans at some other point on the front. Unhappily, the necessity which Petain found for meeting the enemy's attacks with new and fresh troops hindered the plans of GQG. Further, considerable delays on the part of the English in making their preparations left the Germans free to redouble their efforts before Verdun.

The great success which we achieved on the south side of the river, where for the first three days of the battle the surprise had been complete, proved conclusively, according to Colonel Renouard, that we should have won a great victory had we been able to employ thirty divisions instead of ten. In his opinion it would have led to a complete break-through (my emphasis), and after that, what would the loss of Verdun have mattered!.'

De Pierrefeu gives due credit to the British efforts: 'in short, on July 1st... our troops attacked, when the enemy thought us incapable of such an effort and reckoned upon only having to resist our Allies.'

He goes on to say: 'In spite of the continual success which the Franco-British troops gained during July, it was obvious that the battle would have no decisive result. A break-through was no longer hoped for (my emphasis).'

An alternative explanation for Foch's comments emerges from this analysis. His superiors were expecting a break-through. Due to needs of Verdun, the number of divisions for the attack south of the river had been seriously reduced. Foch may have been concerned that Haig would achieve a break-through and that he [Foch] now could not. I am not saying this was the case. I am just saying that we cannot be sure and must interpret Foch's comments with caution.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Something I am not clear about is whether the French also assisted their attack with gas shells at all? I wonder if gas could be the mist to which you refer later on.

Jon, I don't know for sure. Jack Sheldon certainly makes reference to this, and the anecdote about the effects of counter-battery fire supports this. I am less certain about the German descriptions of gas causing a mist where visibility was very limited. Equally, a mist arising from the low lying Somme marshes might have dissipated by 0930 hours. It might have included smoke and dust generated from the earlier attack north of the river. My knowledge of French is not good enough to know whether the French word for mist could have meant gas cloud as well - I would guess so. Some areas of the French attack were quite clear, which would be unusual if gas were used equally across the whole front. For the moment, I will keep an open mind on whether the mist was just a gas cloud.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, I wasn't implying that the French artillery was not 'professional, accurate and up to the task' - your comment didn't necessarily mean that I was implying this, but I just want to be sure.

Robert,

That thought didnt cross my mind. The emphasis was meant to reflect my view that the French artillery were certainly superior to the British artillery at this stage, irrespective of the targets given.

I am of course finding myself at a disadvantage against your much stronger depth of knowledge but will consider your other comments and if I have anything to add, will respond shortly

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

As you know, I agree that there were major problems with the use of British artillery in some sectors. This does not mean that all British artillery should be viewed the same way. It is not appropriate to draw direct comparisons with the French artillery. If the number of German defenders was already relatively low, then the effectiveness of the artillery might be overrated. Too few defenders is another way to achieve low levels of rifle and machine gun fire.

Of course I understand the point you are making but I don't entirely agree. There are aspects that we can compare.

Foch believed the use of heavy artillery was the key to battlefield success not massed infantry attacks (weight of numbers ordered to keep pushing on). Foch wanted to ensure the German defences and guns immediately facing and to the flanks of his army were thoroughly destroyed. It would be naive to expect a 100% success rate against the German guns but that was the French aim.

Foch also knew that the Somme had to be a form of attritional warfare. His resources were diminished because of the need to service Verdun.

We could argue to what extent the British were resourced, trained, led etc and we could argue to what extent Haig had been preparing his army to be able to carry his objectives and we will probably disagree but the fact remains, whether the French were faced with one battery, eight batteries or 800 batteries, the French focus at high command level was to destroy the German artillery, this the French did whilst the British did not. It is also questionable to what degree the British gave due consideration to destroying German guns.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Following on from my comments about British artillery, the more interesting question is whether the British artillery could have matched the performance of the French artillery if the sectors had been reversed. We will never know, but the question bears posing because what I am getting at is the quantitative and qualitative differences in the number of defenders and the lay of the land in the two sectors.

Robert – this is the whole essence of my argument. There is little, if any, evidence to suggest that the British were actively pursuing a policy of destroying German guns – what was it, only eight shells used by one heavy battery on counter-battery work. Attention was given to pounding German trench lines with particular focus and expectation on destroying German morale.

Or are you saying if the French had been attacking to the north ie. Thiepval for example, that their artillery would have virtually ignored the German guns behind Pozieres and so on? I don’t believe that is what you are inferring but if it is then it does not fit with the French counter-battery policy as I know it to have been.

I guess also to take a qualitative and quantitative view we would also have to put Britain in the position of enduring its own Verdun whilst carrying out the Somme preparations.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, I don't know the extent to which the Germans were expecting an attack around Arras. If the Germans were expecting an attack around Arras, and had stationed reinforcements in the area in case, then all the more reason to stage the diversion at Gommecourt. Why not pull even more reinforcements in this direction? I can see the military logic in staging the additional diversion, rather than playing to a sector that was already reinforced.

I am missing something here. I am not clear where the reinforcing guns were originally located. My belief was that Gommecourt was reinforced with guns from outside the Somme region. However I am not sure it greatly matters, as if we had subtlely feinted around Arras I assume the guns that would have been used to reinforce at Gommecourt, would have been the same guns moved to Arras, irrespective of where they had been situated. Irrepsective of where the guns were located previously I cannot see the point of attracting greater German strength to an already significantly fortified area that you plan to send two infantry divisions to attack in the near future.

The real question is whether the attack at Gommecourt, and north of the Ancre, made a significant difference. We will never know if the attacks had not taken place whether the same success would have occurred in the south. All I am doing is pointing to the military rationale for making a prominent demonstration to the north and illustrating how it cannot be isolated from the success of the attack south of Fricourt.

The utter shambles at Gommecourt on 1 July made no difference to the Somme battle. Its only achievement was to waste important human resource unnecessarily. With regard to the military rationale then as far as I am aware, Haig was completely alone in deciding on Gommecourt. Neither Third Army, who were tasked with conducting the feint, or Fourth Army, wanted the feint to take place at Gommecourt.

von Falkenhyn believed the main attack was going to come near Arras and he had been reinforcing his Army (Sixth?) to the north of Arras so as to deliver a smashing blow on the British once their offensive had petered out (German experience was that a much smaller force could successfully defend/hold/repell a larger enemy offensive, more so as EvF rated the British army as ill-trained, inexperienced and ill-led), and EvF fully expected the British to expend themselves against his defensive line.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

The great success which we achieved on the south side of the river, where for the first three days of the battle the surprise had been complete, proved conclusively, according to Colonel Renouard, that we should have won a great victory had we been able to employ thirty divisions instead of ten. In his opinion it would have led to a complete break-through (my emphasis), and after that, what would the loss of Verdun have mattered!.'

I note your emphasis but I don’t think this has any bearing. The French were fighting with 10 Divs not 30. The French were fighting so as to relieve Verdun. They were not fighting for a breakthrough. Consider, France planned more conservatively, yet gained more territory than the British. I believe at one stage (possibly not 1 July) there was an opportunity for the French to push through their cavalry as a wide gap materialised in the German line but they resisted this opportunity. Why would they do that if they had intended a break-through?

He goes on to say: 'In spite of the continual success which the Franco-British troops gained during July, it was obvious that the battle would have no decisive result. A break-through was no longer hoped for (my emphasis).'

An alternative explanation for Foch's comments emerges from this analysis. His superiors were expecting a break-through. Due to needs of Verdun, the number of divisions for the attack south of the river had been seriously reduced. Foch may have been concerned that Haig would achieve a break-through and that he [Foch] now could not. I am not saying this was the case. I am just saying that we cannot be sure and must interpret Foch's comments with caution.

Again noting your emphasis I have to say I would be more cautious of what de Pierrefeu was saying than Foch to Dillon. Neither Foch nor Joffre viewed the Somme as a potential breakthrough battle. They could not because they did not have the resource. Foch certainly did not trust the British to breakthrough and certainly was not concerned by the possibility that the British would break-through and the French would not. His concern was more to do with the unpreparedness of the British together with the battle strategy the British intended to employ. Such concerns as to British preparedness would have been a prime reason why the French guns destroyed the German batteries on their northern flank, that is to say, the batteries that faced the British XV Corps. If Foch had had any confidence in the British then surely he would have left the German batteries in this sector to the guns of XV Corps. At the end of the Somme campaign Foch reflected that the level of British casualties had been completely unnecessary - and he was right.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Some areas of the French attack were quite clear, which would be unusual if gas were used equally across the whole front. For the moment, I will keep an open mind on whether the mist was just a gas cloud.

It’s a wide front, at least 10 miles wide – I woudnt expect the gas to be one continuous cloud but dispersed and broken by wind, shelling, movement of infantry etc. But I still remain unclear to what extent the French used gas.

Regards,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

Foch believed the use of heavy artillery was the key to battlefield success not massed infantry attacks (weight of numbers ordered to keep pushing on).

Jon, your comments about infantry attacks do not accord with the Artois campaign, which was launched by Foch on May 9th, 1915. Nor do they fit with Foch's original plans for the combined Franco-British offensive in 1916, prior to the battle of Verdun.

but the fact remains, whether the French were faced with one battery, eight batteries or 800 batteries, the French focus at high command level was to destroy the German artillery, this the French did whilst the British did not. It is also questionable to what degree the British gave due consideration to destroying German guns.

It is not questionable. There were variations in British practice at corps level. There was, however, no difference between the French and the British 'at high command level'.

Robert