Field Marshal Sir John French

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, you have probably seen the article I wrote on Operation Hush, published here:

http://www.1914-1918.net/BATTLES/hush/hush.htm

There is a map of the proposed landings. I also wrote a brief summary of Operation Strandfest as well, which was triggered when the Germans detected Rawlinson's Corps coming into position on the coast. There is a hyperlink in the aforementioned.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, Admiral Bacon recorded that he submitted a plan in 'early 1917'. Jellicoe was well aware. By March of that year, the first pontoon had been built and was undergoing sea trials. An ingenious method of aerial photography, coupled with submarine reconnaissance, enabled the Navy to draw up a detailed 'contour' map for the shore line. This was used to create the angle of slope on the bottom of the pontoons so that they could then be run up to the very edge of the waterline for disembarkation. Three pontoons were built. They were huge, capable of carrying 1st Division and a combined arms assault group, complete with artillery, tanks, cyclists, MMGs, Royal Engineers and grenade supply companies. 1st Division et al was withdrawn from the frontline and underwent extensive training, including at least one trial landing - all carried out in great secrecy. The tankers trained in northern France. Each pontoon was to be pushed by two monitors attached to either side at the rear. They were setup to fire at very close range, using significantly reduced charges. The smoke screen I have mentioned. So not a fly-by-night (oops, apologies) exercise.

Robert

Robert - thank you. This is exactly the type of preparation I would have expected and for which I have been trying to find evidence - hardly gets a mention in any of the books I have on Haig/Third Ypres other than in brief comment. Off to read your link ...

Jon

[salesie]

Back to French - and Haig - is it possible to have one without the other?

A few more thoughts from Farrar the Para, on the events of 31st October 1914; a crucial day during 1st Ypres.

"......Immediately in rear of the Worcesters, Brigadier-General Fitzclarence watched the three companies attack and win back the left section of the broken line. As A company came forward in a converging operation on the village, he galloped back with the news. It was passed within ten minutes to the chief engineer of I Corps, reconnoitering a new defence line, and he hurried back to Haig at the White Chateau.

Haig was about to get in the saddle to ride forward a second time that day to the very edge of the fighting line to see for himself what was happening. He had decided to take command of the mixture of groups and brigades holding his front until the divisional headquarters were re-established but had been delayed by the arrival of Sir John.

Appraised of the loss of Gheluvelt and the extended pressure on either side of the Menin road, Sir John promised to find Foch to see what extra help he could afford. He had just left Haig when the chief engineer arrived at White Chateau to tell them that the Worcesters had closed the gap. Haig's ADC ran after the commander-in-chief to give him this encouraging news. When he returned, his corps commander was in the saddle.

Upright in a clean suit of service dress and breeches, his boots polished, a cavalryman carrying immediately behind a lance with his personal pennant fluttering below the point. Haig's face we are told by a dozen eyewitnesses remained calm. About noon he had trotted forward with some of his staff in just this way, observing without comment or apparent emotion the ragged figures of the stragglers, the painful flow of the wounded, the guns and howitzers tugged back with empty traces among the teams of horses. When the report came that Gheluvelt had been re-entered, he showed no joy, no elation. He was a dour man. Yet of all the commanders available in the BEF at that time he was probably the officer most suited - perhaps the only one - to direct operations in front of Ypres. At times small-minded, given to criticizising faults in others of which he himself was guilty, he had none the less a high sense of duty, a cool head and a degree of comprehension and instinctive skill in higher tactics. Though he knew less as a cavalryman about the practical capabilities of the infantry than Smith-Dorrian, an infantry officer, he knew more than Rawlinson who, despite his infantry background, had never commanded anything in a regiment above a platoon. Haig had never shunned regimental service. He lacked Allenby's power as a commander and his boldness; but he was more calculating. He had now to calculate the extent to which he could hold the present corps line. There was an immense temptation to fall back. Haig had told his chief engineer to select a defensible line in rear towards Ypres but he knew that whilst this might appear to offer a relief for his weary soldiers, they would find it difficult to break cleanly from the Germans at all points; and would in any case be pursued quickly to a line in which, as yet, there was not a single trench dug. He rode forward to find Major-General Landon and Brigadier-General Fitzclarence.

......Sir John found Foch that afternoon of the 31st by lucky chance. Driving due west from Ypres on the road to Poperinghe, he passed through the village of Vlamertinghe, where his car and flag were recognized by a French staff officer. The car was stopped and he learned that Foch was in the mairie, talking to d'Urbal and Dubois.

The British field marshal was a shaken man. He painted, Foch tells us, a particularly black picture of the state of I corps. The troops were in full retreat towards Ypres, the heavy artillery were retiring at a trot towards the west, the roads were blocked by ammunition wagons and vehicles of every description, as well as by crowds of wounded streaming back towards Ypres. It was the beginning of a defeat.

Did Sir John really think things were as bad as this? He had heard the news that Gheluvelt was restored. It was true that the medium and heavy guns were coming back at the trot; and the wounded were streaming in; and there had been at midday stragglers 'wild-eyed with terror' as Haig had seen before. But these men were also seen to be returning of their own accord to find their broken units. The heavier guns were moving into new positions to accomodate the withdrawal of the line. Sir John had seen streams of wounded before. Perhaps he wanted to impress Foch sufficiently to obtain the whole of the French 32nd Division to buttress his front. Whether his attitude was assumed or genuine - or a mixture of both -it was impressive. He added that if he had to continue the battle without help, 'there is nothing left for me to do but go up and be killed with I Corps.'

'You must not talk of dying but of winning,' Foch replied. He promised to send six battalions of the 32nd Division to attack with Moussy mext morning while part of Dubois' corps attacked on the left. This was two battalions less than he had promised the previous evening but it was a more realistic gesture. He then sat down to write what was in effect a directive, tactfully worded to take account of his lack of authority, '......It is absolutely essential not to retreat; therefore the men must dig in wherever they find themselves and hold on to the ground they now occupy. This does not preclude organizing a position further in rear......but any movement to the rear carried out by any considerable body of troops would lead to an assault on part of the enemy......Such an idea must be utterly rejected......'

Sir John had this translated and then added his own minute of association, to be sent to Haig, 'It is of the utmost importance to hold the ground you are on now. It is useless for me to say this, because I know you will do it if it is humanly possible. I will see if it is possible to send you any more support myself when I reach headquarters. I will then finally arrange with Foch what our final role will be.' The paper was taken at once by Sir John's ADC and private secretary to Haig's I Corps headquarters.

Haig had already decided that, apart from adjustment of the line west of Gheluvelt, where the trenches could be dug on a reverse slope, he would hold on where he was. At 7pm, Brigadier-General Gough signed his orders: 'G.583. Troops will hold their positions...'"

French the ditherer, Haig and Foch not?

The day after, Farrar the Para tells us that:

"......Sir John French had uncertainties of other kinds. He was uncertain personally as to his position. On 1st November, Kitchener had crossed to Dunkerque for a meeting with the French President, minister for war and Joffre. Foch had been present later in the day. Foch told Wilson that Kitchener proposed to Joffre a change in the c-in-c of the BEF: Sir John French should be replaced by Sir Ian Hamilton. According to Foch, Joffre had strongly opposed the idea and had been supported by President Poincare. Whilst this reassurance warmed Sir John it also re-kindled his belief that Kitchener would work for his removal; a belief he had had since he and the secretary of state for war had clashed on 1st September, when the allied armies were in retreat......"

So, it would seem that Sir John French "soldiered-on" in France at the behest of the French President and Joffre?

Cheers - salesie.

[ressmex]

I have thoroughly enjoyed this thread and it has been most informative even though Haig was at times threatning to take over. THANKS

TOM

[PhilB]

even though Haig was at times threatning to take over.

Always a hazard, Tom. I just hope your next thread isn`t entitled "Why wasn`t H**g sacked?"! Phil B