Field Marshal Sir John French

[Muerrisch]

Coming new to this thread, I was intrigued by the use of the word 'prematurely' in the original question.

The implication is that the appointment was for a finite period ..... a 'shelf-life' in modern jargon. News to me.

My answer would be along the lines of 'not a moment too soon either'. Regardless of you-know-who or anyone else succeeding him, he was a classic case of over-promotion in a peacetime army after a successful mid-career.

[Jonathan Saunders]

I must say how much I dislike the expression "They learned from their mistakes" gents. What on earth would you expect a general to do from a battle which sacrificed maybe thousands of brave men? Only a dolt would not learn something! It`s hardly a sign of great intellect. Phil B

Phil - Can I recommend COMMAND ON THE WESTERN FRONT by Prior and Wilson. It analyses the career of Rawlinson in the Great War to assess the development of the British High Command and strategies. It may contain some surprises for you.

[squirrel]

Have to agree with Lt. Col. Saunders about this particular book - a "must read" IMHO for what that's worth. The ones lower down the chain of command need serious looking at as well as the one at the top.

[PhilB]

Phil - Can I recommend COMMAND ON THE WESTERN FRONT by Prior and Wilson.

I`ve read and enjoyed that one, Jonathan. Don`t think I`m tarring all generals with the same brush. In fact, I`m not tarring any - just those who use that excuse on the generals` behalf! Phil B

[truthergw]

I must say how much I dislike the expression "They learned from their mistakes" gents. What on earth would you expect a general to do from a battle which sacrificed maybe thousands of brave men? Only a dolt would not learn something! It`s hardly a sign of great intellect. Phil B

I know what you are saying here and sympathise but it is possible to draw completely wrong conclusions from a battle. This what happened to Nivelle at Verdun. He was successful there but not for the reasons he supposed. He then applied his mistaken beliefs at Chemin des Dames and the Poilus were slaughtered to no purpose. There was a learning process, allbeit a slow one, which went on in the British High Command and culminated in the 100 days in 1918.

[PhilB]

I take your point, T. However, in order to assess the learning capacity of the generals one has to estimate what an average reasonably intelligent man might have been expected to learn over that period and with that series of expensive battles and losses to learn from. And then say "Did our generals learn at a faster pace than that?" Impossible, I know, but you probably have a gut feeling of the answer? Phil B

[AndyHollinger]

Part of the problem here is that we expect Generals (and CEOs) to KNOW ... not to learn. But, if the conflict is long enough, aspects of the conflict change. Adapting to change is learning. Napoleon did negative learning ... over the years getting sloppier and sloppier - ending up with massed column assaults ... etc. The BA, I think, is a great example of learning ... but, of course, one has to dig a bit deeper than the judgemental literature to find and appreciate it. It also depends on what you're trying for ... take a ridge, look at the Canadians at Vimy ... breakout ... well, you get the drift.

As I said a bunch of entries, I think both his superiors and subordinates lost confidence in him ... which is why he had to go. It is, essentially, the same in any management position.

[truthergw]

I take your point, T. However, in order to assess the learning capacity of the generals one has to estimate what an average reasonably intelligent man might have been expected to learn over that period and with that series of expensive battles and losses to learn from. And then say "Did our generals learn at a faster pace than that?" Impossible, I know, but you probably have a gut feeling of the answer? Phil B

As you say, a gut feeling and not one I would want to defend in any sort of reasoned argument. I feel that the role of stupidity and hidebound stubborness is vastly underrated in the tragedies of the Great War. I continually find myself defending the High Command against charges of being unfeeling, uncaring butchers who considered a day wasted if they had not sent a regiment to sure and certain death. I think that they were very slow to learn. They showed at times, a timidity of thought and lack of imagination that is appalling. When the circumstances called out for originality of thought and a new approach to problems, they fell back on the tried and trusted and totally ineffective. All that being said, it is one of the minor miracles that between them, somehow, one step forward and two back, they managed to learn how to win battles and defeat the German army. In the end, that is what Haig and his command did. They did what Generals are meant to do. They won the war.

[PhilB]

Which takes us back to post 28 and the non-sequitur "He won therefore he was skilful and learnt"! Phil B

[Jonathan Saunders]

When the circumstances called out for originality of thought and a new approach to problems ...

I feel that Rawlinson did, to some degree, possess similar qualities to those you mention, but was otherwise too ready and complicit to agree to Haig's wishes as to how battle should proceed, which I believe was often wrong and resulted in the high casualties figures associated with amongst other battles, the Somme and Third Ypres.

[squirrel]

What you learn from a situation depends on how well you can disect and analyse objectively what happened and why and then learn the lessons and decide and how to apply them.

You can only base the ability to disect and analyse on training and experience as well as applying the lessons learned based on that.

A senior commander will have to disect and analyse objectivlely information passed on to him by others who too will have had to rely on their training, experience and objectivity and so on down the various levels of command.

Imagination and the ability to approach a problem from a different angle will always be helpful.

That is all without other pressures such as the politicians and Allied senior officers requiring something else of you and them allowing you to have what you need in men and materiel to fight the next battle. The enemy may not "comply" with your plans either.

[truthergw]

Which takes us back to post 28 and the non-sequitur "He won therefore he was skilful and learnt"! Phil B

What I was trying to say in #28,#29 and #58 was that the British learned very slowly and painfully to beat the Germans. The saving grace that I mentioned was meant to imply that the only good thing about their performance was that they won. That it was not pretty but they did it. An example if you will, of British doggedness.

[Robert Dunlop]

Jonathan, I am not at all sure about Prior and Wilson's interpretations on Rawlinson. I have studied much of the correspondence between Rawlinson and Haig leading up to the Battle of the Somme. It does not come across as complicity on Rawlinson's part. Their book lacked depth. It left me wanting to read Rawlinson's diary for myself - I don't trust the snippets they have selectively published. There are other perspectives on Rawlinson, which they either skimmed over (eg material published by his Chief of Staff, Sir Archibald Montgomery) or did not know about (eg Edward Spears account of Rawlinson in his book 'Prelude to Victory'). Amongst other things, Spears noted:

'The one trouble, in regard to [Rawlinson's] relations with the French, was that, although he could be quite firm at a distance, when he was with them, vive la politesse, and his affability would lead him into giving undertakings to which it was difficult to adhere. This tendency required watching all the more carefully at the moment because the French, naturally enough, soon forgot how weak the Fourth Army was, owing to its extreme extension, and began to look for support on the British right in Franchet d'Esperey's attack.

General Rawlinson's bouts of optimism were apt to play ducks and drakes with the rigid economy of effort imposed on his Army by the niggardly means at its disposal. One day he came to see General Franchet d'Esperey and to my horror spoke as if he had unlimited artillery with which to support the French attack. I spent some difficult hours, tables of guns and munitions of the Fourth Army in hand, dispelling the hopes Rawly had so lightly conjured up.'

Here we see an alternative explanation, from someone who was very skilled [as a liaison officer] in assessing characters and personalities, for some of Rawlinson's behaviours.

I don't recall that Rawlinson played any part in the command decisions during Third Ypres.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jonathan, I am not at all sure about Prior and Wilson's interpretations on Rawlinson ...

Robert - many thanks for your interesting reply and the quotes from Spears, which carry authority as you rightly indicate.

With regard to Rawlinson and Third Ypres you are also right to say that Rawlinson played no direct part in the final tactics and you have misunderstood me if you thought that is what I said. However I do believe Haig was wrong in his choice of Battlefield Commander and his strategy for Third Ypres failed at an early stage.

According to Prior and Wilson, Gough, who had originally offered Haig a thrusting Battlefield Commander, soon realised that no break through was achievable and the battle should be continued on Rawlinson's favoured bite and hold tactics.

[Robert Dunlop]

Jonathan, thanks for your clarification on Third Ypres. Apologies for the misunderstanding. You raise an interesting point which relates to another current thread on breakthrough battles. Haig definitely wanted to break out of the Ypres salient and, at the very least, neutralise the Belgian coast. To that end, his strategic end point failed. Unlike my interpretation of Prior and Wilson, I believe that Haig also believed in the importance of each step along the way. Gough's original plan called for an advance too far, according to the final infantry objectives for the first day. But it was clearly a form of 'bite and hold' operation, not a breakthrough and definitely not a break-out plan. Yes, if the German defences had totally collapsed, there were contingencies in place to exploit this. But realistically this was unlikely to happen - and I believe this was recognised. The nature of the planning and build-up for the battle, just like the Somme, was in preparation for a campaign, not a one-off bust 'em open and advance to Dutch borders.

FWIIW, I agree with your comment about Gough as choice of commander. I have not read Gough's account of the lead up to Third Ypres yet - will do so now that you have touched on this point. Thanks.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

According to Prior and Wilson, Gough, who had originally offered Haig a thrusting Battlefield Commander, soon realised that no break through was achievable and the battle should be continued on Rawlinson's favoured bite and hold tactics.

I believe that both Plummer and Gough went to Haig and said that a different approach was required. This statement shows IMO that the abilities of Gough warrant further investigation. A complicate character who, bears alot of criticism and has no defenders, was perhaps not the complete donkey he is painted. But thats for another thread.

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

I believe that Haig also believed in the importance of each step along the way. Gough's original plan called for an advance too far, according to the final infantry objectives for the first day. But it was clearly a form of 'bite and hold' operation, not a breakthrough and definitely not a break-out plan. Yes, if the German defences had totally collapsed, there were contingencies in place to exploit this. But realistically this was unlikely to happen - and I believe this was recognised. The nature of the planning and build-up for the battle, just like the Somme, was in preparation for a campaign, not a one-off bust 'em open and advance to Dutch borders.

These are interesting points but I am still left feeling a contradiction exists somewhere. Just thinking aloud ... Haig's intention was to secure the coastal ports by way a two prong attack - 1) breaking out of the Salient and heading coastwards and 2) supporting the eventual attack on the German coastal positions by an amphibious landing (which would have been of interest to the observer and a nightmare for those involved). It is the battle for the caost and after that I see a return to something like the bite and hold progress that Rawlinson advocated.

I dont know if I am missing something or being naive but I dont see limited objectives in the battles towards the coast but rather the intention had to be for a quick movement to stop Germans reinforcing already well defended sectors. I find this plan (albeit on my interpretation) as enormously ambitious and of course there is another contradiction in the time elapsed between Messines and Third Ypres.

[Robert Dunlop]

Operation Hush, the code name for the Belgian coastal landings, was planned as an adjunct to the hoped-for advance out of the Ypres salient. There were some who felt it should have gone ahead almost regardless. But, as you rightly point out, this would have been suicide. Picture, however, a situation where the German rear areas and routes of supply/escape are being cut off. Then Operation Hush begins to make sense. It could have succeeded, acting as the final precipitant for the wholescale withdrawal from the coast and the ports, just as planned. As it happened, even though the MarinesKorps Flandern was denuded of some heavy artillery, this was not sufficient to justify the launch of the operation. Haig rightly cancelled it.

You are right about Haig's strategic intent with respect to the salient. He ordered Gough to undertake 'operations for the capture of the Passchendaele-Staden Ridge and the railway Roulers-Thourout. The object of these operations will be to facilitate a landing between the Yser River and Ostend and, in combination with a force so landed, to gain possession of the Belgian coast.'

An interesting insight into the step-wise nature of the proposed attack is illustrated by the projected timings of Operation Hush versus the launch of Third Ypres. The latter took place on July 31, 1917, with the Battle of Pilckem Ridge. No start date was given for Operation Hush. There was no expectation that it would happen within a few days of the Battle of Pilckem Ridge. The Navy thought September offered the best combination of tides, etc, though Admiral Bacon was champing at the bit on this one. He wanted to get stuck in irrespective. Haig said no.

Furthermore, Gough ('the thruster') noted (after the war) that 'impetuous and disordered action was to be avoided and every step forward was to be the result of thorough preparation and organisation, which might require intervals of three to seven days'. The furthest infantry objectives for the Battle of Pilckem Ridge were nowhere near the crest of the Passchendaele-Staden Ridge, let alone the Roulers-Thourout railway.

So you are right that a quick movement to cut off the coast would have been far too ambitious. All the evidence that I have seen is that right from day one, the operational plan (not the strategic one) called for a step-wise approach. This whole issue is another reason why I find Prior and Wilson's works to be quite limited. Harking back to the Somme for a second, it is interesting that Gough noted his plans for an initial advance in Third Ypres bore 'some similarity to the operations carried out in the Battle of the Somme, when we first captured Pozières and then pushed northwards againts Thiepval. But this similarity would only exist if we were able to carry our right forward to Passchendaele, as we had done in the Battle of the Somme to Pozières and Courcelette.' This comment was made with the hindsight of both battles. If he made this analogy just prior to Third Ypres as well, then he would not have been expecting a cake walk.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Operation Hush, the code name for the Belgian coastal landings, was planned as an adjunct to the hoped-for advance out of the Ypres salient ...

Robert, once again thank you for your explanation, which I will continue to consider. Whilst I think Haig deserves some praise for having a dynamic thought in considering an amphibious attack, the retrospective experience of other amphibious landings, ie those at Gallipoli, Normandy and Falklands lead me to believe such an undertaking would have been very unlikely to succeed in September 1917 and that Haig was never in a position to consider an amphibious landing as a serious option. Off to check his diary ...

[armourersergeant]

Jon,

I listeneded to a talk by a chap called Page, a naval captain I seem to rercall about this. I was left thinking that the preperation and ingenuity adopted was very advanced for its time.

However I was left still with the feeling that a terrible fate would have befell the men involved. Though If I had seen the plans for D-Day before hand I may have had that feeling!

I do recall he said that Haig opted to get Tanks involved early on in the preperation for the landing, which showed to me that Haig saw very early on the use of tanks, which I seem to recall was soon after the first use in 1916.

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon,

I listeneded to a talk by a chap called Page, a naval captain ...

Arm,

You mean Chris Page. He wrote the Asquith biography and normally gives lectures on the RND.

I looked up the Haig Diaries last night - there were not many references I could find to the proposed amphibious landing - I cant remember exact dates but say 31st July was a Thursday, then he wrote that he had told Rawlinson that he had to be ready to attack (land?) on Sunday (a very rapid advance)! Then in mid-August he was telling Rawlinson that there was plenty of time for the men to be trained prior to the landing (which was roughly scheduled for an optimum tidal date in early? September). Finally at some point Rawlinson was returning to London and Haig states I told Rawlinson if he sees Jellicoe not to discuss the landings, and to refer Jellicoe to me.

Now I am sure this is missing enormous details and I have got completely the wrong end of the stick otherwise its pretty damning IMHO.

However I am also aware that we have strayed well off topic, for which I apologise.

Jon

[armourersergeant]

Yes we have strayed, Oops.

That would be the man Jon.

I seem to recall being amazed at the fact that Haig would consider and contribute thoughts to something so unconventional as this. especially for a Donkey! Unless of course he was just paying lip service to it.

apologies also for hi-jacking the thread.

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, good work. I had not reviewed Haig's diary on this. My source on dates (or not) for the amphibious attack was Admiral Bacon. Haig reports that '[sir H Rawlinson] will be ready to start his attack on Sunday morning. I told him that if the weather continued wet he must delay in order to ensure having artillery supremacy. I approved of his plan....'. Although Sheffield and Bourne have annotated this as 'Haig discussed the amphibious landings in support of the main attack.', there is something not quite right about the quote. It may be that Haig did discuss the landings and this was not included in the diary extracts. The report of 'artillery supremacy' does not fit with the planning of the landings per se. The whole key to this meticulously planned operation was total surprise. 'Artillery supremacy' implies a land-based counter-battery campaign conducted over several days (this was not the period when hurricane bombardments were used, particularly against enemy artillery). I suspect that Haig is referring to actions based out of the remnants of the Nieuport bridgehead, most of which had been eliminated by the German attack in Operation Strandfest. These land-based actions, which would have been under the command of Rawlinson, were designed to assist the beach landings. There is an indirect link therefore.

I am not quite sure why you think the aforementioned information is 'damning'. Do you mean that an amphibious operation should never have been considered and that the possibility of it being launched so soon after the limited advance of 31st July would have been totally suicidal? It was an ambitious plan but well thought out, particularly [and most importantly] with respect to the conditions required for it to stand any chance of being successful. The most interesting feature was the tons of phosphorus obtained for the purpose of putting up a huge smoke screen. Lots of small ships were to be involved in generating this. As I said before, if such an attack had fallen on an enemy looking over its shoulder because of a major advance out of the Ypres salient, then it stood a chance. Not otherwise. The evidence suggests that the serious risks were appreciated by Haig - the attack was never launched. Even if the reported conversation with Rawlinson related to the amphibious landing, I am not sure it can be construed as a definite order to proceed with the attack. It is more like a check to see if rapid exploitation could be made, if necessary and with the right conditions. Given the scale of the RN's involvement, I am sure Admiral Bacon would have recorded that he was given the go-ahead to at least set things in motion, even if this was subsequently withdrawn. Bacon was quite clear that no such instruction ever came.

Tanks were to feature in the amphibious attack. Mitchell writes of his training for Operation Hush-hush, as he recalled it, in 'Tank Warfare'. The Belgian architect of the beach wall was found living in France. From his plans, a mock-up of the sea wall was created. The tanks were fitted with special tracks and a ramp - the first of the Funnies. Mitchell noted, quite rightly, that if one German field gun had been in the vicinity of the landing then it could have systematically knocked out the tanks as they climbed the wall, though the tanks would have been well supported by the division of infantry and their support weapons. IMHO, the biggest risk (but by no means the only one!) was the huge shore batteries that could have literally blown each of the pontoons out of the water had they scored a direct hit. Hence the need for dense smoke, and the planning to achieve air supremacy. Close behind, in the risk stakes, was the highly trained MarineKorps Flandern, who had practised and practised for just such an eventuality, and were on a heightened state of alert. Even they could have had problems though, if there was a major threat to the rear and the southern land flank. It was not to be.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, good work. I had not reviewed Haig's diary on this. My source on dates (or not) for the amphibious attack was Admiral Bacon...

Robert,

Many thanks for your further explanations. The "ready to attack Sunday morning" comment must refer to the land-based operations. It didnt make sense last night that Haig was referring to an amphibious assault and it doesnt make sense now, so Rawlinson must have been involved in some sort of land based operation as you indicate. Also I thought the "attack Sunday" comment may have proved difficult for the artillery to bring their guns forward so rapidly - obviously one of the problems with a thrust (and possibly that wasnt the intention here) is that you would inevitably lose artillery support. However I reasoned that this would have been offset by Naval guns and assistance from RFC although I now note the use of phosphorus was intended to blind the German defensive positions.

What I meant by "damning" is that I find it difficult to understand why Haig would not want Rawlinson - who was to command the assualt by the army - to discuss the amphibious landing with the extremely bright and capable (IMHO) Jellicoe who would realise the difficulties associated with an amphibious landing only to well. Add to this that Haig said something in mid-August along the lines of "there is plenty of time for the men to be trained prior to the landing", left me thinking however well they may have planned the operation on paper, they had left actual assault training until little time was left. This doesnt sound like Haig at all, so again I am assuming that I am reading something into the diary that is giving me a wrong answer. The problem is I have not really looked at the amphibious plan because it didnt happen so I am now playing catch up and making assumptions.

My own thoughts is that it was a bold idea by Haig and I admire him for that part of it. You say it was a well thought out plan and I have no reason to disbelieve your interpretation, but Haig (IMHO) had a track record of being involved with well thought out plans that (again IMHO) were mainly disasterous - how much of the plan was RN originated I wonder, because I cant convince myself that Haig had the experience to involve himself in planning an amphibious landing. I just feel for a successful amphibious landing we would have needed everything to go our way and a lot of luck into the bargain, but as I said I am not sure I am currently in a position to comment in detail on the plan for the landing. Off to search the bookshelves for something that might help me consider this in better detail ...

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, Admiral Bacon recorded that he submitted a plan in 'early 1917'. Jellicoe was well aware. By March of that year, the first pontoon had been built and was undergoing sea trials. An ingenious method of aerial photography, coupled with submarine reconnaissance, enabled the Navy to draw up a detailed 'contour' map for the shore line. This was used to create the angle of slope on the bottom of the pontoons so that they could then be run up to the very edge of the waterline for disembarkation. Three pontoons were built. They were huge, capable of carrying 1st Division and a combined arms assault group, complete with artillery, tanks, cyclists, MMGs, Royal Engineers and grenade supply companies. 1st Division et al was withdrawn from the frontline and underwent extensive training, including at least one trial landing - all carried out in great secrecy. The tankers trained in northern France. Each pontoon was to be pushed by two monitors attached to either side at the rear. They were setup to fire at very close range, using significantly reduced charges. The smoke screen I have mentioned. So not a fly-by-night (oops, apologies) exercise.

Robert