Field Marshal Sir John French

[truthergw]

Tom, do you feel the same when you read about the German, French, Italian, Austrian, Russian etc commanders?

I have only just started reading about the German Army and I am very slow but early indications are that they had their fair share of blunderers. The French High Command was unspeakably bad. Foch, Mangin, Petain and on and on at almost all levels. Mangin was known as " The Butcher" but how they managed to single him out is beyond me. Reading about the dreadful loss of men in the early days of the Battle of the Frontiers has me nearly in tears. The Russians were carrying on in a long established mode of incompetence. They were abysmal in the Russo-Japanese War and seem to have learned nothing since. The Battle of Tannenberg was a fiasco from the Russian side. I have read little about the other campaigns but 11 or 12 battles of the Isonzo does nothing to persuade me that the Italian generals were masters of their trade. The Russians seemed to have the upper hand of the Austrians so again I am sceptical of their worth. All in all, a dismal catalogue of failure of the high commands of all the nations involved. The saving grace for the British is that we managed to learn enough to win in the end but as a famous general once said, " it was a d******d close run thing".

[ressmex]

Tom, do you feel the same when you read about the German, French, Italian, Austrian, Russian etc commanders?

Sorry Chris if my last statement appeared flippant, really I am trying to understand why a field marshal would be fired, given a plum job, and the people below and above in rank and status make greater mistakes in the future and are honoured ? I know if I make a mistake it would not effect many but each mistake made by the commanders and politicians of the time cost many lives so why plum jobs and promotions.

TOM

[PhilB]

The saving grace for the British is that we managed to learn enough to win in the end but as a famous general once said, " it was a d******d close run thing".

I don`t see this as a proper argument, T! When two sides fight a war, one or other side is likely to win but it doesn`t signify any grace, only that the combination of manpower, supplies and possibly generalship on one side slightly outweighed the other. Would the British High Command have won if they`d been in charge of the German Army? If the answer is "No", what does that say about their generalship? Phil B

[AndyHollinger]

I think we're losing sight of the question at hand....

But in the spirit of following the string ... Losing confidence is a non-objective thing ... also by Haig's tenure victory was seen to be neither cheap, fast or easy. Haig's job was not victory by Christmas, but somehow make it through ...

Andy

[truthergw]

I don`t see this as a proper argument, T! When two sides fight a war, one or other side is likely to win but it doesn`t signify any grace, only that the combination of manpower, supplies and possibly generalship on one side slightly outweighed the other. Would the British High Command have won if they`d been in charge of the German Army? If the answer is "No", what does that say about their generalship? Phil B

I can only say that most people looking at the armies at the start of the war and how the initiative lay with the Central Powers would have backed them to win. I know I would have and they very nearly did. They did not and thanks for that go mainly but not solely, to the French. At the end of the war , the British were the main opponent on the western front or at least seem to have been seen as such by the Germans. Despite another massive all out effort, the allies held the German attack and then drove the Germans back. Thanks for that I believe are due in large measure to the British. I do not see how we can say that the British army had a large part to play in defeating the Germans and at the same time, deny the contribution of the high command. To sum up, entering on to the field as an " inconsequential little army" and ending the conflict as an equal partner in the victory, must surely argue for some credit to be given to the Generals.

[Desmond7]

But which general do you give most credit to? Kitchener/politician for creating the new army and taking the long term view or Haig as the man-manager for putting this force into action and constantly refitting.updating it?

[salesie]

Would the British High Command have won if they`d been in charge of the German Army? If the answer is "No", what does that say about their generalship? Phil B

This hyperthetical and thus factually unanswerable question is nonetheless an interesting one in that it raises a point of vital strategic importance.

The thread has turned into a generalised debate about the conduct of the land war on the western front, and, in particular, Haig's interactions with French and his later contribution as CinC to the eventual victory. There is no doubt in my mind that the British Army learnt many lessons under Haig throughout the war, and that in the end they were as an efficient a fighting force, at all tactical levels, as had probably ever been seen before. But the British Army never acted in isolation at any time between 1914-18. The strategic importance of the naval blockade on Germany was paramount. This blockade, similar to the one used to great effect against Napoleon, in my opinion made eventual victory almost inevitable, because it ensured that vital strategic advantage always lay with the allies, and this advantage filtered down to all tactical levels within the army, in that it not only eventually "starved" Germany but it allowed almost uninterrupted war supplies across the Atlantic and men and supplies to be moved virtually unhindered across the channel.

So, in my opinion, the hyperthetical answer to, "Would the British High Command have won if in charge of the German Army?" has to be - The German High Command made as many mistakes as the British did, so if the British High Command had "changed sides" but the Admiralty had not then I would say that the German army would still have been defeated even with British generalship.

That said, history is littered with defeats and victories that defied the strategic "logic" and even with a massive strategic advantage the British High Command still had to deliver - that's why hyperthetical questions of this sort are fun, but in reality unanswerable in a definitive way because they show us that no armed force acts in a vacuum and therefore tend to raise more questions than they answer.

Cheers - salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

...not exactly endeared him to many whose opinion counted.

As Chris pointed out, I believe this is the key to understanding what happened to Sir John. Had the Battle of Loos been the only incident, then likely nothing would have come of it. I don't know much about Sir John's early career at all. It is clear that he rose to prominence quite quickly, so he must have had a level of competence and socio-political skills/connections. The latter would have been really important - that's the way everything operated at this level at that time. I am just working from first principles in suggesting this.

The Curragh Incident, or at least Sir John's resignation in the face of it, could be interpreted as behaving honourably. Likely there were those who saw it in this light, though no doubt others would have thought Sir John could/should have been more pragmatic than principled. I bet there were some who were really cheesed off that Sir John did something that was so public - to a large extent it would not have mattered what the actual 'incident' was, being exposed in this way is/was 'not the done thing'.

The outbreak of the war offered an opportunity. Sir John took up the post of C-in-C. From the start, it was clear that this was a post too far. He just wasn't a CEO. Sir John failed to galvanise GHQ into an effective unit. The structure of GHQ, with the anomalous position for Sir Henry Wilson versus Sir Archibald Murray, speaks volumes. More importantly, Sir John was responsible for the BEF within the context of the Anglo-French military schema. Militarily, it was Sir John's responsibility to ensure the safety of the BEF, particularly because the left flank was virtually totally open - there were no other armies on that flank. He should have taken whatever steps were necessary to, at the very least, understand what Lanrezac was up to. It was very clear, even before the meeting with Lanrezac, that things were not good, that the BEF was at great risk.

Once the retreat got underway, it seems that Sir John fell to doing what he liked best/perhaps was best at. He went about the troops. There are numerous examples of his being seen on the roads or at the road side. Great boost to morale, but not if your executive team is not a team. His official 2IC, Murray, seemingly got a bad case of the faints, at least immediately after Le Cateau. Wilson wasn't the Rock of Gibralter either. And Sir John persisted in failing to proactively understand and come to grips with what was happening either side of the BEF. His lack of understanding the French language was no excuse. The problem was that his command focus was pointed in the wrong direction - he was looking down, getting too involved at the operational level. Joffre, for example, had to waste precious time molly-coddling to Sir John. As Chris pointed out, Kitchener had to get involved. K of K probably did not put it around that he had to do this. But it would have undermined K of K's opposition to Sir John's removal when the time came.

The real death blow, IMHO, will have been going to 'the press' about the shell scandal. This is just so not the thing to do!!! Again, it would not have mattered what the content was. Don't rock the boat; don't wash dirty linen in public - Rule No 1 of Whitehall!!! Corrigan illustrates this in his book 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock':

'There can be no excuse for French's behaviour in using the press to pursue his ends, right though these ends were. Serving officers in the British army are the servants of the state, and while they may lobby, protest, complain and badger in private, and ultimately resign if need be, they should not carry a professional disagreement with their masters into the public arena, and certainly not in a time of war.'

It just wasn't (still isn't) the done thing! Corrigan implies that the reason is to do with being a 'servant of the state', ie it is a requirement of the role. To some extent this is true but it must also be seen in light of the way things were done more generally, across this stratum of English society as a whole.

Perhaps, in light of the outcome of the Curragh Incident, Sir John thought he could get away with it. In one sense, his appointment as C-in-C could be perceived as a 'reward' for having behaved the way he did. More likely, and this is just a guess, Sir John was under such pressure, having not coped for some while, that he just wasn't thinking clearly. In any event his fate would have been sealed. Loos just offered the opportunity.

Given that appearance is everything ( I exaggerate but bear with me), what happened to the now ex-incumbent of the post of C-in-C was very important, irrespective of who he was. Especially in the time of war. Look at how the French dealt with Joffre. It was vital in the propaganda/public relations arena that the removal of the C-in-C should at least have the protection of a positive-spin. Thus, in my opinion, it was the significance of the post meant that Sir John was given an 'opportunity' that others lower down the chain did not get in similar circumstances. It was not Sir John per se.

Robert

[PhilB]

Would the British High Command have won if they`d been in charge of the German Army? If the answer is "No", what does that say about their generalship? Phil B

Apologies for taking this thread away from its point, but may I say I`m impressed with the level of discussion! Phil B

[Jonathan Saunders]

This hyperthetical and thus factually unanswerable question is nonetheless an interesting one in that it raises a point of vital strategic importance ...

Salesie - although I dont think we have been that far away when having differing points of view in the past I agree with your comments concerning this hypothetical question!

To elaborate my reasons I would comment that Britain actually started winning the war from August 1914 thanks to Jellicoe and the Royal Naval blockade and this is often a very under-rated factor in the Allied victory. I dont believe that Sir John French and subsequently Haig could win the war on the WF (which is why the question is often posed did Britain win the war in 1918 or did Germany lose it).

On the other hand the Germans had the potential to defeat France and then Russia - the longer the war went on this became more difficult for the Germans to achieve and although they came close in the spring of 1918 (IMHO thanks to British High Command) by the end of 1916 I am of the opinion the Germans could not really win the war in the west. Therefore I view the British army role from August 1914 as ensuring the Germans did not defeat France in the west, whilst the Naval blockade ensured that Germany's ability to conduct war continued to diminish and destroyed the German home front.

The point I want to make is that Germany had to force the issue with France and this was a pressure that Haig was never under and it was a presure under which gambles and mistakes could be made. However Haig's breakthrough battles in which he made unenforced errors was pressure he mainly put himself under. It is true to say we had to attack on the Somme to release pressure on the French at Verdun and by and large Rawlinson's initial plans based on bite and hold were IMHO correct. Haig turned the Somme into a breakthrough battle inwhich the British command made terrible errors based on a mismatch plan that was half Haig, half Rawlinson (and we could have learnt a lot from the French counter battery work, or short duration and intense preliminary bombardments to comment on just two errors).

I havent fully thought this through because of the impact of the Russian Revolution but with the French refusal to carry out any further attacks after Chemin des Dames, and with the support of American munitions and the promise that the American troops would soon become available in France, and also in the certain knowledge that the German home front was crumbling, I have yet to be convinced why Third Ypres had to be fought.

As with the Somme this battle was littered with tactical errors for which Haig must be held responsible and I think the question should be not so much would Haig and the British High Command have won the war if they had been in the position of the Germans, but would the German generals have made the same errors made by Haig and the British High Command at the Somme and Third Ypres (to name just two large scale battles) with the same resources available, and would they have conducted those battles as breakthrough battles given the overall British position?

[Guest]

Between 1914 and 1916, the BEF underwent a massive transformation from a glorified regular corps* to a large army group. Clearly, the management skills needed in 1914 were not those needed in 1916, when the individual army commanders could be largely expected to fight their own battles.

In this context, you have to wonder what French was doing at Loos, micromanaging the battle, in the first place.

He had to go because he could not manage an army group.

* yes, I know the original BEF had two infantry corps of two divisions each plus a cavalry division, but that hardly makes it even a small army.

[Jonathan Saunders]

In this context, you have to wonder what French was doing at Loos, micromanaging the battle, in the first place.

Sir John French had been ill and unavailable which fractured the process of Haig understanding French's intentions for the battle - also at the outset both French and Haig had been opposed to the battle in which K of K had to intervene and order them to comply with Joffre and carry out a supporting attack (not a breakthrough as Haig later turned the battle into), therefore French could be said to have good reason to believe that Haig was fully in agreement with his sentiments concerning a battle at Loos.

Sir John French instructed Haig to draw up plans for the battle and for the troops to be involved “to full extent of their power” – this was meant for Haig to ensure the attack was conducted with commitment as dictated by K of K, but evidence has been put forward by Dr. Nick Lloyd that Haig interpreted this (either in error or on purpose) to attack with the full weight of his force.

[Cliff. Hobson]

I believe French was removed because it finally and simply dawned on those in authority that his

judgment was suspect. Two glaring examples his handling of the reserves at Loos and the sacking

of Smith-Dorrien because Smith-Dorrien had shown French's lack of judgement at the 2nd Battle

of Ypres when Smith-Dorrien on his own iniative stopped the costly counter attacks.

[ressmex]

As Chris pointed out, I believe this is the key to understanding what happened to Sir John. Had the Battle of Loos been the only incident, then likely nothing would have come of it. I don't know much about Sir John's early career at all. It is clear that he rose to prominence quite quickly, so he must have had a level of competence and socio-political skills/connections. The latter would have been really important - that's the way everything operated at this level at that time. I am just working from first principles in suggesting this.

The Curragh Incident, or at least Sir John's resignation in the face of it, could be interpreted as behaving honourably. Likely there were those who saw it in this light, though no doubt others would have thought Sir John could/should have been more pragmatic than principled. I bet there were some who were really cheesed off that Sir John did something that was so public - to a large extent it would not have mattered what the actual 'incident' was, being exposed in this way is/was 'not the done thing'.

The outbreak of the war offered an opportunity. Sir John took up the post of C-in-C. From the start, it was clear that this was a post too far. He just wasn't a CEO. Sir John failed to galvanise GHQ into an effective unit. The structure of GHQ, with the anomalous position for Sir Henry Wilson versus Sir Archibald Murray, speaks volumes. More importantly, Sir John was responsible for the BEF within the context of the Anglo-French military schema. Militarily, it was Sir John's responsibility to ensure the safety of the BEF, particularly because the left flank was virtually totally open - there were no other armies on that flank. He should have taken whatever steps were necessary to, at the very least, understand what Lanrezac was up to. It was very clear, even before the meeting with Lanrezac, that things were not good, that the BEF was at great risk.

Once the retreat got underway, it seems that Sir John fell to doing what he liked best/perhaps was best at. He went about the troops. There are numerous examples of his being seen on the roads or at the road side. Great boost to morale, but not if your executive team is not a team. His official 2IC, Murray, seemingly got a bad case of the faints, at least immediately after Le Cateau. Wilson wasn't the Rock of Gibralter either. And Sir John persisted in failing to proactively understand and come to grips with what was happening either side of the BEF. His lack of understanding the French language was no excuse. The problem was that his command focus was pointed in the wrong direction - he was looking down, getting too involved at the operational level. Joffre, for example, had to waste precious time molly-coddling to Sir John. As Chris pointed out, Kitchener had to get involved. K of K probably did not put it around that he had to do this. But it would have undermined K of K's opposition to Sir John's removal when the time came.

The real death blow, IMHO, will have been going to 'the press' about the shell scandal. This is just so not the thing to do!!! Again, it would not have mattered what the content was. Don't rock the boat; don't wash dirty linen in public - Rule No 1 of Whitehall!!! Corrigan illustrates this in his book 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock':

'There can be no excuse for French's behaviour in using the press to pursue his ends, right though these ends were. Serving officers in the British army are the servants of the state, and while they may lobby, protest, complain and badger in private, and ultimately resign if need be, they should not carry a professional disagreement with their masters into the public arena, and certainly not in a time of war.'

It just wasn't (still isn't) the done thing! Corrigan implies that the reason is to do with being a 'servant of the state', ie it is a requirement of the role. To some extent this is true but it must also be seen in light of the way things were done more generally, across this stratum of English society as a whole.

Perhaps, in light of the outcome of the Curragh Incident, Sir John thought he could get away with it. In one sense, his appointment as C-in-C could be perceived as a 'reward' for having behaved the way he did. More likely, and this is just a guess, Sir John was under such pressure, having not coped for some while, that he just wasn't thinking clearly. In any event his fate would have been sealed. Loos just offered the opportunity.

Given that appearance is everything ( I exaggerate but bear with me), what happened to the now ex-incumbent of the post of C-in-C was very important, irrespective of who he was. Especially in the time of war. Look at how the French dealt with Joffre. It was vital in the propaganda/public relations arena that the removal of the C-in-C should at least have the protection of a positive-spin. Thus, in my opinion, it was the significance of the post meant that Sir John was given an 'opportunity' that others lower down the chain did not get in similar circumstances. It was not Sir John per se.

Robert

Robert thank you for this well written and clear aswer.

TOM

[salesie]

Salesie - although I dont think we have been that far away when having differing points of view in the past I agree with your comments concerning this hypothetical question!

To elaborate my reasons I would comment that Britain actually started winning the war from August 1914 thanks to Jellicoe and the Royal Naval blockade and this is often a very under-rated factor in the Allied victory. I dont believe that Sir John French and subsequently Haig could win the war on the WF (which is why the question is often posed did Britain win the war in 1918 or did Germany lose it).

On the other hand the Germans had the potential to defeat France and then Russia - the longer the war went on this became more difficult for the Germans to achieve and although they came close in the spring of 1918 (IMHO thanks to British High Command) by the end of 1916 I am of the opinion the Germans could not really win the war in the west. Therefore I view the British army role from August 1914 as ensuring the Germans did not defeat France in the west, whilst the Naval blockade ensured that Germany's ability to conduct war continued to diminish and destroyed the German home front.

The point I want to make is that Germany had to force the issue with France and this was a pressure that Haig was never under and it was a presure under which gambles and mistakes could be made. However Haig's breakthrough battles in which he made unenforced errors was pressure he mainly put himself under. It is true to say we had to attack on the Somme to release pressure on the French at Verdun and by and large Rawlinson's initial plans based on bite and hold were IMHO correct. Haig turned the Somme into a breakthrough battle inwhich the British command made terrible errors based on a mismatch plan that was half Haig, half Rawlinson (and we could have learnt a lot from the French counter battery work, or short duration and intense preliminary bombardments to comment on just two errors).

I havent fully thought this through because of the impact of the Russian Revolution but with the French refusal to carry out any further attacks after Chemin des Dames, and with the support of American munitions and the promise that the American troops would soon become available in France, and also in the certain knowledge that the German home front was crumbling, I have yet to be convinced why Third Ypres had to be fought.

As with the Somme this battle was littered with tactical errors for which Haig must be held responsible and I think the question should be not so much would Haig and the British High Command have won the war if they had been in the position of the Germans, but would the German generals have made the same errors made by Haig and the British High Command at the Somme and Third Ypres (to name just two large scale battles) with the same resources available, and would they have conducted those battles as breakthrough battles given the overall British position?

Johnathan, I agree completely with your comments vis-a-vis the naval blockade of Germany, and that the British Army could never win outright victory in the west without that highly effective blockade, which would take time to achieve its strategic objective, and that the British army was primarily there to ensure that France was not defeated. Time was not on Germany's side, which was recognised by Von Schlieffenh and a vital element in his plan to knock the French out of the war, and is, in my opinion, the reason why the old British regular army had to be sacrificed (and why French had to be "bolstered" by Kitchener when he attempted to move the BEF south of the Seine). It would seem that Kitchener and others at home were as aware of the strategic importance of time as much as Von Schlieffenh was? (Though, it would seem that French wasn't).

That said, it also has to be mentioned that the blockade itself could not ensure ultimate victory without a strong army in the field in the west. It is therefore, my considered opinion (with the huge benefit of hindsight, of course) that the blockade not only gave us the high-potential for victory from as early as 1914, but by its very nature it bought the army the time to learn how to play its part as an eventual equal in the partnership that was necessary to almost guarantee ultimate victory. Consequently, was French removed because of strategic naiveity rather than tactical ineptitude, or as well as?

As for 3rd Ypres? As you say, Haig undoubtedly made more of the same tactical mistakes during this battle. However, I'm of the opinion that strategically he saw no choice but to attack, and to attack with the full vigour of a breakthrough battle in order to keep the Germans fully occupied, given the dire risk of the them discovering the full magnitude of the French mutiny (still amazes that they never fully discovered the parlous state of the French Army in 1917). Could the onset of 3rd Ypres be viewed as an intrinsic part of the strategic imperative that the French were not defeated in order to buy further time?

Cheers - salesie

[Jonathan Saunders]

Consequently, was French removed because of strategic naiveity rather than tactical ineptitude, or as well as?

I think it was clear from an early stage that French was not up to the job and to answer your question I think iy was a case of "as well as".

I have never understood Haig's attarction to attack vigourously in the Ypres Salient and to put something like 2.5m shells into a battlefield that sat about 4 feet above water level and then expect an attacking force to traverse it. I have the Prior and Wilson book Passchendaele to read and can feel it edging closer to the top of the list.

Once again thanks for the exchange of comments.

[salesie]

I think it was clear from an early stage that French was not up to the job and to answer your question I think iy was a case of "as well as".

I have never understood Haig's attarction to attack vigourously in the Ypres Salient and to put something like 2.5m shells into a battlefield that sat about 4 feet above water level and then expect an attacking force to traverse it. I have the Prior and Wilson book Passchendaele to read and can feel it edging closer to the top of the list.

Once again thanks for the exchange of comments.

I must admit, Jonathan, that Haig's "interest" in the Ypres salient in some ways does appear peculier, given what had gone on there before and the lessons that perhaps should have been learnt. Or was his "strange" attitude towards the salient formed precisely because of what happened there earlier in the war?

I think the following may go some way to explaining. This is a piece I used in another thread about the Old Contemptibles. Written by Farrar the Para, Anthony Farrar-Hockley, in his book Death of an Army, about First Ypres and subtitled In which the British Regular Army was destroyed. In his last few paragraphs, he sums up the Glory and the Sadness of the old contemptibles, the strategic importance of the battle, and the impact he believes this battle had on the minds of some original commanders. Written in 1967 while he commanded a parachute brigade (of course, Farrar the Para later progressed to even greater rank).

I feel the last paragraph, in particular, may give us a clue to Haig's psyche towards the salient.

I quote:

".......No, not the whole expeditionary force. It would never be whole in the original sense again. Typical of its battalions, 2nd Highland Light Infantry was relieved on 16th November by the French to set off '... marching through Ypres to Bailleul and losing an officer and four men by shellfire on the way. Out of all the officers and men mobilized at Aldershot a bare three months before, there were now scarcely thirty left.

The tale of losses is too continuous to sustain an impact; the mind becomes saturated with figures. It is true, too, that the total number of their casualties is insignificant in comparison with those suffered on the Somme or in the attempt to clear the Ypres ridge again in 1917. But it is not for the number fallen, much as they were mourned, that they deserve to be remembered; or for their courage and patriotism - they were, after all, doing their duty as professional soldiers, holding the ring while their countrymen took up arms. What marks them is the standard they set as fighting men, holding for weeks a wide sector of attack against an enemy four to seven times their strength.

Falkenhayn might write after the war, 'That which had to be attained under any circumstances, if the war was to be carried on with any hopeful prospects, was attained' - that is, stabilization of the western front from the Alps to the sea. But that was not what he had aimed at. He aimed to break through to Calais.

It is only fair to say that the allies too had hoped to envelop the enemy line or to break through, but the point is that while it was most desirable for them to do so it was not essential. It was essential for the Germans. Time was not on their side, notwithstanding the errors of their adversaries.

One of these errors, often remarked upon, was the retention of the Ypres salient long after all the ground of tactical significance had been captured by the Germans. The soldiers who came later could not understand the policy. Historians surmise that its retention was due to an obsession by the senior commanders for holding ground - any ground - rather than release it to the enemy gratuitously. But some, at least, however misguidedly, felt that the army should hold on to what it could because they had fought for the ground; they had hallowed it with the blood and bodies of comrades with whom they had soldiered all over the world through a lifetime. The old British Army with its venial faults and marvellous quality had died there in its defence. They could never forget that. Neither should we."

Cheers - salesie.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Thanks - I'll bear that in mind although we are talking about "the educated soldier" here.

[Anthony Pigott]

... Haig's "interest" in the Ypres salient in some ways does appear peculier, given what had gone on there before and the lessons that perhaps should have been learnt. Or was his "strange" attitude towards the salient formed precisely because of what happened there earlier in the war? ...

It could be construed that because Haig believed that the Germans could have broken through at 1st Ypres if only they'd persevered a little longer, he was determined later on not to quit too soon e.g. the Somme campaign and 3rd Ypres.

Regards

Anthony

[armourersergeant]

Jon,

Men have died for far less more stubornly, it is called a flag!

I have never thought about this side in relation to the Ypres salient. Its an interesting hypothosis.

I have however heard recently that Haig thought that in 1914 the Germans gave up to easily at 1st Ypres and resolved never to give up too soon himself.

regards

Arm

[armourersergeant]

Oh Anthony has seen the same, sorry typing interupted by scraming baby!!

[salesie]

Thanks - I'll bear that in mind although we are talking about "the educated soldier" here.

From that, Jonathan, I assume you mean that Haig by the time of 3rd Ypres should have been "educated" by experience? If so, I would have to say that anyone can only learn from their mistakes once they recognise they've made them, and that Farrar the Para's words may just, I emphasise may just, explain one of the reasons why there was such a long learning curve. The other view, of course, is that socks can only be pulled up if they're on the feet in the first place.

Cheers - salesie.

[Anthony Pigott]

Oh Anthony has seen the same, sorry typing interupted by scraming baby!!

Snap! I remember screaming babies.

Regards

Anthony

[Anthony Pigott]

Getting back to the original question, there's an earlier thread that addresses some of it:

 

I think his own book '1914' gives much insight into French. He is so 'full of himself' in everything he writes about. I really find it difficult to read the book - I keep thinking "ugh!" and put it down to do something else - I'm not exaggerating.

I used to think that he couldn't be as bad as he appeared, but I'm afraid he was. To me the difficult question is: how did he get into his position in the first place?

And, of course, his biggest 'crime': getting rid of Smith-Dorrien, probably the most competent of the Great War generals. I'm not claiming he would have worked miracles on the Western front: I'm sure no one could, but given his track record, including an aversion to salients and throwing men into failing attacks, I'm sure things would have been very different. With him in charge there certainly wouldn't be as many names on the Menin Gate.

Regards

Anthony

[PhilB]

I must say how much I dislike the expression "They learned from their mistakes" gents. What on earth would you expect a general to do from a battle which sacrificed maybe thousands of brave men? Only a dolt would not learn something! It`s hardly a sign of great intellect. Phil B