HMS Pathfinder

[Bcta]

On 04/01/2024 at 13:34, KizmeRD said:

First off, everything needs to be put into proper context with a sound understanding of the geography, and the maritime assets available (including an appreciation of their capabilities and limitations). Just trying to build a picture of what particular ship was where that particular day (early morning) will only get you so far.

Admiral Lowry was responsible for sea area defence from the Cromarty Firth down to the Northumbrian Coast, and all points in between (including the Firth of Forth).

The war hadn’t been going on very long, so strategies, tactics and threat perception were all still evolving. Furthermore, before that fateful day, no warship had ever been sunk by a torpedo fired from a submarine - so the danger wasn’t adequately appreciated.

HMS Pathfinder’s job that night was to patrol the outer areas of the Firth of Forth, providing early warning of any incursion by German ships - who may perhaps have wanted to blast away at the footings of the Forth Railway bridge, shell Rosyth naval base (so as to delay its opening) or maybe even open fire on Edinburgh itself. But the most likely threat Pathfinder was seeking to counter out on its patrol was a night time foray into the Forth by a German minelayer. (Had she discovered one, Pathfinder was sufficiently well equipped to see it off).

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla formed part of a layered defence strategy for the Forth estuary, Pathfinder and flotilla destroyers provided the outer security ring (operating seaward of May Island), westwards of May Island torpedo-boats patrolled, then as you move further into the Forth there’s the coastal artillery and searchlight batteries on Inchcolm etc.and finally you come to one or more boom defence nets strung out between Granton and Port Edgar, with trawler patrols operating to the east of the boom and motorboat patrols to the west.

Not sure myself what difference having two additional destroyers screening Pathfinder would have made to the eventual outcome. With luck, they might have spotted U-21’s periscope and rammed her, but who’s to say? But it doesn’t make a whole lot of sense for patrolling ships not to spread out across the entire width of the outer estuary.

In my opinion, what really did for Pathfinder was the audacity Otto Hersing and the element of surprise - that and the fact that Pathfinder was steaming at economical speed in order to preserve her coal bunkers (not wholly unreasonable given the circumstances at the time). Please bear in mind also that anti-submarine weapons and tactics hadn’t yet been developed, and even with Pathfinder proceeding at ten knots, U-21 didn’t have speed advantage to manoeuvre into a firing position, the U-boat would simply have had to rely a bit on chance (picking a likely spot to loiter) and waiting for the hapless Pathfinder to come within range (and not altering course before the torpedo was fired and hit home).

Would escorting destroyers have assisted in saving life subsequent to the sinking? Not sure on that one either (probably not substantially so) as the initial torpedo explosion caused a secondary explosion in the forward magazine, completely wrecking the front part of ship where most off-watch rating were sleeping (and damaging the bridge and wheelhouse too). The extent of structural damage was so catastrophic that Pathfinder sunk rapidly, bow first. Men in the mess decks, and engine room personnel, just wouldn’t have had time to get out on deck and abandon ship and this largely accounts for the high number of fatalities. Had other warships been nearer they might have picked up more survivors from the water sooner, but as it was, rescue craft did arrive on the scene within a reasonable timeframe (first some fishing boats from Eyemouth, joined shortly thereafter by HM Ships Express & Stag).
 

MB

 

Interesting stuff, I agree entirely about the need for context and it is interesting that different naval bases reacted differently to the submarine threat. Scapa in particular seems to have recognised the risk with unboat attacks in Aug 1914 and the fleet dispersing to sea at every submarine alert, there was also the ramming of U15 - my feeling is that these reports may well have emboldened Lowry and Martin-Leake into believing that the uboat threat was manageable with aggressive tactics, it would certainly have played into the risk perception of the command. You mention that pathfinder was out at night, the logs seem to suggest that this was a daytime patrol with calm seas and good visibility, have I got this bit wrong?

Another factor that I think might be important was the incursion of a uboat into the firth on the nights before the 5th, there can be little doubt that Capt 8D was aware of the immediate threat his flotilla faced and that the patrol on the 5th would have had a specific remit to be visible and counter the threat. I think it is certainly worth considering the flotilla tactics in the light of this information and perhaps not see the location of the different units as accidental. 
 

I agree with your analysis of the rapid sinking, many reports say the stern was up at a very steep angle, do you think this suggests that the fore section remained attached for some time after the explosion (with the weight lifting the stern out of the water?) 

overall, and I agree there are many factors to consider, I think there is a case to be considered which suggests greater purpose in the captains mind than the established story of the time 
 

[KizmeRD]

Defence of ports and anchorages is an interesting topic, but the challenges facing Vice-Adm Colville up at Scapa were a little different to those facing Admiral Lowry in the Firth of Forth.

And yes you are right, there was already a nascent theoretical awareness that U-boats constituted a real threat, but the full lesson of what that actually meant in practice hadn’t really hit home yet. That would very soon become fully apparent over the next few weeks - what with the losses of Cressy, Aboukir, Hogue, Audacious (at Scapa) and Niger. -  Such losses certainly highlighted the vulnerabilities of surface ships and caused a great deal of consternation both to Jellicoe and at the Admiralty in London.

And right again on the timing of the sinking - 3:45 pm (not 3:45 am). Sorry, must be age playing tricks on me!

MB

 

 

 

Edited 9 January by KizmeRD

[Bcta]

7 hours ago, KizmeRD said:

Defence of ports and anchorages is an interesting topic, but the challenges facing Vice-Adm Colville up at Scapa were a little different to those facing Admiral Lowry in the Firth of Forth.

And yes you are right, there was already a nascent theoretical awareness that U-boats constituted a real threat, but the full lesson of what that actually meant in practice hadn’t really hit home yet. That would very soon become fully apparent over the next few weeks - what with the losses of Cressy, Aboukir, Hogue, Audacious (at Scapa) and Niger. -  Such losses certainly highlighted the vulnerabilities of surface ships and caused a great deal of consternation both to Jellicoe and at the Admiralty in London.

And right again on the timing of the sinking - 3:45 pm (not 3:45 am). Sorry, must be age playing tricks on me!

MB

 

 

 

I have been searching for a record of the navy’s investigation into the sinking, I thought it might be in adm 178 (cressy etc at 178/13) but can’t see any reference to pathfinder. It may well be in  ADM137/501, enigmatically titled 'Rosyth Secret Memoranda 1914-1916 referenced by Treasurer but if there are other records I could usefully review please point me in the right direction. I am hoping to get back to Kew in April or May so having a full reference list will be really useful 

Bill

[simonharley]

ADM 116/1356 perhaps? Some interesting wartime material ended up in the 116 series for some reason.

[The Treasurer]

41 minutes ago, simonharley said:

ADM 116/1356 perhaps? Some interesting wartime material ended up in the 116 series for some reason.

Someone has looked at this source already. See this thread:

 

[Bcta]

21 hours ago, KizmeRD said:

Defence of ports and anchorages is an interesting topic, but the challenges facing Vice-Adm Colville up at Scapa were a little different to those facing Admiral Lowry in the Firth of Forth.

And yes you are right, there was already a nascent theoretical awareness that U-boats constituted a real threat, but the full lesson of what that actually meant in practice hadn’t really hit home yet. That would very soon become fully apparent over the next few weeks - what with the losses of Cressy, Aboukir, Hogue, Audacious (at Scapa) and Niger. -  Such losses certainly highlighted the vulnerabilities of surface ships and caused a great deal of consternation both to Jellicoe and at the Admiralty in London.

And right again on the timing of the sinking - 3:45 pm (not 3:45 am). Sorry, must be age playing tricks on me!

MB

 

 

 

Clio quotes adm 53 54542 ((Hms Pathfinder) these logs at TNA run from 1/10/13 to 31/5/14 - well before the attack by U21. The reports seemed to be submitted monthly to hms Tyne as depot ship. The question it left me with is why are June July and possibly August missing from the record? 

[The Treasurer]

8 minutes ago, Bcta said:

Clio quotes adm 53 54542 ((Hms Pathfinder) these logs at TNA run from 1/10/13 to 31/5/14 - well before the attack by U21. The reports seemed to be submitted monthly to hms Tyne as depot ship. The question it left me with is why are June July and possibly August missing from the record? 

These deck logs will have gone down with Pathfinder. This in normal with any sunken ship. The last log is almost always lost.

[KizmeRD]

Bcta - In my opinion, the only ‘conspiracy’ involved in the sinking of HMS Pathfinder was the initial attempt by the Admiralty to mislead the public by blaming it on a sea mine. Not sure what more Capt. Martin-Leake could have done under the circumstances, you tell me? There was really only one likely outcome once Otto Hersing fired his torpedo. Or are you seeking evidence that Admiral Lowry knew that U-21 was already in the Firth of Forth (as it had been) and that he did nothing to alert his patrols?

MB

[Bcta]

On 09/01/2024 at 16:43, KizmeRD said:

Defence of ports and anchorages is an interesting topic, but the challenges facing Vice-Adm Colville up at Scapa were a little different to those facing Admiral Lowry in the Firth of Forth.

And yes you are right, there was already a nascent theoretical awareness that U-boats constituted a real threat, but the full lesson of what that actually meant in practice hadn’t really hit home yet. That would very soon become fully apparent over the next few weeks - what with the losses of Cressy, Aboukir, Hogue, Audacious (at Scapa) and Niger. -  Such losses certainly highlighted the vulnerabilities of surface ships and caused a great deal of consternation both to Jellicoe and at the Admiralty in London.

And right again on the timing of the sinking - 3:45 pm (not 3:45 am). Sorry, must be age playing tricks on me!

MB

 

 

17 hours ago, KizmeRD said:

Bcta - In my opinion, the only ‘conspiracy’ involved in the sinking of HMS Pathfinder was the initial attempt by the Admiralty to mislead the public by blaming it on a sea mine. Not sure what more Capt. Martin-Leake could have done under the circumstances, you tell me? There was really only one likely outcome once Otto Hersing fired his torpedo. Or are you seeking evidence that Admiral Lowry knew that U-21 was already in the Firth of Forth (as it had been) and that he did nothing to alert his patrols?

MB

I agree and can understand to some extent the desire of the admiralty to want to reduce the potential moral impact of the growing uboat threat, although it was a little innocent of them given the number of people who knew it was a torpedo that caused the loss. From my perspective there are a number of outstanding issues (such as the lack of any record of an enquiry) that means that the facts we have also support other potential scenarios. My hypothesis is that the patrol that day was aware that uboats had penetrated the anchorage, that the 1st BCS could be at risk from attack and so sub hunting / sub frightening off was part of the intent of the mission. I don’t see this element as conspiracy, indeed it could be argued as a sound tactic in the circumstances. If this scenario exists at all, and had been successful it would have been seen as a major achievement for the navy. So far I have found no evidence to say that the sub hunting scenario is unfounded (admittedly I still have more research to do and there are dead ends such as the minesweeper records - which will remain a mystery). But I really welcome the expertise and knowledge of the forum hence my request to point me at any sources that add to the overall picture or indeed says that sub hunting does not fit the facts we have. 

[The Treasurer]

1 hour ago, Bcta said:

My hypothesis is that the patrol that day was aware that uboats had penetrated the anchorage, that the 1st BCS could be at risk from attack and so sub hunting / sub frightening off was part of the intent of the mission.

As you may be aware an enemy submarine had (incorrectly) been reported and fired on by the Forth batteries on 2 September. The sighting had (correctly) been identified as a false alarm - no German submarine had yet arrived off the Forth.

The patrol screen of destroyers and coastal submarine patrols was obviously aimed at defending the Forth from attack generally. The contemporary documented fixation was disguised minelayers. How much individual commanders took the threat of submarine attack seriously varied enormously at this point from outright complacency (Campbell/Christian) to high vigilance (Jellicoe). Tactics like zig-zagging were established and known to be effective. Steaming at economical speed in straight lines is an indicator of perceiving a low or non-existent threat of submarine attack. Conversely using zig-zags and maintaining cruising speed is evidence of high awareness. Pathfinder did cause a reaction and tactical rethink, in the same way as the sinking a few days later of Hela did for the Germans. Theoretical risks in war become a lot starker when they stop being theoretical.

The secondary sources are a little confused about whether the loss was initially reported as due to a mine, or whether this was from the start a deliberate ruse. If you check  Home Fleet signals that should clear that up conclusively. I was aware from earlier research that Keyes, the Commodore (S), made an inspection trip of the Forth on 12 September to advise on ASW measures there, as requested by Sturdee. He is pretty clear that until she spotted the torpedo Pathfinder was unaware of any submarine in the Forth, although two trawler skippers were. As far as I am aware there is no evidence that U.20 or U.21 had been sighted by naval forces prior to the attack. This is from Keyes report in ADM137/2067:

[Bcta]

One of the records I want to look at is for the carlingnose battery (recorded as firing on a “periscope”) this seems to reflect the fleet nervousness about submarines and would have been accepted as evidence by Lowry and CaptD8 at the time (although later disproved). I had read that Keyes was keen to have more aircraft as part of coastal defence but I understood the decision had been to send available aircraft to the front supporting the land forces. I think the speed and direction argument can be interpreted both as innocence but also as an attempt to get the submarine to show its position and be subject to attack given that Martin Leake probably was overconfident that pathfinder could resist an attack, this would be supported by the readiness of stag and express to support. I think often in this case it’s trying to uncover the propanganda and to consider the Commands natural instinct to suggest innocence and accident as the cause

[KizmeRD]

As this was the very first incident of aggressive submarine warfare (a solo U-boat operating far from its base, sinking a warship with a torpedo), it’s hardly surprising that anti-submarine tactics (or indeed anti-submarine weapons) were still very primitive and under-developed. All Martin-Leake could reasonably do was to patrol his ships up and down the mouth of the estuary hoping to visually detect any likely intruder, be it a disguised enemy mine-layer or a U-boat doing reconnaissance. I don’t believe that there was any specific prior intelligence relating to enhanced U-boat threat.

One interesting entry in T.36’s Logbook for 5th September 1914 subsequent to the sinking reads as follows:

8.0pm: Awaiting orders for expected attack on the port.

Clearly what happened to PATHFINDER had caused a good degree of consternation for ships sheltering in the Fleet anchorage above the bridge, and it wasn’t yet clear whether this might be a prelude for bigger things to come.

MB

 

[Bcta]

I found the investigation into into whether the navy was aware of the submarine threat theatrical, with the clear focus of blame on the trawler captains and torpedo boat commander. The overall message seemed to be in support of the “innocence” scenario with no reference to the “periscope sightings” prior to the 5th. I think it is worth considering whether this was at least partly done to divert attention away from other possibilities 

[Bcta]

Yes MD the message when out to both the 8th and the fleet immediately the rescue mission was launched. Some logs record receipt of the message and their support for the rescue. The shock at the magnitude of the loss of life wasrecorded in the eye witness statements. Other boats at Cromarty for example record receiving the message. I still think we need to take into account the uboat activity right from the start of the war, the mining by uboats, the threat at scapa, the ramming of u15 etc as evidence that the navy would have understood there was an active uboat campaign against the fleet as a whole and that the Forth had every reason to believe they would be on the list as a target.

[KizmeRD]

1 hour ago, Bcta said:

I still think we need to take into account the uboat activity right from the start of the war, the mining by uboats, the threat at scapa, the ramming of u15 etc as evidence that the navy would have understood there was an active uboat campaign against the fleet as a whole and that the Forth had every reason to believe they would be on the list as a target.

The mining by U-boats? Or the mining by German surface ships? (Specialist UC boats didn’t enter service until later in 1915).

The threat at Scapa - Jellicoe was certainly freaked-out by the meagre defences of the Grand Fleet  anchorage and the harm that a potential submarine incursion could sow. Periscope sightings by units of the Grand Fleet and their attending destroyers became so commonplace that one might be forgiven for believing that the Germans must have had U-boats in their thousands. The reality was much different of course (under 40), and furthermore most U-boats sent to sea during 1914 proved to be fairly unreliable mechanically. That said, their successes were profound, both actual and psychological - and U.15 was indeed unfortunate how things unfolded

By year-end the U-boat fleet was five submarines down, but it had notched-up an impressive tally of RN ships- albeit that complacency turned out to be just as deadly as torpedoes were! 

However I wouldn’t say this opening period of the war constituted ‘an active U-boat campaign against the fleet’ - not in the same way that the Trade War against merchant ships clearly was.

MB

PS. In one of my earlier posting I should also have included HMS HAWKE and HERMES.

[Bcta]

Does anyone know if u21 log for Sept 1914 has been translated into English?