Analysing the Battle of Le Cateau.

[joerookery]

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There's plenty of exaggeration in the folklore of 1914 ; but it seems that it reached supreme heights when it came to the Liege fighting.

 

Phil,

 

Thank you for chiming in! I think you have a much better handle on casualties that I have ever had. I really do not know much about Le Cateau.  I have learned a great deal about Liège. While I am not finished at all, I was so disappointed in the Zuber book that I felt compelled to figure it out. There are tons and tons of folklore and exaggeration. It seems to have come from all over but the Germans certainly were trying to avoid blame and move on to the Marne.  From a military operational point of view the Handstreich was an unworkable disaster.  Yet, historians have tried to put lipstick on this for 100 years.  Zuber's book does not tie the operational pieces together. I do not know if I will get to the casualties as that might be a little bit too granular. In fact it is casualty numbers that are causing me to think and rethink German tactical changes between Liège and Mons.

[dansparky]

Nigel Cave and Jack Sheldon Le Cateau state that five Jager Battalions were in support of the mounted regiments. 3,4,7,9 and 10.  This means that No 4 were no longer attached to 7th division and this would also mean up to another 24 machine guns would be available.  The available MG's by now could be as much as 96 mgs.  It also means that in 4th divisions sector the germans (may have) possessed 48, against the British 24.  So in real terms at Le cateau the Germans could have possessed a third more Mg's, double the number in 4th division sector but exactly the same numbers facing each other in 2nd corps sector. 

So against 4th division, there was a lack of opposing infantry but double the Mg's.  Approx then 5,400 infantry and 15,000 cavalrymen against -  16,000 British infantry.   In 2 Corps sector, 17,500 x2 (jack horfall, mons) =35,000 against 2 corps and 19^th brigade = 36,000. 

if the Magdeburgisches Husaren-Regiment Nr. 10, 10th (Magdeburg) Hussars were still attached this could add up to about 850 cavalry with 7 and 8^th division.  (this figure arrived at by 5,000 cavalry in a division consisting of 6 regiments: 5000/6 = 833.

The 4 companies of Magdeburgisches Pionier-Bataillon Nr. 4, =660 (taken from Men in pioneer battalion: Great War DAWNING X 4).  So forces in 2 corps sector were roughly the same. 

 

Some of this based on Mobilisation figures and assuming all present at le cateau.

Edited 17 May , 2017 by dansparky

[dansparky]

therefore the hesitation displayed in the German advance could be due to several factors.

 

prep of the ground prior to advance caused by:

 

1. the stubborn resistance of the British at mons rifle fire and mg fire.

2. lack of infantry particularly in front of 4th division.

3. no overwhelming superiority of men - against any stubborn resistance could be difficult (Clausewitz and the advantages of the defence).

 

Therefore prep of the ground with a marginal superiority of machine guns - mainly 4th division sector and Artillery (unless you agree with Zuber's argument) makes total sense. 

[dansparky]

6 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Dan and Joe,

 

 

Zuber hits very hard at the hyperbole surrounding the extent of German casualties at Liege : there were rumours of fifty thousand Germans cut down there, and even citations of supposedly officially stated figures of forty two thousand plus.

 

Zuber gives a definitive statement and puts German casualties at Liege as under 3,400.

 

There's plenty of exaggeration in the folklore of 1914 ; but it seems that it reached supreme heights when it came to the Liege fighting.

 

That doesn't change the reality that some German units were roughly handled there.

 

Phil

4

How many of these casualties fell on the elements that went on to Le Cateau?  The problem with estimating numbers is it assuming full strength (which is unlikely) and that elements that originally made up a division etc were all present.  Some may have been elsewhere and others absorbed, this is though not easy to ascertain.

 

Dan

[AOK4]

I quickly checked the histories of the mentioned Jäger Bataillone (3,4,7,9 and 10). They seem to have been all engaged at some point near Cattenières and according to one of the maps, Maschinen-Gewehr-Abteilung 4 was also engaged.

 

Of course, not all machine guns were actually engaged (although a lot were according to the descriptions and were very successful) as some were kept in reserve.

 

Jan

[dansparky]

thanks Jan, do you mean the actual histories of each Jager Batt? 

[joerookery]

One of the more heroic units at Liège was the seventh Jaeger Battalion. They paid a steep price during the Handstreich and by the time of Halen,  12 August, they were vastly reduced in size. I have not looked at the history to see if it details any replacements between 12 August and 26 August. A little snippet from The Last Great Cavalry Charge:

 

Quote

They were reinforced by two companies of Jäger Bn Nr 7. Known as the Bückeburg Jäger, they really represented the entire battalion. However, the battalion had been mauled in the battle with the Liège forts; two companies were all that was left. These two were merged into one company. Actually, both Jäger Bn Nr 9 and Nr 7 had been committed to Liège as part of the Army of the Meuse. The Jäger Bn Nr 9 had lost its commander and Jäger Bn Nr 7 had been completely brutalized.

 

 

[phil andrade]

4 hours ago, joerookery said:

.  From a military operational point of view the Handstreich was an unworkable disaster.  Yet, historians have tried to put lipstick on this for 100 years.  .

 

 

That says an awful lot, Joe !

 

Historiographical dynamite.

 

It's made a terrific impact on me.

 

Phil

[AOK4]

1 hour ago, dansparky said:

thanks Jan, do you mean the actual histories of each Jager Batt? 

 

Yes

[dansparky]

ah ok so with Maschinen-Gewehr-Abteilung another 6 machine guns (and 1 in reserve) could have been part of the armoury employed v 4 div 

[dansparky]

1 hour ago, joerookery said:

 

They were reinforced by two companies of Jäger Bn Nr 7. Known as the Bückeburg Jäger, they really represented the entire battalion. However, the battalion had been mauled in the battle with the Liège forts; two companies were all that was left. These two were merged into one company. Actually, both Jäger Bn Nr 9 and Nr 7 had been committed to Liège as part of the Army of the Meuse. The Jäger Bn Nr 9 had lost its commander and Jäger Bn Nr 7 had been completely brutalized.

 

 

 

 

1

With the limited relatively small number of casualties, why was it that the Jager Battalions, in particular, paid such a heavy price? Do you have details of this reference?

 

Best Dan

 

edit, depending on how many were engaged some sources quote 300,000 whilst zuber states 25,000.  so not knowing much about leige my question was based on the former.

Edited 17 May , 2017 by dansparky

[joerookery]

Quote

why was it that the Jager Battalions, in particular, paid such a heavy price?

It seems as if the worst of the worst were concentrated in the 34th brigade attack. So it was not just the Jaeger battalions, but both the ninth and the seventh were part of that endeavor.

 

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Handstreich against the city of Liège started the night of August 5. What transpired was a terrible massacre of this strike force. The initial assault on the Liège fortresses (August 5-6) not only cost time but 5,300 German casualties—for zero gain.[1] A Belgian officer commenting about the initial infantry attacks stated, “They made no attempt at deploying but came on line after line, almost shoulder to shoulder, until we shot them down; the fallen were heaped on top of each other in an awful barricade of dead and wounded.”[2] Clearly, the Germans had fallen back on old traditional doctrine and disregarded any need to disperse. In the ongoing argument between the traditionalists and the reformers, this action clearly came down on the side of the reformers and dispersal. One clue concerning the lack of dispersal is that Third Battalion, Eighty-ninth Infantry Regiment lost their battalion colors and First Battalion, Ninetieth Infantry Regiment buried their colors near one of the forts. In addition, this force had run into the Belgian’s Third Infantry Division. What were the colors doing there?

---

[1]. Herwig, The Marne, 112.

[2]. Brose, Kaiser’s Army, 188.

 

Quote

As luck would have it, while waiting for the infantry battalions to cross, a very heavy thunderstorm broke out. The two infantry regiments crossed first, and so the Jäger battalions did not start crossing until 2030 hours. They did not both complete the task until 2330 hours. The brigade had already moved out, but Ninth and Seventh Jäger caught up just south of Hermée. The thunderstorm turned the route to mud. The troops were exhausted and the mounted officers walked their horses to stay awake.

The brigade reached Hermée at midnight. In the confusion, it seems Ninetieth Infantry Regiment ended up going first, followed by Eighty-ninth Infantry Regiment, directly into contact with Fort Pontisse. A report stated that a battalion flag from Eighty-Ninth Infantry Regiment was buried to save it from capture. Even more alarming, it was reported that Brigade Commander Brigadier General von Kraewel gathered the field grade officers and gave them their orders for the first time. Allegedly, the officers were not aware their objective was the Citadel in Liège until that early hour. If the report were true, there must have been little doubt that in a couple of hours at night the regiments could find their way and cover the huge amount of ground required. Once again, it seems as if the progress arrows shown in the Handstreich history were pure fiction.[1]

Kraewel next ordered Seventh Jäger to become the brigade advance guard and continue the march due south to Liège. Now, instead of having the entire Thirty-fourth Brigade behind it, Seventh Jäger was followed by only Ninth Jäger. Seventh Jäger moved along the road and slipped into a gap between Forts Pontisse and Liers, as imagined in the original plan. Without making any contact whatsoever, they had broken through and were behind Belgian lines. This success occurred at night by a unit only just assigned to the brigade. At dawn, Seventh Jäger reached the Quartier du Nord in Liège—and stopped.

Ninth Jäger Battalion took Haute Préalle, though the battalion history gave no details. Seventh Jäger arrived unaware in front of the house of the Military Commander of Liège, General Leman. Leman and his staff were completely surprised by the advance and progress of the Prussian troops. Staff members evacuated Leman, which led however, to a real collapse of the Belgian command-and-control at a critical time.

Out of contact with the majority of the brigade, Seventh Jäger Commander Major Donalies therefore decided to withdraw. By 0900 hours, the march towards Vottem began. Patrols returned, reporting they had not made contact with the Brigade, leading Major Donalies to believe that the Brigade indeed occupied Liège. Thus, he decided to continue back to Liège at 1600 hours. Before getting very far in the endeavor to return to Liège, the bulk of this organization was either captured or scattered. At the end of the day, Seventh Jäger Battalion could only muster fewer than two companies.[2]

---

[1]. Zuber, Ten Days, 2953-84

[2]. Verein der Offiziere, Prussichen, 24-26.

 

[dansparky]

ah thanks for those will dig out those texts.

[AOK4]

According to what I read from the battalion history, Jäger Bataillon 7 got split up in different columns. Some men were taken prisoner by the Belgians for some time. After Liege was captured, they were all reunited and losses, although serious, were not that dramatic. Unfortunately exact numbers are not given in the unit history.

 

Please have a look at your footnote "Verein der Offiziere, Prussichen, 24-26.".  The word "Prussischen" is misspelt and it even doesn't appear in the title as that is "Das Kgl. Preußische (Westfälische) Jäger-Bataillon Nr. 7 im Weltkrieg 1914-18 (Feldbataillon)".

[joerookery]

Thank you thank you Jan! The original footnote is----

[1]. Verein der Offiziere des Kgl. Prussichen Jäger Bn. no.7, Der Kgl. Prussichen (Westfäliche) Jäger Bn. no.7 im Weltkeig 1914-1918 (Berlin: Verlag Richard Stalling, 1929).

 Now to figure out how it got so mangled between this word-processing program, the editor, and me. Thank you for your observation. If you notice anymore problems with the draft please point them out I can use all the help I can get.

[dansparky]

Wrestling with the Artillery Figures at Le Cateau.

Not calculating for wastage prior on both sides. 

 

Spencer Jones Puts Artillery at German:550 British 228 (The Great Retreat 1914 Kindle).

Zuber German at 162 possessed half of British. 

 

Early Additions to the BOH would certainly suggest massive disparity between German Guns and British i am not sure that by 1937 edition they do.

 

Each British Division had 76 guns (54 X 18pdr, 18 X 4.5 inch howitzers + 4 X 60 pdrs).BOH.  This would total the 228 stated by Spencer.  He has not included the Guns of the cavalry, i guess because they did not really get that involved.  I, however, would also subtract 18 of the 4.5 field howitzers and 4 of the 60pdr.  As the 4th division did not have any heavy field artillery.   My total =206.

 

I am not sure though where the 550 guns come from?   Possibly figures from an earlier edition of the BOH which stated many more German units were present.  Knowing from the latter editions of the BOH on 3 German Cavalry Division, plus Jager units and 2 infantry divisions came into battle the 7th and 8th. 

 

Then the total German guns would be Cav Div 12 x3 + 72 of each infantry division.  This would equal 180.  (Figures are taken from BOH).  However, the BOH also states that the guns from the German 5th Division also come into play early so this would raise the figure to 252.

 

Therefore the 4th's Division 54 guns were initially against 36.  In 2nd Corps sector, there were 152 guns in opposition there were 144 rising to 216. 

 

The BOH also tells us that the guns of the IV Reserve German corps came into play between Wambaix and Fontaine between 11:10 - 11:30 to assists the cavalry corps.  And so by the end of the first phase of Le Cateau this suggests that 4ths divisions 54 guns now faced 180.  Therefore the 206 British Guns faced 180 this rose to 252 and eventually rising to 396 when the IV German Reserve Guns joined the party.  At the end of the first phase it would appear that the British faced a disparity of 2:1.  whilst this equates to a sizeable disparity by the end of the first phase it does not represent the 4:1 or 6:1 figures I have seen.

 

Dan

 

Awaiting the modern translation of the German Official War History i wonder what that will add?

 

 

 

 

[Derek Black]

Don't know how i missed this thread.

 

An interesting read Dan, thanks for highlighting the changes in editions of the BOH.

 

Did that translation of the German History ever arrive?

 

Derek,

[dansparky]

I change to the above the 4th division was only lacking their 60 pounders.  

 

Hi, Derek the German History translation did indeed arrive.  

 

German Official History of the war emphasised the importance of Sordet’s intervention.  The vanguard of the  German 7^th Reserve Division advanced towards Haucourt and attempted to turn the British left wing at Wambaix, however before the rest of the division could follow the vanguard had to turn against a strong attack consisting of French cavalry emerging from Crevecoeur.[1]   Had the German II Corps approaching from the west towards Caintang-Noyelles and Ruimilly not been held up all day by weaker French cavalry and territorial troops they may have been able to block the British retreat here. [2] 

 

The above is paraphrased and taken from my dissertation :-)

 

---

[1] Humphries, Mark Osborne, and Maker, John eds. Germanys Western Front: Translations from the German Official History of the Great War, 1914 Part1. (Canada:Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2014)P.263.

[2] Ibid.P.264.

[Derek Black]

Thanks for that Dan,

 

I'm really into 1914 research at present, so revisiting the relevant threads.

 

Cheers,
Derek.

[dansparky]

What aspects?  there are some interesting threads around mons le cateau etc.

 

 

German III Corps attack British/German accounts. Royals Scots Fusiliers etc

The "machine guns" of Mons ?

Men and Material on Both sides Mons and le cateau

Zuber & Co V Traditional narrative. German tactics during the advance from mons.

Did General Sordet intervene on the british left at le cateau.

BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

 

Best Dan

[joerookery]

 Dan,

What was the subject of your dissertation? Is it available on line?

[dansparky]

Not Yet but it could be if deemed good enough.  The subject was to the Great Retreat of 1914 through the experience of the 4th Division, this encompassed:

 

• Chapter 1 evaluates and to what extent the B.E.F could be considered the best British Army that went forth to war:  This chapter first addresses the complexities that affected the evolution of the Army.  It then examines the doctrine of the Army, continental commitments,  complex problem of attacking a well-defended position particularly with the advent of the machine gun and the associated problems with crossing the fire-swept zone,  emphasis on marksmanship and musketry proficiency following the Boer War. Further, attitudes towards the machine gun,  problems of concentrating large bodies of men in order to practice the skills developed at brigade level to the multidivisional level and the constraints this placed on practising command at the operational level, The art of Retreat within training etc
• Chapter 2 Concentrates on Mons -  The 4th Division was obviously not present, but the idea here was to look at this Battle and then to see to what extent Le Cateau followed the same pattern in the concluding chapter - It also seeks to determine to what extent the evolution of The Army between the wars proved beneficial at mons.
• Chapter 3 Le Cateau and the retreat - This examines the pattern and characteristics of the Battle compared with that of Mons, it also seeks to examine the experience of the 4th Division during the retreat and look at Command and Control problems within the retreat.

 

I also tried to examine the validity of the Traditional Narrative v Zuber.  

 

This is a very Basic Breakdown.  

 

The questions  I put to you and the Great War Dawning were very helpful.

 

Edited 15 March , 2018 by dansparky

[joerookery]

...

Edited 16 March , 2018 by joerookery
Duplicate post

[joerookery]

Our next book, co-authored with Dr. Dennis Showalter,  covers the period of time prior to that from for August to the start of 23 August.  It is heavily reconnaissance and cavalry oriented and I think will be somewhat controversial as it posits that the Germans were in perfect position on 23 August to totally engulf the BEF, despite a long series of structural and operational problems/failures. They balled this up, there was a retreat, and years of war. The book is currently at the publishers – McFarland – and I expect it to come out sometime this fall – maybe November. Unfortunately it ends before your dissertation starts!

[Derek Black]

I like the sound of that Joe.

 

Please keep us posted on its publication.

 

Cheers,
Derek