Position on Kiretch Tepe Sirt

[AndyR]

Also left is the question of whether Hargrave's sketch in my #44 can possibly be in this area?

I agree with Neil's #56 that the apparent flatness in down to the altitude resolution on Google Earth which doesn't seem to be as good as the pictures to me.

I think my #10 gives an impression of the gully here, with another gully parallel just to the north, and with Azmak Dere running down the slope.

However, I have come across a photo which gives a very good impression of this location but viewed from the other side near the crest. The picture is a detail from a photo very kindly sent to me by Garth (gem22) from his visit in summer 2008 (under the "Visiting Suvla Bay Photo opportunity" thread).

To me it looks as if this photo is looking down the gully formed by Azmak Dere, with the sandy patch just above the centre being the sandy depression I have circled at the bottom of LTG.

Moving right from this patch is what I think is Lone Tree Road, and there is a very significant long hill South of it which wouldn't look out of place in Hargrave's sketch (though scale is difficult to judge), though there doesn't appear to be much slope to the North (this side).

However, I think Lone Tree Gully goes to the left from the sandy patch instead. This gully seems to have a similar steep southern hill, but also one to the north, with the parallel gully also visible this side of that northern "hill".

AndyR

[AndyR]

Best view I can manage

AndyR

[Neil2]

Andy - I think these photos certainly show that GE images tend to flatten everything down on the slope. Clearly there is a gully running through there on the left. Looks like a deep little cleft too - a bit like Hargrave's sketch I think. I agree too about the rpesence of a hill and it's tempting to think that might be the " Lone Tree Hill" where at least one burial took place. Is there any sign that these large sandy patches are anything other than natural?

Neil.

[AndyR]

Neil,

Gets ever more speculative ... but ... tried to get a view from GE with the overlay from roughly where the photo was taken (as usual haven't got it quite right - but it's close enough) and I think I can see the trench marked "Cross Street" on Michael's sketch map - it's in the right hand oval.

If that's what it is, and not just some random sandy patch, then the "Grave Yard" is just to its left up the furthest "hillside".

AndyR

[Neil2]

Andy - looking at your overlay there, it seems there are some pretty good fits on features. Have you worked out how the scale on the sketch relates to the scale on the GE image? I realise the sketch scale might not be all that accurate. But when I've tried to match scales, the sketch comes out quite a lot bigger on the terrain. Keith's giving me a hand getting my overlay up as my ancient Adobe Photoshop won't handle the resizing - or I can't work out how to. My scaling is pretty crude but is essentially working on the basis of GE image at 1 inch to 500 feet, and sketch scale at 1 inch to 166 yeards (500 feet.) Orinetation is more tricky so I've just gone with the contour lines at the top of the ridge lining up. Hopefully I'll be able to stick up my effort soon for a good blasting. Looking at yours though, i think it has more points of similarity in the features...your Bond Street is an excellent fit, for example. And LTG looks pretty convincing too.

Neil.

[AndyR]

Neil

An admission to make there - I haven't attempted any sort of scaling - I've no idea how to get scales on GE (only started playing with it a week and a half ago or so after seeing Martin's impressive results)

I simply matched up what I thought I could see in the terrain against the sketch map. Didn't match well to start, as though I got a decent match low down on the slopes, Jepherson's Post was always in the wrong place. Realised I needed to rotate the sketch map, and after trying 10 deg, 15 deg & 20 deg anti-clockwise, the last one seemed to match pretty well.

The trench outline I've finished up with seems to match the Suvla evacuation map that I started with pretty well, and also the Dec map from the IWM/N&MPress map disc - so I'm reasonably confident it's right ... but I admit I haven't checked the scale in any way at all and it could be miles out.

As I said I'm entirely prepared to be told I'm completely wrong as there is a lot of imagination in my constructions!

AndyR

[Neil2]

Andy - I think scaling might not be the answer, as I've been looking at mine again and find more points of difference now than similarity. I think I've messed up the "scaling" anyway and won't post it. Your "salient features" approach might be best. I'm going back to the drawing board...

Neil.

[Neil2]

Hi all - still hammering away at KTS...

In trying to nail down some of these locations from the Turkish point of view, I've come across the following Turkish names for positions on Kiretch Tepe Sirt during the attack by 10th Division and 162nd Brigade and wonder if anyone can identify them definitively...

SIVRITEPE (Jephson's Post?)

ARSLANTEPE (the "intermediate knoll" between JP and Kidney Hill?)

PROJEKTORTEPE (Kidney Hill? Could look like a film projector, or just be "projecting"?) Was Kidney Hill also "The Paps"?

KANLITEPE. Complete mystery.

[michaeldr]

The three peaks (summits) on Kiretch Tepe Sirt were from West to East

Sivri Tepe, Arslan Tepe and Kanli Tepe

Still working on PROJEKTORTEPE

edit I: This is just south of the middle summit, Arslan Tepe

regards

Michael

Edited 5 January , 2011 by michaeldr

[michaeldr]

edit II: This should help with above names (map refers to 21 Aug 1915)

[Neil2]

Michael - many thanks once more. Arslan Tepe is perhaps the first "unnamed objective" of 162nd Bde on August 15? Can't quite make out the Turkish name for Kidney Hill...

Anyone know of an account from the Turkish side in English? Probably aren't many (any?)

neil.

[michaeldr]

Quote from post # 83: PROJEKTORTEPE (Kidney Hill? Could look like a film projector, or just be "projecting"?) Was Kidney Hill also "The Paps"?

I am not certain if it applies in this particular instance, however I have heard of a Searchlight being referred to as a Projector.

See the sketch in post # 9: Kidney Hill = The Paps, and is given on the Turkish map above as Havan Tepe (though the first word is not very clear)

Quote from Post # 86: Arslan Tepe is perhaps the first "unnamed objective" of 162nd Bde on August 15?

Neil, I think that the 162nd were further over on the right.

See the OH page 321:"Acording to Hill's orders the 5/R Inniskilling Fusiliers, holding the left of the 31st Brigade front, was to push forward to a small knoll on the southern slope of the ridge about 400 yards short of Kidney Hill. The 7/R Munster fusiliers was to clear the northern slopes of the ridge. Supporting troops were then to capture the strong-point on the summit of the ridge, and push forward to Kidney Hill whilst the 162nd Brigade came on the right flank"

On page 323 the OH has "Though the Territorials had already suffered crippling losses, a last effort by small parties of all three battalions advanced the left of the line to the south-western corner of Kidney Hill. Here the troops held on for many hours, entirely unsupported, but during the night the whole brigade fell back to a line prolonging the original front line of the 31st brigade."

Regarding an account from the Turkish perspective, Edward J. Erickson's 'Gallipoli The Ottoman Campaign' [iSBN 978 1 84415 967 3] has this

"The British expected to attack the jandarma, which had held the ridge since the landings, and they expected to break through and drive on to occupy Kidney Hill……

Unfortunately, the Turks had brought up significant reinforcements in the week prior to replace the jandarma.

…….Major Willmer formed and took command of an ad hoc 5th Division. He established his division headquarters, not at Tursuhn Keui as noted by Aspinal-Oglander, but on the Kapanca Hill (near Jephson's Post) and he had five additional infantry battalions assigned to him as well as the Gelibolu Jandarma Battalion and the two companies of the 127 Regt already in defensive positions on Kiretch Tepe. Willmer also had two batteries of guns from the 11 Artillery Regt supporting his positions. ……[british] orders were late and the attack did not begin until 2.15pm. The attacks gained some ground against moderate Turkish resistance but as darkness fell, the British were unable to consolidate their gains and were left in a vulnerable position. In the meantime Willmer came to Kiretch Tepe about 8.30pm to examine personally the situation. He was very encouraged and ordered the 1/19 Regt and 1/39 Regt to march forward from Tekke Tepe for a counter attack. They arrived at the front about midnight and Willmer rapidly organized a counterattack using these two battalions plus the 2/19 Regt, which was lying in close reserve just 500m behind the front. He wanted to launch a night attack at 2am but last-minute adjustments in positioning delayed the attack until 4am, 16 August. The attack tore into the 30th Brigade's left flank (?) causing heavy casualties. Willmer then brought up the fresh 2/17 Regt from Tursuhn Keui (Türşunköy) for a follow-on counterattack about 8am with hand grenades. The battle raged all day as the Turks tried to push the Irish off the ridge. At midday Mustafa Kemal diverted incoming reinforcement battalions to reinforce Willmer. These were the 2/1 Regt and 3/1 Regt from the Asia Group, which began to arrive in Tursuhn Keui about 4pm…….Mahon decided to recall his battered brigades about 7pm that evening and the Irish pulled back to their start lines ending the battle."

[the ref to the 30th Brigade's left flank cannot be correct, can it?]

[Neil2]

Hi Michael. From reading the various Divisional War Diaries over Christmas it seems to me the 5th Inniskillings were as you say heading west to east on the southern slope in a frontal attack on Kidney Hill, starting about 1300. And (after a delay caused by confusion about which unit formed the right flank of 10 Division - its conenction point) 162 Bde seems to have headied south to north from somewhere in square 118 probably towards, first, the "unnamed objective" (maybe Projektor Tepe - not Arslan, sorry), then swinging right at or around Projektor Tepe to attack on the same axis as the 5th Inniskillings had earlier on. This would involve crossing the 500 yards or so of relatively open ground between Projektor Tepe and Kidney Hill. Which, amazingly, they were able to do.

The delay in 162nd Brigade setting off seems significant to the outcome when you read the 1930 notes for the OH sent in by officers of both 10 Division (very scathing) and 162nd Brigade. Lots of argument there about who stepped off when and why. It really seems to have been caused by the impossibility/inability of 162nd Bde discovering which unit really formed the Irish right for the purposes of the attack. But in the end the enfilading, defence in depth that you point out in your last post and the Turkish artillery probably meant the whole enterprise was doomed even without the delay. 162nd Bde it seems to me fell back finally off Kidney Hill and intermediate positions to the same south to north line they had held before the start.

See the OH page 321:"Acording to Hill's orders the 5/R Inniskilling Fusiliers, holding the left of the 31st Brigade front, was to push forward to a small knoll on the southern slope of the ridge about 400 yards short of Kidney Hill. This must surely refer to Projektor Tepe?

[Neil2]

The point about 30 Brigade's left flank...the 10th Div regimental history paints a picture of the Turks moving along the southern slope on 16th/17th August and throwing bombs over the top of the ridge on to troops on the north side. The history uses the simile of two men sitting in the gutters of a house throwing things at each other over the roof (except the Irish of course had nothing of their own to throw.) So the bombs were going south to north over the top of the ridge - the throwers not necessarily seeing their targets .

On the 15th part of 30th Brigade (6th Royal Munster Fusiliers and 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers) had charged along the north side to Point 103. At 3am on the 16th (notes 30th Brigade war diary: "The Turks commenced counter stroke (NB - poss "strike") on newly-won knoll on left. It is repulsed." 0400: "Attack continues with bombs and rifle fire and there were many casualties."

The newly-won knoll on the left must have been on the ridge itself I should think as no knolls appear between Point 103 and the end of the ridge. Looks like their left flank was on the end of the ridge itself - as the day before they had been able to fire down on fleeing Turkish troops in the "valley" beyond.

[michaeldr]

Neil,

Quote: See the OH page 321:"Acording to Hill's orders the 5/R Inniskilling Fusiliers, holding the left of the 31st Brigade front, was to push forward to a small knoll on the southern slope of the ridge about 400 yards short of Kidney Hill. This must surely refer to Projektor Tepe?

Agreed

... ... ...

Thanks for your explanation regarding the 30th Brigade's left flank: very interesting and I had not come across these details before.

Looking at Liman's 'Five Years in Turkey' he saw Kiretch Tepe "as one of the most sensitive points of the Turks which would surely have fallen into British hands by a rapid advance from the shore during the first two days. It would have been impossible for the Fifth Army on the evening of the 6th of August and on the 7th to get reinforcements to this point, the distances being too great."

This was the delay which cost the Allies dear. Liman continues "The Fifth Army succeeded in parrying the Anafarta landing only by taking all available troops from adjoining fronts without regard for any dangers that might be threatening them. Thus for the second time the Saros (Xeros) Gulf was completely denuded of troops and on the whole Asiatic coast there were but three battalions and a few batteries left as coast guards."

He then goes on to list what he saw as the dire consequences of an Allied success here, culminating in their link-up with Russia.

Regards

Michael

[Neil2]

Michael - I wonder if it went something like this. Certainly there are references to 10 Division charging up to the crest at this point - so 30 Brigade faces south and the Turks attack north. (Drawing not to scale, obviously.)

Neil.

[AndyR]

Neil, Michael,

I feel sure you will both have seen this before, but just in case not, the following extracts from Coopers Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli confirm the same incident as your descriptions. I have kept the extracts to the dispositions you are discussing, but recommend the full story as described by Cooper in pages 163-180, though it makes a heartbreaking read. In the text that follows, the Dublins & Munsters are 30th Brigade and the Royal Irish Fusiliers are 31st Brigade.

"The result of the failure of the right attack was that while we held the northern slope of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt up to and even beyond the Pimple, yet on the Southern face of the hill we had been unable to advance our line much beyond the trenches which we held when operations on the 15th began. As a consequence, the line held by the Division somewhat resembled a Z. The upper horizontal was represented by a line of trench running from the Gulf of Saros to the most advanced point on the crest of the ridge that was reached by the charge of the 6th Munsters and 6th Dublins. This trench was exposed to fire not only from the hills which continued the line of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt eastward, but also from a spur known as 103, which ran northwards into the sea. The diagonal joining the two horizontals of the Z was represented by a line running along the northern or seaward slope of Kiretch Tepe Sirt just below the crest. The crest itself, since it was liable to be swept by shrapnel and machine-gun fire, and since its rocky nature made it difficult to entrench, was not held except at the lower horizontal, which represented the trench running past Jephson's Post, from which the attack had begun. The position thus created was clearly far harder to hold than if it had been merely a trench running across the ridge from North to South, and would obviously require far more men. The two battalions from the Reserve were, therefore, called up without delay.

After the reserves came up, the dispositions made for the defence of the line running just below the crest of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt were as follows : — The extreme end to the eastward was held by the 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers ; next to them came the 6th Munsters, and beyond them “D” “A” and “C” Companies of the 7th Dublins. “B” Company of the last-named regiment had been sent down the hill on the seaward side to dig a trench covering Hill 103. The 6th Dublins, who had sustained heavy losses in the charge, were withdrawn to rest. These dispositions were adopted just before nightfall. The soil of the ridge was too stony to admit of much entrenching, and in most cases the men lay down on their arms just behind the crest on the seaward side, though in one or two spots stone sangars were constructed. They were given but little time to work before they were attacked. The knowledge that no advance had been made on any part of the plain below made it possible for the enemy to employ a large proportion of his reserves in the recovery of the ground lost on the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, while the fact that the Southern slope of the hill was still in his possession enabled him to push men along it to attack any portion of our long, thinly-held line at close quarters.

The first of the hostile counter-attacks began about 10 p.m., when a wave of Turks who had crept along the landward slope and up to the crest in silence, burst over it with a yell and fell upon the British line. Fortunately, our men were not taken by surprise; a roar of musketry at close range received the enemy, and when it came to bayonet work our morale proved more than sufficient to dispose of the foe. After a stiff fight, the attackers disappeared over the crest leaving a good proportion of their numbers behind them on the ground. Listening posts were then sent out to the further side of the ridge in order to preclude the possibility of a surprise attack succeeding, and the remainder of the tired men lay down again, rifle in hand to secure as much rest as possible.

Little sleep was allowed them. Before the first light of the early summer dawn began to appear in the sky, the listening posts were driven in, and a fresh Turkish attack was made. On this occasion the assault was led by bomb-throwers, and although those who crossed the crest and came to close quarters were disposed of by the Irish with rifle and bayonet, yet a considerable force of the enemy, well-furnished with grenades, succeeded in establishing themselves on the southern slope of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. From this position they proceeded to bomb the whole length of our line incessantly, throwing the grenades over the crest of the ridge so that they burst in the midst of our ranks with deadly effect.

Rifles and bayonets were useless against an invisible foe, on the other side of a rocky ridge. The two forces were, to use a homely comparison, in the position of men sitting in the gutters of a house and fighting across the roof. Under these circumstances grenades were obviously the most effective weapon, and the side that lacked them suffered from an appalling handicap.

The 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers, exposed both in front and in flank, had been practically annihilated. Their 5th Battalion came up to reinforce them and shared their fate. Nearly all the officers of the Irish Fusiliers had fallen, and the other regiments were in nearly as bad a case; but still the line held on."

AndyR

[Neil2]

Andy - thanks, that was the passage I remembered, gutters and rooftops etc. Something that interests me too is what happened to the 5th Inniskillings on the 16th - it seems to me they withdrew some 300 yards west of Jephson's Post as their war diary says that at noon on the 16th they are at 135.Y.2 on the usual map. The middle stroke of the Z ran therefore from the "newly-won knoll" in the east (The Pimple? AKA Kanli Tepe?) to a point 300 yards behind Jephson's Post (about a mile in total.) Hence the very pressing need to straighten the line - or the Turks could have continued the lethal bombing over the ridge top. That was the job the 4th Essex did on the 18th, going forward from somewhere around 135 Y 2 to (I believe) the western slope of Projektor Tepe, then rapidly back again 400 yards after being hit by Turkish fire, to a point where the line finally took shape. Their involvement was no more than a footnote compared with the action on the 15th but I believe their advance on the 18th on the southern slopes met some of those Turkish forces that were attacking over the ridge-top and the ensuing firefight defined where the line eventually sat.

[AndyR]

Neil

Your question regarding the whereabouts of the 5th Inniskillings has been making me think; so apologies for another long ramble trying to justify my speculations. The account that follows of the Inniskillings advance may be of interest to you as I guess it covers much the same ground as the advance you are interested in.

I don’t have access to the Inniskillings War Diary (if you have a copy I would be very interested please) and so the only ‘detailed’ account I have access to is “Suvla Bay and After” by ‘Juvenis’. ‘Juvenis’ is a pseudonym, and is believed to be Lt. OGE MacWilliam of the 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (Philip Orr in Field of Bones).

BATTLE

On his return the captain told us that the division was about to launch an attack upon a certain line, to straighten out our Z-like position, supported by a Territorial division on the right and the torpedo-boat destroyer on the left. Our own particular part in the proceedings was left rather vague.

[Hanna’s map from The Pals at Suvla Bay (see Kritiha’s #16) illustrates the ‘Z’ position on the 15th which was then exaggerated as 30th Brigade advanced further on the Northern slopes. It shows the advance starting from well back from the final trench lines and perhaps level with the end of the highest part of the ridge]

The company commander told me that the Turks were entrenched straight ahead of us. " A " and " D " companies formed the front attacking line—" A " company on the slope of the hill and " D " company carrying down the line into the valley. Two of our (" D ") company platoons had gone on already. I was to deploy mine at once and advance in support.

There was no time for the elaboration of details. We came under fire as we deployed. In front of us was a gradual downward slope for about 250 yards, and then a long, flat, open space which rose to a large spur some 800 yards ahead. This presumably was the Turkish position. To our left, rising up above us fairly steeply, and continuing all the way, was the ridge we had just been holding. We were advancing now parallel to it, along its foot. The ground was covered with low scrub, and here and there an open patch of sand or withered grass.

[is this the line of the advance? Distances are similar to Juvenis’s estimates: the first descent is a touch further than the 250 yards (the GE distances shown are approximate and are in meters), and then the advance on the flat and up the ‘Projector Tepe’ spur is around a 1000 yards depending where the Turkish lines were.

Peter Hart’s IWM account of the action confirms that ‘Projektor Tepe’ was the immediate objective of the advance: “On the right 2nd Lieutenant Terence Verschoyle was advancing with 1/5th Inniskillings towards a small knoll on the southern slope of the ridge just 400 yards short of Kidney Hill.”]

[Assuming the position is right, then this is the line of the attack. The steep slope is on the left, and the path (‘Bond Street’) running up from the bottom left corner is at the foot of this steep slope. The ‘Projector Tepe’ spur is directly ahead running right across the line of advance, with Kidney Hill (just under the highlight) peeping up 400m behind. The advance is downhill roughly to the double “sandy” patch either side of the path, and then appears fairly flat until the spur is reached]

My platoon deployed on either side of me, and we began our advance, stumbling over the rough ground. As we proceeded it became impossible to keep a perfect line. Now and then a clump of bush or a hollow in the ground hid the men from their neighbours. Some places were so exposed that it was necessary to race across them at full speed, others so thorny and rocky as to be almost impassable. So that it can easily be understood how important each man's own initiative and perseverance was. Orders by word of mouth were, of course, impossible in the din of the guns and the bursting shells, the incessant and voluminous roar of rifle fire and the whole orchestra of bullets and ricochets and shell splinters that streamed past us or danced at our feet. Orders by signal were equally and utterly futile, seeing that one could rarely be visible to more than four of one's men at once. So that for all intents and purposes each man was his own master as never before in his military existence ; and of all the men whom I could see that day none could have been better led than they were by their own good sense and sense of duty.

In view of the nature of the ground, the tactics of the enemy and their complete invisibility, a steady and continuous advance seemed best. The bullets from rifles and machine guns were descending in a curtain over the ground that we were covering, the sand was dancing up about our feet, dust and smoke were leaping up in little clouds, shrapnel was bursting overhead, and a great deal of small shell was falling innocuously enough, but with a terrifying trumpeting, in every direction.

To lie down seemed as dangerous as to walk on, and certainly less useful ; for we could see no Turks to shoot, even had we no friends in our immediate front, whose line we were to strengthen, and who, to judge their casualties by our own, would badly need that reinforcement.

To the left front, where the ground rose and the scrub grew thin, I could just make out the long line of " A " company's advance, and, looking back, " B " and " C " companies just deployed and coming down the slope behind us. Straight ahead I could see no troops at all.

Suddenly a broad patch opened out before us, covered with shrivelled grass that shone white in the sun. There were half a dozen of my men close by me and we raced across it for dear life.

[This open patch may well be the bare patch just below ‘Bond Street’ at the centre of the advance (above the ‘600’ measurement on my first diagram). It doesn’t initially look that big, but from GE it is in two halves, the first is about 130m long and 20m wide, while the second, which follows immediately, is much wider, up to about 50m wide and a similar length again at about 140m long.]

[AndyR]

[The edge of the bare patch can just be seen on this picture Keith (Gully Ravine) posted under #46. The slope the Irish started the advance from (assuming my speculation is right) is at the top right of the picture, and you can just about make out the initial down hill slope]

The presence of bullets is far more obvious when they kick up the dust on a broad, open patch like that ; for my own part, I longed to be the other side of it, especially as we had to pass a most unsavoury spectacle on the way — two dead soldiers, an Englishman and a Turk, lying alone together in the grilling sun. They must have been lying there thus for many days, and their blackened faces were in hideous contrast with the bright new khaki drill and helmet. Two snipers, I suppose, or scouts.

A cloud of gaudy flies buzzed up as we ran past, and I thought that nothing mattered so long as I did not fall just there. At length we reached the farther side, where the ground became once more uneven and covered with scrub, rising a little.

[it’s hard to see on the previous photo, but I think a slight rise can be detected to the left of the bare patch and certainly then the down slope (to Azmak Dere). From GE the slight rise seems to be where Bond Street veers slightly up the slope after the bare patch – see the line of attack view.]

[AndyR]

[The slight rise is easier to see on this next photo just after the bare patch – thanks again due to Keith (Gully Ravine)]

Then, on the right, a few yards off, I saw the edge of the platoon we were to support, lying extended in a firing position, and decided to prolong their line to the left, rather than thicken their present one, seeing that there was a gap to be filled and the enemy's fire was coming thick and fast.

I looked round to see if the rest of my platoon on the left were coming up. They had not got the open patch to cross, and consequently could not come up so fast as we.

Suddenly I was hit in the right shoulder and knocked over : the blood poured like a fountain down my sleeve. One of the men rushed up and helped me off with my equipment and jacket. I thought the brachial artery was hit and felt exhausted. As a matter of fact it cannot have been, but my arm was broken. I sent the man on to join the firing line, and looked at my wrist watch : the time was a quarter to two. We had been three-quarters of an hour in action.

You said in your last post that the 5th Inniskillings war diary says that at noon on the 16th they are at 135.Y.2 on the usual map. This seems to be almost exactly where (maybe a little further up the slope) I have suggested Juvenis reached, and I am speculating that the eventual trench line finished only a few hundred yards further forward.

You also suggest that the 4th Essex advanced on the 18th going forward from somewhere around 135 Y 2 to the western slope of Projektor Tepe, then rapidly back again 400 yards after being hit by Turkish fire, to a point where the line finally took shape. This also seems to tie up well with the distance between 135 Y2, the Turkish lines and the final positions.

Sorry for this long and speculative post – I hope at least some of it was of interest!

AndyR

[Neil2]

Andy - hi!

What a cracking post. Brilliantly put together and I think you're spot on. The 4th Essex I believe would have gone back over that same ground precisely. It's my theory that only their leftmost company (D) got as far as the rise in front of Projektor Tepe before being fired on and falling back. The war diary doesn't mention falling back but the theory is based on Capt. Tyler's death having taken place 400 yards ahead of the eventual front line. if you look at the Turkish map on the WFA disc it becomes obvious that the 4th Essex did not manage really to straighten the line properly in that northern sector. i think the higher ground of Projektor Tepe was being entrenched even on the 18th as they went forward and it must have been those working parties or units left in place from the attacks of the 16th onwards (one and the same maybe) who fired on them. The description from Juvenis is fantastic. I think I had read it before somewhere but hadn't put it together with the same ground.

Being a bit rubbish on computer overlays I've resorted to stealing my wife's cork noticeboard from the kitchen and sticking a mosaic of relatively large scale GE print-offs on it, then a scaled tracing of the Turkish trench map over it. What I was not prepared for was the astonishing accuracy of the Turkish map compared with the GE satellite pix. Scaling was a bit tricky but even the first attempt showed how acurate that map is (made after the withdrawal.) Common sense said it should be the best but it is absolutely spot on when applied to the landscape. My first effort was scaled according to the scale bars and came out pretty near but a tad too small. The second effort was made by tracing the clearly visible Turkish trenches at the Bench Mark and behind - clear as day - then scaling the Turkish map to that.

This process reveals very clearly that most of the British dugouts were (it makes sense) on snady parts. Where else could you dig a dugout but on sand? But when comparing with trench map sketches from various sources it becomes pretty obvious where named trenches are on the GE maps. You've probably done this already but, for example, the GraveYard is clearly that sandy area in the last pic that appears here. It's the blobby area on the left of the right hand section, with Lone Tree Gully leading away on the top edge of that leftward spit. My only nagging doubt is as to whether it's in the triangular sand patch (darker) immediately above it - but I think not.

Another surprise is that trench lines falling directly over modern tracks and in some cases field patterns. i suppose it shouldn't be a surprise but I had not expected to find such a concordance.

I have more trouble with Bond Street. The trench plans made by different units don't help too much, being a little contradictory. I think you're right about it though.

Will try to illustrate in due course.

Regards,

Neil.

[AndyR]

Neil

I ended my last post, which was already very long, at the point where I think Juvenis’s description stops. However, of most interest to you is probably the next 500 yards to the Turkish trenches, as it may have been somewhere here that Captain Tyler was killed.

You are of course quite right that the line was never straightened out in the Northern sector (of the Southern slopes), and I think this is due simply to the lie of the land here. While the Projektor Tepe spur runs at approximately right angles from the ridge, the Azmak Dere starts quite close to the spur and then runs gradually further away as it goes down the slope. The top of the dere starts from almost directly between the steep slope to the crest and Projektor Tepe, and runs in the same direction as the line of the advance I’ve suggested was followed by Juvenis. I presume it would have funnelled the attack into a narrow front towards the Turkish trench lines, with heavy fire also coming from the slopes on either side.

This photo (from Gem22) shows Projektor Tepe (I presume it is anyway - circled on the right) and the dere running along almost parallel to the crest (but unfortunately largely hidden here behind and below the thick scrub in the foreground) before it turns down the slope (see the photo in post #96). Kidney Hill is circled on the left and the valley in between it and the Projektor Tepe spur can be made out in between the two ‘circles’.

The GE view from the British positions gives a flatter impression as usual, but shows that the front in the gulley is about 150m wide (the arrow head at the right ends at the bare patch shown in the photo towards the bottom right corner, and the long light sandy line in the photo is the patchy line just outside the width arrow in the GE image). Projektor Tepe is ‘circled’ on the right, while the ‘circle’ on the left shows where the double Turkish trench lines are clearly visible on GE (I agree that nearly all of the Turkish trenches can be distinguished fairly easily).

The ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ are the same as on my post #75 and the same features can be seen (i.e. I think these are the final British trench lines – the purpose of the wiggly little trench ‘2’ becomes clearer as it runs up the steep slope in the foreground, presumably so as to give a view over the top on the flatter part towards the Turkish positions on Projektor Tepe). Thus it’s around 500m between the two sets of trenches, all up a relatively bare slope and with flanking fire coming from the crest and from Projektor Tepe. The view is approximately from where I have suggested Juvenis reached (though at a higher altitude as otherwise the Turkish trenches disappear over the crest of the slope), but I’m sure some of the Inniskillings got further than Juvenis, though it isn’t clear to me whether or not they reached the Turkish trenches.

Cooper says:

The Turkish trenches were invisible and consequently there was little attempt to subdue the enemy by a fire fight. The platoons went straight forward, racing over the exposed patches, losing officers and men at every step. The fire grew hotter and hotter and men fell more and more quickly, but still the front line pressed only to be swept out of existence. The distance was too far to cover in a single rush, and no troops in the world could cross the five hundred yards in front of the enemy's trenches at a walk and live. The supports came up and another attempt was made, but again the lines melted away. The task was one impossible of achievement, for it is now known that against modern weapons in the hands of an undemoralised enemy, a frontal attack by daylight on an entrenched position a thousand yards away is certain to fail. Yet even when they had failed, the 5th Inniskillings did not fall back. Nearly all the officers were down, but little groups of men still clustered in the bushes waiting for orders. They could not advance; they would not retire until they were told to.

However, Peter Hart’s IWM description states that:

On the right 2nd Lieutenant Terence Verschoyle was advancing with 1/5th Inniskillings towards a small knoll on the southern slope of the ridge just 400 yards short of Kidney Hill.

We started off. There were no tactics other than advancing straight ahead. The thick scrub absolutely prohibited any sort of supporting fire because nobody could see what was happening on each side. It was a sort of individual action. … We went on. An absolute hail of bullets going on all the time, not shelling. ... There was a lot of scrub about but there was a large bare patch which we had to cross. There was no avoiding it. Bullets all striking down and setting up little spurts of sand; it wasn't very encouraging. Still, some of us got through. The whole action was over in little more than an hour by which time we'd had nearly 400 casualties. We realised fairly soon from the few people left that it was not a success. We did get the Turks to clear out of the trenches we were supposed to be attacking - I remember having a pot shot at one or two Turks myself - but we were about finished then. We just got stuck there. You couldn't see anybody else, that was the trouble, the tall thick scrub, you didn't know where anybody was. It was left to the individual to decide what he could do.

It isn’t clear which trenches Verschoyle is referring to. I find it hard to believe that the Projektor Tepe trenches were “cleared”? A guess (without any evidence to support it) is that the final British positions might include Turkish trenches that were part of a defensive line based on Jephson’s Post (which was recaptured by the Irish on the 15th).

The Projektor Tepe trenches are presumably the position the 4th Essex attacked again on the 18th and it may well have been somewhere in this dere that Captain Tyler was killed, dependent of course how far up/down the slope he was. I seem to remember that the 190m/90m contour discussion finished with a conclusion of high up the slope. Assuming we are high on the slope, then on the GE view and going 400m from the British trench line is approximately where the angle of the slope changes and starts to flatten out, and is where the Turkish trenches which were otherwise hidden come into view. The ‘400m line’ is approximately where the bright white line on the right hand side reaches my ‘circle’ round Projektor Tepe running across to halfway up the bare patch on the left hand side.

You have suggested that the ‘Grave Yard’ where Captain Tyler was originally buried is the blobby sandy patch if I understand your last post correctly. I would be interested in your evidence to support this, as I have become very uncertain again as to the location of ‘lone tree gulley’ (I now think my previous confidence in post #75 may have been somewhat optimistic!), though, if I had to put money on it, I think I would still be going for the left half of the patch on the further ‘hill’ between the two ‘circles’ on the first photo in my post #75 as being the location of the ‘Grave Yard’.

Regards

AndyR

[Neil2]

]Hi Andy,

Another great post - many thanks. Comments on that to come. I thought I'd go to your last point first, about evidence for the location of the Graveyard (and other positions).

I adopted a pretty low-tech method (not being capable of any other). I wanted to see if the detailed Turkish trench map could shed any light on where positions could be found on GE. Here's an overview shot of what I've come up with:

As you can see it's a background of the 1;20,000 map (for references from war diaries) overlaid with a same-scale print mosaic from GE, and finally overlaid with a same-scale tracing of the Turkish trench map made after the Allies withdrew. How accurate is this?

1. It was quite easy to scale GE with the 1;20,000 map.

2. The scaling of the Turkish map from which I made the tracing I achieved by starting the tracing directly from the GE image, where the Turkish lines are clearest (Projektor Tepe, Bench Mark area). Then I scaled a print-off of the Turkish map to fit that section of tracing and completed the rest of the tracing.

I had no idea of how much similarity there might be between the Turkish map and GE features - the Turkish map looks utterly different from any of the British ones. But having been made with the benefit of time and no combat, I thought it might be the best, at least. What I wasn't prepared for was the high degree of agreement between them, down to very fine detail. The perspective of the satellite image lens is not precisely the same as the map-maker's but the difference is staggeringly miniscule. Some examples in next posts...

[Neil2]

First example: Jephson's Post. Not sure how well you can see through the tracing but they get better: