The Somme

[phil andrade]

Tom,

How about taking a look at what the Germans wrote about the relative performance of the Franco-British enemies they confronted ?

Do not imagine, please, that I seek to refute what you state....I would be very glad to alter my view, and it may well be that you have information which will convince me that I have been wrong.

The British were regarded as more dogged and were admired for tenacity and toughness. The French were seen as the more skillful.

Thus wrote Colonel Wetzell (sp?).

I'm scared now that Robert will tell me off for straying from the topic.

Perhaps we might indulge in this discussion in a more "on" topic manner by referring to British experience at Vimy and Mount Sorrel in the spring and early summer of 1916, when they were attacked by the Germans and took severe punishment , losing some ground. This was obviously contemporaneous with the Verdun fighting, and it would be interesting and instructive to read how the French- and, of course, the Germans - rated the British performance.

The French had fought one of the most intense battles of the war in the Vimy sector in the early summer of 1915, and again in the autumn, and would have been quick to draw attention to British shortcomings on that part of the front.... obviously they would have to eat their words after April 1917.

In this regard I find it interesting to speculate on what Foch might have thought of the British performance. He had, after all, fought alongside the BEF in Flanders in 1914, and presumably would have had a better appreciation of Tommy Atkins than Joffre.

Foch proposed postponing the Somme Offensive, didn't he ? I wonder what he thought about Verdun, and whether he reckoned that the situation there was not so dire as to necessitate such a grand attack to be launched as a relief.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

...wandered a bit there...

Tom, it was great that you went back further in Poincaré's account. The information is still within the timeframe. More significantly, it illustrates a view (Poincaré's) of the French abilities at that time (March 1916). No doubt this view was in his mind as time went on, and the pressure of Verdun built.

We should regard Poincaré's comment for what it is - his personal view. We may agree or disagree (both sides of this coin have been exposed) but I would prefer that we not go down the route of arguing the detail - at least not in this thread. Let's just agree to disagree on this one.

The use of the phrase "d`ailleurs" (moreover, besides) indicates that he had previously made some other comment relating to his allies - what might that have been...

Tom, do you want to pick up on this one? I am pushing forward in time but can easily come back to this section if you would like? Thanks.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

With regards to the debate about the validity of Poincaré's 'our team is better than your team' comment, this is the thread I was thinking of:

See here.

Please feel free to continue the detailed discussion there. Many thanks.

Robert

[Guest Military Times]

The Somme Revised

Might find this article interesting - a revisionist look at The Somme, addressing changing perspectives from historians.

http://www.military-times.co.uk/articles/the-somme-revised.htm

[PhilB]

Quote:-

"Haig and his colleagues were not especially incompetent, and the argument that they were is empirically false and theoretically sterile."

That sounds like historian-speak to me. Can someone explain what makes an argument empirically false or theoretically sterile?

[Robert Dunlop]

Not in this thread

Robert

[phil andrade]

Quote:-

"Haig and his colleagues were not especially incompetent, and the argument that they were is empirically false and theoretically sterile."

That sounds like historian-speak to me. Can someone explain what makes an argument empirically false or theoretically sterile?

Oh Lord, anyone who writes like that must be one helluva pseud !

Apart from that, I liked the presentation.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Some more from Poincaré's memoirs:

Thursday 18 May.

Joffre was, like Briand, quite on form yesterday. He put his views clearly and forcefully during lunch. Joffre told us how Clemenceau, upon arriving at General Douglas Haig’s residence, had asked him to burn point-blank: "Whose orders are you under?" General Haig, who was a little taken aback, replied: "I am, of course, under the orders of my King and my Government”. Then he added: "But I receive, and follow, General Joffre’s directions." Upon returning to the Army Board, Clemenceau said:" The Council President [1] has deceived us. General Douglas Haig told me himself that he was not under Joffre’s command..." Briand’s burning desire is to go to the board and challenge Clemenceau to a public debate. Briand summarized the Council meeting held yesterday at Chalons. He said that if he had to appoint a commander in chief today, then he would not hesitate to choose Joffre, who demonstrated clear-sightedness and acumen yesterday.

Friday 19 May.

Tardieu[2] asked me to talk with Foch, who, Tardieu assured me, is opposed to any offensive this year. Tardieu even alleged that the British themselves do not want to attack before next year. I replied, with some vigour, that I would not presume to decide whether Tardieu's strongly-held views or those of others were the best. I pointed out, insofar as I was able, that Joffre, Castelnau, and even Pétain were all of the opinion that another offensive is needed to free Verdun.

Monday 22 May.

General Roques told me emphatically that, in his opinion, the British offensive should be brought forward as soon as possible to disengage Verdun. He believes we should concentrate all our efforts at Verdun. This has long been my opinion.

[1] In the Third Republic, the Président du Conseil equated to the British Prime Minister.

[2] André Tardieu was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, the legislative assembly of the French Parliament, in 1914. He served in the French infantry for a time then returned to politics in 1916. Tardieu went on to become the Prime Minister of France after the war.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Thank you for resurrecting this thread, Robert....I think it's been a very good one and it would be a pity to let it grow cold.

I do find myself struggling trying to assimilate the French names and titles...it really has been quite a shock to realise how little I know about the whole French aspect in the Great War.

The more I think about it, the more abysmal British ignorance of the French experience seems. Most of us would know a lot more about the US experience of WW2 than we do about the French role in 1914-18.

This thread, I reckon, has done something to redress the balance.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

The next instalment:

"Wednesday 24 May.

I met with Lord Esher, Lieutenant Governor of Windsor Castle. He is very distinguished and speaks French very well. Lord Esher came specifically to tell me that:

1. He had received a letter from Sir Douglas Haig, who expressed annoyance about not knowing what General Joffres real intentions are. Haig doesnt know whether he [Haig] will launch an offensive or not.

2. The issue of the Salonika affair will only be resolved by talking directly to Briand and Asquith.

Thursday 25 May.

Gustave Hervé [1] spoke to me about the British reluctance over Salonika and about the mistakes made at Verdun.

During the Council meeting, Briand told us that General Pétain had asked him for a meeting. I'm afraid that we are not giving Pétain everything that he needs. Freycinet[2] and most members of the Council are also very worried about this. Only Doumergue[3] persists in his blind and unconditional belief that everything is ok. It was agreed that the Minister of War and Briand will arrange for a discussion with Pétain as soon as possible. [Poincaré used the conjugation of the verb 'interroger', which I have translated as 'discussion'. In French, 'interroger' in the context of a meeting between a superior (Briand et al.) and a subordinate (Pétain) doesn't imply an 'interrogation' but it is a reminder of the hierarchical relationship of the parties involved and the professional nature of the 'discussion'. This is a subtle but important distinction.]

In the evening, Pénelon told me that Pétain has not been refused anything but he is always complaining. Pénelon said, amongst other things, that he is happy that Nivelle has now taken over from Pétain as the commander at Verdun [interesting because, as noted earlier, Pétain was still Nivelle's boss]. I responded with some vigour that GQG [French GHQ] is always bound up in its theoretical and academic mindset, without taking into account the reality of things and that, unfortunately, Pénelon himself was also demonstrating that simply denying the facts won't make them go away. Pénelon talked about Tardieus puerile article in le Petit Parisien. "It's as if a child at primary school wanted to debate with an academic! Ordinary people dont know a trade like the professional does... If the Chantilly programme is renounced [referring to the offensive plans developed by the Allies for 1916], we will be dancing to the Germans tune because they want to prevent us from taking the offensive and to keep us on the back foot."

[1] Gustave Hervé was a French politician. Before the war, he was an ardent socialist and pacifist, who was jailed for 26 months for his anti-militarist views (including famously depicting the Tricolor on a dung heap). Upon release in 1912, Hervé became an ultranationalist.

[2] Charles Louis de Saulces de Freycinet played an important role in helping Gambetta raise an army after the Germans defeated the Imperial French Army in 1870. Freycinet was involved in dictating operations to the French generals but this was, not surprisingly, resented. He organised the campaign in the east, which ended in Bourbakis army being forced to cross into Switzerland. Freycinet served as Prime Minister and Minister of War prior to 1914.

[3] Pierre-Paul-Henri-Gaston Doumergue was a French politician of the Third Republic. He was Prime Minister from 9 December 1913 to 2 June 1914.

[4] Tardieu was discharged from the French army after being wounded in 1916. He wrote a series of articles in le Petit Parisien calling for Joffre to be dismissed."

Robert

[phil andrade]

In the evening, Pénelon told me that Pétain has not been refused anything but he is always complaining. Pénelon said, amongst other things, that he is happy that Nivelle has now taken over from Pétain as the commander at Verdun [interesting because, as noted earlier, Pétain was still Nivelle's boss]. I responded with some vigour that GQG [French GHQ] is always bound up in its theoretical and academic mindset, without taking into account the reality of things and that, unfortunately, Pénelon himself was also demonstrating that simply denying the facts won't make them go away. Pénelon talked about Tardieu’s puerile article in le Petit Parisien. "It's as if a child at primary school wanted to debate with an academic! Ordinary people don’t know a trade like the professional does... If the Chantilly programme is renounced [referring to the offensive plans developed by the Allies for 1916], we will be dancing to the Germans’ tune because they want to prevent us from taking the offensive and to keep us on the back foot."

[Robert

There's so much in that passage, both implicit and explicit. I find it quite bewildering. That comment of Poincare's stating that GQG is unwilling - or unable - to take reality into account is very striking : a schism between soldiers and politicians at least as glaring as that between LG and DH.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

It is important to bear in mind that Poincare was a politician and everything in his memoirs is seen through politically tinted glasses. Only at times of crisis do military matters become more important than politics and nothing is completely free of some political resonance. The politicians simply used events in the war as weapons in their political battle. The left wing had been critical of Joffre from the very outset of the war, Even as the press were hailing him for the Miracle of the Marne, he was being criticised simply because he was the CiC and therefore associated with the government. The continued attacks on his management of the war were as much political as military. At the time of the 1st battle of the Marne, the left pushed Gallieni's contribution and instigated a fierce debate which went on for years as to who had won the battle, Joffre or Gallieni. These manoeuvrings were not simply a matter of wily politicians using simple soldiers as their catspaws. Gallieni himself was a relentless critic of Joffre. Although he died before it came to pass, Joffre's downfall owed much to Gallieni's efforts.

[phil andrade]

So much for national unity arising in response to threat ! I'm flabbergasted, Tom. To think that political faction prevailed over national crisis. It makes me see the French in a very poor light. My God, what Haig had to put up with.....

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, best to stop referring to 'the French' as if there was a single entity . The relationship between the French political and military systems was hugely complex. Things fluctuated as individuals, groups and circumstances varied. We are beginning to glimpse the effects of Verdun, coming on top of the previous campaigns.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Phil, best to stop referring to 'the French' as if there was a single entity . The relationship between the French political and military systems was hugely complex. Things fluctuated as individuals, groups and circumstances varied. We are beginning to glimpse the effects of Verdun, coming on top of the previous campaigns.

Robert

Hugely complex, fluctuating and variegated...a "tricky" lot.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

So much for national unity arising in response to threat ! I'm flabbergasted, Tom. To think that political faction prevailed over national crisis. It makes me see the French in a very poor light. My God, what Haig had to put up with.....

Phil (PJA)

I refer the right honourable gentleman to the tricks, plots and counterplots including misleading the House of Commons, which was the common currency of the British political scene throughout the war and after.

[phil andrade]

I refer the right honourable gentleman to the tricks, plots and counterplots including misleading the House of Commons, which was the common currency of the British political scene throughout the war and after.

Common currency, or just DLG specie ?

Perhaps, Tom, I'm just one of those deluded folks who think that the truly tricky fellas start at Calais !

Bringing back my gaze to Verdun , I am struggling with the distinct lack of consensus among the French - both politicians and soldiers - in regard to the impact of the battle, and the danger it posed.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

The battle of Verdun was fought on a total front of some 20 miles and lasted about 10 months. Several generals were engaged on the French side at the same and at different times with overall command changing hands more than once. At any given time, things would be going well here and badly there. Troops would hold their ground , fall back then re-advance. This was a hugely complex undertaking involving hundreds of thousands of men. It was of crucial importance to the politicians and the military. There is no simple, linear description of Verdun. It is a patchwork of contradictory accounts coming from the generals and their supporters. Consider for a moment, the scene at the start of the war during the retreat from Le Cateau. French officers met two different parties of British officers and came away with two different commitments for the BEF the following day, neither of which was sanctioned by Sir John French. If that sort of confusion could reign in what was a minor skirmish compared to what went on at Verdun, how confused do we suppose the surviving accounts would be during that battle?

[Robert Dunlop]

Excellent summary, Tom. I agree that it is not possible to distill Verdun into a linear easy-to-digest synopsis, not if we truly want to understand the significance of the pressures on the British. Too often, 'the French' have been protrayed using simplistic stereotypes.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Twenty mile frontage ? Wasn't Verdun fought in a rather more compressed arena than that ? The ironic thing is, of all the battles of the Great War, this one most exemplified the static nature of the conflict, and was, perhaps, the one best described as an affair of "equilibrium".

Might it be that French politicians, feeling that the Germans had been contained, used this situation of equilibrium to pursue their advantage and indulge in more bickering than ever ?

It would be interesting to speculate on how the impact of Verdun on French political activity differed from the way it impinged on the German political scene.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

Twenty mile frontage ? Wasn't Verdun fought in a rather more compressed arena than that ? The ironic thing is, of all the battles of the Great War, this one most exemplified the static nature of the conflict, and was, perhaps, the one best described as an affair of "equilibrium".

Might it be that French politicians, feeling that the Germans had been contained, used this situation of equilibrium to pursue their advantage and indulge in more bickering than ever ?

It would be interesting to speculate on how the impact of Verdun on French political activity differed from the way it impinged on the German political scene.

Phil (PJA)

I looked at a small scale map and gave a rough guess as to the length of the perimeter of the Verdun salient. If you wish to tighten up the estimate, please do.

Any and every speculation might be true. Who knows? Is there any gain to be made from groundless speculation? I assume we are trying to bring some form and order to an extremely complex series of events of which we have incomplete and sometimes contradictory information. I suggest that we might be better analysing the information to the best of our ability than to spend time imagining possibilites for which there is no shred of evidence.

[phil andrade]

Forgive my tendency to go off at a tangent, Tom. It's proving very difficult to impose a coherent narrative on the whys and wherefores of Verdun. Truly the most enigmatic battle !

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

"Friday 26 May.

At 7:30 am, I left for Mailly[1] camp [to review a Russian brigade], via the eastern railway, accompanied by Isvolsky[2], General Gilinski[3] and General Roques. During the journey, Roques told me that General Joffre has reduced the number of companies per battalion [from four] to three, without consulting him. Fearing that this measure might be criticized by the parliamentary committees and that it might make the manpower crisis seem more serious than it actually is, Roques has demanded that Joffre postpone the change until the minister has considered the measure and submited it to the government.

Saturday 27 May.

General Roques described the outcome of his early research on the Verdun matter. General Herr wrote to General Dubail on February 16th, advising that an attack was likely and requesting two divisions for his reserve. We immediately gave him everything that he asked for. I sincerely hope that Roques forwards the whole dossier to me.

According to General Pétain, from the start of Verdun up to May 25th there will have been 600 officers and 22,743 other ranks (ORs) killed; 1,944 officers and 73,000 ORs wounded; and 1,000 officers and 53,000 ORs missing . On the other hand, the returns from Saint-Dizier Station[4] indicate 13 500 trains have evacuated 32 000 sick and 103 000 wounded. This figure of 103 000 is significantly more than Pétain’s estimate for the wounded. He should realise that the army has counted the 53,000 missing in with the evacuated wounded. This is quite possible as wounded soldiers sometimes evacuate themselves without supervision. But it is all very obscure.

[1] In the Champagne region.

[2] Alexander Petrovich Isvolsky (1856-1919) was a Russian statesman.

[3] Former aid de camp to Emperor Nicholas, and later Chief of Staff under Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch.

[4] Approximately 40 miles SW of Verdun."

Robert

[phil andrade]

There is significant contradiction in Poincare's assessment of Petain's casualty returns. In April ( entries for the 7th and 13th, IIRC) he alludes to large numbers of french prisoners being captured at Verdun, and the ominous implications for morale.

Now he appears to suggest that the 53,000 missing reported by Petain are incorporated in the 103,000 wounded evacuated from Saint -Dizier....as if the prospect of them being POWs ( or dead) is not being countenanced. Is this a case of "lost in translation" ?

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, the more important issue (IMHO) is Roques' anger at Joffre's decision. Here we see the Minister of War, in this case a politically appointed general, taking umbrage with the Commander-in-Chief. Rocque's mood is driven by a concern about how Joffre's decision will be perceived by politicians and by the enemy. Taken in this light, Poincaré's musings illustrate, yet again, how politicians were more than willing to cast different interpretations onto the military leadership's reporting. To some extent, the actual numbers are a distraction. There was, however, a problem in the way figures were being collated in real time. This is not surprising, given the magnitude and ongoing nature of Verdun. A very good friend of mine, Marc (formerly in the French cavalry), reviewed my humble translation and provided the following comments:

"BTW, this extract is really fascinating for WW1 French history :

- parliament may criticize a reorganization of infantry battalions.

- fear of criticism from parliament induced the postponing of this re-organization.

Where else did this happen ?

Bear in mind that French scholars still write that the British parliament had more power over its military than the French one...

Verdun...

You may remember an impression that I talked to you about concerning French casualties in 1914 and the importance of the numbers of men who died while being evacuated toward rear hospitals but were considered as KIA.

This is almost the same issue here.

MIA [comprises] unfound KIA, POW, and evacuated WIA. French 'official' figures about Verdun talk of 60,000 KIA and 100,000 MIA, the latter eventually being considered as killed. Thus, you'll find in many works that the French lost 160,000 men in Verdun. The problem is : among those 100,000 MIA supposedly KIA, how many were evacuated WIA (not registered by their units) and how many were POW captured by Germans ? I know at least one amongst the latter : Capitaine de Gaulle. He was officially registered as KIA. Pétain signed his posthumous citation in his HQ at Souville in the last days of February/early March."

Please note that, for the purpose of this discussion, we can now assume that both the military and the political parties were aware of the significant numbers of casualties (if not the precise breakdown) being caused by the battle. Furthermore, we see that the French politicians were concerned about how the effects of these casualties would be perceived. As a result of this, as well as other factors, we can also see a growing (but not a single unified) opinion against Joffre.

Basically, I am flagging that we should not go down the path of dicussing the precise number or types of casualties in this thread. By all means feel free to start another thread on this subject.

Robert