The Somme

[Robert Dunlop]

Following on from Tom's post, I have been steadily working my way through Raymond Poincaré's memoirs: "Au Service de la France: Verdun 1916". He was the President of France. As such, he had access to the Conseil meetings. Poincaré appears to have written the material contemporaneously in his diary. I don't know how much editing was done before publishing.

This first quote is from his entry on Saturday 1st April 1916. After just over 4 weeks of the Verdun battle, this entry illustrates the dawning of its significance, at the political level.

"The Council then discussed the situation at Verdun. Freycinet expressed the painful surprise that our successive backward steps had caused him. We have lost Malancourt, we have lost Vaux, we cannot stop retreating. We are wearing ourselves away, we are giving up ground. Why can’t we even counter-attack? Is it because of inferiority in artillery? ...

In truth, General Pétain told me the other day that he saw the threat to Malancourt, Béthincourt and Vaux. He preferred, however, to let the enemy wear himself out before making any counter-attack. Moreover, when the opportunity came, he did not want to push north or east of Verdun, as this would extend the pocket that our front formed there without profit. Instead, Pétain is exploring a breakthrough towards Varennes [-en-Argonne, NW of Verdun].

But he added that this operation depended on...…substantial forces and artillery.

However, from what Pénelon has told me, Joffre and GQG are considering an offensive with General Foch and the right wing of the British army ... Joffre and Foch hope that this diversion on a wide front can release Verdun. On the other hand, 37 divisions have already passed through the hands of General Pétain since he took up at Souilly.

General Roques will visit the area tomorrow to make his own assessment. At first glance, he favours Joffre’s idea."

From this quote, we can see that Pétain had the ear of Poincaré from early on.

This is another very important issue. It may not be immediately obvious but relates to the significance of a counter-offensive. Here we see that it had political significance. The failure to launch one had alerted Poincaré to a military problem. The broader significance relates to any ongoing delay in launching one. Pétain and Joffre had both indicated that a counter-offensive was needed, though the method was different. At that time, both attacks required strong French participation. Poincaré appreciated the significance of the drain on French forces to that point in time. The stage was set... If a counter-attack could not be pulled off then it would speak volumes about the impact of Verdun. And not just to the generals.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Three days later, General Rocques reported back to Poincaré:

General Rocques gave me an account of his trip to Souilly. He urged General Pétain not to stand on the defensive too passively and to react more against the enemy’s attacks.

On the 6th April, Poincaré wrote:

Briand and Ribot went yesterday to the train station to greet Asquith, who was returning to England from a visit to Italy. The British cabinet seems to be under serious threat; it is likely that he will have to reshuffle it... The British are not helping us at this time.

Poincaré had noted the financial assistance of the British, so I believe his last comment related to the perceived lack of active military help.

Robert

[truthergw]

Following on from Tom's post, I have been steadily working my way through Raymond Poincaré's memoirs: "Au Service de la France: Verdun 1916". He was the President of France. As such, he had access to the Conseil meetings. Poincaré appears to have written the material contemporaneously in his diary. I don't know how much editing was done before publishing.

...............................................

General Roques will visit the area tomorrow to make his own assessment. At first glance, he favours Joffre’s idea."

From this quote, we can see that Pétain had the ear of Poincaré from early on.

This is another very important issue. It may not be immediately obvious but relates to the significance of a counter-offensive. Here we see that it had political significance. The failure to launch one had alerted Poincaré to a military problem. The broader significance relates to any ongoing delay in launching one. Pétain and Joffre had both indicated that a counter-offensive was needed, though the method was different. At that time, both attacks required strong French participation. Poincaré appreciated the significance of the drain on French forces to that point in time. The stage was set... If a counter-attack could not be pulled off then it would speak volumes about the impact of Verdun. And not just to the generals.

Robert

I am reading a French account of Joffre's career. The author, Recouly, notes that General Roques replaced Gallieni as Minister of War, when Gallieni was too ill to continue. Joffre was well pleased at Roque's appointment, They were old friends of many years standing. In the months before his illness, Gallieni in his capacity of Minister of War had become strongly critical of Joffre and his handling of Verdun. As I have stated elsewhere, French senior officers were inextricably linked to party politics. Generals and their military activities might well be attacked in political speeches as a means of attacking their associated party. The mirror image of that was that generals would fall from grace if and when their political supporters did. Recouly is in no doubt that the Battle on the Somme was instrumental in taking the pressure off at Verdun. In the context of the times, 1920s, that is as likely to be a political statement as a military judgement.

[Robert Dunlop]

Poincaré's entry on 7th April:

"Pénelon told me that General de Castelnau is, like me, concerned about the number of prisoners that we have lost around Verdun. He fears there is a drop in morale."

On 9th April, Poincaré visited the French lines near Belfort. There he met General Christian, who had recently "returned from Verdun". Poincaré does not describe the details of their meeting but it is, perhaps, reasonable that he would have asked Christian about his experiences there.

10th April:

"The Verdun communiqué that we received about the big German attack on the left bank caused us a lot of worry.."

Next day:

"On returning, I find the Council is very nervous. The communiques about Verdun have dampened spirits. Freycinet repeats that we are losing ground every day and that General Pétain is not reacting enough. I replied that General Pétain had expected beforehand to lose some ground, that he warned me of this possibility, and that he prefers to spare the men. General Rocques, who went to [Pétain's HQ at] Souilly to advocate more activity, says that a reckless and bloody counter-offensive could jeopardize the fate of Verdun. But I see Freycinet is not convinced.

In the evening, Pénelon told me that Joffre returned from his visit to Souilly. He was very satisfied with what he saw and he has confidence in Pétain’s tactics."

Robert

[phil andrade]

Very interesting, Robert : thank you.

The entry on April 7 catches my eye : this is a reference to prisoners, rather than to "losses". High numbers of prisoners carry an implication, amply verified by " He fears there is a drop in morale". Was this an allusion to morale generally, or just among the soldiers at Verdun ? This was the seventh week of the Verdun battle, and the Germans were heavily committed to attacking on the left bank of the Meuse. It would be revealing to find out if the Germans themselves were commenting on the number of Frenchmen they had captured by that time, and as to whether they had discerned a deterioration of morale in their enemies.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, the reference to a fall in morale was the musing of the Chief of Staff, de Castelnau. Both he and Poincaré were some distance from the fighting. Both men were seeking explanations for the observed problems. At other times, Poincaré speculates that it would be helpful for the men to have lectures from the officers that 'explain the origins and consequences of the war'. It is a classic example of wanting to help but not having any longer term solutions (more artillery, a counter-offensive by the British, etc) to hand. 'Lack of morale' seemed like a simple option that could be fixed with a 'simple' solution. Future quotes will help cast more light on this.

Robert

[phil andrade]

With just sketchy knowledge at my disposal, I begin to wonder how far Verdun was what today's commentators might describe as a "Black Swan" episode...in so far as it came out of nowhere and disrupted plans and perceptions. If so, Falkenhayn judged the battle's impact well....it forced the British to commit to a massive counter attack before they were properly trained and equipped, with consequential losses that were far too high to be endured for long. In this light, the British casualties of July 1916 might be attributed to Verdun. Although, of course, the plans for the Somme offensive were laid at Chantilly in December 1915, and I've even read somewhere that Joffre said, while contemplating an imminent german attack in early 1916 " Let it be Verdun." All a bit confusing !

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

13th April:

"Thomas gave [the Council] an update about the status of ammunition stocks. The supplies of all calibres, except 120 mm, have increased despite the consumption in the Battle of Verdun.

Roque said that the German's figure of 36,000 [French] prisoners had been verified as correct. The number corresponded roughly to the number of our missing, including killed, wounded left on the battlefield, and captured. The most recent figure of 17,000 men is more usual as a proportion [of casualties to the number involved in the battle]. It's still a lot and I insisted, along with several Council members including Sembat, that a vigorous propaganda campaign should be conducted to discourage soldiers from surrendering. If necessary, we should be ruthless in repressing this tendency.

General Pétain deemed that General Ferry had commanded the 11th Division (20th Corps) badly. Pétain asked General Joffre to relieve Ferry; this has been carried out.

The order of the day attributed to General de Bazelaire by the Germans is true; he did say that if the troops withdraw again they would face being crushed by our own artillery, who would not alter their fire to spare them.

The 111th Regiment, which had fallen back, had entered into talks with the Germans; an investigation is underway. The 258th Regiment is also being investigated. Prosecutions will be ordered if necessary.

The Germans have brought a division back from Bulgaria; they are committed to Verdun and have redeployed all but three reserve divisions from the British front.

General Joffre believes they cannot initiate an attack elsewhere. He is therefore sending some of his fresh reserves to Verdun, including the IXth Corps. Joffre believes that Verdun is where the Germans will continue their effort."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

19th April:

"General Pétain is re-arming the forts that were prematurely stripped of their artillery, due to being decommissioned. It goes without saying that the forts should always be points dappui for the defense. But the unexplainable abandonment of Douaumont has triggered a reaction that is too far in the other direction. It seems that we want to pack out smaller forts that are incapable of resistance when invested.

[After visting Fort Sartell] we left... on foot and, to avoid being observed, made our way through the woods and fields, which were greasy and waterlogged, to Regret [which is only about 2.5 km SW of Verdun] where General des Coings HQ is located. General des Coings commands the 23rd and 24th Divisions guarding the front along the bend of the Meuse at Cumières à Bras.

Regret reminds me of certain pages in Goethes memoirs, where he talked about this district, about another general staff and about the [Prussians and their] Allies sojourn under the walls of Verdun in 1793 [sic 1792 a reference to the Duke of Brunswicks invasion of France in the late 18th Century, which culminated in the Battle of Valmy soon after Verdun had been captured. Valmy has huge significance. Had the French lost, then the Republic would have been snuffed out.]. Fortunately today, on this part of the front, the inundation of the valley is protecting our troops. Here, as in all the areas we've visited, the work is being put in but it is very behind schedule. It is amazing that the defense lines of Verdun have held for so long.

After these various visits, we returned to Souilly and stopped at Pétains headquarters.

He is always confident, but he wants to keep 24 divisions, plus 6 in reserve, permanently. Roques feels, like Joffre, that Pétain exaggerates somewhat.

According to Pétain, the French losses from 21st February to 5th April were 97,000 troops, including 12,163 killed, 68,835 wounded and evacuated, and 16,043 confirmed missing, including dead, wounded and captured. As of 15th April, total losses were probably 107 to 108,000 men, all categories. During this time, the Germans have lost about 278,000 men, based on conservative estimates.

Pétain brought us the report from the liaison officers and the heads of services. The report provided a brief note of what happened yesterday in each corps and in each service. Their reports, however, say much less than we learned from our visits to all the corps commanders. It appears that Pétain, who doesnt have time to see his generals, keeps informed via his liaison officers. Will this dependence on others be his downfall if they make mistakes? I dont want to believe it will happen to him."

Robert

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning All,

Although encompassing WW2 and his subsequent trial, this event will hopefully give a greater insight into Petain and his thinking:

http://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/spip.php?breve14

It looks like a programme on French TV will be made, based on it, for screening later

[phil andrade]

13th April:

Roque said that the German's figure of 36,000 [French] prisoners had been verified as correct. The number corresponded roughly to the number of our missing, including killed, wounded left on the battlefield, and captured. The most recent figure of 17,000 men is more usual as a proportion [of casualties to the number involved in the battle]. It's still a lot and I insisted, along with several Council members including Sembat, that a vigorous propaganda campaign should be conducted to discourage soldiers from surrendering. If necessary, we should be ruthless in repressing this tendency.

Robert

This information is illuminating, Robert. Thanks again.

Confusing, though....what's he saying : that the 36,000 prisoners claimed by the Germans is the true figure; and that the official French communique of 17,000 missing is wishful thinking ?

Lost in translation ?

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

I believe he is talking about two separate sets of figures. One (the larger number) relates to an earlier report. The second comes from a later action.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Verdun is more enigmatic than the Somme. There seems to be obscurity about its provenance and its aims.

The Somme, whether related to its conception at Chantilly or its role in relieving the French at Verdun, is easier to place in context.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Some more quotes from Poincaré:

"Friday 28 April.

I... drew the Commander-in-Chief’s attention to the looting by the troops in Verdun, which is still unpunished.

Then [we] reviewed the issue of troop numbers. Contrary to the Senate Committee’s overly pessimistic view that the number of 141 000 prisoners is too low, the Council concluded that this figure is too high.

Klotz[Lucien Klotz, Ministre des Travaux publics, Postes et Télégraphes; Finance Minister at the end of the war] and Charles Dumont brought me the report of their mission to Verdun.

Tuesday 2 May.

General Pénelon [le lieutenant-colonel du génie Marie Jean-Baptiste Pénelon ; Liaison Officer ; secrétaire général militaire à l’Elysée after the Armistice] told me that General Pétain took command of the Central Army Group today. General Nivelle has replaced him as the head of the Army of Verdun. Pétain continues to direct operations, but he has moved to Bar-le-Duc. Pénelon says these changes have Pétain’s full agreement. I remain somewhat concerned about this and I would have preferred that Pétain remained at Souilly until the end of the battle of Verdun. General Lebrun has replaced General Nivelle.

Pénelon also told me that there have been many failures of the troops at Verdun, that Clemenceau was quite wrong to praise the soldiers at the expense of the commanders, and that the Berliner Tageblatt is publishing statements that our prisoners are complaining about the length of the war. Pénelon tells me that my advice has been considered finally and that officers have been ordered to stay in closer contact with the men and give lectures to improve morale. It will not take much to awaken the magnificent qualities of these brave men.

Wednesday 17 May.

Afterwards we studied the question of the offensive. Pétain said, just as clearly as Joffre and Castelnau, that the Verdun affair can only be ended by an Allied offensive on another front. This counter-attack appears to be essential, but he believes that we cannot participate because of Verdun. We are losing a lot of men at Verdun, and expending a lot of ammunition. In Pétain’s opinion, we have played our part; the British must deliver the offensive alone. Joffre and Castelnau recognize that, above all, we must continue to defend Verdun with whatever it takes. They also believe that if we do not participate in the British offensive, the British will be obliged to attack by themselves. They felt, however, that we cannot support the British right wing or extend their line [which clearly wasn't the case].

I emphasized the need to build up large stocks of heavy artillery, especially the 155s, before the offensive. Joffre and Castelnau said that if we do not attack then we will be attacked, and that if we delay too long then the Germans, with their greater manufacturing capacity, will retain their lead in munitions. With respect to the other Allies, the Russians won’t be ready until about June 15 and the British will start their offensive around 1 July. Until then, we'll have to see what happens at Verdun."

Robert

[phil andrade]

That really is a "corker", isn't it, Robert ?

What strikes me as a theme throughout so many of the reports you've been good enough to post in this thread is that the Verdun fighting appeared to be damaging the morale of the French soldiers to a far greater degree than the actual number of casualties might suggest.

Fragility....that seems to be the right word . Both the political and the military appear to have been afflicted with a sense of dread in regard to the ordeal of Verdun.

Haig had been very aware of this fragile French condition for some time, judging by comments in his letters and diary.

The damage sufered by the French in the earlier part of the war had been so terrible that they were profoundly fragile thereafter.

Why did the Germans last so much longer before they succumbed ?

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

Now and then I just pick up my Blake edited version of Haig's diary/letters, and open it randomly, and read whatever passage meets the eye. I note that he adopts a more personal tone when he describes Joffre...almost a condescending, affectionate depiction "Poor old Joffre" etc. This is especially apparent in the passage dealing with the meeting on May 26 1916. I have not yet seen any other episode depicted in which the personal behaviour of one man is more revealingly described...it's almost as if Haig was writing thus to enhance the dramatic impact of the moment.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

I have not yet seen any other episode depicted in which the personal behaviour of one man is more revealingly described...it's almost as if Haig was writing thus to enhance the dramatic impact of the moment.

I suggest you read a bit more widely, then, before jumping to conclusions which appear specious in the extreme to those who have already done so.

George

[truthergw]

That really is a "corker", isn't it, Robert ?

What strikes me as a theme throughout so many of the reports you've been good enough to post in this thread is that the Verdun fighting appeared to be damaging the morale of the French soldiers to a far greater degree than the actual number of casualties might suggest.

Fragility....that seems to be the right word . Both the political and the military appear to have been afflicted with a sense of dread in regard to the ordeal of Verdun.

Haig had been very aware of this fragile French condition for some time, judging by comments in his letters and diary.

The damage sufered by the French in the earlier part of the war had been so terrible that they were profoundly fragile thereafter.

Why did the Germans last so much longer before they succumbed ?

Phil (PJA)

The French lasted longer than the Germans. They were able to halt the 1918 advances and inflict a defeat on the Germans which was the opening blow of the final defeat. The Germans came to the French to ask for an armistice, not the other way round.

[phil andrade]

The French lasted longer than the Germans. They were able to halt the 1918 advances and inflict a defeat on the Germans which was the opening blow of the final defeat. The Germans came to the French to ask for an armistice, not the other way round.

Of course...of course, Tom ; what I alluded to here was the crisis of French morale in the early summer of 1917, which was not to afflict the Germans for another year. Bearing in mind the enormous losses that the German army had sustained by mid 1917 - refer to our discussions on " The Muddy Grave" - it is remarkable how much longer it took before the collapse occurred.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

Perhaps what we see here is a truly democratic political setup with frontline soldiers also being elected deputies. They could and did report directly to the Chamber on any perceived weaknesses. From very early days, The Battle of the Marne, criticism was heard of high command in the Chamber and was reported to some extent in the press. Clemenceau led a bitter campaign of criticism throughout the war until he was finally elected premier. Even secret sessions included testimony from wounded soldiers. That is one of the strengths of democracy, in a total war, it can also be perceived as a weakness. A government which is directly answerable to the people needs to wage war with one eye on the electorate. This was demonstrated when Joffre was replaced by Nivelle. A purely political movement. On the German side we had a parliament which had no power. All of its administative power flowed from the kaiser. He could call for an election at any time and there were multiple methods built in to the constitution to allow him to ignore or delay any and all decisions by the Reichstag. In effect, Germany was ruled by a military cabal and latterly, by Hindenburg and Ludendorff. In these circumstances, the true state of morale in the German army was never likely to be widely known or admitted. There were signs of unrest on the home front long before late summer, 1918.

[phil andrade]

In these circumstances, the true state of morale in the German army was never likely to be widely known or admitted.

Except in the army itself.

Your points about the war effort of a democratic society being susceptible to a volatile public mood, vulnerable to disclosures and discussion, are very thought provoking. Wasn't Joffre adamant that the press be refused access to some of the combat zones ? This is something I recall reading somewhere, so I'm a little diffident about pushing the point. It's apparent that rumour did more damage in these circumstances than might otherwise have been the case. Take the evidence of some of Robert's posts....we have estimates- in French government circles- of 141,000 French prisoners being taken by the Germans at Verdun by late April 1916 : a very exagerrated figure, and one that speaks of how rumour was flying around, and the harm it could do. A year later, there was to be talk of the Nivelle Offensive collapsing with the loss of one hundred thousand killed in a few days....another grotesque distortion which surely contributed to the debacle that ensued. I wonder what the German public was reading in the newspapers in early July 1916.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

Whatever the German public was reading, we can rest assured it would be nothing like the criticisms appearing in the socialist press in France. Part of the reason for Joffre's downfall was his attempts to restrict the access of the press and the Senators and Deputies to the front. In the war zone, Joffre was in complete control but the politicians, quite rightly, were jealous of their rights and suspicious of any attempt to restrict them. In France, the possibility of a military coup or a coup supported by the military, was never far from politicians' minds. Especially those of the left wing. There was also great suspicion of the church as a political force. Foch fell foul of that when he lost the support of Joffre. Joffre was attacked, nominally, for his neglect of the front in the Verdun sector but in reality, he was seen as too closely allied to one political party. In fact, Joffre seems to have been more or less apolitical. He was however, consistently supported by one party. The defended him against all political attacks. When there was a sea change in the Chamber of Deputies, that party suffered a diminution of power and Joffre was now susceptible to attack. Replacing Joffre by Nivelle was more a political attack on the party which championed him than it was a belief that Nivelle was a better CiC. No one can hope to follow the war on the western front without a basic grasp of politics. That includes French and British. It is easier in Germany. There was one kaiser and one has only to take account of who his main military advisors were. There was no change in view or aims. Simply a struggle to be at the top of the heap. The heap stayed the same.

[phil andrade]

Thank you, Tom...you put that well and succinctly.

It's nice to learn from the threads without being slagged off !

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

From Haig's entry, for April 18 1917, revealing the contents of a letter sent to him by Wilson, depicting the beginning of the Nivelle Offensive the day before.

Wilson wrote :

G.Q.G. is disappointed and they will look about for some excuse, one of them will be will be that the whole German Army is facing them, and that we have not succeeded in easing their load ! This would be pure French, i.e. the woman's side of their nature, wounded vanity, jealousy and disappointment at their own failure and our success.

While this relates to events one year after the period we're discussing in this thread, it speaks volumes about attitudes, especially coming from the most Francophil of all in the British High Command. Perhaps I should remain unrepentant about my suggestion that Haig thought that Joffre, on May 26 1916, was behaving like a "Big Girl's Blouse" !

At the beginning of the war, Haig wrote that he had been playing golf with Doris on August 13, and, reflecting on the enormity of events unfolding, he wrote :

The characteristics too of the German people as compared with the French and ourselves, have also been a subject of interest to me.

It's tempting to conclude that Haig conformed with British tradition by cherishing a caricatured perception of Frenchmen as "hysterical foreigners".

Or am I being specious again ?

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

Or am I being specious again ?

Yes.

George