The Somme

[truthergw]

From Haig's entry, for April 18 1917, revealing the contents of a letter sent to him by Wilson, depicting the beginning of the Nivelle Offensive the day before.

Wilson wrote :

G.Q.G. is disappointed and they will look about for some excuse, one of them will be will be that the whole German Army is facing them, and that we have not succeeded in easing their load ! This would be pure French, i.e. the woman's side of their nature, wounded vanity, jealousy and disappointment at their own failure and our success.

While this relates to events one year after the period we're discussing in this thread, it speaks volumes about attitudes, especially coming from the most Francophil of all in the British High Command. Perhaps I should remain unrepentant about my suggestion that Haig thought that Joffre, on May 26 1916, was behaving like a "Big Girl's Blouse" !

At the beginning of the war, Haig wrote that he had been playing golf with Doris on August 13, and, reflecting on the enormity of events unfolding, he wrote :

The characteristics too of the German people as compared with the French and ourselves, have also been a subject of interest to me.

It's tempting to conclude that Haig conformed with British tradition by cherishing a caricatured perception of Frenchmen as "hysterical foreigners".

Or am I being specious again ?

Phil (PJA)

My question to you would be, what is the purpose of your post?. Is this intended as a debating point? Is it a comment on a previous post? Picking out lines from a diary and adding the random thoughts it invokes in your mind is probably legal but is it useful?

[phil andrade]

My question to you would be, what is the purpose of your post?. Is this intended as a debating point? Is it a comment on a previous post? Picking out lines from a diary and adding the random thoughts it invokes in your mind is probably legal but is it useful?

The tenor of Franco-British relations was of major importance, obviously. There are harsh words about the French in the diaries and letters, some from Robertson, some, surprisingly , from Wilson.... and some from Haig himself. No doubt the French made plenty of unflattering remarks about the British. I deem these comments and perceptions to be of relevance to this thread, which discusses the question of how far Verdun resulted in French pressure on the British to launch the Somme Offensive. The way that British soldiers and politicians regarded their French counterparts mattered, and vica versa, and it certainly impinged on the question we're discussing.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Off topic too, Phil

We should stay focused on what the French perceptions of Verdun were, and whether these perceptions resulted in pressure being applied to the British. Thanks.

Robert

[truthergw]

The tenor of Franco-British relations was of major importance, obviously. There are harsh words about the French in the diaries and letters, some from Robertson, some, surprisingly , from Wilson.... and some from Haig himself. No doubt the French made plenty of unflattering remarks about the British. I deem these comments and perceptions to be of relevance to this thread, which discusses the question of how far Verdun resulted in French pressure on the British to launch the Somme Offensive. The way that British soldiers and politicians regarded their French counterparts mattered, and vica versa, and it certainly impinged on the question we're discussing.

Phil (PJA)

Of course Franco British relations were an important subject. Whether it is the subject of this thread, I beg leave to doubt. Neither was an entry in a private diary in reference to a private letter. That entry had absolutely no relevance to the relationship between Verdun and the Somme.

[phil andrade]

Off topic too, Phil

We should stay focused on what the French perceptions of Verdun were, and whether these perceptions resulted in pressure being applied to the British. Thanks.

Robert

Don't the British perceptions of Verdun count, too, Robert ?

And those perceptions were bound to be shaped - to a degree - by the way the British regarded the French, both in the military and political spheres.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

Don't the British perceptions of Verdun count, too, Robert ?

And those perceptions were bound to be shaped - to a degree - by the way the British regarded the French, both in the military and political spheres.

Phil (PJA)

When the hole reaches a certain depth, stop digging.

[Robert Dunlop]

Don't the British perceptions of Verdun count, too, Robert ?

Phil, I am not saying that they don't count, just not to this thread. Especially perceptions about Nivelle or other non-Somme events, such as the start of the war. Please feel free to start another thread.

Robert

[phil andrade]

The last thing I want to do is to appear thick, and I'm especially anxious to toe the line as far as Robert is concerned, but aren't we discussing the Somme, and how it was related to Verdun, and the pressure that the French were exerting on the British as a result ?

In that case, surely the British perception of the French was of paramount importance .......?

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, thanks to the efforts of all those who have contributed, yourself included, it feels like we have built up an interesting thread on the original topic. Thank you for re-raising your concern on this issue of British perceptions of 'the French'. What I am trying to achieve is a coherent set of related posts. The goal is to enable future readers to go through the content without too many distractions. There are some very interesting insights into a very interesting question.

We have already had detailed information, especially thanks to George's efforts, about Haig's perceptions of Joffre, for example. The quotes relate to contemporaneous material. The information has also covered other key French players who were involved in some way with influencing the British. The focus is around the French pressure and the British perception of this pressure.

I, along with others no doubt, would welcome information from other sources that were written at the time. This means the period from the Chantilly decision up to July 1st 1916. Such information should be focused around the key individuals, including senior commanders, liaison officers, politicians and other figures of influence. I was concerned that information was being drawn in from the beginning of the war and from the Nivelle period, ie after the Somme. It would be unhelpful, IMHO, to broaden the scope in this way. There is the risk of a sub-thread developing on the British attitudes to the French in general. We should avoid this if possible. It will distract readers from the core of this thread.

I hope this explains my rationale more clearly.

Robert

[truthergw]

Here are two quotes from the memoirs of Raymond Poincare, President of France through the war.

A meeting of the French War Council on 25th March, 1916. in Paris.

" I insisted that any general offensive must not be undertaken by the Allies until The French were able to take an important part. If not, the English would say that they had saved France; the victory would be an English one; the peace, an English peace. We had qualities which the allies did not. It would be better if the offensive was delayed a little if necessary, to allow the required resources to be available".

Here he is commenting on a meeting of political and military leaders from all the Entente countries and allies, held in Paris. It started 27 March, 1916. i.e. while the battle was raging at Verdun. This was one of the decisions taken, as reported to the President by M. Briand, Premier.

" Conforming to the the proposals of the general staffs, it was decided that there would be unity of action on all fronts. Asquith had said to Briand, - We accept the direction by the French. " .

Both of these translations are very free but I believe they convey the tenor of the remarks accurately. For those who are, quite rightly, sceptical of my translation skills,here is the reference.

" Au Service de la France. Neuf Annees deMemoirs. VIII. Verdun 1916". Raymond Poincare. Paris. Libraire de Plon 1931.

[PhilB]

We had qualities which the allies did not.

Any suggestions as to what they might be?

[phil andrade]

A suggestion : the Verdun fighting had extended to the West bank of the Meuse in early March, and the Germans had made relatively little progress that month despite paying a high price in casualties. Perhaps there was a confidence in the tone of French commentary that was to decline in May, when the Germans intensified their efforts and conquered Cote 304 and Le Mort Homme.

There does indeed appear to have been enormous volatility in the French depiction of the state of affairs at Verdun, and this must have impinged on the degree of pressure that they were exerting on the British.

As to those qualites, which, according to Poincare, were peculiar to the French my guess would be that he alluded to committment to the battle and a willingness and ability to fight the war with maximum effort : that seems unfair on the Russians in view of Lake Naroch.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

He does not state in that section of his memoirs, to which qualities he was alluding. I quoted these excerpts in order to point to , one, the British at all times, from Prime Minister down, accorded the supreme direction of the activities on the Western front to the French. Two, the sort of political pressure which was continuously brought to bear on Joffre and through him, on Haig. Haig was thus under the influence of his own government and the French. The first excerpt above shows that these influences were not always in accord or directed to the same end. It also shows one of the quandaries in which Joffre found himself. He wished Haig to attack as soon as he could to take pressure off Verdun but his political boss or at least, one of them, wanted him to take a full share in any battle. A complete contradiction.

In reference to French qualities, real or assumed. Before the war and even through it, there was in England a notion that the French were supreme tacticians and military experts. This was not confined to England. It was widely held in USA. England ruled the waves but deferred to France in matters military. The Prussians were universally agreed to have the best trained and equipped army and were admired for their superb discipline. The French were thought to have a flair for tactics. I have to say that, in my mind, history does not completely support that idea but it does seem to have been widely held. There seems little doubt that the French and Prussians were happy to accept that judgement. Perhaps there is an insight to be gained here into some of the failings of French and German plans but that is a horse of a different colour.

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is Poincaré's original for the sentence:

"Nous avons, d'ailleurs, des qualités offensives que n'ont pas nos alliées."

He appears to be referring to expertise and skills in conducting offensive operations.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Here is Poincaré's original for the sentence:

"Nous avons, d'ailleurs, des qualités offensives que n'ont pas nos alliées."

He appears to be referring to expertise and skills in conducting offensive operations.

Robert

And with good reason, I feel compelled to say.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

There does indeed appear to have been enormous volatility in the French depiction of the state of affairs at Verdun, and this must have impinged on the degree of pressure that they were exerting on the British.

Phil, this appears to be the case. The one proviso is that we should not consider 'the French' as a single entity with a single opinion. What is emerging is something more complex. Key individuals had differing views at different times. The fluctuations, and duration, of the battle caused an overall pattern of views. Broadly speaking, the pattern was sinusoidal, corresponding to the relative successes of the German or French forces. I am reading Dugard's history of Verdun, which was published in May 1916. He ends on a relative high, with the French forces having stopped the initial attacks, holding the key terrain features on the left bank of the Meuse, and even putting in some counter-attacks.

As noted previously, it is easy to see how commentators can select a quote from any point along the way to illustrate 'the French' view of Verdun. This can easily skew our overall understanding of how the battle was perceived throughout its complex evolution (and we haven't even considered what happened after July 10th - nor should we in this thread ).

Robert

[truthergw]

And with good reason, I feel compelled to say.

Phil (PJA)

You think that the French experience during the Battles of the Frontiers compares well with the British? I'd have though that the BEF acquitted themselves rather better than many of the French, especially on the Eastern border. The performance at Chemin des Dames in 1917 compared to Arras or Messines and even IIIYpres as a whole, does not cause you any faint doubt as to the inate ability of the French in military matters?

[Robert Dunlop]

Steady, Tom . It is possible that some British commentators would have agreed in the immediate lead up to the Somme, which is the focus of this thread.

Robert

[truthergw]

It is not only possible, Robert, it was certain. Lloyd George and Churchill are only two of a crowd who spring to mind. Unlike them, we have 90 years of historic analysis to guide our judgements. If we have read them, that is and if we choose to base our conclusions on historic analysis.

[phil andrade]

Up to and including the Somme, with the notable exception of Neuve Chapelle, it is - I think - fair to say that the French proved themselves more adept and effective on the offensive than the British.

I'll gladly discuss 1917 as well, but do not want to fall foul of Robert's admonishments !

Phil (PJA)

edit : I must admit that in the Aisne fighting of 1914, Germans commented on the very expert advance of British soldiers who deployed skillfully and minimsied the effects of artillery fire. Surely, though, the overwhelming impression conveyed by German observation in 1915 was that the British were far more rigid and amateurish than the French ?

[Robert Dunlop]

Please, let's take this discussion elsewhere too. There is already a thread that discussed the French versus the British performances.

Robert

[truthergw]

Here is Poincaré's original for the sentence:

"Nous avons, d'ailleurs, des qualités offensives que n'ont pas nos alliées."

He appears to be referring to expertise and skills in conducting offensive operations.

Robert

I agree that I wandered a bit there, Robert. Mea Culpa.

I am picking up on this quotation because I think it illustrates the point I was hoping to make. I actually translated that sentence as you did. It was fairly obvious what Poincare said. I then second guessed myself. I believe it is an instance of the French mistaken belief that they had some form of national genius in the attack. It was the basis of Foch's pre-war teachings at St Cyr and the subject of several, usually boring, pre war books defining how the French could not fail to win as long as they went baldheaded for the Germans when the whistle blew. I think he was mistaken so I deleted the reference to offensive and inserted the exculpatory remark of it being a free translation. In self defence I can only say my conscience was pricked at this constructive editing. All that said, I think that this misconception, that the French had a mystic national ability in the offensive, was swallowed by others, including members of the British establishment. The comparative French success on the first day of the Somme was a result of several factors including a sub standard defence by the Germans. At the end of the battle on the Somme, there was little or no evidence that the French were endowed with greater tactical ability than the British. Hopefully this post will help the thread get back on track.

[PhilB]

The use of the phrase "d`ailleurs" (moreover, besides) indicates that he had previously made some other comment relating to his allies - what might that have been, Robert?

[phil andrade]

An interesting and contradictory state of affairs : the French cherish a superiority complex on the one hand, and suffer an acute sense of vulnerability on the other.

From some of the evidence in posts submitted by Robert, it seems that Verdun had done more to nurture their sense of vulnerability

than it had to enhance their confidence. Reports of poor morale, indiscipline and mass surrender.

I reckon, Tom, that you underate the French tactical superiority over the British at that stage of the war : it does make a strange contrast, though, this fragility of morale, this sense of dismay and despair, when set against the feats that were to be achieved by Fayolle's troops.

There is something paradoxical in the French reaction to Verdun. I remain convinced that it is one of the most "enigmatic" of all battles.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

An interesting and contradictory state of affairs : the French cherish a superiority complex on the one hand, and suffer an acute sense of vulnerability on the other.

From some of the evidence in posts submitted by Robert, it seems that Verdun had done more to nurture their sense of vulnerability

than it had to enhance their confidence. Reports of poor morale, indiscipline and mass surrender.

I reckon, Tom, that you underate the French tactical superiority over the British at that stage of the war : it does make a strange contrast, though, this fragility of morale, this sense of dismay and despair, when set against the feats that were to be achieved by Fayolle's troops.

There is something paradoxical in the French reaction to Verdun. I remain convinced that it is one of the most "enigmatic" of all battles.

Phil (PJA)

The French were heavily defeated in their attack on all fronts in the Battles of the Frontiers. The Miracle of the Marne, was a defensive victory where the Germans were held then pushed back. When the entente went over to the attack, it very quickly fizzled out on the Aisne. 1915 saw a series of bloody stalemates where the French attacked in Artois and Champagne and were held on or near the line with terrible losses. 1916 saw the French hold and finally push back the Germans at Verdun. They had a good start on the Somme but did not maintain that edge. The majority of the gains on the Somme were delivered by BEF after a very bad start. 1917, saw a disastrous attack on Chemin des Dames which nearly broke the French spirit. It also saw Arras, Messines and IIIYpres. Only in 1918 after a very bad fright, did the Entente finally make a successful attack on the Germans. The main contributers to that victory were the BEF in which I include and give special prominence to dominion troops. I say that there is very little evidence in the form of battles won to point to a great superiority of French offensive tactics over British. The two great French victories were 1st Marne and Verdun. Both were defensive.