Evolution of French infantry tactics

[Latze]

Hello Jack,

you wrote:

I wonder if anyone can throw anything into the pot on French infantry-tank cooperation in 1918? All my Hachette says about it, is that, 'French tanks are smaller, lighter, but more manoeuverable than the tanks of our allies. Their tactics and role, therefore, are a little different.' It might have added that they were spectacularly dismal in performance, but instead points out that, ' ... the total cost per kilogram was between five and six francs' - which is an interesting way of expressing it. It sounds a bit like the British saying, 'Mark IVs? 'You don't get many of them to the pound'!

currently I am reading Alexander Fasse's doctoral thesis that discusses tank warfare and anti-tank defence on the western front. A very thorough work that discusses the French experience also and available for free

http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/fa...1/PDF/fasse.pdf

regards

Latze

[Latze]

Hello Robert,

I follow all the detailed stuff you bring to this discussion with much interest! As you seem to be able to read French (I really should re-learn it) maybe you can comment on the following two books:

Michel Goya "La chair et l’acier". Does it discuss low level tactics? It is a hard scientific book or more of a popular history? (If you have read that at all)

I was able to get hold of a copy of Pascal Lucas "The evolution of tactical ideas in France and Germany during the war of 1914-1918" (waiting for it to arrive) do you know if it is worthwile to get F. Culman "Tactique Generale d'apres l'experience de la Grande Guerre" also? Especially if ones French is sketchy and given the fact that he was an artillery commander and probably saw thinks from an artillery perspective? At least I had that impression because of the papers by him available in the US army's Field Artillery Journal.

regards

Latze

[Robert Dunlop]

I have not read Michel Goya's book but will check with a good friend of mine. He served in the French military and has a passion for the Great War.

It would be great if you could let us know how you find Lucas' book. I agree with your view about Culman's book. I would be cautious based on his other works, but I will check with Marc for you.

Robert

[Latze]

Hi Robert,

the Lucas stuff arrived yesterday. 137 pages, type-written. Some parts hard to read. I will print it out because reading it on screen is heavy going. Btw the American translation of Balck (I was unable to get a German copy) is an atrocity. Seems as if the Harry Bell who translated it had his problems with German or Englih or rather both. I hope Lucas is a better read.

so long

Latze

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks for the update. I am working on the translation of various sections of the 1914 regulations. Then I will pick out the relevant material from the 1916, and then 1918 versions. It will take a little time as work is very busy at present.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the first snippet from the French Field Service Regulations of April 1914. I have deliberately translated 'Règlement de Manoeuvre Avril 1914' this way to draw attention to a comparable British publication. The following comes from the introductory section. It provides the rationale for the upgrade from the previous FSR:

"The principles of infantry platoon combat follow on from, in a manner of speaking, the duties of commanders at all levels.

The determination of infantry in the attack, their tenacity in defense, their focus and drive, depend primarily on the precise nature of their assigned objective. A commander’s first duty is to set this goal. It is the central focus of orders to attack or to defend. The objective of each platoon, company, battalion, etc. becomes the target of that unit’s movement and fire.

The commander chooses the point along the line of the objective where he wants to make his main effort and arranges his reinforcements or support troops accordingly. The intended roles of reinforcements and support troops are to maintain momentum towards the enemy during an attack and, when defending, to sustain the capability of destroying any enemy units that come within range.

The 1904 regulations stated that reinforcements would extend or reinforce the line in attack and defense, adding more firepower, or helping push forward. The regulations, however, did not specify further how this was to be done! It follows that, in most cases, reinforcements were added to the firing line without generating the increase in offensive capability needed for an attack to succeed. This new edition explains how reinforcements and support troops can be used more aggressively.

The direction of advance by reinforcements and support troops towards the enemy is determined by the clearly defined objective in an attack order, which should be pursued at all costs. As much as possible, they should pass through gaps in the line and push forward the attack by alternating fire and movement."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Just to give some overall sense of what was contained in the FSR (because I won't reproduce all 200-odd pages ), the regulations are divided into major sections:

1. General principles and methods of instruction (p. 29-42)

2. Basic training for a soldier (p. 43-76, of which 3 pages are devoted to Combat à la baïonnette)

3. Platoon training (p. 77-98)

4. Company and higher level unit training [includes battalion, regiment and brigade training] (p. 101-114)

5. Infantry combat (p. 115-182)

6. Annexe (p. 183-187)

My main focus is on the infantry combat section, specifically chapter III of that section which covers: attack (p. 134-141, including the use of machine guns in attack); defense (p. 142-147); and night operations (p. 148-155).

Already it should be apparent that the coverage of attack vs defense was evenly balanced, bearing in mind that the writing of the regulations was overseen by one Colonel Grandmaison.

Robert

[nigelfe]

I think your attempt to align with FSR is wrong and misleading. The headings listed in the French manual suggest it is a very different document.

British FSR was the peak document, each arm and service was required to produce their own subordinate publications. I don't know what the British infantry equivalent was, I guess 'Infantry Training', because for artillery there was 'Field Artillery Training' and 'Garrison Artillery Training'. The names have changed a bit but the same pattern exists today - the 'capstone' is 'Land Operations', beneath this is the 'Army Field Manual', 2 vols each several pams, including 'Formation Tactics' and 'Battlegroup Tactics', then the 3 volume 'Infantry Tactical Doctrine' (and equivalents for other arms and services).

[Robert Dunlop]

I fully agree with your comments but I am not attempting to align the French regulations with FSR. My choice was quite deliberate because I will be quoting from the corresponding sections of the British FSR, where appropriate. The two documents discuss issues pertaining to offensive spirit, the close assault, etc.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the next brief instalment. It comes from a section entitled 'Movements of a Platoon Deployed as Skirmishers':

215. A platoon in skirmisher formation moves forward at the jog without keeping step ['sans cadence ou au pas gymnastique'], stops, kneels, lies down, faces a certain direction, and opens or closes the intervals between the various sub-units using the commands prescribed [elsewhere in the regulations].

216. As soon as fire commences and a platoon deployed in skirmish formation is advancing through the enemy infantry’s beaten zone, the platoon has to advance by quick bounds.

On the platoon leader’s command ‘FORWARD’ [emphasis in the original] , the infantry quickly move forward together. The squad leaders advance with their men, encouraging them; the serre-files [officers assigned the following role] follow the line and ensure that nobody is left behind.

The skirmishers stop on the command ‘Platoon-HALT’ . The platoon leader lies down just before the point where he wants his platoon to halt; the men move past him until they arrive at the position to be taken up, at which point the command ‘HALT’ is given and they go to ground together.

It is essential that the bound is executed quickly and with the greatest order. The skirmishers all set off quickly at the same time on the command FORWARD and go to ground instantly on the command HALT. Any men who fall slightly behind still go to ground but then crawl forward so that the line is reformed without gaps. Any soldier who does not advance immediately when ordered, who straggles behind or who jostles his colleagues during the bound, or who doesn’t get into the right position for firing, will be picked up by the serre-files.

217. The platoon leader may preface the command 'Advance' with some indication of the position to be reached, for example: "To the hedge, in the ditch ..."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The next section is entitled "Characteristics and role of the infantry (I)". I have highlighted some of the content:

"300. The infantry is the principal arm. It conquers and holds ground. It drives the enemy permanently from their strong points.

It is the only arm able to fight at any time, day or night, and on all terrains.

Infantry operate through movement and fire.

Only an advance ending in hand-to-hand combat is decisive and overwhelming, but it usually takes effective heavy firepower to open the way.

Firepower is not particularly effective in very covered terrain or at night, which means an attack can be scaled down to the approach followed by sudden assault with the bayonet.

In all other circumstances, the combination of movement and fire is the optimal infantry tactic. Forward movement continues as long as possible. Fire is only opened at distances where it can be effective and only when it becomes impossible for the infantry to advance without firing. Progress is by quick bounds supported by artillery fire and the fire of neighboring units until the men are close enough to the enemy to launch an assault with ‘l’arme blanche’.

The power of modern weapons makes it impossible to carry out any attack in dense formation, in daylight, or in open terrain. Offensive momentum can only be maintained with agile formations that minimise vulnerability. Therefore infantry must use skirmisher tactics.

Skirmishers are used throughout the fighting until the assault. They need to be constantly reinforced. To achieve this, the commander must deploy the infantry in depth, especially on those sectors of the front where more powerful and more sustained efforts are required.

The infantry’s task is particularly tough and difficult. It takes more than persistence and repeated efforts but also needs an enormous expenditure of physical energy, morale and bloody sacrifice.

The infantry’s mission on the battlefield is the most glorious."

Robert

[Latze]

Hi Robert,

regarding Lucas: I am not very fast at reading it because I had a lot of work to do. So it is only ten minutes reading commuting in the morning and ten minutes in the evening. Basically his discussion of pre-war regulations is way inferior to yours... Just a very high-level you and the assertion that everything was really good as it was and in no way had the French army any problems in 1914. Maybe except howitzers. Curiously he says that the German cavalry was better at fighting dismounted. All German accounts I know (by infantry officers) have it the other way round.

regards

Matthias

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks for the update, Matthias. Sorry to hear that Lucas is not very helpful.

I have some more material from pre-1914 to translate and upload.

Robert

[truthergw]

Hi Robert. Just to let you know that I am following the thread with great interest and like Mathias, am slowly working my way through a book. This is one which has a quite different slant on the matter of strategy and tactics. No surprise there, as the author is a French General writing in 2000 on the subject of Joffre. I will rejoin the debate when I have finished his book.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Tom. I look forward, as always, to your further contributions.

Robert