Evolution of French infantry tactics

[phil andrade]

The statistics of the reichsarchiv, which were made available to Churchill's research assistant while the World Crisis was being written, provide startling evidence of the relative effectiveness of the Franco- British armies. In the last 6 months of 1916, the French inflicted on the Germans a total loss, in killed and missing only, of 145,295. In the same period, July to December 1916, the French themselves lost 144,000 in the same category. For the first time, after virtually two years of war, the French succeeded in inflicting a higher loss in killed and prisoners than they themselves sustained.

In the same period, the British on the Western Front lost 125,000 killed and missing, while inflicting a loss of 81,968 killed or prisoners on the Germans : a ratio of better than 3:2 in Germany's favour. I have selected the categories of killed and missing only, because there is controversy about the criteria that were used to count the wounded, who comprised the bulk of the casualties. For the entire year of 1917, the French counted 145,000 killed and missing, and succeeded in killing or capturing 152,750 Germans. The British lost 185,000 killed or captured, against a German loss of 172,030 killed or missing. The improvement in the British exchange rate was remarkable, but the French still retained the edge. In the defensive phase of 1918, i.e. the first six months, the British proved far more successful than the French - an interesting change, and a very marked one, with the French losing twice as many killed and missing as the Germans who opposed them, while the British lost 5 for every 4 Germans : here it must be emphasised that a huge loss of prisoners inflated the Anglo-French totals....in terms of killed, the British inflicted much heavier loss than they sustained. The situation changed dramatically thereafter, with the French inflicting roughly double, and the British three times, the loss in killed and prisoners that they themselves suffered. This is a momentous difference, but it is the British case that is particularly spectacular. I cannot resist the temptation to suggest that in both cases there was a two year "learning curve" - that horrid phrase again - that was at work : for the French, July 1916 marked the sea change two years after the catastrophe of August 1914, for the British, July 1918 was the breakthrough two years after the disaster of July 1st 1916.

These figures, are, of course, innately contentious; we have to be careful and circumspect....but the message they convey is too stark to be ignored.

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

Fayolle, I have heard it said, had grasped the concept of the "all arms battle" ( excluding tanks, of course) and put it into practice in Picardy a couple of years before the British.

Phil, this would be surprising. Fayolle was a gunner, so it was to be expected that he paid careful attention to the integration of artillery with infantry attacks. In the absence of tanks, then 'all arms' would refer to combined infantry/artillery/cavalry and aircraft. I am not aware that Fayolle achieved this in 1915.

Robert

[phil andrade]

This was definitely the theme of the talk, Robert, although I must point out that the speaker was alluding to the Somme battles of July-November 1916 : no mention of 1915. It is for me to try and find my old notes, so that I can authenticate and elaborate on the arguments that he presented : maybe I'll be able to find the name of the speaker.

Phil

[bmac]

Was it Elizabeth Greenhalgh? She did a presentation at the Somme Conference in 2006 and France is 'her thing' (I was there as well and bl**dy hot it was too!!).

[Paul Hederer]

A discussion of tactics and their evolution during the war always draws me like a moth to the flame.

There is always to some degree a gap between theory and practice, and a lag in the dissemination and acceptance of any new idea or procedure. It applies when trying to get everyone in the office to use the new copy machines correctly, and it sure applies to the application of new tactics on the battlefield.

I think the study of tactical innovation is important in a real way—it shows the manner in which the various armies learned, digested, distilled, and disseminated battle experience and then trained their organisations in the lessons of combat—it is in a true sense a real measure of their efficiency.

I wonder if tactical change (in any army) during the war was truly innovative, incremental, or in many cases simply a more thorough application of many pre-war tactical concepts necessitated by the conditions of position warfare? Hans von Seekt, who is credited with the German victory at Soissons, wrote something I think worth considering. After the victory he was asked to explain the methods he had used to deliver victory. He writes with his usual dry wit about how he was pestered to write paper after paper on the subject. How did he do it? As he puts it, it was simply the effective application of sound pre-war procedures—nothing new at all. He derived real amusement out of the emphasis put on his “new” methods. I’ve seen his methods and the battle described as “critical in shaping all future German attacks in trench warfare.”

Just some thoughts.

Paul

[phil andrade]

Was it Elizabeth Greenhalgh? She did a presentation at the Somme Conference in 2006 and France is 'her thing' (I was there as well and bl**dy hot it was too!!).

No, it wasn't her. I do remember her talking, though, and IIRC she dealt with the rivalries and resentments between Fayolle, Foch and Joffre, and how their respective assessments of the importance of the Somme vs.Verdun impinged on the planning and progress of the Somme Offensive. No, this was a guy who spoke about the highly effective French tactics, and he repeated the phrase "all arms battle" often enough for it to stick in my memory.

Yes, it was damned hot, wasn't it ?

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

... spoke about the highly effective French tactics, and he repeated the phrase "all arms battle"

Phil, thanks for clarifying the dates. I'm afraid that 'all arms battle' does not describe Fayolle's approach to July 1st 1916. There is no problem with the point that Fayolle planned a thorough artillery campaign in support of the infantry attack. As Bill rightly noted, there were some important tactical innovations within the infantry attack too. I have provided details elsewhere, however, of the poor planning for the cavalry involvement. Fayolle's plans did not match Haig's in the regard, for example.

I have not studied the role of the French air forces in any detail, so cannot comment on this aspect.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Phil, thanks for clarifying the dates. I'm afraid that 'all arms battle' does not describe Fayolle's approach to July 1st 1916. There is no problem with the point that Fayolle planned a thorough artillery campaign in support of the infantry attack. As Bill rightly noted, there were some important tactical innovations within the infantry attack too. I have provided details elsewhere, however, of the poor planning for the cavalry involvement. Fayolle's plans did not match Haig's in the regard, for example.

I have not studied the role of the French air forces in any detail, so cannot comment on this aspect.

Robert

You know how it is, Robert.... here I am, pontificating about something without recourse to a proper reference : I doubt whether I'll find those notes ....but I promise that there was strong and repeated emphasis on Fayolle bringing something special to his battle, and the "all arms" aspect was stressed.

Perhaps Bill will remember : he and I were both there, as was Jack Sheldon, and surely other pals.

Forgive me if I've got this all wrong. At least those casualty statistics that I lifted from the relevant appendix in Churchill's history can be cited to some effect.

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, I doubt you have got it wrong. The problem may be that many commentators do not study 'all arms' when reviewing actions or battles.

Robert

[bmac]

I have provided details elsewhere, however, of the poor planning for the cavalry involvement. Fayolle's plans did not match Haig's in the regard, for example.

Robert,

Can you point me towards this. I ask as I am perplexed as to what cavalry involvement there could have been in Fayolle's plan as, the way I read it, the operation was based on a methodical step by step approach which, in any case, was limited south of the river by the bend in the Somme west of Peronne. There does not seem much scope for cavalry on the Flaucourt plateau. North of the river Fayolle seems, for good reasons, to have concluded that the French advance had to be in tandem with the eastward progress from Montauban towards Guillemont and then Combles and, again, I'm not sure I see where cavalry would play a part. Would be interested to have this explained.

As to aircraft, apart from the ability to call on artillery at immediate notice to fire on 'now firing' German guns there seems to have been a far shorter communication system on the day itself between areas where messages were dropped and the relevant HQ. French Brigade and Divisonal HQs, which themselves had far greater control over guns attached specifically to them, appear to me to have been much nearer the front than their British equivalents and the time delay between the dropping of messages and their being acted on was far shorter. Anyway, in the case of the BEF they had to be sent to the Corps artillery commanders as, in most cases, they retained greater control of the available batteries. The whole managment of the French artillery was much more devolved, more flexible and responsive than is apparent from my readings of the British artillery war diaries.

There was, however, an issue about the weather which worked against both the RFC and the French aircraft north of the Somme throughout the period of the preliminary and intense bombardment and the opening of the attack. There was a lot of fog in late June and in the morning of 1st July. It cleared in time for the French bombardment south of the Somme to be effectively monitored but it made aerial observation north of the river difficult to impossible until after the attack had started. I have yet to see, though, any accounts of French aircraft being used to strafe German trenches or columns in any meaningful way and they were still mainly being used for contact patrols, artillery observation and to report on the progress of the infantry.

Bill

[Robert Dunlop]

Would be interested to have this explained.

Certainly, Bill. I will track the material down for you.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Bill, the post here contains some of the information, as well as links to some of the other posts. There is a little more material just down from the link.

Robert

PS: As an aside, my copy of Général Bouillaire's "Historique de 2e Corps du Cavalerie du 1er Octobre 1914 au 1er Janvier 1919", which was one of the sources that I quoted from, is very special. It was signed personally by Bouillaire.

[Robert Dunlop]

I have yet to see, though, any accounts of French aircraft being used to strafe German trenches or columns in any meaningful way and they were still mainly being used for contact patrols, artillery observation and to report on the progress of the infantry.

Bill, this is my impression too. It hasn't been possible to study detailed accounts of French pilots, or related sources, though.

Robert

[bmac]

Unfortunately a large proportion of escadrille war diaries seem no longer to exist. I have accessed those that do but have not yet translated the majority. One intriguing element which I had not heard of was their use for landing and retrieving spies in German held territory. Given the nature of the equipment in use this sounds like a particularly hairy exercise.

Thanks for the link will read and inwardly digest.

Bill

[Robert Dunlop]

RFC pilots were assigned similar tasks but hated these missions.

Robert

[salesie]

Hi salesie,

Unfortunately I don't quite get your point. If there are factors above the levels of tactics that shape and determine the overall outcome of battles how and why does it then follow (just from a standpoint of logic) that one side might not have enjoyed a tactical edge (at certain places and times) ?

And just to put my interest into perspective: I think that the development of infantry tactics in the period 1914 to 1918 is highly relevant as it was a period of transition towards what can be very broadly described as 'modern usage'. So I think that the question exactly how that happened (on a national and a comparative level) quite interesting and that is not linked to any discussion about superiority per se.

regards

Latze

I would suggest, Latze, that you may not get my point because I'm not making the point you imagine I am. For example, I've never denied that any one side ever enjoyed a tactical edge at certain times and places in WW1 - but I have said that any such tactical edge was highly localised and/or extremely short lived, and that any such short-lived tactical-edge in 1914 was not due to any individual army having overall better tactics to hand and/or better pre-war training, otherwise the military stalemate would not have ensued for four long bloody years as it did (in line with your assertion that no tactical edge in WW1 was ever decisive).

I take your point about learning from the past in order to understand the present, but how does an in-depth tactical study of WW1 teach us too much about the fighting and winning/losing of total-war? It seems to me that all this tactical talk and analysis focuses on but one factor of the multiple factors required to be victorious in total-war i.e. is it not a fact that the tactical level is in reality the least important factor in the winning/losing of total-war? For perhaps a better example of how tactics alone can be misleading when trying to understand total-war, let's leave the stalemate of WW1 and look at a later war - in 1940, the German Army could easily be described as far superior tactically in comparison with the British and French armies (after all, the French army collapsed totally and the BEF almost did, and certainly would have done without Dunkirk). But we all know, despite this all-conquering German tactical superiority (superiority of a magnitude never enjoyed by any army in WW1), that Germany still lost the 2nd war and lost it badly - why?

Do you not think that the end-result gives us massive clues as to what happened then and, therefore, what could happen today and in the future? Do you not think that by ignoring the end-result then a false picture may appear and thus affect our judgement about what to do now and in the future? If we truly wish to understand the transitional nature of WW1 then, in my opinion, the tactics employed by both sides need to be considered as a small cog in a bloody big gearbox, a small cog whose importance can be blown out of all proportion if studied in isolation and thus misses the relationship and inter-dependence with the other cogs, with the shafts, with the casing etc.

I've stated many times on this forum that in my opinion the German High Command never truly understood the total-war they fought in 1914-18, that they could not see beyond purely military solutions in the field to solve increasingly massive problems that were beyond purely military answers - that the allies secured victory because they didn't fight a purely military war; they had more than one truly strategic weapon at their disposal. And, in my opinion, there are plenty of highly knowledgeable WW1 tactical experts around who make exactly the same mistake as the German Generals (the de-facto rulers of Germany for most of the war) did i.e. they can't see beyond the armies and their tactics in the field.

I am definitely away for at least a week now - so continuing this will be a long drawn-out process.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

I wonder if tactical change (in any army) during the war was truly innovative, incremental, or in many cases simply a more thorough application of many pre-war tactical concepts necessitated by the conditions of position warfare?

Paul, an interesting point. There is a visible reminder: on my left 'Règlement de Manoeuvre d'Infanterie du Avril 1914' (issued by the War Ministry) - 187 pages long, covering tactics from squad to brigade and regiment levels; on my right 'Manuel du Chef de Section d'Infanterie. Édition de Janvier 1918' (issued by the Third Bureau of French GQG [GHQ]) - 512 pages, focused on platoon commanders.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

Paul, an interesting point. There is a visible reminder: on my left 'Règlement de Manoeuvre d'Infanterie du Avril 1914' (issued by the War Ministry) - 187 pages long, covering tactics from squad to brigade and regiment levels; on my right 'Manuel du Chef de Section d'Infanterie. Édition de Janvier 1918' (issued by the Third Bureau of French GQG [GHQ]) - 512 pages, focused on platoon commanders.

Robert

Robert,

An interesting example. The transition of the tactical unit downwards seems to have been universal, if developed to different degrees, in the different armies. I don't want to pull the topic away from French tactics (this is a great thread), but I would like to make an observation about German tactics, as it raises a question for me on the French. I find it interesting that the Germans, while empowering lower-level commanders more during the war, moved away from the freedom of form that was allowed tactical commanders in regards to the deployment and use of their troops. The pre-war debate on normaltaktik and normalangriff (standardised tactical procedures) shows that the concept of this standardisation was anathema to many German officers. Yet during the war this standardisation did occur to a large degree. This trend was not to be found only in the instructions and regulations, but also in command and control--I have an intresting article that discusses this, giving an example of the expansion of orders from the pre-war ideal of expressing the commanders concept to be acted upon by his subordinates to a later literal deluge of orders on tactical minutiae. So, I would like to ask did the French pre-war regulations reflect the same freedom of form and action for company level commanders as did the German? Does your example illustrate the same standardisation of procedures at the lower and lower level during the war on the part of the French?

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Paul, there is a definite trend towards more detailed standardisation of tactics at lower levels. Sections of the 1914 regulations were expanded from a page or two at most to whole chapters. Laure provides superb details of how the same process applied at the highest levels too. He was a Staff Officer in the 3ème Bureau, GQG. Laure's book is full of insights into how GQG collated information for reviews of tactics, then disseminated the new conclusions. One of the best examples relates to the German Spring offensives. Pétain almost despaired at trying to get his subordinate commanders to adopt more effective defensive tactics. There is clear evidence that Pétain wanted to respect the independence of his commanders, but by July he was totally frustrated that they kept trying to defend too close to the front line. Dûchenne's debacle during Operation Blücher-Yorck (May 27, 1918) was the last straw. Pétain paid very close attention to Gourard's defensive plans, and forced him to change his approach.

Robert

[Jack Sheldon]

Because of connection problems, my visits to the site have been sporadic for a few days. However, Robert asked the question about 'Moppers Up'. The Germans used the term Grabensaeuberer [trench cleaners] to describe this function, which rather adds weight to the fact that, confronted with the same set of circumstances and applying lessons learned, all three of the main Western Front beligerents tended over time to a uniformity of view over minor tactics.

I wonder if anyone can throw anything into the pot on French infantry-tank cooperation in 1918? All my Hachette says about it, is that, 'French tanks are smaller, lighter, but more manoeuverable than the tanks of our allies. Their tactics and role, therefore, are a little different.' It might have added that they were spectacularly dismal in performance, but instead points out that, ' ... the total cost per kilogram was between five and six francs' - which is an interesting way of expressing it. It sounds a bit like the British saying, 'Mark IVs? 'You don't get many of them to the pound'!

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks Jack,

I have several sources on French infantry-tank cooperation. Interestingly, there is nothing in the January 1918 manual for platoon commanders. Will check the others.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

Paul, there is a definite trend towards more detailed standardisation of tactics at lower levels. Sections of the 1914 regulations were expanded from a page or two at most to whole chapters. Laure provides superb details of how the same process applied at the highest levels too. He was a Staff Officer in the 3ème Bureau, GQG. Laure's book is full of insights into how GQG collated information for reviews of tactics, then disseminated the new conclusions. One of the best examples relates to the German Spring offensives. Pétain almost despaired at trying to get his subordinate commanders to adopt more effective defensive tactics. There is clear evidence that Pétain wanted to respect the independence of his commanders, but by July he was totally frustrated that they kept trying to defend too close to the front line. Dûchenne's debacle during Operation Blücher-Yorck (May 27, 1918) was the last straw. Pétain paid very close attention to Gourard's defensive plans, and forced him to change his approach.

Robert

Robert,

Thank you for the detailed and informative response. The French Army has actually become more of an interest to me as my studies of the German progress, so I'm enjoying this thread very much.

Best Regards,

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

I hope it will get more interesting when I quote the relevant sections of the April 1914 regulations

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Interestingly, there is nothing in the January 1918 manual for platoon commanders.

Jack, I got this wrong. My comment was based on a review of the chapter on the tactics of other arms, which included artillery, cavalry, engineers and the air force but not tanks. There is information in the section on infantry attacks against a position:

"IX. Special provisions relating to tanks.

59. When tanks are going to support an attack, the way they will be used in the proposed operation should be explained to the men.

Company commanders, platoon leaders and NCOs [les chefs des petites unités - the section is within the context of 'Combat de la compagnie', hence my inclusion of company commanders in the translation] should understand the following principles:

After a tank has cleared a trench ahead of the infantry, it will wait for the infantry to catch up before moving forward;

If a tank is surrounded by enemy infantry, our infantry must free it as quickly as possible, not only by counter-attacking but by firing machine guns, rifles and automatic rifles towards the tank without any fear of the bullets penetrating;

Any success by a tank must be exploited immediately by the infantry."

I have reviewed Laure's work on GQG. There was intense interest in the Battle of Cambrai. GQG analysed the details. More information to follow.

Robert

[Latze]

Hi salesie,

I take your point about learning from the past in order to understand the present, but how does an in-depth tactical study of WW1 teach us too much about the fighting and winning/losing of total-war? It seems to me that all this tactical talk and analysis focuses on but one factor of the multiple factors required to be victorious in total-war i.e. is it not a fact that the tactical level is in reality the least important factor in the winning/losing of total-war? For perhaps a better example of how tactics alone can be misleading when trying to understand total-war, let's leave the stalemate of WW1 and look at a later war - in 1940, the German Army could easily be described as far superior tactically in comparison with the British and French armies (after all, the French army collapsed totally and the BEF almost did, and certainly would have done without Dunkirk). But we all know, despite this all-conquering German tactical superiority (superiority of a magnitude never enjoyed by any army in WW1), that Germany still lost the 2nd war and lost it badly - why?

I certainly have no intention of fighting a total war so I think the question how these are won and lost is not really on my mind. Seriously: I have the impression that you are framing the question in a way that has nothing to do with what my intention in starting the thread was. I like to quote Paul:

I think the study of tactical innovation is important in a real way—it shows the manner in which the various armies learned, digested, distilled, and disseminated battle experience and then trained their organisations in the lessons of combat—it is in a true sense a real measure of their efficiency.

This very much sums up my point of view.

Your question about the 2nd World War is rhetorical, right?

regards

Latze